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Abstract		In	2014	 the	Ebola	virus	entered	Sierra	Leone,	 soon	 to	become	 the	epicentre	of	a	global	health	crisis.	A	state	of	emergency	was	declared,	propped	up	by	a	large-scale	and	 far-reaching	 humanitarian	 intervention;	 characterised	 by	 stringent	bureaucratic	 and	 biomedical	 protocols,	 restrictions	 on	 social	 and	 economic	 life,	and	 novel	 monetary	 flows.	 Based	 on	 17	 months	 of	 ethnographic	 fieldwork	 in	Freetown,	 Sierra	 Leone’s	 capital,	 immediately	 before	 and	 during	 the	 state	 of	emergency,	the	thesis	presents	an	intimate	account	of	the	lives	and	social	worlds	of	young	men	living	in	an	urban	neighbourhood.	The	thesis	outlines	the	centrality	of	the	domestic	sphere	–	home,	neighbourhood,	and	family	–	in	young	men’s	projects	of	 coming	 of	 age,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 surviving	 and	 brokering	 ‘crisis’	 and	 foreign	intervention.	Rather	than	‘crisis’	halting	the	processes	of	social	reproduction,	such	processes	 became	 central	means	 through	which	 a	 conflict	 between	 ‘foreign’	 and	‘local’	expectations	–	brought	to	the	fore	by	external	intervention	–	was	reconciled	and	negotiated.	 The	 thesis	 demonstrates	 how	a	 political	 economy	of	 crisis	maps	onto	core	social	tensions	between	independence	and	dependence	that	young	men	ambiguously	 negotiate	 around	 the	 home,	 and	 how	 resultant	 social	 practices	 and	understandings	 connect	 to	 Freetown’s	 deeper	 and	 more	 recent	 histories	 of	intervention,	crisis,	and	entanglement	with	the	Atlantic	World.		
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Prologue.	Two	taxis		It	was	May	24th,	2015.	I	was	packing	my	bags	in	the	front	room	of	a	friend’s	house	in	 Streatham,	where	 I	 had	 been	 staying	 for	 the	 past	 6	months,	 getting	 ready	 to	return	to	Freetown,	Sierra	Leone,	which	I	had	left	after	11	of	a	planned	18	months	of	 ethnographic	 fieldwork	 due	 to	 unforeseen	 circumstances:	 the	 West	 African	Ebola	virus	outbreak,	of	which	Sierra	Leone	was	an	epicentre.	Leaving	the	country	was	 getting	 harder,	 and	 the	 virus	 was	 projected	 to	 spread	 from	 the	 east	 of	 the	country	to	the	capital.	Thankfully	the	virus	did	not	explode	in	the	capital	city	to	the	extent	 some	 had	 anticipated.	 In	 the	 neighbourhood	 where	 I	 was	 based,	 Congo	Town	 –	 also	my	 primary	 fieldsite	 –	 a	 couple	 of	 cases	were	 identified,	 leading	 to	several	 homes	 being	 quarantined,	 but	 the	 virus	 did	 not	 spread	 and	 even	 those	diagnoses	were	 questioned.	 The	 state	 of	 emergency	was	 still	 in	 place,	 but	 it	 felt	safe	to	return	for	a	final	6	months	of	fieldwork.	I	was	both	apprehensive	and	eager	to	get	back.		The	underground	line	I	had	intended	to	use	to	get	to	the	airport	was	experiencing	severe	delays.	Concerned	that	I	would	miss	my	flight,	I	decided	to	order	an	Uber	–	my	 first	 time	using	 the	 taxi	 smartphone	 app.	Moments	 later	 a	 spotless	black	 car	arrived,	 the	 inside	of	which	was	overpowered	by	 the	 smell	 of	 air-freshener.	The	driver,	Mohammed,	was	a	Sierra	Leonean	man	in	his	late	20s	or	early	30s,	who	had	been	living	in	the	UK	for	the	past	six	or	seven	years.	We	spoke	in	Krio	–	the	lingua	franca	 of	 Sierra	 Leone	 –	 about	 Freetown,	 the	 Ebola	 crisis,	 and	 the	 unfolding	political	 drama	 after	 the	 sacking	 of	 the	 country’s	 vice-president	 earlier	 in	 the	month.	 Mohammed	 wondered	 if	 I	 was	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Sierra	 Leone	 Lebanese	community,	 or	 a	medical	worker.	 I	 explained	 that	 I	was	 an	 anthropologist.	Most	years,	he	said,	he	returned	during	the	festive	season,	around	December,	when	he	would	 earn	 the	 nickname	 ‘JC’	 (just	 come),	 given	 to	 visiting	 diasporic	 Sierra	Leoneans.	Driving	was	a	way	of	paying	the	bills,	albeit	a	somewhat	risky	 form	of	the	 ‘gig	 economy’	 work	 exemplified	 by	 Uber	 employment.	 Mohammed	 had	 also	been	studying	law,	and	was	planning	on	getting	married	over	the	summer.	He	told	me	that	he	missed	his	home	country,	even	though	it	was	a	tough	place,	and	that	he	hoped	to	go	back	one	day	after	he	had	established	himself	a	little	more.		
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Driving	around	with	Sierra	Leonean	 taxi	drivers	was	 a	 familiar	 activity	 for	me.	 I	had	 accompanied	 drivers	 in	 Freetown	 on	 countless	 occasions	 as	 part	 of	 my	research	 project,	 which	 –	 although	 it	 had	 since	 shifted	 direction	 (see	 below)	 –	initially	 centred	on	young	 taxi	drivers.	 I	 had	been	 taught	 to	drive	by	Alhassan,	 a	taxi	 driver	 from	 Congo	 Town,	 who	 also	 helped	 me	 obtain	 a	 license,	 and	 I	sometimes	 even	 drove	 his	 and	 others’	 cars	 commercially.	 My	 journey	 with	Mohammed	thus	felt	at	once	novel	and	strangely	familiar.	As	we	were	arriving	at	the	airport,	my	mind	was	 cast	back	 to	a	day	 I	had	 spent	with	a	driver	 and	 close	friend	who	went	by	 the	name	of	Human	Right,	 shortly	before	 I	had	 left	 the	 field.	These	two	journeys	were	in	many	ways	mirror	images	of	each	other.		My	 ride	with	Human	Right	was	 in	 a	beat-up	Nissan	 from	 the	 ‘90s,	which	he	had	recently	acquired	cheaply	–	 reflecting	 its	poor	condition	–	with	money,	yet	 to	be	repaid,	 from	 an	 esusu	 (rotating	 credit	 association)	 operated	 by	 his	 mother	 and	involving	 fellow	 female	 church	 members.	 We	 had	 to	 make	 several	 improvised	repairs	 during	 the	day,	 and	 since	 the	 battery	was	 flat,	we	 relied	 on	 surrounding	volunteers	to	help	me	push	the	car	while	Human	Right	used	the	momentum	to	‘jog’	the	engine	into	life.	At	one	point,	we	visited	a	mechanic	who	advised	Human	Right	to	replace	the	brake	pads	because	the	tyres	were	overheating.	He	reluctantly	went	ahead	with	this	suggestion,	explaining	in	philosophical	vein,	‘in	maths	there	is	only	one	answer,	but	it	is	not	a	real	answer’.	He	had	hoped	the	car	would	be	the	first	in	a	small	 fleet	 of	 taxis	 and	poda	poda	 (minibus	 taxis)	 that	would	 take	his	 life	 to	 the	‘next	level’,	but	the	car	seemed	to	be	pushing	him	the	opposite	way.			Human	Right	was	 famous	 (and	 infamous)	 among	 taxi	 owners	 and	 fellow	drivers	for	his	driving	style.	It	 involved	weaving	at	speed	through	improbably	small	gaps	in	the	traffic,	relying	on	oncoming	drivers	to	‘chicken	out’	at	the	last	mini-second,	and	taking	mountainous	‘short	cuts’	that	resembled	rocky	river	beds	–	and	during	the	rainy	season	were	precisely	that.	He	worked	with	a	sense	of	‘magical	thinking’	in	which	the	limitations	of	space	and	time,	and	lack	of	fuel	in	the	tank	and	available	funds,	 were	 never	 objective	 obstacles.	 To	 date,	 he	 had	 never	 had	 an	 accident.	Human	 Right’s	 working	 days	 included	 stopping	 by	 his	 parents’	 new	 home	 in	 a	remote	 area	 of	 the	 mountains	 –	 which	 was	 being	 increasingly	 populated	 in	
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response	 to	 overcrowding	 in	 town	 –	 as	 well	 as	 visits	 to	 his	 friends	 and	 his	girlfriend,	 Ramatu.	 When	 Human	 Right	 was	 driving,	 he	 seemed	 happy;	 he	 had	money	in	his	hand	from	the	day’s	passengers,	which	he	would	spend	generously	at	road-side	 food	 stalls	 and	makeshift	 bars.	 He	 could	 express	 himself	 on	 the	 road,	while	doing	favours	for	friends	and	family,	in	which	he	took	a	great	deal	of	pride.			On	 this	occasion,	 things	were	different.	As	 the	evening	progressed,	 the	streets	of	the	 East	 End	 of	 Freetown	 –	 normally	 lively	 at	 night,	 with	 small	 crowds	 on	 the	corner	of	every	junction	–	were	empty.	The	state	of	emergency,	recently	declared	to	 contain	 the	 spread	 of	 the	 Ebola	 virus	 outbreak	 earlier	 in	 the	 year,	 included	bylaws	 that	 affected	 taxi	 drivers	 significantly.	 Business	 activity	 was	 prohibited	after	6pm	each	day,	and	taxis	could	accommodate	only	two	customers	in	the	rear	seats	 rather	 than	 three,	 a	 measure	 intended	 to	 reduce	 bodily	 contact.	 To	 make	matters	 worse,	 Ramatu	 had	 recently	 been	 publicly	 spending	 time	 with	 other	partners,	signifying	a	break,	or	at	least	a	serious	set-back,	in	her	relationship	with	Human	Right.	He	 commented	 bitterly	 on	 how	hard	 it	 is	 to	 find	 a	 girlfriend	with	patience	to	build	a	foundation	with	a	poor	man	like	himself	in	Freetown:	‘there	is	too	much	money	love’.	At	times	like	this,	Human	Right	resented	his	now	crippled	father,	 who	 had	 once	 held	 a	 good	 job	 working	 for	 an	 international	 shipping	company,	but	had	–	 in	Human	Right’s	view	–	squandered	 it	on	a	 lifestyle	beyond	his	means.	Shortly	after	the	end	of	the	civil	war,	in	the	early	2000s,	Uria	Bangura	(as	Human	Right	was	then	known)	had	been	forced	to	leave	school	and	take	to	the	streets	to	work	as	an	apprentice	on	a	poda	poda.			The	 virus	 had	 not	 reached	 Freetown	 yet,	 but	 there	 was	 a	 familiar	 sense	 of	foreboding;	the	civil	war	had	emerged	from	the	same	borderland	region	in	the	east	of	the	country,	spilling	over	from	Liberia	and	eventually	reaching	the	capital	with	devastating	effect.	 In	 this	case,	 the	 threat	had	crossed	 from	Guinea.	We	drove	by	the	 hospital	 where	 Human	 Right	 had,	 on	 that	 occasion,	 taken	 refuge	 with	 his	parents	 and	 siblings	when	 the	 rebels	 entered	Freetown	and	British	bombs	were	falling	 from	 the	 skies	 –	 a	 dark	 episode	 in	 the	 city’s	 recent	 past	 that	 was	 rarely	talked	about.		
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By	 now	 it	was	 close	 to	midnight	 and	 the	 light	 drizzle	 had	 gradually	 turned	 into	rain.	We	were	crossing	over	from	the	East	End,	where	Human	Right’s	parents	lived	and	he	spent	many	of	his	days,	back	to	Congo	Town	in	the	more	established	west,	which	had	become	Human	Right’s	adopted	neighbourhood	in	recent	years.	He	was	staying	with	a	friend	there,	another	young	man,	who	was	formally	his	‘apprentice’	but	who	was	also	hosting	him	in	a	room	near	his	family	compound,	making	Human	Right’s	 relative	 seniority	 somewhat	unstable.	Human	Right	became	 connected	 to	the	neighbourhood	through	driving	work	he	had	done	 for	various	 taxi	owners	 in	the	area.			We	arrived	at	a	highway	police	checkpoint,	which	comprised	a	makeshift	rope	that	was	suspended	in	front	of	oncoming	vehicles.	The	police	officer	identified	various	problems	 with	 Human	 Right’s	 car,	 and	 pointed	 out	 in	 addition	 that	 it	 was	irresponsible	to	be	out	driving	late	in	this	time	of	Ebola,	as	if	the	virus	was	a	beast	that	came	out	at	night.	In	what	sounded	like	a	line	from	a	dialogue	performed	by	fatigued	actors	grown	bored	with	the	script,	he	threatened	to	take	Human	Right	to	the	 local	police	 station,	 after	which	he	accepted	a	bribe.	This	 routine	was	all	 too	familiar,	but	this	time	the	payment	was	double	the	usual.			Despite	this,	Human	Right	remained	generally	positive.	The	weather	was	drying	up	from	the	rainy	season,	which	he	and	others	had	been	led	to	believe	would	halt	the	spread	of	the	virus.	When	he	thought	about	the	future	his	mind	appeared	to	travel	through	space,	 in	converse	proportion	to	the	way	that	his	past	and	present	were	limited	by	the	streets	of	Freetown	he	navigated	every	day.	Like	many	young	men	in	Freetown,	he	dreamt	and	speculated	about	the	world	overseas,	particularly	what	were	known	as	‘white	man	countries’.	Human	Right	was	particularly	preoccupied	with	 an	 uncle	 in	 Canada.	 For	 the	 entire	 time	 I	 knew	 him,	 he	was	 expecting	 and	praying	 that	 this	 uncle	 would	 send	 money	 to	 his	 family,	 which	 he	 hoped	 they	would	pool	together	to	buy	him	a	brand	new	poda	poda	from	Conakry,	Guinea.	This	was	an	interesting	counterpoint	to	the	way	that	Mohammed,	likewise	an	informal	worker	in	a	zero-hours	‘gig	economy’	contract	in	the	metropole,	seemed	fixated	on	the	world	he	had	left	behind	and	his	projected	return	to	it.			
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Human	Right	and	most	of	his	peers	were	unable	 to	get	 there,	but	 the	 ‘foreign’	or	‘white’	 world	 on	 which	 they	 were	 fixated	 was	 about	 to	 become	 an	 immanent	reality	 here.	 In	 the	 next	 few	 months,	 an	 extensive	 humanitarian	 intervention	comprising	 scores	 of	 international	 bodies	 and	 authorities	 was	 to	 descend	 on	Freetown,	 attaching	 itself	 to	 existing	 state	 structures	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	National	Ebola	Response	Centre	which	governed	the	state	of	emergency	and	 formal	Ebola	response.	This	created	severe	restrictions	on	many	aspects	of	social	life	in	the	form	of	 a	 host	 of	 far-reaching,	 often	 onerous	 regulations	 and	 protocols,	 informed	 by	bureaucratic	 and	 biomedical	 logics.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	many	 thousands	 of	 young	Sierra	 Leonean	 men	 and	 women	 mobilised	 in	 the	 Ebola	 response	 became	benefactors	of	the	money	and	materials	that	flowed	into	the	country.	Indeed,	these	actors	in	many	ways	became	the	‘face’	of	the	state	of	emergency,	and	redefined	in	their	own	terms	its	operations	and	objectives.	These	were	strange	times,	but,	as	I	gradually	 understood,	 what	 I	 was	 witnessing	 and	 hearing	 in	 Freetown	 were	familiar	 echoes	 –	 faint	 and	 loud,	 distorted	 and	 pitch-perfect,	 remembered	 and	forgotten	–	of	the	notes	of	transatlantic	slavery	and	return	cried	out	by	the	city’s	founding	mothers	 and	 fathers,	 and	 seemingly	 destined	 to	 be	 replayed	 over	 and	over.			
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Chapter	1.	Introduction		“It	 is	 a	 peculiar	 sensation,	 this	 double-consciousness,	 this	 sense	 of	 always	 looking	 at	 one’s	 self	through	the	eyes	of	others,	of	measuring	one’s	soul	by	the	tape	of	a	world	that	looks	on	in	amused	contempt	and	pity”.	W.E.B.	Du	Bois	1903	The	Souls	of	Black	Folk.			The	2014	Ebola	outbreak,	and	humanitarian	intervention,	positioned	Sierra	Leone	as	the	epicenter	of	a	global	health	crisis.	This	was,	in	some	ways,	a	familiar	place	to	be.	 The	 place	 of	 Sierra	 Leone	 in	 the	 popular	 Western	 imagination	 is	 one	 of	repeated	crisis.	As	 I	write	 this	 introduction	 in	 the	summer	of	2017,	Sierra	Leone	has	 re-entered	 the	 global	 news	 cycle	 after	 major	 flooding	 and	 a	 devastating	mudslide	 in	 Freetown.	 But	 what	 does	 ‘crisis’	 mean	 for	 young	 men	 like	 Human	Right	 –	 described	 in	 the	 prologue	 –	who,	 born	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 90s,	 have	 lived	their	whole	lives	through	a	series	of	what	are	considered	crises	and	interventions?			The	1980s	saw	a	severe	economic	downturn,	the	collapse	of	the	single-party	state	that	 had	been	 in	power	 for	 decades,	 and	 the	 implementation	of	 IMF-	 and	World	Bank-led	structural	adjustment	projects,	which	entailed	the	deconstruction	of	state	apparatus	 and	 severing	 of	 patrimonial	 networks	 in	 a	 bid	 for	 ‘clean	 governance’.	The	1990s	were	marked	by	a	decade	of	civil	unrest	and	war,	in	which	mostly	rural	youth	took	up	arms	against	the	severely	weakened	state.	The	post-war	years	have	seen	extensive	peace-building	and	humanitarian	initiatives,	while	the	economy	has	continued	 to	 informalise	 and	 stagnate.	 Relatively	 peaceful	 elections	 in	 2007	 and	2012,	 and	 a	 government	 that	 is	 well-versed	 in	 development	 and	 liberal	 state	discourses,	 mask	 an	 informal	 mode	 of	 statecraft	 and	 lack	 of	 essential	 services.	Freetown	has	grown	rapidly	 in	past	decades,	with	a	significant	bulge	 in	 its	youth	population,	but	urban	life	remains	precarious	for	many.			Taking	 into	 account	 the	 on-going	 nature	 of	 ‘crisis’	 in	 Africa,	 Vigh	 suggests	 that	‘rather	 than	 taking	 a	 traditional	 social	 science	 approach	 to	 the	 phenomenon,	 by	historically	placing	a	given	instance	of	crisis	 in	context,	I	propose	that	we	gain	an	insight	 into	 this	 key	 area	of	 anthropological	 research	by	 seeing	 crisis	as	context’	(Vigh	2008).	Yet	 if	crisis	has	become	the	norm,	 then	what	 is	crisis?	For	Roitman,	
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‘Crisis	 is	 claimed,	 but	 it	 remains	 a	 latency;	 it	 is	 never	 itself	 explained	 because	 it	allows	 for	 the	 further	 reduction	of	 “crisis”	 to	other	 elements,	 such	as	 capitalism,	the	 economy,	 politics,	 culture,	 and	 subjectivity’	 (Roitman	 2016:36).	 Her	 answer	entails	‘asking	questions	about	how	we	produce	significance	for	ourselves—about	how	we	produce	“history”’	(Ibid	48).			My	thesis	does	not	evade	the	problem	of	crisis	in	Africa,	but	tackles	it	head	on.	It	aims	 ethnographically	 and	 analytically	 to	 extend	 our	 knowledge	 of	 crisis,	interrogating	the	ways	in	which	residents	of	places	defined	by	 ‘crisis’	 inhabit,	act	in,	 and	 understand	 their	 world.	 	 The	 thesis	 centers	 on	 young	 men,	 but	 quickly	expands	 to	 the	 social	worlds	 around	 them.	What	 does	 ‘crisis’	mean	 for	 them?	 If	‘crisis’,	 as	 Roitman	 highlights,	 is	 so	 often	 about	 ‘us’	 and	 ‘our’	 narratives,	interventions,	 interests,	 and	 culturally	 specific	 standards,	 then	 where	 does	 that	leave	‘them’?	How,	if	at	all,	is	‘crisis’	shaped	according	to	‘their’	specifications,	and	what	are	they?			In	an	attempt	to	understand	the	lives	of	those	who	lived	through	and	around	this	history,	 my	 thesis	 takes	 as	 its	 starting	 point	 the	 most	 intimate	 and	 quotidian	realms:	everyday	life	around	the	home,	family,	and	neighbourhood.	This	‘domestic’	perspective	is	strikingly	absent	or	marginalized	in	scholarship	about	and	popular	renderings	 of	 male	 youth	 in	 Africa,	 yet	 in	 Freetown	 it	 is	 arguably	 the	 most	significant	arena	in	the	lives	of	young	men.	The	home	and	the	neighbourhood	are	primary	 spaces	 of	 sociality,	 livelihood	 procurement,	 recognition,	 and	 social	mobility	for	young	men,	but	they	are	also	ambiguous	spaces	fraught	with	dangers	and	social	tensions.			My	central	observation	is	that	young	men	in	Freetown	are	faced	with	a	perennial	tension	between	‘independence’	and	‘dependence’	 in	their	day-to-day	journeys	of	coming	of	age.	They	are	caught	between	desires,	on	the	one	hand,	to	escape,	work	outside	 of,	 and	 challenge	 social	 structures	 in	which	 they	 are	 junior	 or	marginal,	and,	on	 the	other,	 to	 further	embed	 themselves	 in	 these	 structures	as	a	mode	of	mobility	 itself,	 or,	 ironically,	 to	 further	 their	 anti-establishment	 tendencies.	 This	tension	is	a	near-universal	element	of	sociality	and	social	reproduction	–	‘should	I	
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stay	or	should	I	go?’	–	but	what	makes	it	significant	in	Freetown	is	how,	in	shifting	ways,	it	interacts	with	a	political	economy	of	‘crisis’	and	foreign	intervention.			Crisis,	 in	 Sierra	 Leone,	 has	 often	 entailed	 a	 return	 to	 the	 home	 and	 a	 greater	mutual	 reliance	 on	 intimate	 others.	 Conversely,	 crisis	 creates	 uncertainties	 and	change.	These	sow	the	seeds	of	the	processes	of	social	realignment	that	can	involve	either	enhanced	agency	for	young	people	or	further	marginalisation.	Connected	to	these	intimate	and	family	centred	negotiations	of	‘dependence’	and	‘independence’	are	larger-scale	conflicts	and	negotiations	between	opposing	models	and	visions	of	‘how	 to	 act’	 in	 crisis.	 These	 are	 informed	 both	 by	 national	 and	 international	debates	and	discourses,	and	by	local	racialised	codes	of	‘black’	and	‘white’	cultural	ways	of	doing.	For	example,	liberal	notions	of	human	rights	or	neoliberal	modes	of	consumption	 and	 entrepreneurship	 become	 models	 with	 which	 young	 men	articulate	 independence,	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 obligations	 of	 kinship,	 informal	economic	practice,	and	family	hierarchies	suggestive	of	dependence.			However,	 young	 men	 who	 have	 grown	 in	 an	 era	 of	 external	 interventions	 and	‘crisis’	often	work	alternately	and	simultaneously	with	multiple	visions	and	sets	of	social	 expectations.	 These	 they	 strategically	 mobilise	 within	 and	 around	 the	domestic	sphere,	as	well	as	beyond	it.	This	was	evidenced	during	the	Ebola	crisis,	when	 the	 performance	 of	 life	 course	 ritual	 and	 family	 formation	 were	 pressing	concerns	for	young	men,	as	well	as	key	arenas	in	which	social	tensions	of	the	crisis	were	 negotiated.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 young	 men,	 widely	 recruited	 by	 the	 official	Ebola	 response,	 became	 the	 face	 of	 a	 humanitarian	 intervention	 premised	 on	bureaucratic	and	biomedical	protocols.			The	 thesis	 contains	 two	 central,	 and	 interconnected,	 lines	 of	 argument.	 Firstly	 it	argues	for	a	re-examination	of	the	‘crisis	of	youth’	in	Africa.	The	thesis	outlines	the	non-linear,	 piecemeal,	 quotidian,	 and	 ambiguous	 ways	 that	 social	 mobility	 does	take	 place	 among	 young	 men	 in	 Freetown,	 presenting	 an	 alternative	 model	 of	social	 reproduction	 to	 that	 underscoring	 the	widespread	 notion	 of	 a	 generation	stuck	in	perennial	youth	in	Africa.		The	thesis	instead	identifies	a	kind	of	coming	of	age	predicated	on	necessarily	 ambiguous	means	 and	measures.	 	Rather	 than	 the	
	 19	
more	 overt	 markers	 and	 social	 reconfigurations	 traditionally	 ascribed	 to	 the	attainment	 of	 adulthood	 through	 a	 life-course	model	 of	 social	 reproduction,	 this	mode	 relies	 on	 everyday	 realigning	 of	 intimacies,	 particularly	 around	 the	 home	and	the	neighbourhood.	In	this	sphere,	the	registers	of	kinship	and	business,	family	and	 work,	 are	 closely	 entwined.	 The	 thesis	 therefore	 makes	 a	 case	 for	 the	centrality	 of	 family	 –	 understood	 in	 broad	 and	 novel	 ways	 –	 in	 the	 lives	 and	livelihoods	of	young	men	in	urban	Africa.		Secondly,	 the	 thesis	 interrogates	 the	 relationship	 between	 crisis	 and	 social	reproduction	 more	 generally,	 in	 which	 novel	 interpretations	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	‘crisis’	 are	 suggested.	 	 The	 central	 case	 study	 for	 this	 examination	 is	 the	 Ebola	crisis,	 in	 which	 the	 thesis	 presents	 a	 contrasting	 perspective	 to	 popular	 and	scholarly	assumptions	on	the	meanings	and	effects	of	crisis;	including	notably	the	assumptions	 underpinning	 much	 of	 the	 formal	 Ebola	 response,	 in	 which	 social	reproduction	was	viewed	as	something	that	could	be	put	‘on	hold’	until	the	spread	of	 the	 virus	 was	 curtailed.	 	 However,	 rather	 than	 the	 crisis	 causing	 social	reproduction	 to	 stall,	 instead	 it	 appeared	 to	 take	 place	 in	 accelerated	 rhythms,	according	 to	 both	 novel	 and	 yet	 also	 traditional	 forms,	 particularly	 around	 life-course	ritual	such	as	baby	naming	ceremonies,	marriages,	and	burials.	 	What	was	particularly	notable	about	this	was	the	ways	that	these	life-course	events	regained	potency	and	meaning	 for	young	men,	whose	coming	of	age,	as	mentioned	above,	had	been	much	more	centred	around	 the	 ‘everyday’	 than	 the	 ‘event’.	 	During	 the	Ebola	 crisis	 young	 men	 were	 in	 variety	 of	 ways	 central	 actors	 in	 family	 ritual,	which	marked	a	transition	from	ambiguity	towards	clarity	in	their	comings	of	age.				Running	through,	and	connecting,	these	two	major	lines	of	argument	is	a	strand	of	empirical	 attention	and	analysis	 that	 takes	 its	 lead	 from	economic	anthropology.	This	has	value	firstly	in	that	it	reflects	the	concerns	of	many	of	the	young	men	at	the	heart	of	 the	study,	 for	whom	business,	work,	money,	consumption,	exchange,	and	 theories	of	distribution	were	overtly	 core	 concerns	 in	 their	day-to-day	 lives.		Secondly,	this	approach	offers	a	powerful	analytical	way	of	connecting	the	macro	with	 the	micro;	 the	political	economy	of	crisis	with	 the	 intimate	experience	of	 it.	Thirdly,	 this	 approach	 contributes	 both	 to	 studies	 of	 youth	 in	 Africa	 as	 well	 as	
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global	health	studies	as	an	alternative	point	of	entry	to	much	scholarship	on	these	subjects.		In	 the	 following	 sections	 of	 the	 introduction,	 I	 erect	 some	 theoretical	 and	contextual	 scaffolding	 around	 which	 I	 will	 construct	 my	 thesis	 and	 lay	 out	 its	contributions.	 I	 start	 by	 examining	 the	 significant	 scholarly	 interest	 in	 youth	 in	Africa,	outlining	what	a	family-centred	account	brings	to	the	debate.	I	then	turn	to	the	 analysis	 of	 the	 Ebola	 crisis	 itself,	 showing	 how	 my	 ethnographic	 account	contributes	to	understandings	of	health	crisis	in	Africa	more	broadly.	In	the	third	section,	 I	discuss	 temporalities,	 rhythms	and	expectations	 in	Africa,	after	which	 I	provide	some	context	on	my	fieldsite,	including	a	historical	sketch	of	intervention	and	crisis.	Finally,	I	outline	my	personal	engagement.				
	
Figure	1	Map	of	Sierra	Leone	and	neighbouring	countries	in	West	Africa		
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Youth	in	Africa:	a	return	to	the	family			In	 recent	 decades,	 youth	 in	 Africa	 has	 become	 a	 major	 area	 of	 political	 and	scholarly	 concern	 and	 scholarship,	 as	 the	 divide	 between	 ‘adult’	 and	 ‘youth’	 has	been	 framed	 as	 a	 dominant	 social	 and	 political	 fault-line	 across	 the	 continent.	Cruise	 O’Brien’s	 formative	 (1996)	 essay,	 ‘A	Lost	 Generation?	 Youth	 Identity	 and	State	Decay	in	West	Africa’,	sets	the	terrain	for	much	of	the	scholarship	directed	at	this	 issue.	Neoliberal	 reforms	 –	 particularly	 the	 IMF	 and	World	 Blank	 structural	adjustment	programmes	in	the	1980s	and	90s,	which	aimed	at	stripping	down	the	state	 and	 cutting	 international	 aid	 –	 in	 effect	 strained	 and	 severed	 patrimonial	networks,	 blocking	 the	 dominant	 avenues	 for	 the	 distribution	 of	 resources	 on	which	 young	 people	 depended.	 As	 a	 result,	 there	 was	 a	 corresponding	 crisis	 of	social	 reproduction	–	or	 ‘crisis	of	youth’	–	 in	which	young	people	en	masse	were	unable	 to	 achieve	 social	 adulthood	 through	marriage	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	household,	 instead	 becoming	 stuck	 in	 the	 liminal	 category	 of	 ‘youth’	 (Cole	 and	Durham	2008,	Masquelier	2005)	The	Sierra	Leone	civil	war	and	its	aftermath	is	a	primary	 case	 study	of	 the	 violent	 potential	 of	 this	 political,	 economic,	 and	 social	reality	(Hoffman	2011,	Peters	2011,	Richards	1996).			So	how	have	youth	in	Africa	responded	to	their	predicament,	and	what	strategies	do	 they	employ	 to	attempt	mobility	when	all	avenues	of	progress	seem	blocked?	These	 questions	 are	 key	 in	 cross-disciplinary	 scholarship	 on	 the	 subject.	 Most	scholars	 frame	 youths	 as	 political	 and	 economic	 actors,	 highlighting	 their	combination	of	 ‘productive’	 and	 ‘destructive’	 potential	 (Abbink	 and	Kessel	 2004,	Honwana	 and	 de	 Boeck	 2005).	 Anthropologists	 have	 tended	 towards	 nuanced	accounts,	 examining	 the	 range	 of	ways	 that	 youth	 create	meaning	 in	 their	 lives,	pursue	 forms	 of	 social	 realignment,	 grapple	 with	 ‘presentist’	 and	 uncertain	temporal	 confines,	 and	 investigating	 the	 ways	 that	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘youth’	 is	socially	 and	 culturally	 constituted.	 Studies	 have	 focused	 on	 a	 variety	 of	 social	practices	 and	 arenas:	 religious	 practice	 (Engelke	 2010,	 Janson	 2013,	Masquelier	2007,	 Meyer	 2008),	 technology	 (Archambault	 2017,	 Gilbert	 2016),	 love	 and	 sex	(Cole	 and	 Thomas	 2009,	 Stasik	 2016),	 and	 consumption	 and	 popular	 culture	(Kringelbach	2013,	Newell	2011,	Trapido	2010,	Weiss	2009).		
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	Such	studies	reveal	several	important	findings	that	I	build	on	in	this	thesis.	Firstly,	the	understanding	that	 ‘youth’,	rather	than	being	a	universal	biological	age-based	category,	is	instead	a	social	category.		Thus	in	a	given	social	context,	the	biological	ages	 of	 those	 occupying	 the	 category	 of	 youth	 differs.	 And	 indeed,	 in	 the	 same	social	 context	 individuals	 can	 move	 in	 and	 out	 of	 the	 category	 in	 a	 non-linear	manner.	As	a	 social	 category	 then,	youth	gains	meaning	 in	a	given	social	 context	through	 its	 interaction	 with	 other	 social	 categories,	 such	 as	 religious	 affiliation,	gender,	 class,	 ethnicity,	 and	 race.	 	 These	 interactions	 are	most	 clearly	 observed	through	 an	 ethnographic	 lens	 that	 reveals	 how	 people	 in	 the	 course	 of	 social	interaction	 in	various	 social	 arenas	 come	 to	 take	on	markers	 and	experiences	of	age-based	status.			Therefore	while	anthropologists	and	other	social	scientists	often	consider	 ‘youth’	as	 an	 analytical	 category	 that	 can	be	 identified	 cross-culturally,	 its	meaning	 as	 a	social	 category	 is	 variable	 and	 contingent.	 	 In	 Sierra	 Leone,	 as	 in	 other	 contexts	across	the	continent,	the	majority	of	scholarship	on	youth	has	focussed	primarily	on	male	youth.	This	in	part	is	reflective	of	the	fact	that	in	this	context	the	term	is	primarily	used	to	refer	to	men,	typically	low	in	status	by	measures	of	educational	attainment	and	class.	There	is	also	an	underlying	assumption	in	much	scholarship	on	youth	that	attaining	adulthood	for	men	is	a	fundamentally	different,	and	often	more	elongated,	process	to	that	of	women.	For	men	it	 is	predicated	on	starting	a	family	and	household,	whereas	as	for	women	it	is	based	on	childbirth;	a	claim	that	this	 thesis	 somewhat	 complicates.	Gender	 categories	 are	understood	 to	 intersect	with	 age-based	 categories	 in	 other	 ways	 too;	 such	 as	 with	 expressions	 of	masculinity	 becoming	 entwined	with	 political,	 social,	 and	 cultural	 performances	and	understandings	of	‘youth’	for	rebel	fighters	during	the	Sierra	Leone	civil	war.		Many	of	 these	 fighters	were	uneducated	rural	young	men	and	children	(Hoffman	2011,	Peters	2011,	Richards	1996).		In	 my	 thesis	 I	 am	 largely	 concerned	 with	 the	 ways	 that	 economic-based	 social	categories,	 activities,	 relationship-types,	 and	 identities	 intersect	 with	 social	categories	of	age-based	status,	and	in	turn	with	gendered	categories.	In	this	regard	
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I	am	particularly	in	interested	in	different	types	of	work	–	formal	and	informal	–	as	well	 as	 practices	 of	 exchange	 and	 consumption.	 The	 primary	 arena	where	 these	interactions	 are	 observed	 in	 the	 thesis	 is	 the	 domestic,	 neighbourhood,	 and	familial	spheres,	which	paint	a	contrasting	picture	of	masculinity	to	that	of	studies	of	combatants	and	ex-combatants,	for	example,	in	Sierra	Leone.	This	is	one	where	traits	 traditionally	 associated	 with	 masculinity	 –	 as	 evidenced,	 for	 example,	 by	Human	 Right’s	 driving	 in	 the	 prologue,	 or	 in	 showy	 consumption	 practices	described	in	chapter	4,	or	through	participation	in	front-line	Ebola	response	work	in	burial	teams	described	in	chapters	5	and	7		–	are	balanced	and	reconciled	with	intimacies	 with	 other	 young	 men	 who	 co-inhabit	 each	 other’s	 spaces,	 and	expressions	 of	 care	 and	 support	 for	 sexual	 partners,	 family	 members,	 and	neighbours.				In	the	thesis,	age-based	status	is	never	fixed,	but	something	that	individuals	occupy	differentially	at	different	 times	and	 in	different	social	spheres	of	 their	 lives.	Such	movement	 between	 categories	 of	 youth	 and	 adulthood,	 and	 the	 on-going	negotiations	of	 status,	 are,	 I	 suggest,	more	defining	and	shared	characteristics	of	‘youth’	 than	 the	 stasis	 that	 the	 ‘crisis	 of	 youth’	 literature	 suggests.	 Therefore,	 I	mainly	use	the	analytical	term	‘young	men’	to	describe	my	primary	interlocutors,	most	of	whom	are	aged	between	their	late-teens	and	mid-thirties;	given	that	many	are	not	stably	identified	as	‘youth’	or	‘senior’	locally.		Young	women	are	also	part	of	this	research,	although	a	less	explicit	focus.	The	thesis	reveals	the	ways	that	young	women’s	attainment	of	 status,	while	not	being	predicated	on	 the	same	measures	and	expectations	of	young	men,	are	equally	piecemeal	and	everyday	processes	that	are	 not,	 as	 much	 literature	 suggests,	 predicated	 simply	 on	 childbirth;	 not	 least	because	child-birth	does	not	guarantee	social	motherhood	in	this	context.			One	of	the	major	contributions	of	this	thesis	to	the	study	of	 ‘youth’	 is	through	its	examination	of	the	ways	that	social	age-based	and	gender	categories	become	both	reinforced	 yet	 also	 reconfigured	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 crisis.	 	 The	 unexpected	conclusion	of	the	thesis	is	that	the	experience	of	a	crisis,	such	as	Ebola,	for	young	men	 and	women	does	not	 straightforwardly	 correspond	 to	 ‘crisis	 of	 youth’.	 	 For	example,	 formal	 recruitment	 of	 young	 men	 into	 burial	 teams	 –	 described	 in	
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chapters	 5	 and	 7	 –	 allowed	 for	 attainment	 of	 seniority	 through	 formal	 salaried	work	and	prominent	responsibilities	during	burial	rites	–	yet	equally	resulted	in	a	reinforcement	 of	 youthful	masculinity	 through	 flashy	 consumption	practices	 and	stigmatization	 as	 front-line	 responders	 to	 the	 Ebola	 virus.	 While	 women	 risked	extended	marginalization	 during	 the	 crisis	 through	 greater	 confinements	 to	 the	home	 that	 lockdowns,	 curfews,	 and	 quarantines	 entailed,	 in	 many	 instances	women	 were	 either	 employed	 in	 the	 Ebola	 response	 as	 medical	 or	 community	workers,	or	were	able	to	continue	informal	work	that	they	participated	in	–	such	as	market	 trading	 –	while	 state	 of	 emergency	 regulations	made	much	 ‘men’s	work’	more	challenging	to	perform.		Some	women,	such	as	Rachel,	described	in	chapter	6,	gained	 elevated	 bargaining	 positions	 within	 their	 family	 and	 among	 intimate	relations	during	this	period.			In	 the	 past	 decade,	 two	 dominant	 models	 of	 youth	mobility	 have	 emerged	 as	 a	focus	 for	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 scholarship.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘waithood’,	popularised	by	Alcinda	Honwana	 (2012),1	inspired	by	 the	 social	movements	 and	mass	uprisings	of	 the	Arab	Spring,	and	informed	by	 interviews	with	young,	often	educated,	Africans	from	across	the	continent.	The	second	is	Henrik	Vigh’s	(2006)	concept	of	 ‘social	navigation’,	 informed	by	research	among	male	youth	in	Guinea-Bissau	who	had	become	attached	to	violent	militia.	Vigh	was	concerned	in	part	to	explain	why	youth	so	readily	undertake	dangerous	risks	involving	violence.			These	two	models	are	opposed	in	at	least	two	major	ways:	their	characterisation	of	structure	 and	 their	 notion	 of	 agency.	 In	 ‘waithood’	 the	 social	 structure	 in	which	youth	 are	 situated	 is	 rigid	 and	 static.	 Meaningful	 mobility	 takes	 place	 through	
horizontal	mass	collective	action	(almost	a	form	of	Marxian	class-consciousness	/	revolution),	 through	 which	 new	 structures	 can	 be	 negotiated.	 Through	 ‘social	navigation’,	 the	 structure	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 young	 men’s	 social	 environment	 –	 is	constantly	in	motion	and	shifting.	All	available	escape	routes	from	marginalisation	entail,	 in	 one	way	 or	 another,	 the	 joining	 of	 vertical	 patrimonial	 networks.	 Both	models	 depict	 a	 desperate	 state	 in	 which	 diminishing	 resources	 and	 the																																																									1	‘Waithood’	is	similar	in	some	respects	to	Craig	Jeffrey’s	concept	of	‘timepass’	in		his	study	of	youth	in	India	(2010)	
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consequent	 increasing	 difficulty	 of	 escaping	 the	 category	 of	 ‘youth’,	 lead	 to	increasingly	drastic,	often	violent	measures.			With	a	few	notable	exceptions,	one	arena	is	strikingly	absent,	or	side-lined,	in	these	otherwise	 insightful	 models,	 and	 in	 other	 scholarship	 on	 youth.	 This	 is	 the	domestic	 sphere,	 which,	 when	 investigated,	 introduces	 a	 very	 different	perspective.	 While	 earlier	 studies	 of	 youth	 in	 Africa	 had	 positioned	 youth	 in	structures	 of	 kinship,	 household	 economies,	 and	 life-cycle	 ritual	 and	 exchange	(Evans-Pritchard	 1951,	 Fortes	 1949,	 Terray	 1975,	 Turner	 1967,	 MacCormack	1984,	McAllister	1985,	Meillassoux	1960),	this	aspect	has	been	neglected	in	recent	scholarly	 attention.	 Perhaps	 the	 focus	 on	 neoliberal	 political	 economy	 as	 a	 root	cause	of	the	‘crisis	of	youth’	led	to	a	propensity	to	situate	male	youth	primarily	in	the	public	sphere,	particularly	in	urban	settings.			However,	in	Sierra	Leone,	late	20th	century	processes	of	economic	informalisation	and	decline,	rapid	urbanization,	high	unemployment,	 the	straining	of	patrimonial	networks,	 and	de-industrialisation	–	which	have	 their	parallels	across	Africa	and	beyond	–	have	rendered	the	home	and	neighbourhood	as	arenas	of	great	political,	economic,	 and	 social	 significance	 for	 young	men.	My	 study,	 while	 sharing	many	interests	 with	 other	 anthropologists	 engaging	 with	 youth	 in	 Africa,	 situates	 my	subjects	primarily	in	their	neighbourhood,	family	and	home,	which,	I	suggest,	are	today	 primary	 spaces	 and	 arenas	where	 both	 coming	 of	 age	 and	 social	mobility	occurs.	 Following	 Johnson-Hanks’	 (2002)	 theory	 of	 ‘vital	 conjectures’	 –	 in	which	adulthood	 is	 achieved	 in	 sporadic	 bursts	 rather	 than	 progressing	 through	 set	stages	 with	 firm	 boundaries	 between	 statuses	 –	 my	 study	 emphasises	 the	piecemeal	and	 intermittent	character	of	 coming	of	age.	As	opposed	 to	 ‘waithood’	and	 ‘social	 navigation’,	 the	 most	 significant	 form	 of	 politics	 in	 which	 my	interlocutors	participated	was	neither	mass	collective	action,	nor	mobilisation	into	dangerous	fighting	groups	along	patrimonial	lines.	Instead	it	was	a	more	everyday,	relational	 form	 of	 micro-politics,	 in	 which	 a	 multitude	 of	 often	 proximate	 and	intertwined	social	relationships	and	expectations	were	carefully	managed.	In	this	arena,	young	people’s	desires	to	escape	or	rebel	against	the	social	structures	that	were	stacked	against	them	were	inseparable	from	working	within	them;	horizontal	
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and	vertical	networks	too	were	often	tightly	interwoven.	Young	people	themselves	had	a	high	degree	of	individual	agency	in	self-making,	short-term	mobility,	and	the	process	of	realigning	intimacies	–	often	themselves	utilising	ambiguity	as	strategy	–	which	were	 the	 primary	mechanism	of	mobility.	 Such	 realignments	 took	place	not	only	in	everyday	life	but	also	–	especially	during	the	Ebola	crisis	–	around	key	threshold	 moments,	 such	 as	 life	 course	 ritual,	 family	 ceremonies,	 and	 family	meetings,	which	often	followed	the	building	up	of	social	tensions,	or	crises,	such	as	death	or	illness.			My	interest	 is	thus	to	embark	on	a	re-exploration	of	the	 life	course	as	negotiated	through	domestic	and	familiar	structures.	What	makes	this	a	pressing	concern	in	my	 fieldsite	 is	 the	 meaningfulness	 today	 for	 young	 men	 in	 Freetown	 of	 the	structures	and	modes	that	enable	transformation	in	everyday	and	ritual	frames.	In	approaching	this	task,	I	chart	the	ways	that	large-scale	occurrences	and	forces	are	interpreted	 and	 configured	 around	 the	 home.	 In	 so	 doing,	 I	 build	 on	 notable	scholarship	in	a	variety	of	settings,	which	often	links	instabilities	around	the	home	to	violent	histories	and	the	spread	of	capitalism	(Das	2006,	Ferme	2001,	Geschiere	2000,	Han	2012,	Shaw	2002).	Such	interplay	between	family	and	broader	political	and	 economic	 structures	 is,	 of	 course,	 not	 new,	 even	 if	 there	 has	 been	 greater	permeability	between	these	arenas	today	(De	Boeck	2011,	Geschiere	2013).			What	makes	these	practices	meaningful	today	is	not	just	their	contemporary	form,	but	 how	 they	 relate	 to	 the	 particular	 history	 of	 Freetown.	 Practices	 around	 the	home,	flexible	understandings	of	kinship,	consumption	of	western	goods,	attitudes	to	dress,	and	high	degrees	of	formality	and	priority	attached	to	family	ceremonies	among	my	interlocutors,	most	of	whom	have	relatively	shallow	family	histories	in	the	 city,	 resemble	 and	 reconfigure	 earlier	 modes	 of	 sociality	 among	 its	 Krio	founders	 (mostly	 freed-slaves	 from	the	Americas),	and	 their	descendants.	This	 is	evident	 by	 comparing	 their	 styles	 and	 aspirations	 with	 those	 in	 Abner	 Cohen’s	(1981)	 study	 in	 the	 1970s,	 set	 in	 a	 very	 different	 social	milieu.	 Freetown	 youth	resemble	Cohen’s	 interlocutors	 in	 some	ways	more	 than	 they	 take	on	 from	 their	own	parents.			
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Before	exploring	 this	historical	background	 to	Freetown	and	Sierra	Leone,	 I	 look	first	at	two	key	thematic	areas	of	concern	in	the	thesis.	 In	both	of	these,	external	interventions	interplay	with	local	concerns	in	particular	and	revealing	ways.		
	
Ebola,	intimacy,	and	global	health		The	Ebola	virus	is	thought	to	have	entered	Sierra	Leone	from	neighbouring	Guinea	in	May	 2014,	 soon	 spreading	 from	 the	 East	 of	 the	 country	 to	 the	 capital.	 Sierra	Leone	became	one	of	the	three	countries	at	the	epicentre	of	a	global	health	crisis,	as	the	world	feared	that	this	virus	with	no	available	cure	would	continue	to	spread.	A	state	of	emergency	was	declared	in	June,	after	which	scores	of	humanitarian	and	international	organisations	were	mobilized,	becoming	attached	to	local	authorities	in	forming	the	National	Ebola	Response	Centre,	headed	by	the	minister	of	defence.	The	 scale	 of	 this	 intervention	 was	 unprecedentedly	 large	 and	 well-funded.	Ultimately,	4000	deaths	would	be	attributed	to	 the	virus.	While	most	people	had	no	 direct	 contact	 with	 it,	 ‘Ebola’	 was	 everywhere	 and	 unavoidable,	 not	 least	because	of	the	far-reaching	and	heavy-handed	character	of	the	state	of	emergency	and	humanitarian	intervention.			The	home,	and	family,	represented	in	many	ways	the	frontline	in	the	fight	against	Ebola.	For	example,	the	virus	was	transmitted	through	care	practices	towards	the	sick	 and	 the	 dead	 that	 are	 typically	 performed	 by	 intimate	 others	 around	 the	home.	Homes	were	subjected	to	an	array	of	regulations,	including	neighbourhood	lockdowns	 and	 quarantines,	 while	 life	 course	 ritual,	 particularly	 but	 not	 only	burials,	was	heavily	regulated	and	restricted.	The	shutting	of	schools	and	colleges,	daily	 curfews,	 restrictions	 on	 trade,	 travel	 and	 business	 activity,	 over-filling	 of	hospitals,	 along	 with	 a	 general	 economic	 downturn,	 rendered	 the	 home	 more	significant	than	ever	for	sustenance,	sanctuary,	and	survival.	At	the	same	time,	the	home	became	a	more	intense	site	of	danger,	of	which	Ebola	was	just	one.			The	anthropological	engagement	with	the	Ebola	outbreak	has	drawn	attention	to	the	 core	 social	 conflicts	 that	 emerged	 during	 the	 crisis:	 namely,	 the	 tension	between	 local	 beliefs	 and	 practices	 and	 those	 underlying	 the	 international	
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response	 (Fairhead	 2016,	 Richards	 2016).	 These	 tensions	 contributed	 to	 the	breakdown	or	continued	straining	of	multiple	 forms	of	 ‘trust’:	between	state	and	citizens,	 between	 medical	 workers	 and	 local	 practitioners,	 and	 within	 local	communities	 and	 families	 (Anoko	 2014,	 Brown	 2016,	Martineau,	Wilkinson	 and	Parker	 2017,	 Shepler	 2017,	 Wilkinson	 and	 Fairhead	 2017).	 The	 international	response	 was	 working	 with	 a	 set	 of	 assumptions	 and	 priorities	 that	 were	fundamentally	different	from	what	happened	on	the	ground;	it	was	also	tainted	by	a	 complex	 history	 and	 an	 unstable	 state	 structure,	which	 together	 compromised	the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 formal	 response	 in	 defeating	 the	 virus,	 and	 introduced	additional	problems.	The	anthropological	interest	in	Ebola	has	not	remained	solely	in	 the	 academic	 arena,	 but	 is	 bound	 up	 in	 the	 extensive	 engagement	 between	humanitarian	organisations	and	social	scientists	during	the	outbreak.			My	 thesis	 attempts	 to	make	 ethnographic	 sense	of	 how	 such	 social	 conflicts	 and	tensions	played	out	on	the	ground	and	were	conceived	locally.	My	interest	extends	beyond	 the	 small	minority	who	were	 caught	up	with	 the	virus	 itself	 –	 they	have	been	 given	 considerable	 scholarly	 attention	 –	 to	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 those	who	lived	 through	 the	 crisis.	 I	 am	 also	 concerned	 in	my	 thesis	with	making	 sense	 of	how	these	 tensions	and	mistrust	can	be	reconciled	with	 the	significant	degree	of	co-operation,	compromise	and	negotiation	that	were	in	play	during	the	crisis.	This	question	remains	largely	unexamined	in	existing	analyses.			Young	men	offer	a	revealing	perspective	through	which	to	analyse	the	Ebola	crisis.	Young	people	were	recruited	into	the	Ebola	response	in	heavy	numbers,	taking	on	roles	 such	as	nurses,	members	of	 official	 burial	 teams,	drivers,	medical	workers,	and	sanitizers.	Many	had	never	been	formally	employed	before.	Others,	who	were	not	formally	recruited,	nonetheless	acted	informally	as	mediators	between	families	and	 state	of	 emergency	authorities.	These	acts	of	brokerage	 revealed	 that	 it	was	not	simply	the	case	that	humanitarian	actors	and	authorities	had	expectations	and	priorities	 that	were	 fundamentally	 opposed	 to	 those	 of	 Freetown	 residents.	 The	residents	were	also	juggling	conflicting	sets	of	expectations,	and,	at	different	times	and	 in	 different	 ways,	 demonstrated	 significant	 capacities	 to	 negotiate,	compromise,	and	adjust,	as	well	as	acknowledge	and	articulate	grievances.	
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My	thesis	examines	how	the	kinds	of	social	conflicts	and	tensions	associated	with	Ebola	 that	have	been	highlighted	 in	existing	scholarship,	are	entangled	with,	and	often	subsumed	within,	existing	social	tensions	surrounding	family	life,	the	home,	the	state,	and	established	responses	to	crisis.	The	thesis	forwards	the	observation	that	 processes	 of	 social	 mobility	 among	 young	 men	 were	 not	 fundamentally	distinct	from	the	processes	of	dealing	with	 ‘crisis’.	Rather,	they	were	one	and	the	same	 process.	 This	 involved,	 at	 its	 core,	 the	 ‘realigning	 of	 intimacies’.	 Flexible	social	 practices,	 and	 continued	 prioritisation	 of	 life	 course	 rituals,	 allowed	 this	process	 to	 continue	 –	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 accelerate	 –	 despite	 the	 challenging	conditions.	This	contrasts	with	the	notion	that	‘crisis’	entails	the	halting	or	slowing	down	 of	 processes	 of	 social	 reproduction.	While	 Ebola	 was	 ‘exceptional’,	 it	 was	made	 meaningful	 in	 locally	 familiar	 ways.	 Furthermore,	 for	 many	 young	 men,	‘social	death’	proved	to	be	a	more	pressing	concern	than	the	risk	of	actual	death.		Beyond	providing	ethnographic	context	to	enhance	scholarly	understanding	of	the	Ebola	 crisis	 itself,	 my	 thesis	 also	 engages	 in	 the	 broader	 investigation	 of	 the	relationships	between	epidemics	and	the	home	in	Africa	and	beyond.	Scholarship	on	 responses	 to	 AIDS	 show	 how	 health	 crises	 create,	 but	 also	 uncover,	 social	tensions	along	familiar	fault-lines,	such	as	race	(Fassin	2007),	sexuality	and	gender	(Hunter	2010),	intimacy	(Henderson	2011),	and	growing	social	inequality	(Farmer	2004,	Smith	2014).	 In	 relation	 to	AIDS	 in	Sierra	Leone,	which	has	never	reached	the	 scale	 of	 other	 countries	 on	 the	 continent,	 Benton	 argues	 that	 intervention	reinforces	 its	 exceptional	 status,	 and	 in	 doing	 so,	 reproduces	 global	 hierarchies	(Benton	 2015).	 Ebola	 too	 held	 exceptional	 status,	 often	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 more	common,	and	more	curable,	 illnesses	and	causes	of	death,	yet	 ‘Ebola’	outstripped	these	 as	 a	 meaningful	 signifier	 on	 the	 ground.	 Through	 ‘Ebola’	 Sierra	 Leoneans	reflected	 on,	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 reconfigured,	 their	 relationships	 with	 and	expectations	of	 the	state,	 the	 international	community,	and	the	home	and	family;	‘local’	culture	and	society	were	placed	in	sharp-relief	by	the	intervention.		
	
Expectations,	temporalities,	and	cross-rhythms			Much	 recent	 anthropological	 work	 on	 Africa	 has	 investigated,	 in	 one	 way	 or	
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another,	the	social	and	cultural	effects	of	what	might	be	termed	the	failure	of	the	post-colonial	 modernist	 project.	 In	 Ferguson’s	 (1999)	 book,	 Expectations	 of	
Modernity:	 Myths	 and	 Meanings	 of	 Urban	 Life	 on	 the	 Zambian	 Copperbelt,	 we	witness	 the	 ‘reversal	of	history’,	 as	what	once	 looked	 like	a	bright	 industrialized	future	gives	way,	 through	shrinking	 trade	and	a	debt	 crisis,	 to	a	 rejection	by	 the	modern	 global	 community	 and	 a	 return	 to	 the	 village.	 Such	 neoliberal	disassembling	 of	 state	 apparatus	 is	 a	 continent-wide	 experience,	 and	 raises	questions	 about	 shifts	 in	 the	 ways	 people	 think	 and	 act	 in	 ‘times	 of	 crisis’.	 For	Mbembe	and	Roitman,	 the	subjective	experience	of	crisis	 is	directly	connected	to	the	proliferation	of	authoritative	structures,	urban	decay,	and	lack	of	agreed	upon	protocols,	 such	 as	 in	 legal	 disputes	 or	 bureaucratic	 engagement	 (Mbembe	 and	Roitman	 1995).	 	 In	 her	 recent	 critical	 examination	 of	 anti-crisis	 (2014),	 Janet	Roitman	 observes	 that	 it	 is	 almost	 impossible	 to	 write	 about	 Africa	 without	invoking	 ‘crisis’,	which	has	become,	 in	her	 terms,	 ‘an	 enabling	blind	 spot	 for	 the	production	of	knowledge’	(Roitman	2014:14).		These	literatures	point	to	a	view	of	Africa	 that	 is	 constantly	 in	 ‘crisis’;	 where	 ‘crisis’,	 rather	 than	 the	 exception	 has	become	the	norm.			An	 alternative	 way	 of	 analysing	 ‘crisis’	 has	 been	 to	 see	 it	 as	 a	 selective	 label	through	which	certain	interventions	are	made	possible,	rather	than	signifying	any	kind	of	‘objective’	disorder	(Goldstone	and	Obarrio	2016).	At	the	heart	of	such	uses	of	 ‘crisis’	 are	 assumptions	 about	 markers	 of	 ‘normality’,	 ‘order’,	 and	 stability’,	which,	if	not	visible,	generate	fear	and	justify	intervention.	In	many	instances,	such	assumptions	 or	 ‘expectations’	 come	 from	Western	 centres	 of	 global	 power,	 and	often	act	to	reinforce	global	disparities	in	wealth	and	power.	This	line	of	argument	was	made	famous	by	Naomi	Klein	(2007)	in	her	book,	The	Shock	Doctrine:	The	Rise	
of	 Disaster	 Capitalism,	 in	 which	 she	 outlines	 the	 neoliberal	 strategy	 of	 ‘shock	therapy’,	 whereby	 crises	 and	 disasters	 are	 manufactured	 or	 exploited	 as	opportunities	 to	promote	unpopular	 free	market	policies	and	deregulation	 in	 the	interest	 of	 elite	 accumulation.	 Such	 anti-state	 interventions	 can	 also	 create	material	 opportunities	 on	 the	 ground,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 Hoffman’s	 analysis	 of	the	 post-Fordist	 modes	 of	 production	 and	 profitability	 that	 underscored	 rebel	movements	in	Sierra	Leone	and	Liberia	(Hoffman	2011).	
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The	notion	of	 ‘crisis’	 as	 closely	 connected	 to	 intervention,	often	 in	ways	 that	 are	antithetical	 to	 state	 structures,	 chimes	 with	 contemporary	 trends	 in	humanitarianism,	 which	 are	 steeped	 in	 anti-politics,	 and	 structured	 around	 the	temporalities	 of	 ‘emergency’	 or	 ‘relief’	 (Fassin	 and	 Pandolfi	 2013).	 As	 Calhoun	points	 out,	 ‘Emergency	 focuses	 attention	on	 the	 immediate	 event,	 and	not	 on	 its	causes.	It	calls	for	a	humanitarian	response,	not	political	or	economic	analysis.	The	emergency	has	 become	 a	 basic	 unit	 of	 global	 affairs’	 (Calhoun	2013:	 30).	 In	 this	context,	 there	are	ever	shrinking	 ‘horizons	of	expectation’,	as	concern	 for	 ‘rights’	become	concerns	for	‘needs’,	and	infrastructural	and	state	bio-politics	gives	way	to	design-oriented	market	solutions	(Redfield	2017).	Taking	inspiration	from	Walter	Benjamin,	 scholars,	 including	 famously	 the	 philosopher	 Giorgio	 Agamben,	 have	similarly	charted	the	ways	that	the	state	of	‘exception’,	or	emergency,	has	instead	increasingly	become	the	 ‘rule’.	Thus,	even	crisis	as	 ‘intervention’	does	not	escape	the	problem	of	exceptionality,	in	large	part,	in	Africa,	because	of	a	consistent	anti-state	bent.			Ebola	 itself	 does	 not	 fit	 neatly	 into	 either	 vision	 of	 crisis;	 and	 it	 is	 here	 that	my	thesis	makes	a	contribution	to	existing	paradigms	for	interpreting	crisis.	Ebola	was	certainly	 largely	 defined	 by	 an	 external	 intervention	 enacted	 in	 large	 part	 by	Western-based	 organizations	 quite	 obviously	 motived	 by	 self-interest,	 whether	understood	 in	 terms	 of	 global	 health	 security	 (preventing	 the	 spread	 of	 Ebola	beyond	 Africa),	 or	 in	 more	 subtle	 ways	 connected	 to	 funding	 structures	 in	 the	world	of	humanitarianism	and	epidemiology.		Such	a	mode	of	structural	analysis	is	powerfully	argued	by	 Ismael	Rashid	and	 Ibrahim	Abdullah	 in	 their	 recent	edited	volume	 (2017):	 Understanding	West	 Africa’s	 Ebola	 Epidemic:	 Towards	 a	 Political	
Economy.	 	 However,	 what	 is	 missing	 from	 this	 perspective	 is	 firstly	 a	 full	appreciation	 of	 the	 character	 of	 the	 Ebola	 response	 itself,	 which	 involved	 the	erection	 of	 health	 infrastructure	 and	 bureaucratic	 apparatus	 that	 made	 it	 differ	significantly	 from	 the	 kind	 of	 anti-state	 neoliberal	 interventions	 associated	with	the	shock	doctrine.	Equally	needed	 is	a	perspective	that	gives	colour	to	the	ways	that	 the	 crisis	 was	 experienced,	 interpreted,	 enacted,	 and	 rendered	 meaningful	locally	by	ordinary	people	living	through	it.		
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	What	did	Ebola	mean	for	young	men	and	those	around	them	in	Congo	Town?	How	did	their	hopes	and	aspirations	become	entangled	with	crisis?	And	what	do	these	perspectives	 tell	 us	 about	 crisis?	 	 Scholarship	 on	 youth	 in	political	 economies	 of	crisis	have	tended	to	highlight	their	experiences	of	social	stagnation	and	boredom	(Mains	2007,	Jeffrey	2010);	the	kind	of	‘enforced	presentism’	often	associated	with	marginal	people	(Bourdieu	2000,	Day,	Papataxiarchis,	and.	Stewart	1999).	Despite	this,	 or	 perhaps	 because	 of	 it,	 the	 future	 in	 Africa	 is	 a	 major	 preoccupation	 in	recent	 anthropological	 investigation	 (Cooper	 and	 Pratten	 2015,	 Goldstone	 and	Obarrio	 2016).	 Much	 scholarship	 has	 taken	 its	 inspiration	 from	 Guyer’s	 (2007)	essay,	 ‘Prophecy	 and	 the	 near	 future:	 Thoughts	 on	 macroeconomic,	 evangelical,	and	 punctuated	 time’.	 Taking	 as	 a	 starting	 point	 her	 fieldwork	 conducted	 in	Nigeria	 during	 the	 1990s	 under	 structural	 adjustment	 and	 military	 rule,	 she	outlines	 a	 global	 shift	 in	which	 the	 near	 future	 –	 as	well	 as	 the	 near	 past	 –	 has	become	 evacuated,	 disconnected	 from	 the	 present	 and	 from	 the	 long-term	imaginary.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 emerging	 development	 discourses	 and	 corporate	based	 development	 strategies	 position	 the	 globally	 marginalized	 as	 ‘the	 future’	(Dolan	 2012),	 producing	 entrepreneurial	 subjectivities	 in	 line	 with	 what	Appadurai	 labels	 ‘the	 capacity	 to	 aspire’	 (2004).	 These	 shifts	 and	 tensions	 are	apparent	 in	 West	 Africa’s	 emergent	 ‘post-postcolonial’	 period	 where,	 as	 Piot	summarizes,	 ‘a	 diffuse	 and	 fragmented	 sovereignty	 is	 replacing	 authoritarian	political	 culture;	 tradition	 is	 set	 aside	 and	 cultural	 mixing	 looking	 down	 upon;	Africanicity	 is	 rejected	 and	 Euro-modernity	 embraced;	 futures	 are	 replacing	 the	past	as	cultural	reservoir’	(Piot	2010:16).		Anthropologists	have	developed	sophisticated	analyses	of	hope	and	aspiration	 in	what	has	become	something	of	sub-field	within	the	discipline.	Much	of	 this	work	takes	its	lead	from	formative	analysis	by	Vincent	Crapanzano	(2003),	in	which	he	reflects	 on	 how	 hope	 is	 less	 individualistic	 than	 often	 assumed,	 and	 rather	becomes	meaningful	socially.	Such	a	view	is	developed	in	analysis	that	stresses	the	interactions	 between	 social	 life	 and	 individual	 self-understanding.	 As	 Long	 and	Moore	 outline,	 ‘The	 social	 life	 of	 achievement	 is	 an	 ongoing	 trajectory	 that	 rolls	forward	 over	 time,	 as	 the	 self	 comes	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 new	 ways,	 as	 new	relations	are	forged,	and	as	old	relations	transform	in	character’	(Long	and	Moore	
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2013:5).		While	hopes,	aspirations,	and	achievements	can	integrate	individuals	into	social	 groups,	 equally,	 and	 indeed	 often,	 they	 can	 sit	 in	 tension	with	 each	 other.		Scholarship	 on	 hope	 and	 aspiration	 in	 contemporary	 Africa,	 especially	 among	youth,	has	pointed	to	the	despairing	mismatch	between	expectations	and	realities.	Such	 expectations	 are	 often	 understood	 as	 structured	 by	 globalization	 and	capitalist	fantasies	of	individual	success	calibrated	in	material	or	monetary	terms,	which	do	not	correspond	with	what	is	materially	possible	(Di	Nunzio	2015,	Turner	2015,	Weiss	2009).	Alternatively,	analysis	points	to	the	ways	that	individual	hopes	and	 aspirations	 of	 various	 sorts	 come	 into	 conflict	 with	 collective,	 family	 or	community-oriented	values	and	aims	(Schielke	2009).		This	can	provide	the	sense	of	being	 ‘stuck’	 –	not	only	 in	 time	–	but	 also	 in	place;	 such	as	 in	Ethiopia	where	young	men’s	desires	to	migrate	cannot	be	realized	(Mains	2007),	or,	 for	youth	 in	Zambia,	who	live	their	lives	‘stuck	in	the	compound’	(Hansen	2005).			In	 this	 thesis	 I	 present	 an	 analysis	 of	 aspiration	 and	 hope	 that	 builds	 on	 these	findings	 in	 several	 ways.	 Firstly,	 my	 study	 interrogates	 how	 both	 individual	aspirations	and	those	of	families	are	manipulated	and	reconstituted	through	time	through	the	careful	process	of	‘realigning	of	intimacies’,	often	taking	place	around	economic	activity,	family	politics,	and	life-course	ritual.	In	this	version,	 individual	and	 collective	 aspirations	 are	 simultaneously	 antithetical	 as	 well	 as	 mutually	constitutive	 and	 productive.	 As	 Cooper	 points	 out,	 the	 family	 in	 Africa	 has	 long	been	 a	 site	 of	 crisis	 due	 to	 social,	 economic	 and	political	 changes,	which	 creates	space	for	new	ways	to	‘fix’	the	family	(Cooper	2012).	The	protagonists	in	my	thesis	are	not	just	victims	of	a	political	economy	that	has	severed	predictable	expectation	and	 replaced	 it	 with	 a	more	 fantastical	 regime	 of	 expectation.	 Rather,	my	 study	highlights	the	agency	of	individuals	to	juggle,	manipulate,	and	creatively	play	with	temporal	 expectations,	 often	 in	 contentious	 and	 even	 coercive	ways.	 During	my	fieldwork,	 it	became	clear	 to	me	that	aspirations	and	expectations,	such	as	 those	surrounding	business	partnerships,	friendships,	temporary	domestic	relations,	and	romantic	relationships,	greatly	exceeded	material	realities.	While	there	were	over-riding	expectations	that	even	the	best	conceived	plans	were	unlikely	to	be	realized	in	Freetown,	these	plans	and	aspirations	nonetheless	held	significant	currency	 in	structuring	social	relationships	and	material	exchange,	often	generating	significant	
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medium	 and	 long-term	 outcomes.	 Mismatch	 between	 competing	 sets	 of	expectations	 was	 a	 source	 of	 considerable	 day-to-day	 uncertainty,	 punctuated	sooner	or	 later	by	moments	of	alignment	or	reconfiguring,	often	at	 formal	 family	meetings	or	around	life	course	events.		Thus	in	this	setting,	spending	time	at	home	or	around	the	family,	and	the	disputes	and	frustrations	that	characterize	social	life	in	 the	 sphere,	 are	 not	 interpreted	 at	 face	 value,	 so	 to	 speak,	 but	 rather	 such	frustrations	and	contradictions	are	seen	as	part	and	parcel	of	everyday	processes	of	social	mobility	and	coming	of	age.			The	 thesis	 demonstrates	 how	 the	 uncertainties	 and	 resolutions	 at	 play	 in	 this	micro-social	arena	mapped	onto	competing	temporalities	and	expectations	at	the	level	of	political	economy	and	large-scale	humanitarian	intervention.	What	makes	this	 ethnography	 particularly	 revealing	 is	 the	 relatively	 sudden	 shift	 in	 political	economy	 during	 the	 crisis.	 While	 neoliberal	 intervention	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	deconstruction	of	state	apparatus	which,	according	to	those	discussed	above,	has	rendered	‘crisis’	and	‘emergency’	as	on-going	experiences	in	Africa,	the	Ebola	crisis	saw	a	heavily	 infrastructural	and	bureaucratic	 (i.e.	 state-like)	 intervention	 that,	 I	suggest,	reversed	this	trend.	In	other	words,	while	‘impermanence’	has	become	the	general	 norm	 in	African	 settings,	 here	 the	 temporary	 state	 of	 emergency	had	 an	infrastructural	and	institution-like	‘permanence’	to	it,	working	according	to	almost	Weberian	principles	and	ideals	of	rationality	and	bureaucratisation.				The	thesis	then	develops	our	understandings	of	the	ways	that	aspiration	and	hope	interact	with	such	a	crisis.		In	this	regard,	the	thesis	builds	on	studies	emphasizing	how	those	caught	up	in	conditions	of	uncertainty	and	crisis	aspire	and	hope	for	a	‘normal’	or	 ‘sane’	 life,	 rather	 than	a	 future	good	(Asad	2003,	Berlant	2007,	Zigon	2009).	Hage	has	pointed	out	the	value	often	ascribed	in	the	contemporary	world	to	‘waiting	 out	 the	 crisis’	 and	 thus	 the	 corresponding	 ‘heroism	 of	 the	 stuck’	 (Hage	2009).	 	 These	 observations	 certainly	 resonate	 with	 the	 perhaps	 surprising	‘normality’	 and	 at	 times	 mundantiy	 of	 the	 crisis	 for	 residents	 of	 Congo	 Town.		However,	 what	my	 ethnography	 demonstrates	 is	 the	 ways	 that	 ‘normality’	 is	 in	itself	a	malleable	and	contested	concept	for	my	interlocutors,	especially	so	during	the	 crisis	 when	 competing	 notions	 of	 social	 order	 came	 into	 play:	 ‘white’	 and	
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‘black’.	 These	 competing	 ideas	 of	 ‘normal’	 are	 seen	 to	 structure	 and	 become	structured	 by	 aspirations,	 hopes,	 and	 achievements,	 thus	 providing	 another	dimension	to	scholarly	engagement	with	these	topics.		My	thesis	describes	actors	grappling	constantly	with	alternative	and	competing	–	yet	 in	 practice	 blended	 and	 brokered	 –	 temporal	 expectations,	 registers,	 and	rhythms.	During	the	Ebola	crisis,	Freetown	residents	were	called	upon	to	prevent	the	spread	of	the	virus	and	sudden	losses	of	life,	thus	aligning	themselves	with	the	dominant	 humanitarian	 temporalities	 of	 ‘emergency’	 (Calhoun	 2013:	 30,	 Fassin	and	Pandolfi	2013)	and	‘immediate	future’	(Redfield	2011),	and	with	the	values	of	predictability	 in	 biomedical	 and	 bureaucratic	 protocols	 under	 the	 state	 of	emergency.	 Yet	 these	 expectations	had	 to	be	 reconciled	with,	 for	 example,	 novel	monetary	 flows,	 including	 formal	 employment	 opportunities	 that	 brought	unusually	regular	pay-days;	enduring	familial	obligations,	such	as	the	performance	of	 funerary	 rites;	 and	 the	 on-going	 processes	 of	 family	 formation.	 In	 many	instances,	 young	men’s	 social	 practices	 hold	 ambiguous	 temporal	meanings.	 For	example,	showy	consumption	practices	known	as	‘bluffing’,	discussed	in	chapter	4,	are,	 to	 use	 Bloch	 and	 Parry’s	 modalities,	 at	 once	 ‘short-term’	 and	 ‘long-term’	exchanges.	 Another	 case	 study,	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 6,	 concerns	 the	 periods	 of	extreme	volatility	on	which	the	processes	of	enduring	 family	 formation	are	often	predicated.			The	notion	of	competing,	and	culturally	determined,	temporal	expectations	during	the	 Ebola	 crisis	 was	 not	 novel	 for	 my	 informants.	 For	 them,	 these	 expectations	were	 coded	 in	 local	 categories	 of	 ‘black	 time’	 and	 ‘white	 time’,	 the	 former	indicating	 a	 sense	 of	 flexibility	 depending	 on	 social	 circumstance,	 and	 the	 latter	indicating	a	more	abstracted	notion	of	punctuality.	The	ethnography	in	this	thesis	reveals	that	these	were	not	irreconcilable	–	competing	rhythms	could	be	adhered	to	–	yet	the	result	often	lacked	defined	resolution.			A	useful	analogy	for	the	interplay	between	these	temporal	categories	is	the	musical	concept	of	‘cross-rhythm’,	which	happens	to	be	generative	principle	in	many	West	African	 musical	 styles	 (Chernoff	 1979,	 Thompson	 1979).	 Typically,	 there	 is	 a	
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regular	series	of	accents,	over	(or	under)	which	a	contradictory,	often	syncopated	and	stressed,	pattern	is	played.	Taken	individually,	each	element	is	predictable	and	regular	 –	 although	 one	 is	 more	 metronomic	 than	 the	 other	 –	 yet	 together	 they	create	a	tension	in	in	rhythms	that	is	not	momentary	but	in	a	permanent	state	of	contradiction,	 never	 aligning	 or	 coming	 into	 sync.	 The	 mix	 is	 meaningful,	 and	deeply	beautiful,	but	without	an	ending,	there	is	a	sense	of	unresolved	flux.	
The	fieldsite:	Congo	Town	
Congo	Town	owes	its	name	to	early	settlers	who	came	indirectly	from	the	Congo,	via	 slave	 ships	 leaving	 coasts	 adjacent	 to	 Sierra	 Leone	 that	were	 intercepted	 by	British	after	the	slave	trade	was	banned.	As	Fyfe	explains,	‘The	Congo	people	who,	it	is	said,	preferred	to	live	by	the	waterside,	left	their	hilltop	at	New	Cabenda	and	followed	the	pretty	stream	dignified	as	the	Congo	River	down	to	Whiteman’s	Bay	where	 in	1816	they	bought	 from	a	Maroon	woman	a	site	 for	a	new	home,	Congo	Town	 (Fyfe	 1962:120).	 The	 neighbourhood	 is	 in	 Western	 Freetown,	 the	 more	established	part	of	the	city,	which	in	recent	decades	has	also	become	the	home	to	‘slums’,	or	‘subaltern	cities’	(Abdullah	2002),	along	the	Congo	River.	Congo	town	is	built	 along	 the	 side	 of	 the	 valley	 of	 the	 Congo	 River	 Valley,	 which	 feeds	 into	Whiteman’s	 Bay,	where	 locally	 built	wooden	 boats	 used	 for	 trade	 and	 transport	along	 the	coast	are	docked.	On	 the	other	 side	of	 the	valley	 is	 the	now	crumbling	Siaka	 Stevens	 stadium,	 built	 by	 Chinese	 contractors	 in	 the	 1980s.	 The	neighbourhood	 abuts	 Congo	 Cross,	 a	 large	 roundabout	 on	Main	Motor	Way,	 the	primary	 road	 that	 runs	 along	 the	 Freetown	 peninsula.	 Near	 Congo	 Cross	 is	 the	local	 police	 station,	 a	 petrol	 station,	 a	 covered	 produce	 market,	 and	 the	 Congo	Town	cemetery.			Leading	into	the	cemetery	is	Cemetery	Road,	the	only	paved	road	in	the	immediate	neighbourhood.	 It	was	 apparently	 paved	 shortly	 after	 independence	 (the	 paving	programme	 must	 have	 stopped	 at	 the	 cemetery	 gates)	 and	 still	 features	 old	colonial	street	lampposts.	The	lamps	had	been	dysfunctional	for	many	years	until,	during	my	fieldwork,	in	an	initiative	led	by	Congo	Town	Development	Committee	(a	collection	of	 local	 ‘stakeholders’,	 including	tribal,	religious,	political,	and	youth	representatives),	cheap	Chinese	bulbs	were	inserted	that	were	connected	to	local	
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homes	 rather	 than	 directly	 to	 the	 national	 grid.	 The	 other	 streets	 in	 the	neighbourhood	were	 rocky	and	with	many	 large	pot-holes	 that	 filled	with	water	during	the	rainy	season.	It	was	a	source	of	frustration	to	many	residents	that	even	the	 ‘Honourable’	 (parliamentary	member)	who	 lived	on	one	 such	 road	had	been	unable	 to	 secure	 state	 resources	 to	 pave	 it.	 Instead	 the	 task	was	 undertaken	 in	small	pothole-filling	initiatives	led	by	unemployed	neighbourhood	youth	and	local	sponsors.			
	
Figure	2	Map	of	Congo	Town	(Map	data	Google	2017)		The	neighbourhood	streets	were	not	merely	the	means	of	getting	in	and	out	of	the	neighbourhood,	they	were	also	spaces	of	business	and	socialisation	in	themselves.	Sitting	 on	 chairs	 outside	 shops	 and	 food-stalls,	 people	 would	 ‘keep	 time’	 (hang	out).	Mechanics	used	corners	for	repairing	vehicles.	Children	played	street	games,	including	football	with	makeshift	goals	made	of	rocks.	Women	would	get	their	hair	
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‘planted’,	 often	 on	 a	 weekly	 basis,	 in	 makeshift	 street	 salons,	 or	 by	 friends	 and	sisters.	 Most	 homes	 did	 not	 have	 kitchens;	 cooking	 would	 take	 place	 on	 the	veranda,	or	the	street	itself.	In	the	less	day-to-day	frame,	the	streets	were	also	the	key	spaces	where	seasonal	and	national	festivities	were	marked,	as	well	as	family	rites	 of	 passage.	 In	 December,	 streets	 held	 their	 own	 carnivals,	 in	 which	 large	sound-systems	were	hired	 to	play	 through	 the	night.	Secret	 societies	would	hold	masquerade	 performances	 on	 street	 corners,	 often	 unannounced.	 In	 this	 multi-faith	 neighbourhood,	 religious	 festivities	 also	 took	 place	 on	 the	 street.	 On	 ‘pray	day’	(Eid),	public	spaces	such	as	football	fields	would	be	packed	with	worshippers	wearing	newly	tailored	clothes.	New	Year	and	Easter	involved	processions	behind	the	 local	debul	 (masquerade	 ‘devil’),	who	was	a	kind	of	a	neighbourhood	mascot.	Weddings	and	 funerals	also	 involved	processions	 through	 the	streets	–	 the	more	prominent	 the	 family	 the	 bigger	 the	 procession,	 which	 in	 some	 cases	 included	marching	 bands	 and	 convoys	 of	 jeeps.	 Baby-naming	 ceremonies,	 locally	 named	
pulnador	(literally	‘take	outside’)	were,	by	definition,	held	on	the	street	outside	the	home.			The	 neighbourhood	 comprised	 a	 range	 of	 built	 structures.	 Dotted	 around	 were	some	 of	 the	 distinctive	 two-story	 bod	 os,	 the	 wooden	 Krio	 architectural	 style	inspired	by	town	houses	in	Louisiana	and	South	Carolina.	Other	family	compounds	were	 built	 of	 cement	 blocks	 in	 a	 more	 contemporary	 style.	 Many	 homes	 had	become	 increasingly	 populated	 and	 subdivided,	 as	 younger	 generations	 found	 it	hard	 to	 build	 independent	 households	 elsewhere.	 Alongside	 family	 households	were	 several	 nearby	 schools,	 a	 church	 and	 a	mosque	 (reflecting	 a	 roughly	 even	split	 in	the	neighbourhood	in	religious	affiliation),	numerous	small	grocery	shops	selling	household	goods,	small	bars,	cookery	shops	(prepared	food),	cinemas	(for	watching	football	games),	tailors,	carpenters,	a	small	water	purifying	factory,	a	car	mechanic,	 a	 male	 and	 female	 secret	 society	 base,	 and	 ‘long-benches’,	 where	primarily	young	men	would	gather	and	hang	out.			I	 spent	 much	 of	 my	 time	 circulating	 through	 these	 various	 spaces,	 often	accompanying	 or	 going	 to	 meet	 friends	 and	 neighbours.	 Many	 of	 my	 meals	consisted	of	portions	of	the	daily	‘pots’	that	were	offered	to	me	by	the	neighbours	
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who	cooked	 them;	 like	many	other	young	people,	 I	did	not	eat	 in	a	stable	house.	Leaving	 the	 neighbourhood	 to	 travel	 elsewhere	 was	 typically	 a	 lengthy	 process	that	 involved	 greeting	 scores	 of	 neighbours.	 If	 I	 went	 for	 a	 few	 days	 without	stopping	 by	my	 acquaintances,	 I	was	 criticised	when	we	 next	met:	 yu	 los	pa	me	(you’ve	hidden	yourself	from	me),	they	would	say.			A	 further	 driver	 of	 social	 circulation	was	 the	 irregular	 electricity	 supply;	 it	 was	sometimes	out	for	weeks,	and	was	rarely	regular	for	more	than	a	few	days.	Since	a	significant	 portion	 was	 hydroelectrically	 generated,	 it	 was	 most	 regular	 in	 the	rainy	 season.	 Different	 areas	 of	 the	 neighbourhood	 were	 connected	 to	 different	power	lines,	which	meant	that,	especially	after	dark,	people	would	move	between	homes	to	charge	phones,	keep	cool	with	fans,	watch	television,	and	listen	to	music	on	stereos.			The	 elevated	 part	 of	 the	 neighbourhood	 contained	 a	 combination	 of	 more	established	 family	 compounds	 alongside	 more	 temporary	 structures,	 called	 pan	
bodi	constructed	 of	metal	 sheets.	 However,	 along	 the	 contours	 of	 the	 valley	 the	proportion	 shifted	 in	 favour	 of	 temporary	 structures	 and	 poorer	 households,	 or	those	 of	 recent	 immigrants	 or	 younger	 generations.	 Access	 to	 these	 required	negotiating	 steep	 rocky	 paths,	 or	 dilapidated	 colonial	 era	 stairways	 that	 had	originally	 led	 to	 the	 dock.	 These	 lower-down	 areas	 had	 become	 increasingly	packed	 in	 the	 post-war	 years,	 when	 the	 population	 of	 Freetown	 tripled	 in	 size,	initially	through	the	influx	of	a	combination	of	people	escaping	fighting	upcountry	and	 those	 looking	 for	 economic	 opportunities,	 proximity	 to	 family	 support	networks,	 and	 out-migration	 opportunities.	 While	 Congo	 Town	 residents	 were	once	 primarily	 Krio,	 today	 this	 ethnic	 group	 is	 a	 minority,	 far	 outnumbered	 by	those	from	autochthonous	Sierra	Leonean	tribal	backgrounds,	many	of	whom	are	relatively	recent	migrants	to	Freetown.			The	 land	 in	 this	part	of	 the	neighbourhood	was	generally	owned	by	 families	 that	were	 well-established	 in	 the	 area;	 several	 of	 Krio	 background	 were	 the	 first	 to	secure	property	ownership	in	the	city.	The	river-bed	was	likely	to	be	squatted	land	owned	by	the	state.	Those	who	built	on	state	land	faced	the	threat	of	eviction;	the	
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state	periodically	made	efforts	to	clear	out	what	were	deemed	‘slum’	settlements.	In	June	2015,	I	witnessed	a	large-scale	city-wide	effort	of	dispossession,	especially	close	to	the	beach	areas,	allegedly	to	promote	tourism.	Another	risk	faced	by	these	residents	 was	 their	 proximity	 to	 the	 waterline	 during	 the	 rainy	 season,	 which	every	 year	 would	 result	 in	 casualties	 and	 destruction	 of	 property,	 necessitating	many	 grassroots	 acts	 of	 rescue	 and	much	 repair	work.	 The	 state	 also	 played	 its	part.	During	the	rainy	season	of	2015,	many	who	lost	their	houses	to	flooding	were	temporarily	 resettled	 in	 the	 national	 stadium	 and	 given	 aid	 supplies,	 made	possible	by	the	humanitarian	resources	floating	around	for	‘Ebola’.			As	this	description	demonstrates,	Congo	Town	has	had	a	certain	permanence	as	a	site	 of	 refuge	 since	 its	 early	 settlement,	 yet	 at	 the	 same	 time	 it	 has	 a	 deeply	unstable	and	impermanent	character.	It	is	a	place	where	the	boundaries	between	friends,	 rivals,	 business	 partners,	 debtors,	 creditors,	 family	 and	 housemates	 are	fluid	 and	 shifting.	 Equally	 porous	 are	 the	 borders	 between	 domestic	 and	 public,	sacred	 and	 profane,	 and	 quotidian	 and	 ceremonial	 space.	 Class	 structures	 are	reflected	in	the	lay	of	the	land,	but	the	proximity	and	flows	of	social	 life	between	these	 areas	 defies	 straightforward	 class	 analysis.	 There	 is	 a	 strong	 community	ethos,	and	a	large	range	of	forms	of	association	and	membership,	with	numerous	cross-cutting	 structures	 of	 authority.	 Yet	 these	 conditions,	 alongside	 tight-knit	living,	 lead	 to	 frequent	 complaints	 that	 ‘politics	 is	 ruining	 this	 country’;	 ‘there	 is	too	much	congosa	(gossip)’;	and	even	‘congosa	kills’.			This	characterisation	of	life	in	Congo	Town	bears	some	notable	resemblances	with	a	 burgeoning	 literature	 on	 the	 African	 city	 (and	mega-city),	 much	 of	 which	 has	similarly	 placed	 youth	 as	 its	 central	 protagonists	 (de	 Boeck	 and	 Plissard	 2006,	Nuttall	 and	Mbembe	 2008,	 Simone	 2004).	 	 For	 across	 the	 continent	 are	 similar	patterns	of	mass-migration,	state	decay,	proliferation	of	authorities,	and	crumbling	urban	 infrastructure.	 Thus	 African	 cities	 are	 rapidly	 growing	 while	 centralized	provisions	 to	manage	 them	deplete.	 Scholars	 have	 broadly	 aimed	 to	 understand	firstly	 how	 such	 cities	 actually	 function	 as	 cities	 given	 these	 circumstances,	 and	secondly,	what	kinds	of	social	institutions,	socialites,	and	cultural	forms	emerge	in	these	novel	social	and	spatial	environments.		
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While	 scholars	 have	 approached	 these	 questions	 differently,	 the	 pictures	 they	paint	of	African	cities	have	certain	notable	commonalities.		They	have,	what	Nuttall	and	 Mbembe	 (2008)	 gloss	 as	 a,	 ‘spectral	 quality’.	 They	 appear	 as	 apocalyptic	environments,	 yet	 also	 places	 of	 remarkable	 cultural	 and	 social	 innovation	 and	improvisation;	two	sides	of	this	same	‘spectral’	coin.	Simone’s	much	cited	concept	of	 ‘people	 as	 infrastructure’	 (Simone	2004),	 and	perhaps	 less	 famous	 concept	 of	‘cityness’	 (Simone	 2010),	 capture	 the	 innovative,	 flexible,	 open,	 and	 provisional	social	 practices	 and	 regimes	 of	 sociality	 in	 African	 mega-cities,	 such	 as	Johannesburg.	 	 Behind	 these	 ideas	 is	 the	 interplay	 between	 dynamism	 and	mundane	regularity,	which	reflects	 in	part	a	dialogue	between	formal	hegemonic	mappings,	 and	 the	 informal	 forms	 that	 exist	 in	 the	 gaps	 opened	 up	 by	 declining	formal	 institutions.	De	Boeck’s	 characterisations	 of	 the	African	 city	 –	 specifically	Kinshasa	 –	 share	 some	 of	 these	 qualities.	 His	 work	 stresses	 the	 power	 of	 the	invisible;	the	blurring	of	public	and	private	arenas;	and	the	fragmented	assemblage	of	ideas	of	what	a	city	should	be.			Where	 this	 thesis	departs	 from	such	characterisations	of	 the	African	city	 is	 in	 its	long-term	 ethnographic	 centring	 on	 a	 set	 of	 residents	 of	 the	 Congo	 Town	neighbourhood.	 From	 this	 vantage	 point,	 the	 picture	 of	 city	 life	 that	 emerges	 is	more	 structured	 and	 grounded.	 	 While	 Freetown	 as	 a	 whole	 is	 a	 city	 in	transformation,	many	of	its	inhabitants’	experience	of	it,	I	suggest,	is	mediated	by	the	 institution	of	 the	 family,	 and	by	what	 Fortes	 (1969)	 terms	 ‘neighbourliness’:	social	 relations	 connected	 by	 spatial	 proximity,	 suffused	with	 values	 of	 kinship;	similar	to	what	has	recently	been	described	as	‘urban	kinship’,	paying	attention	to	the	 micro-political	 facets	 of	 urban	 relatedness	 (Bjarnesen	 and	 Utas	 2018).	 The	young	men	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 this	 study	might	 at	 times	 resemble	 the	 hustlers	 and	improvisers	inhabiting	the	African	mega-city,	yet	much	of	their	social	lives	centre	around	the	less	glamorous,	desperate,	and	dynamic	arenas	of	family	and	domestic	life.	 Thus	 their	 shifting	 positionalities	 are	 grounded	 in	 the	 relatively	 stable	intersecting	social	structures	of	kinship,	the	household,	and	neighbourly	relations.	This	 thesis’	 account	 of	 the	 Ebola	 crisis	 in	 many	 ways	 reinforces	 this	 picture,	contrary	 to	 apocalyptic	media	 renderings	 of	 the	 Ebola	 epidemic.	 	 In	many	ways	this	crisis	reinforced,	rather	than	further	eroded,	the	boundaries	between	‘public’	
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and	 ‘private’	 that	 de	 Boeck	 and	 others	 note	 as	 being	 so	 blurred	 in	 the	contemporary	 African	 city.	 The	 Ebola	 crisis	 entailed	 a	 new	 regime	 of	 flows	 and	circulations	 in	 the	 city,	 experienced	 through	 quarantines	 and	 lock-downs	 in	 the	neighbourhood,	in	which,	by	contrast,	the	private	and	public	became	at	times	very	clearly	articulated	 separated	domains,	 and	 road-blocks	and	 regulations	on	 travel	represented	a	re-assertion	of	centralised	authority.			
	
Figure	3	Congo	Town	residents	inspecting	flooding	in	the	Congo	River	Valley	
	
A	short	history	of	intervention	and	crisis	in	Freetown	and	Sierra	Leone		This	 section	 gives	 a	 brief	 sketch	 of	 the	 city	 and	 the	 country,	 outlining	 historical	threads	that	resonate	with	the	primacy	ethnographic	data	discussed	in	the	thesis.	A	key	tenet	of	this	history	is	foreign	intervention,	ranging	from	the	slave	trade,	to	Freetown’s	unusual	history	as	a	place	of	return,	to	the	place	of	Freetown	in	British	colonialism,	the	more	recent	history	of	structural	adjustment	and	post-war	liberal	intervention	and	peace-building,	and	mostly	recently	the	Ebola	state	of	emergency.	History	 did	 not	 simply	 repeat	 itself	 with	 Ebola,	 but	 responses	 to	 Ebola	 were,	 I	suggest,	 informed	 in	 various	 ways	 by	 repeating	 historical	 patterns.	 As	 political	historian	 David	 Harris	 notes,	 ‘it	 is	 not	 rare	 to	 have	 an	 outside	 interest	
	 43	
endeavouring	to	influence	or	being	used	at	key	moments	in	Sierra	Leonean	history’	(Harris	 2013:6).	 Those	 outsiders	 who	 intervened	 encountered	 significant	obstacles	on	the	ground	–	in	the	form	of	armed	uprisings	and	repeated	epidemics	–	but	also	openness	to	brokerage	and	compromise	in	cases	where	outright	coercion	was	impossible	and	undesirable.		Brokerage	 has	 long	 been	 an	 avenue	 for	 social	 mobility	 in	 Freetown,	 involving	shifting	 and	 transformative	 elements	 of	 identity.	 The	 thesis	 points	 to	 ways	 that	modes	of	brokerage,	transformation,	and	mediation	that	were	enacted	during	the	Ebola	 crisis	 recall	 historical	 strategies	 and	 practices	 in	 Freetown,	 which	fundamentally	shaped	the	character	of	both	the	formal	Ebola	response	as	well	as	local	responses.	Conflicts	and	tensions	between	local	and	foreign	expectations	and	interests	 –	 and	 the	 resultant	 instabilities	 that	 come	 with	 them	 –	 were	 at	 once	brought	to	the	fore	and	reignited	during	Ebola,	at	the	same	time	as	a	this	history	and	the	particular	sets	of	practices	that	have	emerged	around	it,	were	a	‘resource’	through	which	 to	make	 interpret	 and	negotiate	 crisis	 and	 intervention	 in	 locally	meaningful	ways.			Pre-colonial	 Sierra	 Leone	 is	 thought	 to	 have	 been	 a	 relatively	 isolated	 region	 of	thick	forests	and	Atlantic	coastline,	which	for	a	long	time	separated	it	 from	other	kingdoms	and	the	spread	of	Islam.	The	country’s	name	is	a	variation	of	Serra	Lyoa	(Lioness	Mountain),	 coined	by	 the	Portuguese	 explorer,	 Pedro	de	 Sinta,	 in	 1462,	with	 reference	 to	 the	 shape	 of	 the	 mountains	 along	 the	 Freetown	 Peninsula.	Portuguese	contact	with	the	region	escalated	in	the	late	15th	century;	by	the	mid-16th	 century	 the	 region	 had	 become	well-integrated	 into	 the	 Atlantic	 System,	 in	which	 Britain	 was	 the	 dominant	 player.	 The	 region	 became	 a	 major	 site	 of	extraction	of	slaves,	which	operated	out	of	slaving	castles	such	as	the	well-known	Bunce	 Island,	 from	which	 the	 primary	 direction	 of	 travel	was	 the	 plantations	 of	North	America	(Opala	1985).		Alongside	this	developed	an	internal	slave	trade	in	the	interior.	This	was	part	of	a	process	of	local	social	transformation,	as	Walter	Rodney’s	(1970)	formative	study	demonstrated,	 inextricably	 linked	 to	 the	 external	 trade	 that	 had	 interacted	with	
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coastal	 societies	 for	 a	much	 longer	 period.	 Change	 in	 the	 16th	 Century	was	 also	driven	by	the	Mane	invasions,	although	it	seems	that	they	were	motivated	in	large	part	 by	 a	 growing	market	 for	 slaves.	 The	Mane-occupied	 region	 of	 Sierra	 Leone	was	eventually	divided	into	distinct	kingdoms	that	remained	in	a	more	or	less	on-going	 state	 of	 war.	 The	 spread	 of	 Islam	 brought	 more	 invasions;	 Sierra	 Leone	continues	 to	be	evenly	divided	between	Muslim	and	Christian	 identification,	 and	between	 two	major	 ethnic	 groups,	 the	 Temne	 and	 the	Mende,	 which	 have	 been	politically	dominant	for	most	of	the	post-colonial	period.			In	 1807,	 the	 British	 slave	 trade	 was	 banned	 after	 significant	 pressure	 from	 a	growing	 abolitionist	 movement	 –	 considered	 the	 first	 modern	 humanitarian	project	–	in	which	the	establishment	of	Freetown	was	a	key	element.	The	land	was	settled	initially	by	400	or	so	former	slaves	from	London	with	land	bought	from	a	local	king	by	the	Committee	for	the	Relief	of	the	Black	Poor.	Freetown	proper	was	established	 after	 meetings	 between	 the	 African	 American,	 Thomas	 Peters,	abolitionists	in	London,	and	members	of	the	Sierra	Leone	Company.	This	resulted	in	a	second	wave	of	settlers,	known	as	‘black	loyalists’.	Many	of	these	people	came	via	Nova	Scotia,	after	escaping	from	plantations	in	Virginia	and	South	Carolina	and	fighting	 for	 the	British	 in	 the	American	War	of	 Independence.	Subsequent	waves	included	 Jamaican	 Maroons	 and	 a	 piecemeal	 migration	 of	 black	 British	 colonial	subjects,	particularly	those	who	had	fought	in	the	Napoleonic	wars.	Freetown,	with	its	 sizeable	 natural	 harbour,	 became	 a	 Royal	 Navy	 base	 for	 intercepting	 slaving	operations,	 and	 many	 further	 ‘recaptives’	 from	 along	 the	 Atlantic	 coast	 were	brought	there.	These	migrants	and	their	descendants	–	along	with	other	migrants	to	 Freetown	 from	 upcountry	 who	 associated	 with	 them	 –	 became	 collectively	known	 as	 the	 Krio,	 the	 name	 of	 an	 ethnic	 group	 and	 the	 lingua	 franca	 of	 Sierra	Leone	 today,	 which	 is	 an	 English-based	 Creole.	 A	 socially	 significant	 distinction	between	‘country’	people	and	the	Krio	(city	people)	remains	to	this	day.			The	British	Crown	Colony	of	Sierra	Leone	was	established	in	1808,	with	Freetown	serving	 as	 the	 capital	 of	 British	 West	 Africa.	 Throughout	 the	 19th	 Century,	 the	colony	expanded	from	Freetown	and	its	immediate	vicinity	into	the	interior.	These	British-	 and	 Krio-led	 treaties,	 trade	 agreements	 and	 military	 operations	 were	
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aimed	at	shoring	up	commerce.	By	 the	 late	19th	 century,	Britain	 faced	 increasing	competition	with	France	over	 regional	 influence:	part	of	what	became	known	as	the	 ‘scramble	 for	 Africa’.	 In	 1896,	 the	 British	 established	 a	 Protectorate,	 which	encompassed	much	of	what	 is	 the	 country	 today.	This,	 despite	 its	 name,	 utilised	forceful	 and	 coercive	measures.	 Few	 tribal	 authorities	 subjugated	 themselves	 to	the	British	willingly,	most	offered	armed	resistance,	and	many	were	replaced	with	a	 network	 of	 ‘Paramount	 Chiefs’,	 which	 exemplified	 the	 British	 approach	 to	indirect	 rule.	A	house	 tax	was	 instituted,	which	was	met	with	an	armed	uprising	led	by	Bai	Bureh	 in	 the	 ‘Hut	Tax	War’,	which	 is	depicted	on	today’s	1000	Leones	note.			As	 Reno	 argued	 in	 his	 analysis	 (1995)	 of	 contemporary	 corruption	 and	 state	politics,	the	development	of	the	‘shadow	state’	dates	to	this	period,	when	informal	political	 and	 economic	 arrangements	 that	 compromised	 stated	 colonial	 protocol	were	 tolerated	and	encouraged	as	a	means	of	brokering	stability	and	order.	This	tension	 between	 the	 ‘state’	 and	 ‘shadow-state’	 remains	 in	 place,	 in	 a	 different	guise,	today.			Armed	resistance	was	not	the	only	obstacle	that	the	British	faced	in	enacting	their	colonial	 designs.	 Fyfe’s	 (1962)	 colourful	 800-page	 ‘History	 of	 Sierra	 Leone’	 is	dotted	 with	 a	 litany	 of	 accounts	 of	 deadly	 epidemics,	 for	 which	 the	 mosquito-ridden	 marshes	 and	 jungles	 around	 the	 Freetown	 peninsula	 were	 a	 natural	breeding	ground.	It	is	no	coincidence	that	the	expression	‘white	man’s	grave’	was	coined	in	Sierra	Leone.	For	the	year	1859,	Fyfe	notes:			 One	disease	after	another	broke	out	–	fever,	yellow	fever,	measles.	Smallpox	ravaged	the	villages	[around	Freetown].	At	least	500	died	in	seven	months.	The	doctors	fell	ill,	Dr	Bradshaw,	the	Colonial	Surgeon,	with	yellow	fever	–	from	which,	a	rare	case,	he	recovered.	Only	one	Army	Surgeon	was	 left	 to	tend	 the	 sick.	 The	 forty-two	 European	 deaths	 (half	 the	 European	population)	 included	 both	 bishops,	 the	 Roman	 Catholic	 priests,	 and	 the	headmaster	 of	 the	 Grammar	 School	 and	 his	wife.	 Only	 one	 senior	 official	died,	Smyth,	the	Colonial	Secretary,	of	smallpox.	It	was	in	this	terrible	year	
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that	the	vultures	or	turkey-buzzards	are	said	to	have	first	come	to	Freetown	where	they	have	since	been	so	conspicuous.	(Fyfe	1962:296).		There	were	other	major	yellow	fever	outbreaks	in	1859,	1884	and	1897.	Options	to	drain	the	swampy	regions	at	the	turn	of	the	century	were	discounted,	with	the	Colonial	Office	finally	opting	to	move	Europeans	to	the	hills,	which	were	served	by	a	newly	built	 railway	 line.	The	most	 recent	epidemic	of	 smallpox	was	 in	1968-9,	which,	as	with	Ebola,	was	transmitted	through	burials	(Hopkins	et	al	1971).			The	 Colony	 –	 comprising	 Freetown	 and	 its	 immediate	 surroundings	 –	 and	 the	Protectorate,	its	hinterland,	were	separated	only	by	an	invisible	boundary	that	was	crossed	 regularly.	 Yet	 each	 had	 its	 own	 unique	 legal	 and	 administrative	 system,	and	these	coexistence	arrangements	remained	in	place	until	only	a	decade	before	independence.	Colony	residents	were	subjects	of	the	British	Crown	and	therefore	required	to	abide	by	English	law,	whereas	Protectorate	residents	were	subject	to	the	customary	law	of	native	courts	and	the	improvised	justice	administered	by	the	Frontier	 Police.	 Protectorate	 taxes	 were	 introduced	 along	 with	 foreign	 rule,	whereas	this	occurred	in	the	Colony	almost	a	year	after	Freetown	was	ceded	to	it,	and	 with	 exemptions.	 While	 slavery	 was	 outlawed	 in	 the	 colony	 in	 1787,	 it	remained	legal	in	the	protectorate	until	1927	(Ferme	2004).	Finally,	in	relation	to	land	 tenure	 law,	 the	Colony	 operated	with	English	 concepts	 of	 freehold	 interest,	while	 those	 of	 the	 Protectorate	 were	 rooted	 in	 customary	 principles	 (Asiama	2006:222).		Throughout	the	19th	and	20th	centuries,	the	positions	of	the	Krio	shifted	radically.	In	 a	manner	 reminiscent	 of	 earlier	 brokers	 between	 European	 traders	 and	 local	populations,	the	Krio	positioned	themselves	as	intermediaries	between	the	British	and	 locals,	 and	 as	 ‘interpreters	 of	 Western	 culture	 to	 other	 Africans’	 (Harris	2013:13).	Their	position	was	based	in	large	measure	on	affinity	to	British	colonial	culture	and	education,	finding	expression	in	forms	of	property	ownership,	English-sounding	 names,	 Western	 dress,	 American	 architectural	 styles,	 and	 Christian	practice.	However,	as	 the	20th	Century	progressed,	 the	Krio	 found	 themselves	on	
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officials.	The	wane	of	Krio	political	dominance	was	underpinned	by	the	birth	and	extension	of	a	 ‘patron-client’	system,	 in	which	 the	state	acted	as	middlemen,	and	the	 population	 as	 clients.	 This	 system	 became	 increasingly	 politically	 and	economically	integrated	in	the	decades	following	independence	(Keen	2005).	The	Krio	lost	their	politically	elite	status	to	native	ethnic	groups,	but	retained	control	of	economic	 niches	 in	 the	 capital,	 and	 were	 influential	 members	 of	 Freetown’s	professional	 and	 civil	 society.	 They	 also	 earned	 wages	 from	 the	 British,	 for	example,	from	a	British	air	base	on	the	peninsula	that	operated	during	the	Second	World	War	(Cohen	1981).			In	1951,	after	much	contestation	and	resistance	from	the	Krio	community,	a	new	constitution	was	drafted	 in	which	 the	Protectorate	 and	Colony	were	united.	 The	‘skewed	development’	(Keen	2005:8)	under	the	British	did	not	alter	substantially	after	 independence,	 in	 which	 the	 ‘shadow	 state’	 (Reno	 1995)	 premised	 on	patrimonial	 principles	 continued	 to	 thrive,	 despite,	 and	 because	 of,	 growing	international	pressures	to	reform.		The	colonial	period	was	followed	by	almost	two	decades	of	what	was	in	effect	a	one-party	state,	from	1973	until	the	military	coup	in	1992.	In	1979,	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	negotiated	an	economic	stabilization	plan,	pressuring	the	government	to	reduce	state	spending,	with	major	cuts	 made	 in	 areas	 of	 development,	 health,	 and	 education.	 The	 country	 went	through	a	process	of	economic	collapse,	with	huge	shortages	of	staple	foods,	such	as	 rice	 (Peters	 2011).	 The	 patrimonial	 system,	 faced	 with	 limited	 resources,	collapsed.	‘Big	men’	began	to	prioritize	their	own	interests,	and	to	privilege	short-term	security	–	supplying	imported	to	rice	to	clients	such	as	the	army	and	police	–	over	 long-term	 survival	 through	 providing	 jobs	 and	 supporting	 the	 education	 of	loyal	subjects	(Richards	1996).			This	 sowed	 the	 seeds	 for	 the	decade-long	 civil	war,	which	began	 in	March	1991	with	 an	 attempted	 overthrow	 of	 the	 government	 by	 the	 Revolutionary	 United	Front	 (RUF),	 a	 youth-based	 rebel	 group	 supported	 by	 Charles	 Taylor’s	 National	Patriotic	 Front	 of	 Liberia.	 Large	 areas	 of	 the	 mining	 districts	 were	 seized.	 This	allowed	for	a	separate	military	coup,	in	which	a	26-year-old	junior	officer	became	President.	With	pressure	from	the	international	community,	including	sanctions	on	
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trade,	 this	 regime,	 while	 popular	 among	 many	 youth,	 was	 overthrown.	 The	underpaid	 military	 proved	 unable	 to	 contain	 the	 RUF,	 which	 fought	 a	 stealthy	guerrilla	war,	operating	out	of	camps	in	the	rainforest.	With	pressure	from	the	IMF	to	cut	government	expenditure,	the	use	of	external	mercenaries	by	the	government	proved	 unsustainable.	 After	 a	 failed	 peace	 accord,	 the	 war	 persisted,	 and	eventually	reached	Freetown	with	bloody	consequences.	This	paved	the	way	for	a	British	and	Nigerian	led	‘liberal	intervention’	in	which	the	rebel	forces	were	driven	out	 of	 the	 capital.2	The	RUF	 came	under	 increasing	 financial	 pressure	 as	 trading	links	to	Liberia	had	become	strained,	and	signed	a	peace	accord	in	2001.			The	closing	stages	of	the	war	and	its	aftermath	saw	a	UN	sponsored	Disarmament,	Demobilisation,	 and	 Reintegration	 programme,	 the	 deployment	 of	 UN	peacekeepers,	 and	 a	 high-profile	 peace-building	 and	 reconciliation	 process.	 This	co-existed	 with	 a	 proliferation	 of	 NGO	 activity,	 with	 issues	 concerning	 youth	 a	priority,	 given	 its	 central	 role	 in	 the	 war.	 In	 2007,	 a	 relatively	 peaceful	 general	election	was	held	in	which	there	was	a	much-celebrated	peaceful	transfer	from	the	SLPP	 party	 to	 the	 APC	 party,	 led	 by	 Ernest	 Bai	 Koroma,	who	 remains	 president	today.	Political	discourse	across	both	parties	is	based	on	shared	neoliberal	visions	of	 economic	 development	 (through	 foreign	 investment),	 anti-corruption,	 human	rights,	and	youth	economic	participation,	which	is	reflected	in	a	host	of	civil	society	and	 informal	 youth-based	 organisations.	 Yet	 there	 is	 widespread	 dissatisfaction	with	 the	 political	 process,	 with	 continual	 reports	 of	 ‘corrupt’	 practices,	 political	infighting,	and	a	disconnect	between	the	political	discourse	and	the	reality	on	the	ground,	where	state-sponsored	development	projects,	increasingly	out-sourced	to	Chinese	companies,	are	 regarded	as	superficial	and	short-term,	and	 in	which	 the	majority	 of	 the	 country’s	 natural	 resources	 continue	 to	 be	 signed	 off	 to	 foreign	investors	in	short-sighted	deals.	Popular	personal	engagement	with	the	state,	such	as	 through	 its	 legal	 and	 bureaucratic	 institutions,	 often	 requires	 bribes:	 a	phenomenon	reinforced	by	the	underpayment	of	government	workers.			
Fieldwork	and	personal	engagement		
																																																									2	The	rebels	got	as	far	the	Congo	River,	the	opposing	side	to	Congo	Town.		
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Continuities	and	shifts	in	focus			My	 research	 is	 informed	 by	 seventeen	 months	 of	 ethnographic	 fieldwork	 from	October	 2013	 to	 September	 2014	 and	 March	 2015	 to	 September	 2015,	 in	Freetown.	When	I	first	arrived,	I	stayed	in	Congo	Town	with	Foday,	to	whom	I	had	been	introduced	by	my	brother,	Jacob,	who	spent	two	years	in	Freetown	working	in	Sierra	Leone’s	foreign	ministry.	Foday	was	a	taxi	driver	and	aspiring	recording	artist.	For	9	months,	we	shared	a	bed	in	his	small	‘room	and	parlour’	in	the	Congo	Town	 valley,	 before	 I	 moved	 to	 stay	 in	 a	 family	 compound	 close	 by	 in	 the	neighbourhood.			My	original	PhD	research	proposal	was	an	economic-anthropology-inspired	study	of	young	men	who	work	as	taxi	drivers,	a	popular	profession	for	youth	in	the	city,	with	its	post-war	population	boom	and	its	increasingly	young	demographic.	In	the	early	stages	of	my	fieldwork,	I	spent	my	days	with	drivers,	some	of	whom	were	my	neighbours	 in	 Congo	 Town,	 and	 others	 that	 I	 got	 to	 know	 through	 their	involvement	 with	 the	 Sierra	 Leone	 Commercial	 Bike	 Riders	 Union	 (BRU),	 with	which	 I	 was	 also	 working.	 When	 I	 was	 not	 with	 drivers,	 I	 was	 in	 my	neighbourhood,	spending	time	with	young	men	and	their	families,	friends,	lovers,	enemies,	and	neighbours,	 to	whom	I	had	 increasingly	become	socially	connected.	All	the	while	my	Krio	was	rapidly	improving	through	24-hour	exposure,	and	I	was	taking	detailed	fieldnotes	on	everything	that	came	up.			Gradually,	 the	 balance	 of	 my	 research	 began	 to	 shift	 towards	 life	 in	 the	neighbourhoods	where	 these	young	men	 lived:	 their	 families,	and	young	women,	assumed	 greater	 prominence.	 Building	 relationships	 with	 the	 bike	 riders	 had	proved	 a	 slow	 and	 gradual	 process,	 but	 I	 was	 now	 getting	 a	 much	 richer	perspective	on	life	in	the	neighbourhood,	where	I	was	becoming	integrated	into	a	very	 rich	 and	 close-knit	 social	 network,	 through	 day-to-day	 exchange	 of	 food,	conversation,	 attending	 important	 family	 events	 and	 festivities,	 and	 generally	becoming	 personally	 involved	 in	 the	 life	 projects	 of	my	 friends	 and	 neighbours.	This	 focus	 felt	 reflective	 of	 urban	 life	 in	 a	 context	 with	 very	 limited	 formal	
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employment;	for	young	people,	especially,	much	of	day-to-day	life	was	spent	in	the	neighbourhood,	an	integral	arena	to	‘start	from’.			A	second	shift	 in	 focus	was	brought	by	 the	unanticipated	Ebola	virus	outbreak.	 I	first	 came	across	 reports	of	 the	virus	 from	a	neighbourhood	WhatsApp	group	 in	which	 I	 participated.	 I	 had	 at	 first	 written	 it	 off	 as	 ‘fake	 news’,	 which	 was	 not	uncommon	on	 these	 threads.	For	Freetown	residents,	 the	virus	remained	distant	for	many	months,	and	for	a	long	time	the	veracity,	and	extent	of	the	virus	remained	questioned	and	hotly	debated.	However,	 ‘Ebola’	 soon	become	 inescapable,	as	 the	nation’s	borders	began	to	tighten,	commercial	airplane	companies	stopped	flying,	an	extensive	set	of	far-reaching	bylaws	and	protocols,	restrictions	and	regulations,	were	 formalised	 under	 the	 state	 of	 emergency,	 and	 humanitarian	 organisations	poured	in.	In	a	matter	of	months,	Sierra	Leone	was	at	the	heart	of	a	global	health	crisis.			From	my	perspective,	my	greatest	 fear	was	getting	stuck	 in	 the	country	 if	 things	got	significantly	worse.	Throughout	 the	summer	months	of	2014,	 this	 felt	 like	an	increasingly	 legitimate	 cause	 for	 concern,	 not	 because	 I	 had	 encountered	 Ebola	victims	personally,	but	because	leaving	the	country	was	getting	more	challenging.	After	close	consultation	with	and	assistance	from	my	supervisors	and	department,	I	decided	to	leave	in	mid-September	2014	until	it	felt	safe	enough	to	return,	which	ended	 up	 being	 6	 months	 later.	 I	 booked	 a	 ticket	 on	 a	 connecting	 flight	 via	Marrakech,	 operated	by	Royal	Air	Maroc,	which,	 in	 an	act	of	 solidarity	 (so	 I	was	told),	had	committed	 to	continuing	 its	operations	by	request	of	King	Mohammed	IV.		By	 this	 time,	 I	had	been	reporting	on	 the	crisis	 from	Freetown.	Back	 in	 the	UK,	 I	became	involved	in	two	initiatives	that	were	set	up	to	co-ordinate	anthropologists	providing	 assistance	 to	 the	 formal	 Ebola	 response:	 the	 UK-based	 Ebola	Anthropology	Response	Platform,	and	the	US-based	Ebola	Anthropology	Initiative.	This	 involved	 several	 activities.	 One	 was	 email-based	 consultation	 with	 those	involved	 in	 the	Ebola	response,	which	 in	my	case	 included	organisations	such	as	the	UN	and	UNICEF.	 In	most	 cases	 this	amounted	 to	writing	briefings	–	 typically	
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produced	 collectively	 –	 on	 themes	 such	 as	 burial	 practices,	 livelihood	 strategies,	mobilisation	 of	 youth,	 and	 under-reporting	 of	 cases.	 I	 aimed	 to	 forward	 the	concerns,	views,	and	priorities	of	my	friends	and	neighbours	in	Congo	Town,	which	I	 hoped	 might	 mitigate	 against	 the	 destructive	 potential	 of	 heavy-handed	humanitarian	 intervention.	While	 I	 felt	 encouraged	 that	 anthropological	 insights	were	 on	 some	 level	 being	 considered,	 I	 felt	 uneasy	 about	 the	 requirements	 to	reduce	cultural	and	social	complexity	to	bullet-point-based	briefings,	as	well	as	the	assumption	that	seemed	to	underlie	the	official	response	that	 ‘culture’	was	 ‘local’	and	relatively	static.	The	atmosphere	of	 ‘crisis’,	or	 ‘mayhem’,	as	one	development	professional	described	it	to	me,	allowed	agencies	to	make	consequential	decisions	too	quickly.	While	I	was	in	London,	I	was	regularly	in	touch	with	my	interlocutors	via	social	media	and	phone	calls.	However,	 I	was	keen	 to	get	back	 to	 the	 field	as	soon	as	it	seemed	safe	to	return.			In	March	2015,	I	returned	for	a	final	6	months	of	fieldwork.	The	state	of	emergency	was	 still	 in	 full	 effect,	 even	 if	 cases	 of	 the	 virus	 in	 Freetown	 were	 decreasing.	Several	 of	my	 interlocutors	 had	 become	mobilised	 in	 various	ways	 in	 the	 Ebola	response.	 One	 of	my	 close	 friends,	 Peter,	 a	motorbike	 taxi	 driver	 and	 university	student,	 had	 become	 attached	 as	 a	 bike	 rider	 to	 one	 of	 the	 official	 NGO-	 and	Ministry	 of	 Health-run	 burial	 teams	 that	 were	 established	 during	 the	 crisis	 to	perform	 all	 burials.	 He	 invited	me	 to	meet	 the	 team	 he	 worked	 with,	 and	 after	obtaining	 the	 necessary	 permissions	 from	 relevant	 authorities,	 I	 would	 spend	about	 a	 day	 a	 week	 or	 so	 with	 the	 team.	 The	 rest	 of	 the	 time	 I	 continued	 to	document	the	lives	of	my	existing	interlocutors,	in	my	neighbourhood	and	beyond,	carefully	charting	life	and	death	in	the	time	of	Ebola.			
Fieldwork	and	ethics			My	primary	fieldwork	method	was	participant	observation.	I	also	conducted	semi-structured	 interviews,	 primarily	 with	 people	 connected	 to	 my	 research	 interest	but	whom	I	did	not	encounter	regularly:	political	authorities	in	Congo	Town,	bike	park	 executives,	 and	 administrators	 at	 the	NGO	who	managed	 the	 burial	 team	 I	followed.	 In	addition,	 I	collected	family	histories,	primarily	 from	the	families	that	
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feature	 recurrently	 feature	 in	 my	 thesis,	 and	 I	 took	 photographs	 regularly,	primarily	on	the	smartphone	that	I	carried	around	with	me.		As	 is	common	with	ethnographic-centred	research,	my	fieldwork	took	on	a	 fairly	formless	character.	Much	of	my	time	was	spent	in	the	neighbourhood,	circulating	between	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 contacts	 I	 had	 come	 to	 know,	 particularly	my	neighbours	 and	 the	 families	 who	 ‘adopted’	 me.	 As	 my	 Krio	 improved,	 and	 our	relationships	 developed,	 these	 interactions	 became	 more	 fruitful.	 Those	 with	whom	I	had	developed	particularly	close	relationships,	or	with	whom	I	had	prior	connections	 via	 my	 brother,	 soon	 became	 my	 key	 interlocutors.	 I	 would	 often	spend	 much	 of	 the	 day	 with	 these	 primary	 interlocutors,	 participating	 in	 many	aspects	of	their	lives;	in	the	home,	preparing	food,	at	family	events,	meals,	visiting	friends,	work	 (especially	 the	 taxi	drivers	 that	 I	knew;	one,	Alhassan,	even	 taught	me	to	drive).	I	also	attended	religious	services	and	festivals,	visited	offices,	courts	of	 law	 and	 police	 stations,	 went	 to	 the	 beach,	 and	 hung	 out	 at	 bars	 and	 music	venues.	Many	of	these	interlocutors	became	my	close	friends;	or	perhaps	it	was	the	other	way	 around.	 I	would	write	 fieldnotes	 on	 a	daily	 basis,	 but	worked	 flexibly	around	 the	 rhythm	 of	 activity	 on	 the	 particular	 day.	 I	 soon	 learnt	 that	 evenings	were	a	time	to	socialise,	so	sticking	to	a	regular	schedule	of	writing	in	the	evenings	was	impossible.			My	 research	 methodology	 thus	 involved	 following	 a	 relatively	 fixed	 set	 of	interlocutors	 –	 most	 of	 whom	 knew	 each	 other	 –	 on	 a	 recurring	 basis	 for	 the	duration	of	my	fieldwork.	In	the	course	of	this	process	I	became	embedded	in	this	dense	 social	 network,	 gaining	 my	 own	 perspective	 on	 events	 as	 they	 unfolded,	while	 simultaneously	 recording	 the	 interpretations	of	my	 interlocutors,	which	 in	turn	 guided	 me	 in	 my	 process	 of	 integration.	 Thus	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 data	recorded	in	my	fieldnotes	involves	my	own	personal	reflections	and	observations	interweaved	among	the	conversations	that	I	had	with	of	those	around	me,	often	in	which	 these	very	same	events	were	discussed.	The	 thesis	 itself	 is	structured	 in	a	way	 that	 closely	 reflects	 this	 approach.	 	 	 Broadly	 speaking	 the	 thesis	 moves	forward	in	time	–	although	not	strictly	–	with	the	first	three	chapters	covering	in	principle	the	period	of	my	fieldwork	before	the	height	of	the	Ebola	outbreak,	and	
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the	second	half	covering	the	crisis	itself.	 	Throughout	the	thesis,	however,	we	see	many	of	the	same	characters	appear.		Much	of	the	ethnography	in	the	thesis	details	interconnected	 events	 and	 processes	 that	 unfolded	 during	 the	 course	 of	 my	fieldwork.	 This	 provides,	 I	 suggest,	 a	 particularly	 powerful	 and	 nuanced	 means	through	 which	 to	 chart	 and	 interpret	 the	 continuities	 and	 transformations	 that	social	life	during	Ebola	entailed.				This	empirical	and	theoretical	approach	to	fieldwork	takes	significant	 inspiration	from	 the	 work	 by	 the	 anthropologists,	 who	 following	 Max	 Gluckman,	 became	known	as	the	Manchester	School.		Many	of	those	in	the	school	examined	processes	of	modernity	and	urbanization	in	Southern	Africa	in	their	research	(Epstein	1958,	Gluckman	 1971,	 Mitchell	 1966),	 some	 of	 whom	were	 connected	 to	 the	 Rhodes-Livingstone	Institute.		These	anthropologists	were	not	aiming	to	discover	the	social	system	 that	 governed	 and	 reproduced	 order	 in	 a	 given	 society,	 as	 had	 become	structural-functionalists	 orthodoxy,	 but	 rather	 aimed	 to	 understand,	 and	document,	change.		The	methodology	developed	in	order	to	answer	such	questions	was	 the	 ‘extended	 case-study	method’,	 also	known	as	 ‘situational	 analysis’.	 	 This	method	 relied	 on	 rich	 ethnographic	 recording	 of	 the	 ‘event’,	 with	 a	 full	acknowledgement	that	social	processes	and	actors	are	in	a	continual	state	of	flux.	Through	this,	one	could	gain	an	insight	into	the	social	forces	at	play	guiding	change	and	 transformation.	 The	 method	 thus	 relied	 on	 dialectic	 relationship	 between	ethnography	and	analysis	(Evens	and	Handelman	2008).				There	are	many	ways	in	which	the	social	context,	as	well	as	theoretical	interests,	of	my	research	project	fit	particularly	well	within	the	methodological	tradition	of	the	Manchester	 School.	 Firstly,	 the	 location	 of	 my	 fieldwork	 in	 an	 urban	 centre;	particularly	 one	 that	 has	 in	 recent	 decades	 experienced	 significant	 population	influx.	 It	 is	notable	that	 this	methodological	approach	of	 the	extended	case-study	has	been	applied	 less	overtly	 to	West	Africa	 than	 in	Southern	and	Central	Africa.		Secondly,	 the	 social	 flux	experienced	by	young	men	at	 the	heart	of	 this	 study,	 in	which	individuals	move	between	multiple	positionalities	in	their	‘comings	of	age’.	The	method	 is	particularly	well	 equipped	 to	pick	up	on	and	 theorize	 such	 shifts.	Thirdly,	 this	 flux	extends	 to	 the	social	 field	more	broadly	during	 the	Ebola	crisis.	
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The	 fine-grained	 ethnographic	 method	 paints	 a	 more	 nuanced	 picture	 of	continuities	than	might	be	initially	expected.			Fourthly,	 and	 linked	 to	 this	 point,	 are	 firstly	 the	 conceptual	 links	 between	 the	‘event’	 or	 ‘situation’,	 and	 ‘crisis’,	 which	 this	 thesis	 attempts	 to	 in	multiple	 ways	theorize;	 secondly,	 the	 contention	 of	 the	 thesis	 that	 the	 Ebola	 crisis	was	 not	 an	aberration	 from	 normality,	 but	 instead	 was	 uncovering	 and	 revealing	 of	 deep-rooted	forces	–	such	as	the	‘cross-rhythms’	described	above	–	and	in	particular	for	young	 men,	 productive	 and	 generative;	 and	 thirdly,	 the	 ways	 that	 the	 thesis	connects	 attention	 to	 the	 micro-social	 processes	 with	 the	 macro,	 in	 this	 case	dynamics	 of	 a	 neighbourhood	 with	 the	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 a	 global	 health	crisis.	 	 These	were	 central	 concerns	 of	 Gluckman	 and	 his	 followers.	 As	Kapferer	summarizes:	 ‘a	 major	 point	 that	 Gluckman	 stresses	 is	 that	 in	 crisis	 –	 in	 the	situation	as	crisis	as	specifically	in	events	that	constitute	concentrated	and	intense	dimensions	of	overall	 crisis	of	 the	 situation	–	 that	 the	vital	 forces	and	principles	already	 engaged	 in	 social	 action	 (or	 taking	 form	 in	 the	 event	 itself)	 are	 both	revealed	and	rendered	available	to	anthropological	analysis’	(Kapferer	2008:122).		Thus	this	thesis	is	in	part	a	testament	to	the	enduring	usefulness	of	the	extended	case	study	method	in	the	study	of	the	contemporary	world.		My	close	relationship	with	my	interlocutors	raised	several	ethical	questions	that	I	grappled	with	throughout	my	fieldwork.	 In	 introducing	myself	to	people,	 I	would	explain	 that	 I	was	doing	research,	and	give	 them	an	outline	of	what	 the	research	entailed,	enquiring	as	to	consent.	However,	I	soon	learned	that	maintaining	social	relationships,	 through	 which	 I	 was	 accessing	 my	 data,	 came	 with	 significant	expectations,	 not	 least	material	 support.	While	 this	 is	 a	 prominent	 feature	 of	 all	close	relationships	 in	Sierra	Leone,	 I	discovered	that	my	position	as	a	white	man	often	 led	 to	 amplified	 expectations,	 which	 in	 many	 cases	 I	 could	 meet.	 A	 key	concern	was	how	my	privilege	was	impacting	on	my	relationships	and	the	nature	of	 the	 data	 I	was	 collecting.	 As	 time	went	 on,	 I	 learned	 to	 discern	what	 felt	 like	‘reasonable’	requests	for	assistance,	and	in	turn	what	it	was	reasonable	for	me	to	ask	of	others.	My	transition	from	an	outsider	to	an	insider,	which	was	sometimes	described	as	a	racial	transformation	by	my	friends	and	neighbours,	at	times	made	
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this	an	easier	task,	but	at	the	same	time,	my	position	as	both	a	white	foreigner	and	a	 Congo	 Town	 resident	 was	 a	 cause	 of	 uncertainty	 in	 this	 area.	 I	 often	 felt	 as	though	 I	 was	 reconciling	 being	 a	 ‘good’	 person	 by	 local	 standards	 (which	 I	 was	constantly	 learning	 and	 assessing),	 and	performing	what	 I	 felt	 comfortable	with,	and	what	others	expected	me	of	me,	as	a	foreigner.		My	 solution	 was	 to	 help	 out	 as	 much	 as	 possible	 in	 non-material	 ways	 such	 as	household	 tasks,	 health	 and	 safety	 measures	 (for	 example.	 setting	 up	 a	 hand-washing	station),	and	skill	sharing	(such	as	IT,	English	language,	writing,	reading,	musical	 tuition).	 I	 tried	 to	 provide	material	 assistance	when	 it	 felt	 ‘right’,	which	meant	 particularly	 among	 those	 I	 was	 close	 to,	 or	 living	 with.	 My	 deep	entanglements	with	those	around	me	was	sometimes	a	cause	of	 internal	 tension;	the	 most	 personal	 exchanges	 were	 those	 that	 felt	 most	 pressing	 to	 record	 as	fieldnotes.	 Living	 in	 close	 emotional,	 material,	 and	 physical	 proximity	 to	 my	interlocutors	was	a	source	of	personal	tension	and	uncertainty,	as	well	as	a	source	of	 conflict	 in	 relationships,	 where	 I	 sometimes	 perceived	 hostilities	 that	 were	indirect	 and	 unspoken,	 yet	 troubling.	 These	 feelings,	 I	 would	 discover,	 were	extremely	 instructive	 in	 interpreting	 the	 social	 world	 of	 my	 interlocutors.	Ultimately	 I	knew,	and	reminded	my	 interlocutors,	of	my	reason	 for	being	 there;	those	who	came	close	to	me	were	always	willing	and	enthusiastic	participants	 in	the	project.	During	my	fieldwork,	I	made	sure	to	gain	appropriate	permission	from	relevant	 gate-keepers,	 which	 often	 included	 not	 just	 the	 people	 I	 was	 working	closely	 with,	 but	 also	 the	 authorities	 above	 them:	 officials	 at	 the	 NGO	 and	 bike	park,	family	elders,	and	local	political	authorities.			During	 Ebola,	 personal	 safety	 was	 a	 considerable	 concern.	 While	 I	 was	 in	 the	country,	 I	monitored	carefully	the	daily	reports	of	Ebola	cases	and	their	 location.	When	Ebola	entered	Freetown,	 I	 returned	 to	London	until	 the	virus	had	become	more	 contained.	 The	 only	ways	 of	 catching	 the	 virus	were	 through	 close	 bodily	contact	 and	 exchange	 of	 fluids	 with	 the	 sick	 and	 dead.	 During	 this	 period,	 I	refrained	from	all	body	contact,	and	carried	around	hand-sanitizer,	which	I	would	apply	regularly.	I	washed	my	home	regularly	with	chlorinated	water,	and	I	did	not	eat	meat.	 Even	 though	 I	was	 following	 a	 burial	 team,	 I	 felt	 safe,	 yet	 nonetheless	
	 56	
took	precautions,	such	as	keeping	a	significant	distance	when	they	were	physically	handling	a	body.	However,	the	burial	teams	were	well-trained	and	equipped,	and	as	such	were	not	at	risk	of	contagion.	Throughout	my	fieldwork	I	adhered	closely	to	the	LSE	Research	Ethics	policy.		
	
Chapter	outlines					The	 thesis	 broadly	moves	 between	 a	 focus	 on	 life	 immediately	 before	 the	 Ebola	outbreak	(in	chapters	2-4)	to	life	during	the	outbreak	(chapter	5-7).	A	central	task	of	the	thesis	is	to	chart	ethnographically	how	the	flows	of	life	before	crisis	folded	into	those	of	crisis.		This	not	only	theoretically	extends	our	interpretive	capacity	to	make	sense	of	 ‘life	during	Ebola’,	but	conversely	 ‘life	during	Ebola’	sheds	light	on	life	in	Sierra	Leone,	and	contemporary	Africa,	more	broadly,	revealing	both	deep-rooted	 and	 perhaps	more	 immediately	 contemporary	 social	 dynamics.	 However,	the	events	that	unfold	in	the	thesis	do	not	always	sharply	fit	into	these	two	phases,	and	move	between	them;	as	do	my	own	critical	reflections,	as	well	as	those	of	my	interlocutors,	 which	 allow	 us	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 what	 was	 going	 on.	 	 In	 rough	parallel	to	these	temporal	flows	are	expanding	thematic	shifts	through	a	series	of	nesting	spheres:	starting	with	the	intricacies	of	specific	home	and	domestic	spaces,	and	 ending	 with	 deliberations	 on	 how	 these	 relate	 to	 the	 broader	 political	economy.	 As	 with	 the	 temporal	 narrative,	 this	 is	 not	 a	 linear	 journey.	 We	 see	returns	 to	 the	 home,	 neighborhood,	 and	 the	 realignments	 and	 negotiations	 of	intimacies	 throughout.	 These	 movements,	 reversals,	 accelerations,	 overlapping,	and	 interweaving	 threads,	 in	 space	 and	 time,	 are	 crucial	 to	 the	 central	ethnographic	 and	 analytical	 ambitions	 of	 the	 thesis.	 	 While	 coming	 of	 age	 is	broadly	a	 journey	out	of	 the	home	–	 from	dependence	 to	 independence	–	 in	 this	context,	it	is	a	far	from	linear	one.			Chapter	2	centers	on	 three	case	studies	 from	Congo	Town,	 that	 take	place	 in	 the	two	most	 common	 young	men’s	 domestic	 settings:	 in	 family	 compounds,	 and	 in	smaller	 structures	 that	 are	 typically	 shared	 with	 other	 young	 men.	 	 The	 case	studies	all	concern	conflicts,	contestations	of	status,	and	resolutions	between	more	junior	 and	 more	 senior	 people,	 which	 demonstrate	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 status	 is	
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asserted	 and	 reconfigured	 on	 a	 day-to-day	 basis.	 	 These	 cases	 also	 reveal	 the	fundamental	ambiguities	that	surround	the	home	and	young	men’s	place	in	it.	The	home	is	both	a	space	of	meaning	and	mobility	for	young	men	as	well	as	danger	and	decay,	 and,	 in	 an	 interlinked	 way,	 it	 is	 a	 space	 where	 relations	 are	 defined	 by	registers	of	kinship	as	well	as	business;	registers	that	are	both	in	conflict	yet	also	heavily	 intertwined	 in	 a	 context	 where	 domestic	 spaces	 are	 central	 arenas	 for	livelihood	procurement	as	well	as	familial	status	formation	for	young	men.				Chapter	3	steps	outside	the	home	onto	the	street,	centering	on	taxi	driving,	which	is	one	of	the	most	popular	occupations	for	young	men	in	Freetown,	yet	one	fraught	with	social	and	corporeal	dangers.	 It	 identifies	 two	major	models	of	professional	status	 that	 young	men	 channel:	 unionism	 and	 entrepreneurialism.	 	 The	 chapter	situates	 these	 two	models	 in	 two	 distinct,	 yet	 intertwined,	 social	 networks	 that	drivers	are	embedded	in,	and	through	which	working	relationships	are	structured:	the	 Sierra	 Leone	 Commercial	 Bike	 Riders	 Union	 (BRU),	 and	 the	 family	 and	neighborhood.	 	 	 The	 chapter	 demonstrates	 how	 both	 networks,	 and	 the	 ideals	according	 to	 which	 work	 is	 structured	 in	 each,	 position	 young	 men	 in	contradictory	 sets	 of	 relations	 and	 drives.	 	 These	 contradictions	 boil	 down	 to	complex	 and	 multifaceted	 relationships	 with,	 firstly,	 the	 neoliberal	 state,	 and,	secondly,	with	familial	structures.	Both	are	united	and	entangled,	not	only	in	ways	that	drivers	move	between	each	network	in	practice,	but	also	in	the	ways	that	their	actions	appear	to	simultaneously	work	against	and	within	‘oppressive’	structures,	and	in	turn	reproduce	them.	However,	the	channeling	of	performative	repertoires	of	 unionism	 and	 entrepreneurialism,	 and	 the	 social	 bonds	 that	 are	 forged	 and	negotiated	in	the	process,	allow	for	meaningful,	yet	volatile,	mobility	to	take	place.				Chapter	4	examines	the	popular	showy	consumption	practice	among	young	men,	known	 as	 ‘bluffing’,	 revolving	 around	Western	 consumer	 goods.	 The	 practice	 is	valued	 in	 morally	 ambiguous	 ways:	 understood	 as	 both	 ‘fake’	 and	 ‘false’	 at	 the	same	 time	 as	 valued	 as	 almost	 a	 necessary	 feature	 of	 being	 a	 socially	 accepted	young	male	 in	Freetown.	 	The	chapter	untangles	 the	social	and	economic	 ‘logics’	behind	 this	 practice,	 in	 which	 those	 who	 partake	 in	 it	 are	 carefully	 positioning	themselves	 in	 relation	 to	 family	 hierarchies	 and	neighborhood	networks	 in	 both	
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subversive	ways,	and	yet	also	in	keeping	with	established,	yet	reconfigured,	means	through	 which	 status	 has	 historically	 been	 asserted	 in	 Freetown.	 	While	 showy	consumption	 practices,	 with	 reference	 to	 British	 aesthetics,	 were	 historically	attributed	 to	 the	 Krio	 –	 reflective	 of	 their	 often	 elite	 economic	 and	 political	positionalities	 in	 the	 colonial	 and	 nascent	 post-colonial	 context	 –	 today	 bluffing,	often	inspired	by	the	aesthetics	of	transatlantic	urban	youth	culture,	is	reflective	of	a	much	more	 informalised	 political	 economy	 that	 young	 ‘country’	 (i.e.	 non-Krio)	men	 are	 marginally	 positioned	 in.	 In	 considering	 its	 ambiguous	 moral	 and	symbolic	qualities,	as	a	form	of	both	long-term	and	short-term	exchange,	as	well	as	collapsing	distinctions	between	‘local’	and	‘global’,	the	bluff	represents	a	powerful	commentary	on	the	ambiguous	nature	of	coming	of	age	in	Freetown	today.		Chapter	5	turns	to	an	explicit	examination	of	the	Ebola	crisis,	through	an	analysis	of	 the	performance	of	burials.	 	While	most	of	 the	 city’s	 residents	had	no	 contact	with	 the	 virus,	 ‘Ebola’	 was	 inescapable,	 due	 to	 the	 onerous	 state	 of	 emergency	regulations	 imposed	 by	 national	 and	 international	 authorities.	 All	 burials,	regardless	 of	 the	 cause	 of	 death,	 were	 to	 be	 performed	 by	 newly	 established	official	 teams	 operating	 according	 to	 unfamiliar	 biomedical	 and	 bureaucratic	protocols.	 Burials	 became	 emblematic	 of	 the	 crisis	 through	 presenting	 a	 conflict	between	 local	 practices	 and	 novel	 procedures,	 which	 was	 coded	 locally	 in	 a	complex	racial	 language	of	 ‘black’	and	 ‘white’,	 recalling	a	 long	regional	history	of	violent	 integration	 into	 the	 Atlantic	 World.	 Building	 on	 longstanding	anthropological	 discussion	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 ‘good’	 death	 and	 social	order,	 the	 chapter	 explores	 how	 burials	 became	 sites	 around	 which	 opposing	‘orders’	were	experienced,	negotiated,	and	reconciled	in	locally	meaningful	ways.			Chapter	 6	 describes	 the	 rocky	 and	 non-linear	 process	 of	 family	 formation	 in	Freetown,	centring	on	the	case	of	a	young	couple	in	Congo	Town,	whose	child-birth	coincided	 exactly	 with	 the	 height	 of	 the	 Ebola	 state	 of	 emergency.	 The	 chapter	analyses	 the	 ways	 that	 the	 challenging	 and	 disruptive,	 yet	 equally	 enabling,	conditions	of	crisis	became	entangled	with	on-going	life	projects	of	young	men	and	women	 living	 through	 it.	 The	 prioritisation	 and	 pressing	 pursuit	 of	 family	formation	in	adverse	circumstances	represented	in	itself	a	powerful	and	revealing	
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local	 response	 to	 ‘crisis’.	 The	 realignment	 of	 intimacies	 inherent	 in	 this	 process,	relying	on	 the	management	and	harnessing	of	 social	 instability,	 served	as	both	a	means	 of	 building	 long-standing	 social	 structures,	 as	 well	 as	 maintaining	 and	reconfiguring	networks	of	support	during	hard	times.	Existing	flexibility	of	social	practices	 surrounding	 family	 formation,	 which	 is	 a	 challenge	 even	 in	 ‘normal’	circumstance,	 became	 a	 resource	 through	 which	 social	 reproduction	 was	forwarded,	and	accelerated,	in	times	of	crisis.				Finally,	 chapter	 7	 turns	 to	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 dimensions	 of	 crisis,	ethnographically	centering	on	the	experience	of	a	3-day	lockdown	in	Congo	Town,	and	 returning	 to	 the	 working	 life	 of	 the	 burial	 teams.	 The	 chapter	 explores	 the	interaction	 between	 the	 protocols	 and	 authoritative	 structures	 of	 the	 state	 of	emergency	 and	 humanitarian	 intervention	 with	 established	 social	 routines	 and	responses	 to	 ‘crisis’	 in	 Freetown,	 through	which	 residents	 were	 presented	 with	contradictory,	 yet	 neither	 unfamiliar,	 sets	 of	 social	 expectations.	 While	 some	 of	these	tensions	centred	around	practices	that	risked	transmission	of	the	Ebola	virus	–	 such	 as	 care	 and	 burial	 practices,	which	 have	 received	 the	most	 scholarly	 and	humanitarian	 attention	 –	 the	 chapter	 describes	 how	 a	wider	 set	 of	 tensions	 and	divergent	 visions	 pertaining	 to	 social,	 economic,	 and	 political	 life	 complexly	mapped	onto	 these	 fault-lines,	 often	 in	ways	 that	 challenge	 analysis	 of	 the	 crisis	that	pits	 ‘local’	culture	squarely	against	 ‘foreign’	humanitarian	culture.	Central	 to	the	analysis	is	the	phantom	state	that	emerged	during	the	intervention,	that	was	in	some	ways	more	concrete	than	the	real	state,	but	seemingly	only	for	as	long	as	the	crisis	itself.		The	chapter	demonstrates	the	ways	in	which	crisis	can	be	productive	of	‘normality’	and	vice	versa.		
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Chapter	2.	Home	truths:	care	and	danger	around	the	house		In	November	2014,	the	first	Ebola	case	was	reported	in	Congo	Town.	A	sick	man	came	 from	upcountry	 to	stay	with	a	 relative	 in	a	nearby	neighbourhood.	He	was	seeking	treatment	and	care	in	town,	a	common	practice	in	normal	circumstances.	The	man	died,	presumably	from	Ebola,	and	shortly	afterwards	the	daughter	of	his	relative,	his	primary	carer	in	the	house,	became	sick.	Her	mother	rushed	her	to	her	father’s	house,	in	Congo	Town.	The	move	was	explained	to	me	as	a	means	in	part	of	avoiding	 the	 congosa	 (gossip)	 of	 neighbours	 –	 she	 would	 be	 safer	 in	 another	neighbourhood.	Particularly	during	the	early	stages	of	the	Ebola	outbreak,	people	feared	 being	 falsely	 diagnosed	 as	 Ebola	 positive,	 and	 then	 being	 contaminated,	either	 intentionally	 or	 accidently,	 while	 receiving	 treatment.	 The	 young	 woman	died	at	her	father’s	house,	which	was	subsequently	quarantined	by	the	authorities	for	21	days,	the	incubation	period	of	the	virus.	No-one	was	permitted	to	enter	or	to	leave.	Fortunately,	 there	were	no	other	deaths	 in	 the	house	 in	 this	period,	which	caused	some	doubt	as	to	whether	she	had	had	Ebola	in	the	first	place.		During	 the	 Ebola	 crisis,	 in	 which	 the	 home	 became	 the	 front-line	 in	 the	 fight	against	the	virus,	people	were	caught	in	a	cruel	double-bind.	On	the	one	hand,	the	crisis	had	the	effect	of	increasing	dependence	on	those	‘close’	to	them.	This	was	in	large	part	due	to	the	economic	fallout	experienced	during	the	crisis,	along	with	the	effect	 of	 onerous	 state	 of	 emergency	 regulations	 such	 as	 lockdowns,	 travel	restrictions,	 and	 curfews,	 which	 hit	 livelihoods	 heavily	 and	 severely	 restricted	mobility.	 The	 home	 became,	 in	 an	 exaggerated	 sense,	 a	 site	 of	 refuge	 and	sustenance	 during	 these	 hard	 times.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 it	was	 at	 home	that	people	were	most	vulnerable	to	catching	the	virus.	Care	practices	towards	the	sick	and	recently	dead,	often	performed	around	the	house,	were	the	most	potent	means	through	which	the	virus	was	transmitted	between	people.	Ebola	meant	that	intimate	others	could	suddenly	be	transformed	into	deadly	enemies.	Harbouring	a	sick	 person	 ran	 the	 risk	 not	 only	 of	 catching	 the	 virus,	 but	 also	 of	 severe	 legal	penalties	and	household	quarantines.			
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What	 struck	me	about	 the	 relationship	between	Ebola	and	 the	home	was	not,	 as	might	have	been	expected,	that	it	presented	a	radical	shift	 in	the	dynamics	of	the	house	–	the	transformation	of	the	home	from	a	site	of	safety	and	stability	to	one	of	danger	 and	 volatility	 –	 but	 rather	 the	 very	 familiarity	 of	 the	 interplay	 between	these	 opposing	 forces,	 and	 the	 resulting	 sense	 of	 ambiguity.	 Throughout	 my	fieldwork,	I	observed	how,	just	below	the	surface	of	seemingly	convivial	and	close	relationships,	long-harboured	tensions	often	lurked.		I	was	struck	by	the	high	level	of	 generosity	 and	 care,	 and	 the	 willingness	 for	 poor	 households	 to	 accept	 new	residents.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 though,	 I	 learned	 that	 such	 gestures	 were	 seen	 as	potentially	harmful	and	exploitative,	and	that	 just	as	strangers	could	become	kin,	so	 too	 could	 kin	 become	 strangers,	 and	 friends	 readily	 become	 enemies.	 The	dependence	that	many	of	my	neighbours	had	on	those	around	them	was	a	source	of	vulnerability	as	well	as	strength;	suspicion	and	secrecy	were	 the	other	side	of	the	coin	of	trust	and	reliance.	In	this	light,	Ebola	in	the	home	felt	like	an	intensified	and	 alarmingly	 physical	manifestation	 of	 an	 enduring	 and	 deep-rooted	 dynamic	that	was	all	too	familiar	in	Freetown.		In	this	chapter,	I	outline	how	these	dynamics	played	out	for	young	people	in	Congo	Town,	with	reference	to	three	case	studies	that	provide	a	representative	overview	of	domestic	settings	in	the	neighbourhood.	The	first	outlines	life	in	what	was	called	a	 room	 and	 parlour,	 a	 small	 two-room	 house	 in	which	 several	 young	men	 lived	together,	including	me	for	the	first	nine	months	of	my	fieldwork.	The	second	was	the	family	compound	where	I	lived	for	the	second	half	of	my	fieldwork.	And	finally,	I	 outline	 a	 contest	 of	 over	 property	 between	 an	 uncle	 and	 his	 nephew,	 also	neighbours	of	each	other,	after	the	death	of	owner.	All	three	case	studies	reveal	the	deep	 ambiguity	 that	 surrounds	 relationships	 in	 and	 around	 the	 home.	 In	particular,	there	is	a	recurring	fault-line	of	tension	between	young	people	and	the	people	who	are	looking	after	them,	or	those	who	are	expected	to	do	so.	These	same	figures	were	 often	 simultaneously	 seen	 to	 be	 ‘holding	 them	 back’.	 The	 status	 of	young	people	 in	this	context	was	highly	unstable,	but	instead	of	being	assigned	a	junior	status,	their	position	was	negotiated	and	contested	on	a	day-to-day	basis	in	unspoken,	 gestural,	 ways,	 punctuated	 by	 occasional	 explicit	 negotiations.	 The	desire	 for	 social	mobility	 and	 progression	 often	 involved	 conflicting	 desires;	 the	
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young	people	 concerned	 simultaneously	wanted	 to	 come	 closer	 and	be	 accepted	and	promoted	within	the	home,	and	to	leave	altogether.			Instability	and	ambiguity	centred	on	the	home	has	attracted	scholarly	 interest	 in	Sierra	Leone	and	beyond3.	Mariane	Ferme’s	(2001)	ethnography	of	a	Mende	village	in	 the	 east	 of	 the	 country,	 The	 Underneath	 of	 Things:	 Violence,	 History,	 and	 the	
Everyday,	 provides	 a	 rich	 and	 compelling	 examination	of	 the	ways	 that	 a	 violent	history	 has	 produced	 a	 ‘hermeneutic	 of	 suspicion’	 (Ferme	 2001:7),	 a	 central	organisational	 principle	 and	 cultural	 trope	 around	 which	 ambiguous	 social	relations	and	institutions	are	structured.	For	Ferme	the	materiality	of	everyday	life	is	 shaped	 by	 these	 unstable	 historical	 processes,	 which	 are	 in	 turn	 reproduced	through	 shifting	modes	of	 interpretation	and	 forms	of	 concealment.	 In	 a	parallel	way,	 Veena	 Das,	 working	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 violence	 of	 the	 Partition	 in	 India,	demonstrates	how	such	traumatic	events	work	their	way	into	everyday	life	in	the	family	and	community;	social	worlds	that	become	infused	with	‘doubt’	(Das	2006).			Others	have	located	this	ambiguity	less	directly	in	the	legacy	of	violence	–	although	this	is	often	the	backdrop	–	and	more	in	the	ways	that	the	outside	world	comes	to	restructure	relations	within	the	home.	Rather	than	home	being	a	site	of	trust	and	protection	 from	 the	 outside	 world,	 as	 has	 often	 been	 understood	 in	 classic	anthropological	scholarship	and	beyond,	the	home	itself	becomes	a	site	of	danger.	For	 Geschiere,	 witchcraft	 in	 Africa	 is	 a	 powerful	 discourse	 on	 the	 way	 that	relations	 of	 intimacy	 hold	 malevolent	 potential.	 Witchcraft,	 or	 the	 ‘dark	 side	 of	kinship’,	 thrives	 ‘at	 the	 interface	 of	 intimate	 relations	 within	 the	 house	 and	 the	outside	world,	 dangerous	 but	 also	 promising’	 (Geschiere	 2013:16).	 The	 external	forces	of	the	outside	world	are	broadly	the	forces	of	modernity:	the	state	and	the	market	(Comaroff	and	Comaroff	2013,	Geschiere	2000).	This	process	is	also	richly	demonstrated	in	Han’s	ethnography	of	care	in	an	urban	slum	in	Chile,	where	‘state	intuitions	and	economic	precariousness	are	folded	into	people’s	intimate	relations,	commitments,	and	aspirations’	(Han	2013:17).																																																										3	It	does	not	seem	coincidental	that	Sierra	Leone	provides	a	spring	board	for	Jackson’s	(2011)	existential	claims	that	ambiguity	in	social	relations	is	definitive	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	human	being.	Jackson	concedes	that	material	scarcity	in	Sierra	Leone	makes	secrecy	and	suspicion	particularly	prominent.	
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	In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 build	 on	 these	 explanations	 and	 approaches,	 while	 remaining	attentive	to	the	specificities	of	the	Freetown	context,	especially	the	ways	that	my	interlocutors	themselves	interpreted	and	analysed	the	ambiguous	sets	of	relations	that	they	found	themselves	in	around	the	home.	While	a	history	of	violence,	largely	unspoken,	 forms	 the	backdrop,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 central	 strand	of	my	analysis	 in	 this	chapter.		Equally,	witchcraft,	as	identified	in	Geschiere’s	work,	is	a	force	at	play	in	Freetown,	 and	 one	 that	 is	 understood	 to	 transmit	 through	 channels	 of	 intimacy,	and	 is	 often	 interpreted	 as	 expressions	 of	 jealousies	 and	 conflicts	 around	 the	home.		While	witchcraft	does	feature	in	this	chapter,	and	throughout	the	thesis,	it	is	not	an	explicit	analytical	focus.		Rather,	my	attempt	to	focus	on	the	more	visible,	although	 nonetheless	 ambiguous,	 arena	 of	 interpersonal	 dependencies	 and	tensions	–	and	their	relation	to	a	broader	political	economy	–	hopes	to	shed	light	on	conditions	that	analysis	of	witchcraft	in	Africa	is	often	concerned	with.		In	this	chapter,	taking	my	interlocutors’	preoccupations	as	a	starting	point,	I	focus	on	 the	ways	 that	 economic	 forces	 that	 are	 not	 necessarily	 informed	 by	 violence	ambiguously	 reconfigure,	 constitute,	 and	 become	 structured	 by	 kinship-based	relationships	 around	 the	 home.	 In	 Chile,	 according	 to	 Han,	 credit	 –	 readily	available	to	the	poor	under	the	neoliberal	imperative	–	is	used	to	 ‘make	possible’	existing	regimes	of	care;	this	has	parallels	in	many	other	contexts	where	markets	have	been	 liberalised	 (James	2014).	 In	Sierra	Leone,	on	 the	other	hand,	 credit	 is	not	 readily	 available	 from	 banks	 or	 even	 loan	 sharks.	 Instead,	 for	 many	 young	people,	 family	 and	neighbours	 become	 the	most	 promising	 sources	 for	 finding	 –	often	 informal	 –	 work,	 and	 obtaining	 money	 and	 property,	 even	 if	 there	 is	competition	 over	 these	 resources.	 In	 many	 instances,	 however,	 these	 prospects	and	expectations	remain	just	that,	prospects	and	expectations,	in	a	context	where	business	 plans	 and	 possibilities	 vastly	 outnumber	 genuine	 sources	 of	 income.	Nevertheless,	though	elusive	or	projected,	they	are	highly	formative	in	structuring	domestic	relations.			My	 case	 studies	 and	 analysis	 foreground	 a	 complex	 interplay	 between	 two	competing	yet	highly	intertwined	registers,	through	which	domestic	relationships	
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are	 structured	 and	 statuses	 reckoned.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 register	 of	 kinship.	 The	second	is	what	might	be	termed	the	register	of	business.	These	two	registers	were	reflective	 of	 two	 sets	 of	 terms	 that	 people	would	 draw	upon	 in	 referring	 to	 and	greeting	 one	 another.	One	 set	were	 kinship	 terms,	 such	 as	 ‘bro’,	 ‘sister’,	 ‘auntie’,	‘uncle’,	 ‘pa’	 and	 ‘ma’.	The	other	 set	were	professional	names,	 such	as	 ‘bra’	 (male	boss),	 ‘sisi’	(female	boss),	 ‘grandjon’	(from	French-speaking	Guinea),	 ‘senior	man’,	‘boss	man’,	 ‘manager’,	 and	 bor	bor	 (apprentice	 /	 house	 boy).	Most	 relationships	built	around	the	home	can	be,	and	indeed	are,	understood	according	to	both	these	registers,	which	 become	mutually	 productive	 and	 destructive:	 kinship	 is	 a	 route	for	business	opportunities,	and	business	relations	are	locally	productive	of	kinship.	Conversely,	 business	 relations	 can	 sever	 and	 strain	kinship	ones,	 and	vice	 versa.	However,	 the	 inclination	 to	 view	 a	 relationship	 alternately	 through	 the	 lens	 of	kinship	and	business	relations	produces	two	distinct	vision	of	the	relationship,	of	participants’	motivations	and	the	morality	of	their	actions.	This,	I	suggest,	gets	to	the	 heart	 of	 the	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 home.	 Examined	 through	 the	 kinship	 lens,	 a	young	 person	 doing	 housework	 looks	 like	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 a	 familial	 obligation.	Seen	through	a	business	one,	it	could	be	interpreted	as	exploitative,	unpaid	labour.	While	analytically,	of	course,	these	two	registers	of	relationality	around	the	home	are	heavily	entwined	–	and	thus	problematic	to	distinguish	–	paying	close	attention	to	 the	particular	ways	 that	 each	 register,	 and	 the	 sets	of	 expectations	associated	with	it,	is	mobilised,	as	well	as	the	ways	in	which	ambiguity	itself	is	often	actively	promoted,	is	revealing	of	the	dynamics	of	the	home.			
Room	and	parlour			For	the	first	half	of	my	fieldwork	I	lived	in	a	room	and	parlour	(a	two-room	house)	located	 near	 to	 the	 base	 of	 the	 Congo	 River	 valley	 around	 which	 the	neighbourhood	 was	 built.	 The	 house	 was	 built	 by	 Foday,	 a	 man	 in	 his	 mid-twenties,	 on	 land	 that	 belonged	 to	 his	 deceased	 grandfather’s	 only	 living	 wife.	Foday	had	a	lease-hold	agreement,	according	to	which	the	property	would	return	to	his	grandfather’s	wife	after	a	certain	number	of	years	or	he	would	pay	her	rent.	Given	 that	 the	 land	 did	 not	 belong	 to	 Foday’s	 own	 (recently	 deceased)	
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grandmother,	his	move	 to	build	on	 the	 land	was	 controversial	 and	 the	 source	of	some	resentment	in	the	family.			Foday	was	a	taxi	operator	and	a	recording	artist.	He	ran	a	small	recording	studio	–	located	in	the	front	room	of	the	house	–	which	he	would	typically	operate	at	night	when	electricity	was	more	reliable	than	in	the	day.	I	shared	the	bed	with	Foday.	In	the	parlour,	when	recording	had	stopped,	slept	Umaru	and	Sam,	two	male	cousins	of	 Foday’s.	 Umaru,	 slightly	 older	 than	 Foday,	 was	 a	 comedian.	 He	 presented	 a	weekly	comedy	radio	programme,	although	this	work	had	not	yet	translated	into	financial	reward.	Umaru	and	Foday	had	a	very	intimate	and	close	friendship,	which	they	described	as	‘brotherhood’.	Sam,	a	few	years	younger	than	Foday,	was	the	bor	
bor	(boy)	of	the	house,	who	had	come	to	stay	with	Foday	after	his	father	had	died;	Foday’s	father	had	asked	him	to	teach	Sam	to	drive.			While	 all	 three	were	 cousins,	 and	 roughly	 the	 same	 age,	 their	 relationships	 and	their	reasons	for	living	together	extended	well	beyond	these	familial	connections.	Foday	 had	 hundreds	 of	 cousins.	 Umaru	 and	 Foday	 had	met	 at	 the	 funeral	 of	 an	elder	within	the	family,	and	their	relationship	soon	became	a	close-knit	one;	they	became	 collaborators	 in	 the	 shared	 project	 of	 gaining	 traction	 in	 Freetown’s	entertainment	scene.	Umaru	and	Foday	were	also	bound	together	through	a	close	friendship	that	involved	daily	acts	of	tactile	(never	sexual),	playfulness,	sharing	of	clothes	and	food,	and	attending	church,	family	and	professional	events	together.			The	relationship	between	Foday	and	Sam	was	initiated	by	Foday’s	father,	but	took	on	a	life	of	its	own.	Sam	had	expected	Foday	to	become	his	‘boss’	and	‘big	brother’,	and	to	initiate	him	into	the	driving	business	by	teaching	him	how	to	drive	and	then	employing	 him	 as	 a	 driver.	 From	 Sam’	 perspective,	 coming	 close	 to	 Foday,	 and	working	around	the	house,	was	a	way	of	encouraging	Foday	to	take	him	under	his	wing	and	give	him	the	tools	to	earn	a	living.	On	a	day-to-day	basis,	he	performed	household	tasks	such	as	cleaning	the	house,	washing	clothes,	and	collecting	items	from	the	shops.	Foday	sometimes	gave	him	portions	of	food	–	that	he	himself	often	received	from	family	and	neighbours	–	and	he	provided	him	with	a	floor	to	sleep	on.	This	was	a	common	arrangement	for	young	people	moving	into	a	household;	a	
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roof	over	their	head	was	conditional	on	either	contributing	money	(if	they	had	an	external	income)	or	working	‘for’	the	house.				These	 relationships,	 while	 involving	 acts	 of	 care,	 mutual	 support,	 and	 intimate	proximity,	 were	 unstable.	 Umaru	 and	 Foday’s	 relationship	 became	 increasingly	strained.	 While	 Umaru,	 as	 a	 more	 senior	 and	 well-connected	 person	 in	 the	entertainment	business,	was	in	many	ways	a	desirable	partner	for	Foday,	he	soon	began	to	look	like	something	of	a	liability;	Foday	was	investing	much	more	in	the	relationship	on	a	day-to-day	basis.	The	difficulties	were	compounded	when	Umaru,	after	driving	a	motorbike	that	Foday	had	bought	(in	exchange	for	his	car),	left	the	keys	 in	 the	 ignition	and	 the	brand-new	bike	was	 stolen.	 It	 also	appeared	 that	 so	much	proximity	was	itself	a	cause	of	tension.			The	 relationship	 between	 Sam	 and	 Foday	was	 full	 of	 resentment	 and	 animosity.	Sam	ultimately	lived	in	the	house	for	three	years,	during	which	time	he	was	never	taught	to	drive:	something	he	saw	as	a	condition	of	his	being	there.	Lessons	were	still	 held	 up	 as	 a	 possibility	 whenever	 Sam	 brought	 the	 subject	 up,	 but	 were	continually	pushed	back.	Increasingly	Sam	felt	that	he	was	being	exploited,	that	his	work	 around	 the	 house	was	 for	 no	 benefit,	 and	 his	 junior	 status	 of	bor	bor	was	becoming	 cemented	 and	 further	 reinforced.	 Sam	once	 said	 to	me,	 ‘We	 should	be	working	 together	 as	 brothers,	 so	 we	 can	 develop,	 but	 he	 doesn’t	 take	 other	people’s	problem	seriously’.				These	grievances	were	rarely	expressed	explicitly	to	the	person	in	question	(in	this	case	Foday),	but	were	enacted	indirectly	around	the	house,	which	was	the	stage	on	which	 the	 relationships	 between,	 and	 the	 relative	 statuses	 of,	 the	 actors	themselves	were	constantly	re-negotiated.	Sam	stopped	helping	out	so	much	in	the	house,	 and	 Foday	 started	 doing	 much	 more	 of	 his	 own	 cleaning.	 Equally,	 Sam	would	 accept	 Foday’s	 offers	 of	 food	 much	 less	 regularly,	 finding	 food	 instead	among	 other	 neighbours	 and	 friends	 with	 whom	 he	 had	 close	 relationships,	independent	of	Foday.	On	one	occasion	Foday,	Umaru,	and	I	were	sharing	a	plate	of	rice	 and	 cassava	 leaf	 and	 fish	 stew	 prepared	 by	 one	 of	 our	 neighbours.	 Foday	called	out	 to	Sam,	who	was	sitting	on	 the	veranda	 listening	 to	music,	 ‘Come	 let’s	
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eat’.	 After	 a	 few	 loud	 shouts,	 and	 no	 response	 from	 Sam,	 Foday,	 frustrated,	exclaimed,	‘He	does	this	too	much,	this	is	the	last	time	that	I	am	going	to	offer	him	food’.	 For	 Sam,	 these	 gestures	 demonstrated	 that	 he	was	 not	 entirely	 reliant	 on	Foday.	 For	 Foday,	 they	 signified	 that	 he	 owed	 Sam	 less.	 Eventually	 Sam	 started	spending	nights	elsewhere,	though	leaving	his	clothes	at	Foday’s	as	a	marker	that	he	still	had	a	place	there.	In	one	tense	moment,	Foday	moved	his	clothes	from	their	usual	spot	when	he	was	cleaning	the	place,	sending	the	signal	that	Sam	no	longer	had	a	place	in	his	home.	Eventually,	after	three	years	together,	Sam	moved	out	to	stay	with	a	friend	elsewhere,	in	a	relationship	similar	to	that	between	Umaru	and	Foday.			Sam	was	obsessed	with	finding	a	place	of	his	own.	He	told	me	once,	‘If	I	move	out	I	believe	 I	will	be	able	 to	progress	more	 if	 I	 am	on	my	own’.	He	had	attempted	 to	negotiate	with	the	same	grandma	in	the	family	to	build	on	a	small	plot	of	land	near	to	Foday’s,	but	this	proved	challenging	given	the	complexity	of	family	politics	and	his	 relatively	 distant	 connection	 to	 the	 family	 compound	 (where	 none	 of	 his	nuclear	 family	 lived).	 It	was	 interesting	to	me	that	Sam	seemed	to	see	having	his	own	place	as	a	means	to	an	end,	a	way	of	getting	on	in	life	more	generally,	rather	than	 an	 end	 in	 itself.	 The	 lack	of	 a	 place	of	 his	 own	was	not	 the	 consequence	of	having	no	regular	employment,	but,	as	he	described	it,	almost	the	reason	for	it.	The	logic	became	clear	when	Sam	explained	 to	me	 that,	 ‘Foday	would	respect	Umaru	more	 if	 he	 had	 his	 own	 place,	 at	 his	 level,	 he	 should	 have	 his	 own	 place’.	 This	exemplified	 a	 paradox	 that	 was	 central	 for	 many	 young	 people	 like	 Foday	 and	Umaru	–	getting	on	required	at	one	and	the	same	time	living	under	the	protection	of	close	support	figures,	and	being	independent	from	them.			I	 suggest	 that	 many	 of	 the	 ambiguities	 and	 tensions	 around	 the	 home	 can	 be	connected	 to	 the	 interplay	 between	 kinship	 and	 business-oriented	 modes	 of	relatedness.	 Foday	 and	 Sam	 were	 cousins	 of	 the	 same	 age-set,	 but	 in	 their	projected	 business	 relationship,	 Foday	 was	 Sam’	 boss,	 which	 relegated	 Sam	 to	Foday’s	junior	in	the	house.	The	terms	of	their	relationship	fluctuated	ambiguously	according	 to	 these	 two	measures.	A	 changing	working	 arrangement	 in	 the	home	led	to	a	renegotiation	of	 their	roles	and	statuses.	Although	Sam	did	not	 learn	the	
	 68	
trade	through	which	he	had	hoped	to	gain	an	income,	he	demonstrated	an	ability	to	survive	without	Foday.	This	was	an	empowering	act	of	maintaining	self-esteem	and	the	basis	for	negotiating	a	more	favourable	status	within	the	home.	For	much	of	 this	 time,	 Foday	was	 simultaneously	 looking	 after	 Sam	and	holding	him	back;	the	home	was	on	the	one	hand	a	means	of	surviving	and	a	source	of	opportunity	and,	on	the	other,	an	unwelcome	and	threatening	space.		
	
Family	compound	(Mafembe)		For	 the	 second	 half	 of	my	 fieldwork,	 I	 transferred	 to	 a	 room	 and	 parlour	 of	my	own,	attached	to	a	family	compound	only	a	few	hundred	meters	from	where	Foday	lived.	The	family	compound	belonged	the	Bangura	family.	I	was	particularly	close	to	James,	the	oldest	son	in	the	family,	who	was	friends	with	Foday	(although	their	relationship	 was	 rocky).	 In	 the	 main	 house	 in	 the	 compound,	 which	 comprised	three	small	bedrooms,	a	bathroom,	living-room,	and	veranda,	lived	James’s	father,	Jonathan	–	who	grew	increasingly	frail	during	the	course	of	my	fieldwork	–	and	his	four	children,	of	which	 James	was	the	oldest.	 Jonathan’s	wife	Rachel	also	 lived	 in	the	home,	with	her	three	children.	In	attached	homes	lived	several	other	relatives,	including	James’s	uncle	and	aunt	and	their	daughters,	and	his	great-uncle.	During	my	 stay,	 several	 occupants	 came	 and	 went,	 giving	 the	 extended	 household	 a	shifting	character.			The	house	structure	was	representative	of	a	typical	family	compound	in	Freetown.	Unlike	 Foday’s	 room	 and	 parlour,	 the	 kinship	 structure	 was	 more	 formally	hierarchical,	with	several	generations	 represented	 in	 the	household	reflecting	an	idealized	 authority	 structure.	 In	 practice,	 however,	 hierarchies	 in	 the	 home	deviated	significantly	 from	 this	model,	with	 roles	 continually	being	 renegotiated.	Jonathan,	a	chef,	was	designated	as	head	of	the	compound.	According	to	the	strict	kinship	 system,	 though,	 the	most	 senior	man	 in	 the	 compound	was	Mohammed,	nicknamed	Bois	(boy),	a	son	of	Mami	Mefembe,	whose	name	the	compound	bears	today.	Mami	Mefembe	had	arrived	from	upcountry	in	the	1950s	and	acquired	the	land,	initially	to	establish	a	women’s	initiation	society;	this	still	existed	during	my	fieldwork,	 though	 in	 a	much	 less	 prominent	 form.	Mohamed	had	never	married,	
	 69	
had	 not	 been	 educated,	 and	 did	 not	 hold	 a	 steady	 job	 (he	 was	 an	 occasional	labourer).	He	had	several	children,	but	many	of	them	were	estranged	from	him.	As	a	 result,	 his	 seniority	within	 the	 family	was	 significantly	 reduced.	 Jonathan	was	frail	during	the	time	that	I	was	staying	in	the	compound,	and	he	died	shortly	after	I	left.	His	wife	Rachel	had	taken	over	some	of	his	jobs	as	a	chef,	and	had	also	taken	over	many	of	the	key	decision-making	processes	in	the	household,	another	mark	of	seniority.	 James,	 also	 a	 chef	 and	waiter,	 became	more	 involved	 in	managing	 the	house	at	this	stage,	and	took	over	as	head	of	the	household	alongside	Rachel	when	his	father	passed	away.	Uncle	Samuel,	a	distant	relative	and	thus	lacking	any	claim	to	the	land,	did	not	attempt	to	replace	Jonathan	as	head	of	the	household,	but	as	an	esteemed	school	teacher,	held	seniority	and	respect	within	the	compound.			Beyond	the	decision-making	level,	hierarchies	within	the	home	were	performed	on	a	day-to-day	basis	through	various	overt	enactments	of	a	chain	of	command.	One	notable	example	entailed	senior	people	‘sending’	junior	people	to	the	shops	to	buy	something	for	themselves	or	for	the	house.	This	activity	could	only	be	performed	this	way	round;	sending	a	more	senior	person	would	be	seen	as	highly	 insulting.	For	people	who	were	closely	positioned	in	terms	of	status,	sending	each	other	was	a	 semi-humorous	 activity	 through	which	 to	 attempt	 to	 assert	 seniority.	 Another	example	 involved	 the	distribution	of	 the	daily	pot	of	 rice	and	plasas	(sauce)	 that	was	 cooked	 in	 the	home.	The	more	 senior	 people	 in	 the	home	would	have	 their	own	 portions	 set	 aside,	 often	 with	 larger	 quantities	 of	 meat	 or	 fish,	 in	 ways	reflective	 of	 practices	 across	 the	 continent	 (Whitehead	 1981).	 It	 was	 their	responsibility	 to	 pass	down	portions	 of	 food	 to	 the	more	 junior	members	 of	 the	household.			These	practices	 represented	 everyday	means	by	which	 status	was	 reckoned	 and	hierarchies	 reinforced,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 they	 reconfigured	 and	 challenged	idealized	 kinship	 structures,	 and	 allowed	 for	 neighbours	 and	 strangers	 to	 be	incorporated	into	the	home.	For	example,	food	was	often	shared	with	a	wide	range	of	 people	beyond	 those	who	 lived	 in	 the	home.	 Food-sharing	was	understood	 to	build	relatedness	and	establish	people’s	connection	to	the	house.	As	one	friend	told	me,	 ‘your	 base	 is	 where	 you	 eat’.	 The	 passing	 down	 of	 food	 could	 reassert	
	 70	
hierarchies,	 but	 food	 could	also	be	 shared	 in	 less	hierarchical	 or	more	humbling	ways.	 Equally,	 professional	 and	 kinship	 status	 terms	 were	 used	 broadly	 and	flexibly.	 In	many	cases,	 they	were	also	used	aspirationally;	 as	 a	way	of	 asserting	desired	 dependence	 on	 someone,	 or	 aspired	 superiority	 over	 another.	 Kinship	terminology	was	much	more	commonly	applied	to	those	not	formally	related	than	to	those	who	were.	Thus,	it	was	broadly	possible	to	become	attached	to	the	family	compound	 and	 to	 become	 family,	 as	 I	 learned	 first-hand	 when	 my	 neighbours	called	 me	 ‘uncle	 Jonah’,	 ‘my	 son’,	 ‘my	 brother’,	 and	 sometimes,	 jokingly,	 ‘my	husband’.			
	
Figure	4	Filling	up	buckets	at	the	communal	compound	tap			One	such	long-time	resident	was	Zainab,	a	young	woman	who	I	came	to	know	as	James’s	 sister.	 I	 discovered	much	 later	 that	 she	was	 not	 formally	 related	 to	 the	Bangura	 family.	 She	 was	 the	 long-time,	 long-distance,	 girlfriend	 of	 James’s	 first	cousin,	 Victor,	 who	 James	 had	 grown	 up	with	 in	 their	 native	 village.	 James	was	particularly	 close	 to	 her	 as	 a	 result.	 Victor	 had	 been	 living	 in	 Ghana	 for	 several	years,	 where	 he	 was	 training	 to	 become	 a	 Catholic	 priest,	 which	 created	 some	ambiguity	 about	 the	 status	 of	 his	 relationship	 with	 Zainab.	 There	 were	expectations	of	celibacy,	of	course,	but	Victor	did	not	seem	intent	on	adhering	to	this	 ‘religiously’.	 Zainab	 slept	 in	 a	 room	 that	 she	 rented	 immediately	 adjacent	 to	
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the	main	family	compound.	She	often	did	her	cooking	separately,	which	gave	her	a	degree	of	independence.	She	was	studying,	as	well	as	working	at	a	hotel	in	town	as	a	receptionist	(at	one	point	she	juggled	two	full-time	jobs	at	separate	hotels).	She	had	 incorporated	herself	 into	 the	 family	beyond	her	 relatively	 fragile	 connection	through	 James’s	 cousin,	 in	 large	 part	 by	 contributing	 to	 family	 expenses	 –	 she	made	especially	generous	contributions	to	family	programmes	such	as	weddings	–	but	also	by	attending	family	events	and	being	a	respected	and	caring	figure	in	the	compound.	For	much	of	the	time	that	I	was	in	the	compound,	Zainab	took	care	of	two	children	 from	the	Bangura	 family	whose	mother	had	passed	away	and	were	waiting	 to	 be	 transferred	 elsewhere.	 These	 activities	 strengthened	 her	 position	within	the	family,	and	she	was	regularly	called	to	family	meetings	where	decisions	were	made.	However,	her	connection	to	the	family	was	never	entirely	stable.	In	the	physical	absence	of	her	boyfriend,	 she	kept	 local	boyfriends	without	 letting	 it	be	widely	known;	a	common	practice,	yet	nevertheless	somewhat	looked	down	upon.	These	 relationships	 involved	 not	 only	 companionship,	 but	 also	 shared	 income	from	 which	 the	 family	 benefitted.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 though,	 Zainab’s	 other	relationships	challenged	her	position	in	the	house.			Others	who	entered	the	household	did	so	with	much	less	success	and	acceptance	than	Zainab.	For	example,	Rachel’s	niece,	Kadiatu,	 a	 young	woman	 in	her	mid	 to	late	 twenties,	 came	 to	 live	 with	 us	 for	 a	 few	 rocky	 months.	 Rachel	 had	 taken	Kadiatu	 under	 her	 wing;	 her	 mother,	 Rachel’s	 younger	 sister,	 did	 not	 have	 the	resources	to	look	after	her.	In	addition,	Kadiatu	had	borne	four	children	to	various	partners	and	was	unable	to	look	after	them.	Rachel	explained	to	me	that	she	hoped	the	compound	would	provide	Kadiatu	with	a	stable	environment	until	she	was	able	to	settle	down	herself.	A	condition,	presumably	unspoken,	of	Kadiatu	living	in	the	compound	was	that	she	would	contribute	to	daily	household	tasks	such	as	cooking	and	 cleaning.	 While	 her	 kinship	 connection	 to	 the	 house	 was	 more	 direct	 than	Zainab’s,	and	she	was	older,	her	lack	of	external	income	(she	had	neither	a	job	nor	financially	 supportive	 partners)	 made	 her	 manifestly	 lower-status	 within	 the	home.	She	was	tasked	with	household	work	alongside	the	children	and	teenagers	in	 the	 house,	 with	 one	 of	 whom	 she	 was	 sharing	 a	 bed.	 Before	 Kadiatu’s	pregnancies,	Rachel	had	previously	been	sponsoring	her	education.	An	expectation	
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associated	with	Kadiatu’s	living	in	the	house	was	that	Rachel	would	pay	for	her	to	continue	her	education,	or	to	do	a	course	such	as	in	cookery.	But	Kadiatu	saw	this	as	 a	 false	 promise,	 similar	 to	 Foday’s	 promise	 to	 teach	 Sam	 to	 drive,	 that	 was	dangled	 like	 a	 carrot	 on	 a	 stick	 while	 she	 cooked	 and	 cleaned	 in	 the	 house;	 a	practice	that	often	goes	hand-in-hand	with	fosterage	(Schrauwers	1999).			The	 relationship	 between	 Kadiatu	 and	 Rachel	 became	 increasingly	 fraught,	 and	tension	 came	 to	 the	 head	 over	 several	 issues.	 The	 first	 was	 that	 Kadiatu	would	leave	in	the	evenings,	sometimes	coming	back	very	late,	and	sometimes	spending	the	 night	 elsewhere.	 During	 this	 time	 she	 started	 seeing	 Umaru,	 and	 would	sometimes	spend	 the	night	with	him	on	 the	 floor	of	Foday’s	parlour.	Rachel	 saw	this	as	irresponsible,	and	worried	about	Kadiatu.	On	some	occasions	Rachel	would	spend	the	night	on	a	chair	on	the	veranda,	waiting	 for	her	 to	come	home	so	that	she	could	unlock	the	gate.	Another	tension	surrounded	a	failed	business	venture.	Rachel	had	loaned	Kadiatu	money	to	start	a	business	whereby	she	would	buy	fish	from	 fishermen	 and	 sell	 them	 directly	 to	 households.	 What	 happened	 instead,	according	 to	 Rachel’s	 plausible	 reports,	 was	 that	 Kadiatu	 borrowed	 fish	 from	market	 traders	downtown	on	credit,	 and	sold	 them	on	without	significant	profit,	while	 spending	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 Rachel’s	 seed	 money.	 She	 was	 slowly	 repaying	Rachel’s	 loan,	but	 she	 soon	 found	herself	 in	debt	 to	 the	 fish	 seller	downtown,	 as	well	to	Rachel,	who	ended	up	forking	out	more	cash	to	bail	Kadiatu	out.			An	 underlying	 tension	 between	 Rachel	 and	 Kadiatu	 was	 the	 nature	 of	 their	relationship,	which	proved	unstable	and	contested.	Rachel	regarded	Kadiatu	as	her	daughter	 while	 she	 was	 living	 in	 her	 house	 and	 sponsoring	 her	 education	 and	business	projects.	But	Kadiatu	did	not	regard	Rachel	as	her	mother,	and	thus	did	not	 feel	 that	 she	 needed	 to	 obey	 house	 rules	 such	 as	 coming	 home	 early	 and	working	 around	 the	 house.	During	 one	 heated	 argument	 that	 took	 place	 outside	the	 house,	 Rachel	 cried,	 ‘If	 your	 child	 does	 not	 act	 correctly	 you	 will	 feel	 it’,	 a	statement	 that	 got	 straight	 to	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 matter:	 the	 ambiguity	 in	 their	relationship.	When	 Kadiatu	 came	 close	 to	 Rachel	 she	 at	 one	 and	 the	 same	 time	became	 a	 family	 member	 and	 a	 business	 partner.	 Their	 relationship	 was	structured	around	work	and	a	business	project,	and	this	had	strained	their	familial	
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connection.	Finally,	Kadiatu	 left	 the	house	 leaving	her	 tensions	with	Rachel	 alive	and	 unresolved.	 After	 many	 months	 of	 indirect	 tension,	 Kadiatu	 came	 to	 ‘beg’	Rachel.	This	was	a	formalised	process	whereby	she	would	apologise	verbally	and	physically	lower	herself;	bending	on	her	knees	at	the	climax	of	the	ritual	(although	this	was	performed	semi-jokingly	in	this	case,	to	the	amusement	of	all	parties).	The	meeting	 was	 formally	 witnessed	 by	 several	 neighbours	 and	 significant	 family	members,	and	chaired	by	the	pastor	of	the	Pentecostal	church	that	James,	Umaru,	Kadiatu,	 and	Foday	attended.	During	 the	 course	of	 the	meeting,	 grievances	were	openly	expressed.	The	pastor	 talked	about	how	this	was	an	opportunity	 to	 ‘start	again’.	At	one	point,	he	told	Rachel,	‘You	are	in	fact	the	mother,	this	is	your	child’,	thus	clarifying	the	underlying	tension,	as	well	as	astutely	drawing	direct	attention	to	the	root	cause	of	the	problems.	By	confronting	this	issue,	and	through	Kadiatu’s	lowering	 herself	 and	 accepting	 her	 junior	 position	 as	 Rachel’s	 ‘daughter’,	 their	tension	was	finally	resolved.	Interestingly,	though,	this	seemed	possible	only	once	Kadiatu	was	no	longer	living	in	Rachel’s	house.			These	 stories	 from	 the	 family	 compound	 reveal	 themes	 similar	 to	 those	 that	surfaced	 in	 the	room	and	parlour,	even	 if	 they	emerged	 from	a	different	starting	point.	 Unlike	 the	 room	 and	 parlour,	 which	 embodied	 a	 horizontal	 arrangement	between	 cousins,	 the	 family	 compound	 hierarchy	 corresponded	 to	 an	 idealized	vertical	 kinship	 structure.	 In	 practice,	 however,	 the	 family	 compound	demonstrated	a	great	deal	of	flexibility	and	room	for	negotiation	in	the	processes	through	which	 hierarchies	were	 established,	 and	 relatedness	 and	 kinship	 forged	and	broken.			These	 processes	 involved	 a	 complex	weaving	 together	 of	 business-	 and	 kinship-based	registers,	through	which	status	was	never	entirely	secure.	The	character	of	the	relationship	was	asserted	and	contested	on	a	daily	basis,	albeit	with	significant	moments	when	 roles	were	 formally	 acknowledged,	 such	as	 after	 the	death	of	 an	elder	(when	a	successor	needs	to	be	identified:	after	Jonathan’s	death,	James	was	chosen	as	the	formal	successor,	although	in	practice	he	worked	closely	with	Rachel	and	his	uncle	 in	managing	the	household),		or	at	a	 family	meeting	 like	 the	one	to	resolve	the	conflict	between	Rachel	and	Kadiatu.	The	ways	that	these	two	registers	
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were	weaved	together	was	a	source	of	ambiguity,	a	means	of	being	elevated	and	included	as	well	as	being	brought	down	and	excluded.			Mohammed,	though	senior	in	formal	kinship	terms,	was	junior	in	economic	status.	His	attempts	 to	convert	his	seniority	 in	 the	 family	 into	an	economic	seniority,	by	claiming	 ownership	 to	 areas	 of	 the	 land	 purchased	 initially	 by	 his	 mother,	 had	been	unsuccessful.	He	lost	out	to	Mr.	Wright,	a	prominent	resident	whose	claim	to	the	land	was	weaker,	but	whose	influence	enabled	him	to	win	in	court.	Partly	as	a	consequence	of	this,	Mohammed	–	by	now	an	elderly	man	–	was	nicknamed	‘boy’.	Although	 Zainab’s	 formal	 connection	 to	 the	 family	 was	 weak	 and	 her	 position	never	 permanent,	 she	 had	 been	 successful	 at	 becoming	 ‘kin’	 by	 contributing	 to	household	and	family	projects.	For	Kadiatu,	the	opposite	had	been	the	case;	work	in	the	house	felt	exploitative	and	demeaning,	and	her	failed	business	arrangement	with	 her	 aunt	 resulted	 in	 a	 suspension	 of	 their	 relationship.	 When	 their	relationship	was	 finally	 reconciled,	 it	was	 possible	 only	 by	 the	 reinforcement	 of	Kadiatu’s	 subservient	 position	 to	 Rachel,	 and	 an	 acknowledgement	 of	 Rachel’s	maternal	role	in	Kadiatu’s	life.			Life	 in	 the	 household	 therefore	 revealed	 that	 material	 exchanges	 and	 business	plans	 were	 both	 the	means	 through	 kinship	 relationships	 could	 be	 constructed,	and	the	means	through	which	they	could	be	severed	and	strained.	Between	these	two	 extremes	 was	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 day-to-day	 contestation	 and	 tussle.	 Daily	exchanges,	 such	 as	 the	 sharing	 of	 food,	 the	 delegation	 of	 household	 tasks,	 and	monetary	 contributions	 to	 household	 expenses,	 were	 the	 means	 by	 which	positions	 in	 the	 household	 were	 asserted.	 All	 this	 took	 place	 in	 a	 complex	framework	involving	division	of	labour	and	organization	of	the	chain	of	command.	Much	of	the	drama	that	occurred	in	the	house	on	a	day-to-day	basis	emerged	when	people	 were	 seen	 as	 not	 acting	 according	 to	 their	 place,	 for	 example	 when	someone	was	reluctant	to	perform	a	task	requested	by	someone	else.			By	 the	 same	 token,	however,	 kinship-	 and	household-based	 relationships	were	a	major	 arena	 in	which	 business	 opportunities	 and	working	 arrangements	 played	out.	 This	 appears	 to	 have	 intensified	 the	 ambiguity	 that	 surrounded	 relations	 in	
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the	home,	especially	given	the	two	models	of	relatedness	that	were	at	play.	At	the	same	 time,	 it	 introduced	unstable	economic	relations	 into	 the	domestic	space,	as	evidenced	 by	 Kadiatu	 and	 Rachel’s	 failed	 business	 venture	 and	 their	 troubled	kinship	relations.			
The	Cole	compound:	land	disputes			My	third	case	study	in	this	chapter	centres	on	a	land	dispute	between	an	uncle	and	nephew,	both	of	whom	lived	on	the	compound	adjacent	to	Mafembe.	I	had	grown	close	to	the	nephew,	Brima,	during	my	fieldwork.	He	was	in	his	30s,	and	worked	as	an	intelligence	officer	at	the	local	police	station,	which	was	a	steady	job,	but	badly	and	unreliably	paid.	Brima	was	a	significant	figure	in	the	neighbourhood.	He	often	acted	as	an	informal	mediator	between	residents	and	the	legal	system;	they	would	come	to	him	first	when	they	were	considering	taking	a	legal	issue	to	court.	Brima	lived	in	a	small	room	and	parlour	with	his	wife,	Ami,	and	their	two	young	children.	The	 land	he	 lived	on	was	owned	by	his	 father,	who	died	during	my	 fieldwork.	 It	was	 divided	 into	 several	 units	 containing	 homes	 similar	 to	 Brima’s,	 as	well	 as	 a	much	larger	multi-storey	compound	that	had	been	built	by	his	uncle,	Andrew	–	a	former	police	officer	–	and	Andrew’s	wife,	Caddie.	Andrew	had	made	a	significant	amount	of	money	when	he	worked	as	 a	police	officer	 at	 the	 airport	 and	became	involved	 in	 the	 illegal	cocaine	business.	He	had	ultimately	served	prison	time	for	this	 and	 had	 been	 dismissed	 from	 the	 police	 force,	 but	 was	 nonetheless	 an	established	 member	 of	 the	 community	 and	 family.	 The	 family	 compound	 and	attached	land	was	divided	roughly	in	half.	Andrew	lived	primarily	off	rent	that	he	collected	from	the	compound,	as	well	as	from	a	small	grocery	store	that	Caddie	ran	from	the	ground-floor	of	their	house.	Until	Brima’s	father’s	death,	Brima	collected	rent	from	one	half	and	Andrew	from	the	other.	At	the	end	of	the	compound	was	a	garden,	 where	 Brima	 and	 others	 grew	 vegetables	 for	 cooking	 and,	 sometimes,	selling	on.			Brima’s	 father,	 who	 had	 lived	 in	 his	 native	 Kambia	 district	 in	 Northern	 Sierra	Leone,	died	in	September	2014.	He	held	the	documents	for	the	land,	which	were	in	his	name.	According	to	Brima,	his	father	had	intended	to	hand	over	the	documents	
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to	him	as	his	wife’s	oldest	son	(although	he	also	had	children	with	other	women),	but	he	had	not	got	round	to	putting	Brima’s	name	on	the	document.	Brima	would	have	 had	 a	 stronger	 claim	 to	 the	 property	 if	 he	 had	 been	 able	 to	 access	 the	documents,	 but	 in	 a	 cruel	 twist	 of	 fate	 (as	 reported	 to	me),	 his	 father	 had	 been	buried	rapidly	by	 the	Ebola	burial	 teams	–	who	were	 tasked	with	performing	all	burials	during	the	outbreak	–	with	the	documents	still	in	his	pocket.	As	a	younger	brother	of	the	owner,	and	a	long-time	resident	of	the	compound,	Andrew	also	had	a	strong	claim	to	 the	 land,	and	 to	becoming	head	of	 the	compound.	Such	 tension	over	competing	claims	between	siblings	and	children	was	a	common	fault-line	 in	land	disputes	in	Sierra	Leone.			The	conflict	blew	up	when	Andrew	began	collecting	rent	from	the	whole	property,	rather	 than	 just	 the	 side	 from	which	 he	 had	 collected	when	 Brima’s	 father	was	alive.	Brima	felt	under	increasing	pressure	to	leave	the	property.	His	half-brother,	Alfred,	 who	 shared	 the	 same	 father,	 was	 being	 groomed	 by	 Andrew	 to	 replace	Brima	 as	 the	 property's	 ‘caretaker’.	 But	 Brima	 saw	 this	 as	 the	 same,	 ultimately	manipulative,	form	of	‘care’	that	he	too	had	received	from	Andrew.			Andrew	had	helped	bring	Brima	into	the	police	force	and,	as	Brima	put	it,	he	‘gave	me	my	first	Guinness	stout’.	Brima’s	indebtedness	to	and	respect	for	his	uncle	were	interwoven	with	 feelings	of	betrayal	and	resentment.	All	 this	was	crystallised	 for	Brima	when	Andrew	 spoke	 to	 him	 at	 his	 father’s	 funeral.	 ‘I	 distinctly	 remember	him	saying,	“I	will	look	after	you	now”.	It	was	an	ironical	statement’.	The	event	of	death	brought	 to	 the	 fore	competing	 interests	 that	had	been	suppressed	beneath	the	convivial	surface	of	everyday	life	shared	by	neighbours	in	an	extremely	close-knit	 social	 environment.	 Brima	 had	 taken	 on	 a	 nurturing	 role	with	 Andrew	 and	Caddie’s	daughters,	regularly	helping	them	with	their	schoolwork	and	giving	them	lunch	money.	Likewise,	Brima	and	his	wife	Ami’s	daughter,	Aisha,	went	regularly	to	Andrew	and	Caddie’s	to	play	and	eat.			For	Brima,	the	conflict	was	a	test	of	pride,	dignity,	and	resolve.	Andrew	and	Caddie	did	 ‘not	have	mind’	 (found	 it	 unimaginable)	 to	 tell	 him	directly	 to	 leave.	 Instead	they	 employed	 indirect	means	 to	make	 it	 intolerable	 for	 Brima	 to	 stay,	 thereby	
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forcing	him	and	his	 family	to	depart	by	their	 ‘own’	volition.	This	approach,	 I	was	informed,	 was	 ‘a	 typical	 African	 way’.	 Brima	 was	 convinced	 that	 Andrew	 and	Caddie	wanted	to	prove	that	he	could	not	survive	without	collecting	the	rent	from	the	 houses:	 ‘They	 wanted	 to	 see	 me	 suffer’.	 He	 believed	 that	 they	 cut	 off	 his	electricity	connection	by	contacting	someone	from	the	National	Power	Authority,	through	another	neighbour	who	worked	there	who	had	similarly	distanced	himself	from	Brima.	He	was	sure	too	that	Caddie	was	targeting	him	and	his	family	through	occult	 ‘fetish’	 rituals,	 although	 –	 as	 with	 the	 electricity	 being	 cut	 off	 –	 this	 was	indirect	and	impossible	to	confirm.	Brima	isolated	himself,	not	socialising	with	his	neighbours	as	he	normally	would	have	done.	He	started	building	a	small	house	on	the	outskirts	of	town,	where	he	had	bought	land	and	had	been	planning	for	a	while	to	build.	He	did	not	intend	to	give	up	the	fight	by	leaving,	but	the	knowledge	that	there	was	to	be	a	place	where	his	 family	could	 ‘live	 in	peace’	and	 ‘keep	things	to	themselves’	was	a	 source	of	 comfort	 to	him.	 It	also	proved	 that	he	could	survive	and	 thrive	 without	 collecting	 the	 rent.	 His	 emotional	 states	 during	 this	 period	seemed	to	me	to	correspond	closely	to	the	progress	on	the	house.	Each	stage	that	was	 completed	 gave	 Brima	more	 confidence,	 marking	 the	 transition	 from	 being	socially	 reclusive	 and	 cut-off	 to	 engaged	 in	 the	 community	 as	 normal.	 The	relationships	 he	 had	with	 Andrew’s	 daughters	were	 also	 key	 in	 overcoming	 the	hostilities.	 Andrew’s	 oldest	 daughter	 came	 to	 Brima’s	 to	 appeal	 him	 to	 become	close	 again	 with	 her	 family,	 claiming	 that	 they	 were	 acting	 in	 a	 different	 mind	because	 they	 had	 eaten	 a	 salad	 prepared	 by	 Andrew’s	 former	 wife,	 which	 had	‘changed	 their	 minds’;	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 salad	 had	 been	 poisoned.	 Brima	remained	cautious	about	 letting	down	his	guard	and	reconnecting.	 ‘Trust	 takes	a	long	 time	 to	 build	 back’,	 he	 told	 me,	 not	 least	 because	 he	 feared	 that	 exposing	himself	 further	 to	 them	would	 enable	 them	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 him	 again.	 He	feared	 that	 Caddie’s	 call	 to	 perform	 a	 sara	 (ceremony)	with	 his	 daughter	 Aisha,	after	she	was	 ill,	 to	protect	her	 from	witchcraft,	was	 in	 fact	a	means	of	attacking	her	and	them,	of	 ‘coming	close’	with	bad	intentions.	 In	turn,	Brima	felt	aggrieved	that	 the	 close	 and	 supportive	 relationship	 that	 he	 had	 built	 with	 Andrew	 and	Caddie’s	daughters	had	not	been	acknowledged.			
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As	a	form	of	ceasefire,	Brima	and	Ami	went	to	‘beg’	formally	to	Andrew	and	Caddie,	in	 the	 presence	 of	 Mr.	 Barrie,	 a	 respected	 community	 elder	 and	 a	 prominent	member	of	the	local	mosque.	Although	Brima	believed	that	he	was	in	the	right,	as	the	 less	senior	person,	 it	was	his	responsibility	to	apologise	to	his	uncle.	Andrew	was	upset	about	bad	language	that	Brima	had	used	against	him,	and	claimed	that	Brima	had	spread	 the	 rumour	around	 the	 family	 that	Andrew	had	killed	Brima’s	father.	The	session	was	an	opportunity	 for	Brima	 to	voice	his	grievances	against	his	uncle,	and	some	measure	of	peace	was	achieved.	The	issue	over	ownership	of	the	compound	was	not	resolved,	and	Andrew	continued	to	collect	the	rent,	but	the	‘bad	feeling	in	the	heart’	was	ameliorated.	Shortly	afterwards,	Brima	told	me	that	‘dignity	 is	more	 important	 than	money’.	 A	 key	marker	 in	 this	 process	 for	 Brima	was	his	ability	to	celebrate	his	anniversary	with	his	wife	Ami,	which	he	had	been	delaying.	The	big	sound	system	blasting	out	the	latest	Nigerian	Afrobeat	music	was	a	proud	message	to	Andrew	and	Caddie	that	he	was	continuing	his	life	rather	than	suffering.	He	was	able	to	send	them	and	his	other	neighbours	food	and	drinks	from	the	party,	and	to	come	close	to	them	again.	It	did	not	seem	coincidental	that	it	was	during	 this	 semi-public	 celebration	 that	 Brima	 and	 Caddie	 were	 able	 to	 talk	 at	length,	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 ‘dancing	 area’,	 and	 visibly	 air	 what	 they	 had	 been	holding	 inside.	 It	 was	 a	 public	 gesture	 that	 exchange	 was	 being	 resumed	 and	kinship	 reconstructed,	 in	 stark	 opposition	 to	 the	preceding	months	 of	 ambiguity	and	 secretiveness,	 when	 indirect	 hostilities	 as	 the	 primary	 means	 of	communication.			This	 case	 study	connects	 to	many	 themes	similar	 to	 those	 identified	 in	 the	cases	above.	 We	 see	 parallels	 in	 the	 competing	 claims	 to	 seniority	 within	 a	 kinship	system,	which	come	to	the	fore	through	conflicts	over	rights	to	land.	Brima	has	a	claim	 to	 the	 land	 as	 the	 eldest	 son	 of	 his	 father,	 who	was	 the	 legal	 owner,	 and	Andrew	also	has	a	claim	as	the	owner’s	younger	brother.	Alternative	measures	of	seniority,	 beyond	 kinship,	 similarly	 come	 into	 play,	 and	 these	 prove	 to	 be	 the	trump	card;	in	this	case	Andrew	is	a	more	established	figure	and	can	get	his	way.			As	 with	 the	 other	 cases	 outlined	 above,	 the	 ambiguities	 can	 be	 connected	 to	competing	 notions	 of	 relatedness,	 which	 prove	 complex	 to	 reconcile.	 This	 case	
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illustrates	 particularly	 clearly	 how	 entangled	 economic	 and	 kinship	 spheres	 are	around	the	home.	On	the	one	hand,	the	residents	of	the	compound	are	neighbours	and	 family	members,	who	 live	deeply	 connected	 lives	with	high	 levels	of	mutual	care	and	support.	This	is	illustrated	by	the	way	that	the	two	couples	–	Brima	and	Ami	 and	 Andrew	 and	 Caddie	 –	 looked	 after	 each	 other’s	 children,	 taking	 on	 in	various	 ways	 the	 responsibility	 for	 raising	 them.	 This	 was	 the	 relationship	 that	Brima	 himself	 had	 with	 his	 uncle	 Andrew,	 who	 has	 acted	 in	 many	 ways	 like	 a	father	 to	 him.	 This	 form	 of	 relatedness	 extended	 to	 the	 other	 neighbours,	 who	were	pivotal	characters	 in	each	other’s	 lives,	socialising	and	sharing	on	a	day-to-day	 level,	 and	 being	 key	 figures	 in	 family	 events,	 such	 as	 Brima	 and	 Ami’s	engagement	party	at	which	the	neighbours	were	the	main	guests.	These	characters	position	 themselves	 as	 familial	 figures,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 familial	 and	domestic	space	also	functioned	as	an	economic	sphere	in	which	relationships	were	characterised	 in	 economic	 and	 monetary	 terms.	 The	 compound	 is	 a	 site	 of	production,	with	 land	used	 for	growing	 food,	and	also	of	commerce,	with	several	informal	enterprises	 running	 in	 the	area,	and	relationships	around	 the	home	are	also	structured	through	monetized	tenancy	agreements.			I	 am	 not	 suggesting	 that	 these	 registers	 are	 inherently	 contradictory.	 The	anthropological	record	shows,	of	course,	the	prevalence	of	kinship	as	an	organising	principle	 for	 economic	 activity,	 particular	 in	 non-state	 societies,	 as	 well	 as	 in	‘informal	economies’	(Hart	2000).	Equally,	as	Guyer’s	(1994)	historically	grounded	research	 on	 exchange	 in	 Atlantic	 Africa	 demonstrates,	 there	 is	 a	 long	 regional	history	 of	 status	 recognition	 intersecting	 complexly	 with	 registers	 of	 exchange	based	 on	 contradictory	 logics,	 in	 which	 ‘marginal	 gains’	 are	 secured	 through	strategic	positioning	at	the	interface	of	registers.	 	What	seems	to	mark	this	social	setting	 as	 particularly	 unstable	 is	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 ambiguity,	 and	 thus	 tension,	between	 kinship	 and	 economic	 registers,	 which	 are	 both	 understood	 as	 distinct	and	yet	are	highly	entwined	and	mutually	constituting.		For	Brima,	the	ambiguities	were	experienced	as	a	kind	of	Jobian	trial,	in	which	his	dignity	and	respect	was	on	the	line.	He	felt	attacked	from	within	and	from	without	by	 invisible	 or	 semi-visible	 forces	 –	 his	 electricity	 supply	 tampered	 with;	 his	
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children	 and	his	 brother	manipulated;	 and	witchcraft/poisoning	 (which	 involves	similarly	‘indirect’	modes	of	intimate	warfare).	Brima’s	own	interpretation	of	these	events	 did	 not,	 however,	 focus	 on	 his	 ejection	 from	 the	 compound	 for	 material	profit.	 He	 thought	 rather	 that	Andrew	 and	 Caddie	wanted	 to	 ‘see	 him	 suffer’;	 to	humiliate	him	in	front	of	his	neighbours;	to	demonstrate	that	he	could	not	 ‘stand	alone’.	When	 the	 issue	was	 finally	 resolved,	 Brima	was	 content,	 even	 though	 he	was	 no	 longer	 collecting	 rent,	 because	 he	 had	 proved	 to	 his	 neighbours	 that	 he	could	support	himself.	This	suggests	that	financial	gain	or	loss	was	less	significant	for	Brima	than	what	either	said	about	his	own	status	and	his	relationship	to	those	around	him	(a	parallel	with	Sam	and	Kadiatu	who	appeared	more	concerned	with	their	 ‘status’	 than	material	opportunities).	The	engagement	party	was	 significant	because	 he	 was	 able	 to	 show	 his	 neighbours	 that	 he	 was	 a	 ‘man’,	 not	 a	 youth,	reliant	on	his	father	or	uncle,	and	thus	his	self-esteem	was	somewhat	maintained.	By	 the	 same	 token,	 however,	 the	 means	 by	 which	 normal	 relationships	 could	resume	 depended	 on	 Brima’s	 formal	 apology	 to	 his	 uncle	 and	 aunt,	 much	 as	Kadiatu	apologised	 to	Rachel.	Similarly,	his	position	as	his	uncle’s	 junior	nephew	was,	for	the	time	being,	reaffirmed.			All	the	cases	in	this	chapter	have	in	common	a	relationship	between	a	senior	and	a	junior	 person,	 connected	 both	 by	 kinship	 and	 by	 various	 kinds	 of	 working	relationships	within	and	beyond	the	domestic	sphere.	In	all	cases,	the	exact	nature	of	 the	 relationship	 remains	 ambiguous.	 All	 are	 relationships	 of	 genuine	 mutual	support	 and	 care,	 but	 all	 feature	 deep-harboured	 tensions	 and	 resentments,	especially	on	the	part	of	the	junior	partner,	who	feels	exploited	and	‘held	back’.	The	double-edged	 dynamic	 surrounding	 care	 was	 particularly	 evident	 in	 the	 case	 of	Brima	and	his	uncle.	Andrew	had	partly	raised	Brima	and	helped	him	to	achieve	his	 current	 position.	 His	 uncle	 promised	 to	 look	 after	 him	 after	 his	 father	 died,	which	even	at	the	time	seemed	threatening	to	Brima.	This	may	be	because	‘looking	after’	 him	 –	 formalising	 his	 dependence	 on	 him	 and	 supporting	 him	 –	 risked	making	him	junior,	thus	lowering	his	status	and	his	quality	of	life.		In	the	end,	however,	Brima	did	not	want	to	leave	the	compound,	even	if	 it	meant	accepting	 his	 uncle’s	 seniority	 and	 his	 dependence	 upon	 him.	While	 Brima	 was	putting	 a	 lot	 of	 energy	 and	 resources	 into	 building	 a	 house	 on	 the	 outskirts	 of	
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town,4	where	he	could	‘live	in	peace’,	his	actions	suggested	that	he	did	not	want	to	leave	unless	absolutely	strictly	necessary.	He	had	a	plan	to	rent	out	the	new	house	if	he	did	not	move	 there	himself.	 I	 found	 this	revealing	of	a	dilemma	common	to	many	of	the	young	people	I	had	come	to	know	in	Congo	Town.	They	experienced	a	strong	desire	and	drive	for	independence,	which	often	meant	leaving	the	home	or	the	 neighbourhood,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 they	 desperately	 wanted,	 and	 often	desperately	 needed,	 to	 remain	 connected.	 These	 competing	 desires	 found	expression	in	the	complex	dual	dynamics	surrounding	crucial	relationships	of	care	and	 support,	 and	 in	 experiences	 and	 conceptions	 of	 ‘home’	 as	 places	 of	 both	security	and	protection	and	instability	and	danger.			
Conclusion			In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 have	 examined	 the	 complex	 and	 ambiguous	 dynamics	surrounding	the	home	in	Freetown,	focusing	particularly	on	the	positions	of	young	people	 in	 various	 representative	 domestic	 situations.	 The	 Ebola	 virus	 and	 crisis	rendered	 the	 home	 a	 site	 of	 both	 sanctuary	 and	 support,	 yet	 equally	 a	 site	 of	corporeal	 danger	 in	 dramatic	 and	 cruel	ways.	 	However,	 in	 light	 of	 this	 chapter,	these	 dynamics	 are	 remarkably	 consistent	 with	 the	 on-going	 dynamics	 of	 the	home.	For	young	men	and	women	in	such	a	context	where	land	is	hard	to	come	by,	as	 are	 sources	 of	 income,	 the	 home	 and	 family	 is	 the	most	 promising	 route	 for	personal	 mobility,	 as	 well	 as,	 in	 practical	 terms,	 a	 place	 of	 shelter,	 food	 and	emotional	 sustenance.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 home	 is	 a	 dangerous	 space	 where	junior	statuses	of	‘youth’	can	be	prolonged	and	reinforced.			Building	 on	 anthropological	 examinations	 of	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 home,	which	 have	been	attributed	to	histories	of	violence	(Das	2007,	Ferme	2001),	and	the	effects	of	state	and	market	forces	(Comaroff	and	Comaroff	2013,	Geschiere	2008,	Han	2013,																																																									4	During	my	fieldwork,	a	new	highway	opened	up	connecting	the	Western	part	of	Freetown	 to	 the	 road	 out	 of	 town.	 It	 bypassed	 central	 and	 East	 Freetown,	traversing	 a	 mountainous	 part	 of	 the	 peninsula,	 beyond	 the	 old	 Krio	 villages	settled	by	 the	early	 settlers.	This	opened	up	a	 significant	amount	of	 land,	which,	while	off	 the	grid	and	not	easily	accessible	given	the	 lack	of	connecting	roads	off	the	highway,	could	be	bought	relatively	cheaply.		
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Hansen	 2005),	 I	 have	 examined	 how	 individuals	 themselves	 understood	 the	ambiguous	 sets	 of	 relations	 in	 which	 they	 found	 themselves	 entangled,	 and	 the	contradictory	 ways	 through	 which	 young	 people	 go	 about	 gaining	 status	 in	Freetown.	 I	 have	 suggested	 that	 it	 was	 the	 interplay	 between	 business-oriented	and	kinship	registers,	and	the	corresponding	 lenses	through	which	the	actions	of	others	 are	 examined,	 that	 accounts	 for	 this	 ambiguity	 and	 tension.	 In	 many	instances,	 this	 ambiguity	 was	 promoted	 both	 by	 young	 people	 and	 those	 upon	whom	 they	 relied,	 becoming	 at	 the	 same	 time	 a	 strategy	 to	 enhance	mobility,	 a	means	of	subordination,	and	a	site	of	unfulfilled	expectation.				This	chapter	thus	introduces	some	of	the	central	arguments	of	the	thesis.	Firstly,	it	highlights	the	everyday	ways	that	statuses	are	reckoned	and	reconfigured	around	the	home;	in	particular	through	the	entanglements	of	work	with	family	networks.	This	 is	 a	 notable	 contribution	 to	 analysis	 of	 coming	 of	 age	 in	 Africa,	 through	presenting	 an	 alternative	model	 of	 social	mobility	 for	 young	men	and	women	 in	relation	 to	 family	 to	 that	 of	 a	 life-cycle	 model	 of	 social	 reproduction,	 in	 which	status	 is	 reconfigured	 around	 ritual.	 	 This	 chapter	 therefore	 challenges	 ‘crisis	 of	youth’	narratives	by	suggesting	that	even	if	social	reproduction	is	not	available	to	many	young	people	in	traditional	ways,	coming	of	age	is	nonetheless	taking	place	within	 family	 networks	 through	 other,	 less	 overt,	means.	 	 Secondly,	 the	 chapter	highlights	 the	 ways	 that	 individual	 aspirations	 and	 expectations,	 and	 those	 of	family,	 come	 into	 dialogue	 with	 each	 other;	 and	 the	 parallel	 ways	 that	understandings	 of	 relatedness	 are	 reconstituted	 in	 the	 process.	 	 This	 account	highlights	how	individual	and	collective	aspirations	are	simultaneously	antithetical	as	 well	 as	 mutually	 constitutive	 and	 productive,	 and	 how	 individuals	 creatively	manage	 different	 sorts	 of	 expectations	 in	 negotiating	 their	 own	positions	within	and	around	the	home.	In	the	next	chapter,	I	turn	to	an	examination	of	the	ways	that	young	 men’s	 work	 and	 mobilities	 are	 structured	 beyond	 the	 home,	 in	 the	 taxi	driving	 industry.	 However,	 we	 similarly	 see	 family,	 neighbours,	 and	 idioms	 of	kinship	as	key	 in	structuring	this	work;	as	well	as	a	 forms	of	social	mobility	 that	rely	on	negotiating	contradictory	sets	of	expectations	and	registers	of	sociality.		
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Chapter	3.	Entrepreneurialism	and	unionism:	contradictory	
modes	of	professional	status	for	young	men	working	in	informal	
transport		
		On	the	11th	of	September	2015,	a	week	before	leaving	the	field	for	the	last	time,	I	received	 a	 disturbing	 call	 from	 Human	 Right,	 the	 taxi	 driver	 introduced	 in	 the	prologue.	 The	 previous	 night	 he	 had	 been	 involved	 in	 a	 severe	 accident	 on	 his	motorbike,	 and	 was	 in	 desperate	 need	 of	 medical	 attention.	 A	 traffic	 policeman	standing	by	the	side	of	the	road	had	attempted	to	stop	him.	Human	Right	swerved	out	the	way,	but	was	pulled	off	his	bike	by	the	policeman.	He	came	flying	off	and	landed	on	an	iron	rod,	which	penetrated	his	groin,	narrowly	missing	his	testicles.	Despite	 this,	 Human	 Right	 had	 spent	 the	 night	 in	 a	 prison	 cell.	 It	 was	 his	 third	accident	in	a	matter	of	weeks.			Human	 Right,	 as	 he	 was	 popularly	 known,	 was	 a	 young	 man	 in	 his	 thirties,	although	he	had	the	appearance	of	someone	much	younger.	He	had	worked	on	the	streets	 in	 transport	 since	 he	 was	 14	 years	 old,	 when	 he	 dropped	 out	 of	 school	because	of	financial	hardship	that	confronted	his	parents.	He	worked	initially	as	an	apprentice	on	a	poda	poda	(minibus	taxi).	This	was	a	common	route	to	becoming	a	driver;	 it	was	expected	that	the	operator	or	driver	would	teach	the	apprentice	to	drive	on	 the	 side.	For	many	years	now,	Human	Right	had	driven	 taxis	owned	by	others,	 and	 he	 had	 taught	 many	 others	 to	 drive,	 inducting	 them	 into	 the	 taxi	business	along	the	way.	The	previous	summer,	he	had	bought	his	first	taxi,	but	 it	was	in	such	poor	condition	and	required	so	much	maintenance,	that	it	turned	out	to	be	a	bad	investment.			Human	Right’s	 family	 lived	 in	 the	 East	 End	 of	 Freetown,	 but	 he	 had	 been	 living	intermittently	 in	 Congo	Town	 for	many	 years,	where	 he	 had	worked	 for	 several	taxi	owners.	He	would	typically	stay	with	his	‘apprentice’,	known	as	Balloon	Burst,	who	 had	 a	 small	 room	 near	 his	 family	 compound	 in	 the	 area.	 However,	 this	arrangement	was	proving	increasingly	unsatisfactory;	Balloon	Burst	often	shared	
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the	space	with	his	wef	 (serious	girlfriend)	and	their	baby	daughter.	Human	Right	moved	back	to	stay	with	distant	relatives	in	the	East	End,	and	sold	his	car	for	very	little.	He	bought	two	motorbikes	that	he	operated	as	taxis,	known	as	okada.	Both	were	 in	 poor	 condition,	 and	 a	 series	 of	 messy	 and	 long-unresolved	 exchanges	ensued,	 involving	his	mother,	who	 ran	a	 rotating	 credit	 association	with	 church-going	 female	 friends,	 and	his	uncle.	While	Human	Right	had	 a	 reputation	 for	his	overly	confident	and	speedy	style	of	driving,	he	had	never	had	an	accident	in	a	car.	On	a	motorbike,	however,	his	luck	was	much	worse.			Balloon	Burst	and	I	travelled	across	town,	where	we	met	Human	Right,	along	with	his	distraught	mother,	 father,	and	sister,	outside	a	 small	 local	pharmacy.	At	 such	moments	 of	 crisis,	 I	 had	 often	 witnessed	 the	 strong	 obligations	 for	 family	 and	friends	 to	 ‘come	 close’;	 to	 be	 visibly	 present,	 sympathetic	 and	 supportive.	 But	 it	was	 not	 just	 Human	 Right’s	 close	 family	 and	 intimate	 friends	 who	 had	 rallied	around	 him;	 he	 had	 received	 the	 support	 of	 other	 okada	 riders,	 particularly	committee	members	from	the	local	‘bike	park’,	representatives	of	the	Sierra	Leone	Commercial	Bike	Riders	Union	(BRU).	This	group	had	entered	the	police	station	to	negotiate	his	release	from	police	custody	and	to	demand	justice	on	his	behalf.	The	police	 issued	 a	 report	 that	 technically	 entitled	 Human	 Right	 to	 medical	compensation,	but	the	bureaucratic	procedures	seemed	too	long-winded	to	enact,	in	 part	 because	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 formal	 hospital	 network	 had	 been	 so	overwhelmed	 by	 the	 Ebola	 crisis.	 The	 family,	 knowing	 that	 an	 immediate	 full	payment	would	not	be	necessary,	decided	to	go	to	the	local	pharmacy	to	have	the	wound	stitched	up	and	get	painkillers.	Human	Right	was	stoical,	and	did	not	show	signs	of	his	pain.	We	discussed	ways	that	he	might	prosecute	the	policeman.	This	seemed	 challenging	without	money	 and	without	 continued	 support	 from	within	the	 police	 force	 and	 from	 the	 BRU.	We	 also	 discussed	 arrangements	 for	 Human	Right	to	come	back	and	stay	in	Congo	Town	again,	given	that	his	return	to	the	east	had	been	so	ill-fated	and	seemed	likely	to	get	worse	as	pressure	mounted.		Human	Right’s	accident	exemplified	some	of	the	many	dangers	entailed	in	making	a	living	on	the	road:	the	overt	presence	of	the	state,	in	the	form	of	police	abuse,	as	well	 as	 its	 absence	 in	 other	 ways;	 and	 the	 risk	 of	 road	 accidents	 on	 poorly	
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maintained,	 overcrowded	 streets	 –	 all	 risks	 that	 were	 compounded	 by	 the	pressures	drivers	 faced	 to	make	 ‘fast	money’	 to	pay	off	debts	and	make	a	profit.	Conversely,	Human	Right’s	crisis	also	exemplified	the	support	networks	into	which	he,	 and	 many	 others	 in	 his	 position,	 were	 integrated	 and	 embedded.	 These	comprised	two	social	networks	that	constitute	 the	central	 focus	of	 this	chapter.	 I	suggest	 that	 each	 network	 represents	 contrasting	 models	 through	 which	 young	men	attempt	to	gain	professional	status	in	their	projects	of	social	mobility.			The	 first	 network	 is	 the	 Sierra	 Leone	 Commercial	 Bike	 Riders	 Union,	 which	emerged	from	the	conjoining	of	smaller	regional	associations	when	the	bike	riding	industry	 took	off	 in	 the	post-war	years.	This	was	a	youth-based	association	with	branches	throughout	the	country.	It	operated	according	to	a	hierarchical,	state-like	model,	with	 an	 associated	 set	 of	 performative	 repertoires:	 biannual	 elections,	 ID	cards,	 membership	 fees,	 internal	 fines,	 and	 its	 own	 security	 force.	 The	 BRU	represented	 a	 ‘political’	 avenue	 for	 gaining	 professional	 status	 through	membership	 of	 an	 association	 governed,	 in	 theory,	 by	 bureaucratic	 and	hierarchical	organisational	principles	on	the	one	hand,	and,	on	the	other,	by	values	of	 horizontal	 camaraderie,	 solidarity,	 and	 ‘brotherhood’.	 As	 Human	 Right	explained	to	me	when	explaining	the	differences	between	commercial	bike	riders	and	 regular	 taxi	 drivers:	 ‘when	 you	 are	with	 an	 okada	 then	 other	 okada	 people	know	you	are	one	in	the	same,	they	don’t	differentiate,	I	can	go	to	any	bike	park	in	town	and	spend	time	there’.	A	primary	task	of	the	BRU	was	to	protect	its	members	from	 police	 abuse,	 which	 was	 a	 defining	 struggle	 of	 commercial	 bike	 riding	 in	Freetown	during	my	fieldwork.	This	involved	a	complex	combination	of	resistance,	partnerships	formed	with	the	state	and,	in	my	analysis,	replicating	the	state	in	its	own	terms.			The	second	network	comprised	neighbourhood-based	kin	and	friendship	linkages.	While	most	commercial	bike	riders	were	members	of	the	BRU,	union	membership	and	 participation	 was	 much	 less	 common	 for	 regular	 taxi	 drivers.	 Their	professional	 activity	 was	 structured	 instead	 through	 these	 informal	 social	networks,	 through	 which	 drivers	 found	 cars	 to	 drive	 commercially,	 and	 where	money	was	typically	raised	for	investment	in	driving	businesses.	In	contrast	to	the	
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BRU,	 the	 professional	 status	 of	 taxi	 drivers	was	more	 ‘economic’	 than	 ‘political’,	informed	 by	 the	 ideals	 and	 effective	 performances	 of	 ‘entrepreneurialism’.	Here,	drivers	and	taxi	owners	styled	themselves	as	hustlers	and	businessmen,	utilising	a	language	 of	 ‘bosses’	 and	 expansive	 ‘futures’.	 Their	 businesses,	 however,	 were	necessarily	 embedded	 in	 an	 array	 of	messy	 and	 complicated	 arrangements	with	family,	 neighbours,	 and	 friends,	 which	 were	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 notion	 that	entrepreneurialism	 would	 provide	 a	 ‘way	 out’.	 Young	 men	 desired	 to	 escape	through	 business	 the	 complex	 relations	 deemed	 to	 hold	 them	 back,	 yet	 these	relations	 were	 the	 very	 means	 by	 which	 they	 could	 gain	 acceptance	 and	 status	within	these	family-based	economic	networks.			These	two	networks	were	overlapping	in	various	ways.	Individuals	such	as	Human	Right	 moved	 between	 them	 as	 they	 switched	 to	 and	 from	 taxi	 driving	 to	 bike	riding,	and	many	bike	riders	were	also	 integrated	 into	neighborhood	and	 family-based	 informal	 economic	 networks	 alongside	 the	 BRU.	 However,	 the	 two	occupations,	and	the	social	networks	into	which	they	were	embedded,	were	clearly	understood	 as	 distinct	 on	 the	 ground.	 They	 represented	 contrasting	 models	through	which	young	men	could	gain	professional	status;	each	model	had	its	own	contradictions	 and	 tensions,	 even	 if	 individuals	 occupied	 them	 both	simultaneously.		This	chapter	examines	these	two	networks	and	their	corresponding	sets	of	ideals	and	performative	repertoires,	which	are	interrogated	in	the	light	of	contradictions	entailed	by	membership	to	both.	In	the	case	of	okada	riders,	this	contradiction	lay	in	BRU’s	ambiguous	relationships	with	the	state.	In	the	case	of	taxi	drivers,	it	lay	in	the	blurry	boundaries	between	entrepreneurial	aspirations	and	the	expectations	of	family	and	neighbourhood	membership.	Both	reveal	a	 fundamental	contradiction	that	young	people	face	in	attempting	to	progress	in	life	in	Freetown:	their	powerful	desire	 to	 escape	 and	 resist	 a	 system	 ‘stacked	 against	 them’	had	 to	be	 reconciled	with	their	equally	powerful	desire	to	be	accepted	and	work	within	this	system.	To	push	 this	paradox	even	 further,	my	primary	 case	 studies	 reveal	 that	 resisting	or	escaping	these	structures	involved	working	closely	with	and	through	them,	and	in	the	process,	further	embedding	in,	and	reproducing,	them.		
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	In	 both	 cases,	 I	 suggest,	 these	 tensions	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 local	 responses	 to	what	might	be	labelled	neoliberal	political	economy	and	development	discourses.	First,	 in	 the	ways	 that	 neoliberal	 imperatives	 have	 reconfigured	 the	 relationship	between	 informal	associations	and	a	 stripped-down	state,	as	well	as	affected	 the	internal	 constitution	of	 associations	 themselves,	 at	 the	 same	 time	as	 state	actors	become	increasingly	reliant	on	these	associations	and	‘corrupt’	informal	economic	practises.	 And	 secondly,	 in	 the	 proliferation	 of	 development	 and	 capitalist	discourses	that	promote	business	as	a	primary	means	for	young	people	to	achieve	social	mobility	 (Cross	 and	 Street	 2009,	 Dolan	&	 Johnstone-Louis	 2011,	 Elyachar	2002).				In	the	course	of	this	chapter	we	see	what	appears	to	be	a	more	benign,	and	more	socially	 integrated,	 version	 of	 the	 type	 of	 ‘shadow	 state’	 identified	 in	 influential	analyses	of	the	African	state	(Bayart	1993,	Bayart,	Ellis	&	Hibou	2001,	Reno	1995).	The	 chapter	 reveals	 the	 ways	 that	 the	 tensions	 between	 ‘formal’	 and	 ‘informal’	workings	are	felt	and	reconciled	in	many	sectors	of	society,	which	might	in	other	analyses	 all	 be	 considered	 to	 operate	 within	 the	 imperatives	 of	 the	 informal	‘shadow	state’.	This	 tension,	and	 the	way	 that	 it	maps	onto	modes	of	 sociality,	 is	key	to	making	sense	of	local	responses	to	the	Ebola	state	of	emergency	–	discussed	primarily	in	chapter	7	–	which	represented	at	once	a	radical	shift	in	the	character	of	the	state,	at	the	same	time	as	slotting	into	a	familiar	framework.			In	 addition,	 what	 emerges	 ethnographically	 is	 a	 dynamic	 picture	 of	 the	‘marginalization’	 of	 youth	 in	 contemporary	 Africa,	 in	 which	 there	 are	 fuzzy	 and	shifting	boundaries	between	patrimonial	and	horizontal	networks,	between	acts	of	resistance	 and	 complicity,	 and	 between	 understandings	 of	 the	 statuses	 and	categories	 of	 ‘youth’	 and	 ‘adulthood’.	 Building	 on	 the	 insights	 of	 chapter	 2,	 this	chapter	shows	how	it	remains	possible	for	young	people,	on	a	day-to-day	level	and	in	temporary	ways,	to	achieve	meaningful	mobility	through	these	social	networks	and	 in	 relation	 to	 these	 political	 and	 economic	 categories	 of	 status.	 Equally,	 the	contradictory	and	performative	aspects	involved	in	these	forms	of	work	cannot	be	reduced	by	calling	them	self-defeating	or	confused.	As	was	revealed	after	Human	
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Right’s	accident,	it	was	representatives	from	these	networks	that	assembled	by	his	side	when	he	was	in	greatest	need.	This,	in	turn,	is	revealing	of	established	social	responses	 to	 ‘crisis’	 in	 Sierra	 Leone;	 which	 is	 revealing	 when	 interpreting	responses	to	and	tensions	at	play	during	the	Ebola	crisis,	as	will	become	evident	in	the	second	half	of	the	thesis.		
	
Sierra	Leone	Commercial	Bike	Riders	Union			For	 the	 first	 few	 months	 of	 my	 fieldwork,	 I	 noticed	 a	 striking	 character	 riding	around	on	a	motorbike	–	sometimes	driving	and	sometimes	a	passenger.	He	looked	as	 if	he	had	stepped	out	of	an	old	photo	of	 the	American	Black	Panthers.	He	was	dressed	from	head	to	toe	in	elaborate	and	immaculate	outfits	comprising	military-style	caps	and	hats,	black	shoes	or	boots	so	shiny	you	could	see	your	reflection	in	them,	 black	 sunglasses,	 shiny	 buttons,	 an	 ID	 card	 holder	 around	 his	 neck,	 and	 a	badge	 that	 read	 ‘chief	 inspector	 of	 okadas’.	 He	 looked	 subversive,	 cool,	 and	rebellious,	while	resembling	at	the	same	time	a	military	official-cum-civil	servant.	I	eventually	got	 talking	to	this	man	and	discovered	that	he	was	 famous	among	the	city’s	commercial	bike	riders	(okada),	and	was	popularly	known	as	Councillor.		At	 the	 time,	 Councillor	 was	 campaigning	 for	 the	 upcoming	 biannual	 bike	 park	elections.	 Bike	 parks	 were	 administrative	 units	 of	 the	 Sierra	 Leone	 Commercial	Bike	Riders	Union,	as	well	as	physical	locations	where	bike	riders,	known	as	okada,	would	meet.	There	were	about	thirty	bike	parks	in	Freetown,	and	Councillor	was	running	to	become	chairman	of	one	of	 the	 largest,	known	as	Upgun,	 located	by	a	major	 roundabout	 in	 the	 East	 End	 of	 Freetown,	 close	 to	where	 Councillor	 lived.	Councillor	won	by	a	landslide;	during	his	campaign	he	had	managed	to	register	to	the	union	a	 large	number	of	bike	riders	 from	across	town,	enabling	them	to	vote	for	him.			Councillor’s	 arresting	appearance	–	a	mixture	of	 the	 two	extremes	of	 conformity	and	non-conformity	–	was	matched	by	his	way	of	conducting	his	role	as	chairman	of	 the	bike	park.	Councillor	carried	around	a	briefcase,	sandwiched	between	him	and	 the	 handlebars	 of	 his	 bike	 as	 he	 wove	 through	 traffic,	 often	 whizzing	 onto	
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narrow	pedestrian	back-alleys	to	avoid	traffic	police	and	checkpoints.	His	briefcase	held	certificates,	paperwork,	pens,	stamps,	tape,	tickets	(sold	daily	to	members	to	collect	money),	and	shoe	polish.	He	held	impromptu	meetings	with	members	of	his	committee	in	roadside	cafes	and	bars,	where	he	would	set	up	a	make-shift	office,	carefully	unpacking	and	placing	 the	 contents	of	his	 suitcase	on	a	 table	or	bench.	Councillor’s	 appeal	 to	his	 supporters	 and	 colleagues	 appeared	 to	be	his	blend	of	being	‘one	of	them’,	a	street-savvy	former	rebel	turned	bike	rider,	and	an	‘official’	able	 to	 use	his	 influence	 and	 charisma	 to	 bail	 them	out	 of	 prison	 cells	 and	 their	bikes	out	of	police	custody,	or	advocate	for	his	bike	park	among	stakeholders	and	at	 union	 meetings.	 Councillor	 was	 also	 criticised,	 however,	 when	 the	 balance	seemed	incorrect.	He	was	sometime	labelled	‘too	civilian’	(i.e.	not	official	enough),	and	therefore	lacking	influence,	and	at	others	criticised	for	forgetting	his	‘brothers’	at	the	bike	park	as	he	advanced	his	personal	development	among	officials.			
	
Figure	5	Make-shift	bike	park	office		Councillor’s	 own	 self-contradictions	 embodied	 those	 faced	 by	 the	 BRU	 and	 its	members	 in	general.	They	 faced	a	 combination	of	 explicit	 targeting	and	abuse	at	the	 hands	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 neglect.	 They	 responded	 both	 by	 gaining	 acceptance	through	partnerships	and	 informal	working	arrangements	with	 the	 state,	 and	by	aligning	 themselves	 to	a	 country-wide,	hierarchical	yet	youth-based	organisation	with	collectivist	tendencies	that	created	spaces	away	from	the	state.		
	 90	
	Motorbikes	 have	 been	 used	 as	 a	 means	 of	 rural	 transport	 in	 Sierra	 Leone	 for	decades,	 but	 the	growth	of	 the	 commercial	 industry	 can	be	 traced	 to	 the	 closing	stages	 of	 the	 civil	 war,	 most	 notably	 the	 disarmament,	 demobilisation,	 and	reintegration	(DDR)	programme	that	was	enacted	between	1999	and	2004	by	the	Government	of	 Sierra	Leone	with	 support	 from	 the	World	Bank	and	a	 variety	of	NGOs.	 The	 programme,	which	 reached	 72,000	 combatants,	 involved	 exchange	 of	weapons	for	money,	and	skills-training	in	such	areas	as	carpentry	and	engineering.	By	 far	 the	 far	 the	 most	 popular	 profession	 to	 emerge	 from	 the	 programme,	however,	was	 informal	 commercial	 bike	 riding,	 as	many	 ex-combatants	 invested	their	packages	in	motorbikes.			Initially	 the	business	operated	primarily	 from	towns	 in	 the	north	and	east	of	 the	country,	near	to	the	border	with	Guinea,	 from	which	bikes	were	imported.	In	the	first	 decade	 of	 the	 21st	 century,	 it	 expanded	 rapidly	 to	 all	 major	 towns	 in	 the	country,	as	primarily	uneducated	migrants	travelled	to	urban	centres	in	search	of	work.	 In	 2005,	 commercial	 bike	 riding	 took	 off	 in	 Freetown,	 and	 has	 since	expanded	considerably.	Initially	major	towns	and	urban	districts	were	represented	by	 their	 own	 associations;	 three	 formed	 in	 Freetown	 itself.	 In	 2006,	 these	were	amalgamated	to	 form	a	Freetown-wide	association	named	 ‘One	Brother’	 (kinship	idioms	 were	 plentiful	 among	 such	 associations).	 In	 late	 2007,	 after	 meetings	 in	Makeni,	 the	 economic	 centre	 of	 the	 Northern	 District	 of	 the	 country,	 an	 interim	national-level	association	was	established	in	which	bylaws	and	a	constitution	were	drafted.	In	2010,	this	became	an	officially	recognised	association.		
Okadas	 are	 essential	 to	 the	 day-to-day	 functioning	 of	 the	 city	 of	 Freetown.	 The	boom	in	population	in	recent	decades	has	not	only	seen	many	young	men	seeking	work,	but	also	a	considerable	demand	for	urban	transport.	Given	its	infrastructural	limitations	 in	 relation	 to	 its	 population	 size,	 motor-bike	 taxis	 are	 particularly	effective	 in	 Freetown.	 They	 can	 weave	 through	 congested	 traffic	 and	 reach	 the	increasingly	populated	mountainous	off-the-grid	areas	of	the	Freetown	peninsula.	Yet,	despite	this,	bike	riding	is	widely	perceived	as	undesirable.	As	my	friend	James	
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told	Human	Right	after	one	of	his	accidents;	 ‘Bike	riding	 is	not	a	real	profession’.	By	this	he	meant	that,	given	the	risks	involved,	it	was	not	a	long-term	career.		Today,	the	BRU	is	a	nationwide	hierarchical	structure.	At	the	top	sits	the	president	and	an	executive	committee,	who	operate	out	of	 the	central	office,	 located	 in	 the	building	adjacent	to	the	head	office	of	the	Department	of	Road	Transport.	 	Below	this	 are	 four	 countrywide	 regional	 committees,	 which	 sit	 above	 district-level	committees.	Finally	 comes	 the	bike	park	committees.	Elections	are	 typically	held	every	 two	 years.	 Alongside	 these	 structures	 sit	 the	 Bike	 Monitoring	 Officers,	nicknamed	 ‘taskforce’,	 the	 BRU’s	 militant	 wing.	 The	 taskforce	 became	 a	 more	visible	presence	during	my	fieldwork;	they	were	issued	with	blue	uniforms.	They	were	 responsible	 both	 for	 disciplining	 bike	 riders	 from	 within,	 and,	 as	representatives	of	the	BRU,	for	providing	a	direct	interface	with	traffic	police.	This	was	manifested	 in	 groups	 of	 traffic	 police	 and	BMOs	 gathering	 at	 the	 corners	 of	junctions,	marking	the	boundaries	of	where	bikes	could	legally	operate.	This	made	them	seem	like	national	border	guards	with	two	equivalent	sets	of	authorities.			The	BRU	secured	funding	in	four	major	ways.	First,	there	was	annual	registration,	amounting	to	50,000	Le	per	year,	after	which	riders	were	issued	with	an	ID	card	that	 allowed	 them	 to	 vote	 in	 elections.	 Second,	 daily	 payments	 of	 1000	 Le	were	taken	 from	riders	 in	a	 ticketed	 system	at	 the	bike	parks,	which,	 as	well	 as	being	administrative	 units	 of	 the	 BRU,	were	 also	 physical	 spaces	where	 riders	 parked	and	 congregated	 between	 shifts.	 A	 proportion	 of	 these	 tickets	 filtered	 up	 to	 the	three	 higher	 levels	 of	 the	 union.	 A	 third	 means	 of	 raising	 money	 was	 through	internal	fines,	 issued	by	the	Bike	Monitoring	Officers,	 for	misdemeanours	such	as	failure	 to	 wear	 appropriate	 clothing	 or	 safety	 gear.	 Finally,	 there	 was	 external	funding	 from	 ‘stakeholders’	 such	 as	 political	 sponsors.	 This	 was	 particularly	remunerative	when	politicians	needed	 support	 around	 elections	 (Enria	2015).	 It	also	 came	 from	 NGOs	 looking	 to	 invest	 in	 youth-development	 initiatives	 or	 to	recruit	riders	 for	 their	own	projects.	The	 latter	happened	on	a	 large	scale	during	the	 Ebola	 outbreak,	 when	 many	 riders	 were	 recruited	 in	 the	 formal	 Ebola	response,	for	example	to	join	burial	teams.			
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The	 relationship	 between	 the	 BRU	 and	 the	 state	 has	 fluctuated	 and	 been	transformed	throughout	the	association’s	history.	The	violent	insurgency	of	young	rebels,	 many	 of	 whom	 turned	 to	 bike	 riding,	 represents	 one	 extreme	 on	 the	spectrum.	At	the	other	extreme	is	the	active	promotion	of	bike	riding	as	a	valuable	form	 of	 youth	 employment	 that	 took	 place	 under	 the	 administration	 of	 former	president	 Tejan	 Kabbah.	 The	 Traffic	 Regulation	 Act,	 signed	 in	 2007,	 included	sections	on	safety	standards	for	bikes,	and	initiated	the	option	to	formally	license	bikes	as	commercial	vehicles,	with	distinctive	number	plates.	A	few	years	later	the	BRU	 became	 an	 officially	 recognized	 organization.	 As	 the	 relationship	 with	 the	state	 deteriorated,	 however,	 measures	 of	 recognition	 such	 as	 licensing	 and	regulation	came	to	serve	as	means	of	targeting	bike	riders.		
	During	my	fieldwork,	the	state	operation	to	clear	bike	riders	from	the	downtown	area,	effectively	severing	bike	riders	the	East	from	the	Western	parts	of	Freetown,	used	 increasingly	 stringent	measures,	 such	 as	 the	 deployment	 of	military	 police,	armed	 with	 large	 batons,5	at	 major	 junctions.	 The	 fines	 and	 bribes	 that	 police	routinely	imposed	on	riders	–	either	to	avoid	arrest	or	to	facilitate	the	release	of	a	rider	or	a	bike	–	had	 increased	about	 ten-fold	 in	 the	past	 few	years.	More	senior	officials	 in	 the	police	department	and	 legal	 system	expected	a	 certain	number	of	drivers’	 cases	 to	 reach	 their	 ‘level’	 (i.e.	 to	 be	 taken	 to	 the	 station,	 and	 the	 court,	rather	 than	 settled	 at	 the	 roadside),	 which	 would	 in	 practice	 require	 greater	payments	 to	 reach	 informal	 settlements	 or	 formal	 bail	 charges.	Given	 that	many	were	 unable	 to	 pay	 the	 escalating	 costs	 at	 each	 level,	 reaching	 roughly	 $100	 for	bail	 at	 the	 court	 level,	 the	 result	was	 that	 the	 city’s	police	 cells,	 courtrooms,	 and	prison	were	full	of	bike	riders	who	had	committed,	at	the	most,	minor	offences.			Bike	 park	 executives	were	 expected	 to	 use	 their	 influence	 and	 connections	with	police	and	other	officials	to	negotiate	on	behalf	of	their	members	Councillor	visited	police	stations	most	days	to	negotiate	the	release	of	bike	riders,	 in	the	process	of	which	 he	 developed	 close	 relationships	 with	 several	 officers.	 Through	 these																																																									5	After	the	Ebola	‘state	of	emergency’	was	lifted,	the	former	head	of	the	National	Ebola	Response	Center	was	appointed	as	the	lead	figure	on	this	operation.	This	gives	an	indication	of	the	scale	of	this	operation	as	a	government	agenda.		
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connections,	 bike	 park	 executives	 would	 get	 tip-offs	 in	 advance	 of	 police	 raids,	allowing	 riders	who	did	not	hold	drivers’	 licenses	or	owned	unlicensed	bikes,	 to	leave	 the	 scene.	 Bike	 parks	 would	 also	 hold	 official	 partnership	 meetings	 with	police	 representatives	 and	 political	 stakeholders,	 which	 demonstrated	 that	working	together	was	an	official	part	of	the	agenda	of	both	groups.			Such	 relationships	were	not	 restricted	 to	 the	executive	 level.	 It	was	 common	 for	bike	 riders	 to	 develop	 informal	 relationships	 with	 police	 officers,	 who	 offered	them	protection	at	police	stations,	or	 let	 them	pass	checkpoints	unobstructed.	 In	some	cases,	this	was	based	on	prior	connections,	often	through	neighbourhood	or	family	networks.	In	other	cases,	it	was	fostered	through	special	payments,	referred	to	as	bora	and	ajo,	names	that	refer	to	respectful	gifts	and	fines	traditionally	made	to	elders.			Some	riders	chose	to	evade	the	police	altogether,	which	required	taking	back	roads	and	 alleys	 to	 avoid	 traffic	 police,	 or	 pretending	 not	 to	 be	 an	 okada	 at	 all,	 by	registering	 bikes	 as	 ‘private’	 rather	 than	 ‘commercial’	 (they	 have	 different	coloured	 license	 plates),	 or	 by	 dressing	 like	 commuters	 or	 (especially	 after	 the	Ebola	outbreak)	medical	workers	to	avoid	police	harassment.			Tensions	 between	 bike	 riders	 and	 authorities	 has	 been	 foregrounded	 in	 earlier	studies	of	bike	riding	in	Sierra	Leone.	Peters	(2007)	discusses	how	solidarities	that	formed	between	ex-combatants,	mostly	from	rural	areas	but	now	living	in	towns,	provided	 the	 infrastructure	 for	 the	 motorbike	 driving	 associations	 under	 which	many	 drivers	 operate.	 According	 to	 Peters,	 associations	 ‘fight	 a	 war’	 for	 their	members,	no	longer	through	armed	conflict	as	during	the	civil	war,	but	through	the	means	of	trade	unionism,	aiming	to	protect	drivers	from	corrupt	police	and	traffic	authorities,	and	from	exploitation	by	bike	owners	(Peters	2007:19).	Menzel	(2010)	developed	this	analysis	to	consider	the	 ‘double-edged	qualities’	of	motorbike	taxi	driving,	whereby	the	potential	for	individuals	to	create	livelihoods,	and	collectives	to	 support	 their	 ambitions,	 is	 threatened	 by	 public	 stigmatisation	 of	 drivers	 for	being	dangerous,	as	well	as	by	the	potential	for	political	‘big	men’	to	recruit	drivers	for	 violent	 campaigning,	 reinforcing	 ex-combatant	 statuses	 and	 involving	 risks.	
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This	analysis	is	echoed	by	Burge	(2011),	who	elaborates	on	the	discursive	means	by	okada	riders	are	socially	‘contained’	and	their	marginality	perpetuated.			These	 studies	 emphasize	 specific	 connections	 between	 bike	 riders	 and	 former	rebels,	which	can	be	seen	as	explaining	their	continued	stigmatization.	The	data	I	collected	on	the	BRU	and	bike	riders	and	Freetown	in	2013-15,	however,	suggests	another	way	 of	 thinking	 about	 the	 positionalities	 of	 bike	 riders	 and	 the	 BRU.	 It	indicates	 that	 their	 relationship	 with	 the	 state	 was	 defined	 not	 only	 by	marginalization	and	stigmatization,	which	generated	in	turn	feelings	of	bitterness	and	the	desire	to	resist	and	fight	back,	but	also	by	a	powerful	desire	to	be	accepted	by	 the	 state,	 to	 form	 partnerships	 with	 it,	 and	 to	 replicate	 it	 in	 strikingly	performative	ways.	For	its	part,	the	state,	in	legal	and	illegal	ways,	demonstrated	a	reliance	on	bike	riders	and	their	income.			Fluctuating	and	often	tense	relationships	between	the	state	and	informal	transport	has	been	 identified	 in	studies	of	 the	subject	 in	a	variety	of	contexts.	This	suggest	that	the	phenomenon	is	inherent	in	informal	transport,	beyond	its	specific	history	in	 Sierra	 Leone.	 In	 Uganda,	 bike	 riding	 represents	 a	model	 of	 development	 that	stands	 in	 stark	 opposition	 to	 the	 dominant,	 yet	 unobtainable,	modernist	 visions	and	aesthetics	 favoured	by	city-planners	(Rollinson	2013).	This	suggests	that	the	visibility	 of	 informal	 transport,	 and	 its	 reliance	 on	 state	 infrastructure,	makes	 it	particularly	 challenging	 to	 the	 state.	 The	 tense	 relationship	 between	 informal	transport	 and	 the	 state	 could	 also	 be	 connected	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 many	 cities	depend	on	informal	transport	for	proper	functioning.	In	Bangkok,	motorcycle	taxi	drivers’	mastery	of	the	streets	enables	them	to	cause	blockages	as	much	as	enable	circulation	this	was	apparent	in	their	position	as	key	actors	in	major	civic	protests	(Sopranzetti	2014).			The	 complex	 relationship	 between	 bike	 riders	 and	 the	 state	 might	 also	 be	connected	 to	 the	 effects	 of	 neoliberal	 structural	 adjustment	 and	 marketization,	which	 have	 elicited	 similarly	 contradictory	 responses	 in	 relation	 to	 informal	associations	 in	 many	 different	 contexts.	 Meagher’s	 (2010)	 research	 in	 Nigeria	demonstrates	that	intense	liberalization	and	formal	institutional	neglect	since	the	
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1980s	 eroded	 institutionalized	 practices	 and	 relations	 of	 trust	within	 enterprise	networks.	 These	 became	 in	 turn	 increasingly	 unstable	 and	 exploitative,	 shifting	towards	 weaker	 ties	 and	 more	 individuated	 networks,	 often	 formed	 along	exclusionary	lines	of	identity.	A	major	factor	in	this	downward	turn	is	the	failure	of	associations	to	forge	productive	relations	with	local	and	state	governments,	which	have	themselves	been	weakened	and	deconstructed	over	the	past	few	decades.	As	Hart	and	Hann	point	out,	‘Under	a	neoliberal	imperative	to	reduce	the	state’s	grip	on	 “the	 free	 market”,	 manifested	 in	 developing	 countries	 as	 “structural	adjustment”,	 national	 economies	 and	 the	 world	 economy	 itself	 were	 radically	informalized’	(Hart	and	Hann	2011:151).			Yet	 in	 other	 contexts,	 however,	 neoliberal	 conditions	 have	 not	 necessarily	weakened	 informal	associations;	 rather	 the	opposite	 trends	have	been	observed.	In	 South	 Africa,	 liberalization	 of	 the	 markets	 was	 seen	 to	 encourage	 increasing	formality	 –	 according	 to	 customary	 and	 novel	 models	 –	 in	 informal	 economic	associations,	 protecting	members	 from	 the	 dangers	 of	 the	 spread	 of	 capitalisms,	and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 allowing	 participation	 in	 it	 (James	 2015,	 Krige	 2014).	 In	addition,	neoliberal	development	agendas	globally	often	encouraged	the	forging	of	‘public-private’	partnerships	(Elayachar	2002),	or	have	indirectly	relied	upon,	and	thus	 even	 promoted,	 informal	 economies	 (Cross	 2010).	 Studies	 have	 highlighted	how	 individuals	 in	different	 strata	of	 society	were	 inserted	 into	 roles	of	 creative	‘brokerage’,	 in	which	conflicting	 ideals	and	organizational	 logics	are	blended	and	blurred,	often	through	charismatic	performance	(Bear	2011,	Pratten	2008,	 James	2011).			Such	 opposing	 trends	 in	 neoliberal	 political	 economy	 –	 informalization	 yet	 also	elements	 of	 associational	 formalization,	 an	 impetus	 for	 associations	 to	 form	partnerships	with	the	state	as	well	as	severing	of	such	relationships,	as	well	as	the	re-emergence	 of	 forms	 of	 brokerage	 -	 are	 pertinent	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 BRU.	 The	BRU’s	fluctuating	relationship	with	the	state	is	not	just	a	product	of	historical	shifts	between	 modalities,	 however;	 these	 modalities	 currently	 co-exist.	 This	 became	clear	to	me	in	an	interview	I	conducted	with	Ibrahim	Tula,	the	secretary	general	of	the	Western	Region	of	the	BRU:		
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	 In	the	current	phase	of	this	bike	riding	operation,	harassment	has	become	a	usual	 practice	 of	 the	 Sierra	 Leone	 police.	Whenever	 there	 is	 the	 law	 and	those	who	break	 the	 law,	 there	will	 always	 be	 a	 conflict.	 The	 police	 from	their	 point	 of	 view	 say	 that	 they	 are	 managing	 the	 transport	 area.	 On	several	occasions	we	have	met	with	the	police,	sometimes	we	have	them	as	stakeholders,	 so	 they	will	 be	 able	 to	 tell	 our	membership	 how	 to	 comply	with	the	law,	because	we	are	greatly	disadvantaged	by	the	government.	We	license	our	bikes,	 now	 they	 threaten	us	 to	 insure	 them	 [to	pay	 additional	sums].			But	 what	 do	 we	 expect	 from	 the	 government?	 For	 them	 to	 maintain	 the	roads,	 that	 is	 one.	 Two,	 for	 them	 to	 organise	 skills	 training	 for	 riders,	because	that	is	part	of	social	cooperation	between	the	government	and	the	bike	 riders	 union.	We	 do	 not	 have	 adequate	 training.	We	 have	 found	 out	that	 most	 of	 the	 things	 that	 the	 police	 pounce	 on	 us	 for	 is	 a	 result	 of	ignorance.	 And	 the	 system	 of	 getting	 them	 [licenses]	 from	 government	department	is	very	poor.	Even	if	you	don’t	know	how	to	ride	you	can	get	a	license	if	you	pay	for	it,	so	because	of	that	you	cannot	read	road	traffic	signs.	And	because	of	 that	police	will	 just	 implement	 the	 law,	but	 they	 forget	 to	correct	 their	mistakes,	 as	 a	 government,	 they	 just	 implement	 the	 law,	 so	most	of	the	time	the	boys	can	fall,	and	when	the	boys	fall,	there	will	always	be	 conflict,	 there	 will	 always	 be	 threat,	 there	 will	 always	 be	discouragement.			Therefore,	we	 as	 stakeholders	 can	 step	 in,	 and	when	we	 step	 in	 it	 can	be	noted	to	them,	but	they	need	the	follow	up	on	their	part.	This	is	always	the	tension	between	us	and	the	police.	And	again,	there	are	times	we	can	go	and	say	‘let’s	sit	at	a	round	table	and	discuss’,	and	we	can	all	agree,	but	when	it	comes	 to	 implementation	 they	go	beyond	 the	mandate	 that	we	give	 them.	And	when	perhaps	we	ask	questions,	they	say	we	are	 just	a	union.	That	 is	the	tension.			But	honestly	our	boys	have	negative	parts,	because	we	are	youths,	we	as	a	union	have	challenges,	 the	youth	organisation	that	you	have	formed,	most	of	 the	 youths	 came	 from	 various	 backgrounds,	 regions,	 societies,	communities,	so	in	order	to	get	them	how	you	want	them	is	different	from	when	you	have	given	birth	to	a	child	and	you	want	to	train	them,	and	they	are	all	youths,	all	able	youths.	It	is	difficult	to	control,	right?	Sometimes	we	do	 our	 own	 moral	 sensitisation,	 we	 can	 call	 everyone	 into	 a	 meeting	 so	when	they	meet	the	riders	we	can	tell	them	that	this	is	the	system.			So,	 the	issue	of	police	and	bike	riding,	the	relationship	is	not	stable.	 It	 is	a	fluctuating	system,	it	can	go	on	and	off,	 it	fluctuates.	So	we	still	have	to	do	more,	 the	 government	 needs	 to	 do	 more	 to	 challenge	 the	 law	 enforcing	department.	That	 is	what	 I	have	to	say	about	us	and	the	police.	But	we	as	youth,	we	have	serious	problems.	Someone	can	go	buy	a	bike	and	not	have	a	license,	and	you	the	rider	want	a	livelihood.	So	you	will	take	that	risk,	and	when	you	take	that	risk,	you	will	go	on	the	street,	and	the	police	apprehend	
	 97	
you,	you	feel	bad,	you	feel	offended,	although	you	have	done	everything,	but	just	because	the	police	stop	and	don’t	want	to	let	you	free	they	will	extort	from	you,	unless	you	give	them	something	[money].	So	those	conflicts	arise.	We	have	our	own	negative	part,	they	have	their	own	negative	part,	but	their	negative	part	is	worse	than	ours.’		Ibrahim’s	 account	 is	 analytical	 and	 level-headed	 as	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	relationship	between	the	bike	riders,	the	BRU,	and	the	state.	In	this	statement,	he	reflects	 on	 core	 contradictions	 that	 make	 their	 relationship	 so	 ambiguous	 and	multi-faceted.	 The	 state,	 in	 his	 analysis,	 embodies	 the	 contradiction	 of	 both	attempting	to	 ‘develop’	 the	city	through	clearing	out	and	regulating	reckless	bike	riders,	yet	at	 the	same	time	does	not,	or	cannot,	 to	provide	viable	alternatives	 in	the	form	of	an	effective	urban	transport	system.	It	is	this	failure	that	keeps	the	bike	riders	in	business.	Furthermore,	the	police,	who	are	under-resourced,	are	strongly	incentivized	 to	 supplement	 or	 source	 their	 income	 from	 payments	 from	 bike	riders.	 If	 bike	 riding	was	 not	 deemed	 dangerous	 and	 illegal,	 and	 thus	 subject	 to	(often	unobtainable)	road	safety	standards	and	restrictions	on	areas	of	operation,	the	 police	 would	 have	 less	 scope	 for	 demanding	 money	 from	 them.	 Perhaps	Ibrahim	 was	 correct	 when	 he	 said	 that	 this	 is	 why	 the	 state	 resists	 providing	training	for	bike	riders,	many	of	whom	are	recent	young	migrants	to	the	city	and	in	genuine	need	of	 it.	 It	 thus	 falls	 to	 the	BRU	to	 train	 its	members,	but	all	 too	often	their	attempts	are	unrecognised	and	undermined	by	the	state.			This	 complex	mutual	 reliance	and	antagonism	between	bike	 riders	and	 the	 state	corresponds	with	some	patterns	identified	in	the	above	literature	on	the	effects	of	neoliberal	 reform.	 While	 the	 regulatory	 capacity	 of	 both	 formal	 and	 informal	sectors	 becomes	 eroded	 and	 tense,	 strong	 mutual	 dependencies	 form	 between	them.	The	police	become	reliant	on	bike	riders	for	their	income,	and	riders	and	the	BRU	become	reliant	on	often-informal	partnerships	with	the	police	and	the	state	to	continue	their	programme	of	resistance.			This	mutual	reliance	manifests	 itself	 in	a	degree	of	equivalence	between	the	BRU	and	the	state,	evident	especially	 in	the	BRU’s	remarkably	state-like	structure	and	performative	repertoires.	At	one	level,	these	seemed	to	compensate	for	the	feelings	of	neglect	and	alienation	that	many	bike	riders	experience	in	relation	to	the	state;	
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they	provided	a	substitute.	Many	bike	riders	I	met	did	not	have	national	ID	cards,	and	thus	could	not	vote	in	national	elections,	but	they	did	have	BRU	ID	cards	and	voted	 in	 their	 internal	 elections	with	great	vigour	and	enthusiasm.	The	BRU	had	welfare	programmes	that	included	funding	and	support	around	accidents,	such	as	hospital	 bills	 and	 funeral	 costs.	 For	many	 riders,	welfare	 support	 from	 the	 state	was	unimaginable,	while	that	from	BRU	was	concrete	and	easily	attained.		At	the	same	time,	the	BRU	took	on	disciplinarian	aspects	of	state	governance.	Some	bike	park	offices	had	demographic	information	about	their	members	pasted	on	the	wall:	ages,	region	of	origin,	contact	details,	and	head-shots.	Overtly	displayed,	this	resembled	a	state-like	form	of	governmentality	of	monitoring	and	data	collection.	The	 BRU’s	 disciplinary	 tendencies	 were	 exemplified	 most	 vividly	 by	 its	 Bike	Monitoring	 Officers,	 who,	 did	 not	 simply	 resist	 state	 violence	 on	 behalf	 of	 their	members,	 but	 actively	 reproduced	 it.	 The	 BMOs	 were	 an	 increasingly	 visible	presence	throughout	the	course	of	my	fieldwork,	particularly	those	attached	to	the	Upgun	 bike	 park	 run	 by	 Councillor.	 One	 of	 Councillor’s	 first	 initiatives	 after	winning	 the	 election	 was	 to	 buy	 the	 BMOs	 new	 blue	 uniforms	 that	 looked	strikingly	like	police	uniforms.	The	BMOs	often	apprehended	riders	who	were	not	wearing	 appropriate	 clothing	 or	 safety	 gear,	 confiscating	 their	 bikes	 until	 fines	were	paid.	 The	union’s	 hierarchical	 structure	mirrored	 the	 state	 legal	 system,	 in	which	 unresolved	 matters	 were	 taken	 up	 to	 a	 higher	 level.	 Instead	 of	 being	escalated	from	the	police	station	to	the	court,	unresolved	issues	in	the	BRU	were	escalated	 from	 the	 bike	 park	 to	 the	 central	 office,	 where,	 as	 in	 the	 formal	 legal	system,	fines	would	typically	increase	and	hearings	become	more	formalised.				Two	main	 justifications	 for	 the	BMOs	were	 offered	 to	me	 by	BRU	members	 and	officials	alike.	First,	 that	they	were	preferable	to	the	police;	by	disciplining	riders	less	 severely	 and	 punitively	 than	 the	 state,	 the	 BMO	 helped	 them	 to	 avoid	 the	state’s	harsher	penalties.	Second,	as	revealed	by	Ibrahim’s	statement	(above),	the	BRU	shared	the	popular	notion	that	many	of	their	bike	riders	are	uneducated,	wild,	young,	country	folk,	in	genuine	need	of	training	and	discipline.	While	others	have	noted	 disciplinary	 and	marginalizing	 discourses	 emerging	 from	 the	 side	 of	 state	(Burge	2011,	Menzel	2011,	Peters	2007),	it	 is	significant	that	the	BRU	itself	plays	
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an	 active	 role	 in	 reproducing	 these	 discourses,	 even	 as	 it	 appears	 to	 resent	 and	resist	them.			
Taxi	driving	and	‘entrepreneurialism’			Taxi	driving	in	Freetown	was	organized	around	a	strikingly	different	set	of	ideals,	social	 networks,	 and	 performative	 registers	 from	 that	 of	 bike	 riding,	 yet	 it	 too	contained	contradictory	elements.	Rather	than	presenting	themselves	in	state-like	guises,	taxi	drivers	identified	with	‘entrepreneurialism’,	often	styling	themselves	as	hustlers	 and	 businessmen.	 Very	 few,	 if	 any,	 of	 the	many	 taxi	 drivers	 that	 I	 met	during	 my	 fieldwork	 were	 members	 of	 any	 driving	 association	 or	 union.	 Their	markers	 of	 status	 were	 not	 overtly	 aligned	 to	 membership	 of	 a	 collective,	 but	aligned	 rather	 to	 values	 of	 capitalist	 individualism.	 Human	 Right’s	 very	 name	signifies	the	values	of	individual	rights.	Like	many	other	taxi	drivers,	Human	Right	aspired	to	be	not	a	‘councillor’,	but	a	‘boss’.			Drivers	 routinely	blasted	American	rap	and	 Jamaican	dancehall	music	 from	their	taxis,	 which	 were	 often	 equipped	 with	 large	 sound-systems	 with	 heavy	 bass	speakers	 in	 the	 boot.	 In	 these	 songs,	 artists	 narrated	 rags	 to	 riches	 narratives,	sparing	 no	 detail	 of	 the	 extravagant	 life-style	 that	 being	 a	 boss	 affords.	 Taxis	themselves	 were	 often	 kitted	 out	 with	 flashy	 decorative	 features,	 seemingly	inspired	to	new	heights	by	the	‘pimped	up’	vehicles	in	hip-hop	music	videos:	flashy	rims,	shiny	paintjobs	and	stickers.	In	Sierra	Leone,	taxis	typically	have	slogans	on	the	back,	often	a	religious	phrase,	or	an	aspirational	phrase	such	as	‘No	condition	is	permanent’,	‘Freekick	na	goal’	(free-kick	is	a	goal),	‘Beyond	expectation’,	or	‘Honest	labour’.	When	drivers	 like	Human	Right	were	 at	work,	 it	 seemed	 that	 they	were	indulging	 at	 times	 in	 the	 fantasy	 of	 romanticized	 masculine	 freedom	 that	 came	with	fast-living	and	fast-money	on	the	road,	and	of	being	‘self-made’.			
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Figure	6	A	poda-poda	and	a	taxi	(with	Human	Right	and	his	father)		Human	Right	aspired	to	build	a	fleet	of	taxis;	this	would	allow	him,	in	his	words,	to	‘become	 somebody’	 and	 reach	 ‘the	 next	 level’.	 In	 our	 conversations,	 he	 would	sometimes	map	out	to	me	timelines	of	when	this	could	happen	–	when,	based	on	his	 daily	 earnings,	 he	would	 have	 accumulated	 enough	 from	 one	 car	 to	 buy	 the	next.	These	aspirations	and	idealized	timelines	were,	however,	sadly	disconnected	from	the	reality	in	which	Human	Right	operated.	In	a	strictly	economic	sense,	they	did	not	usually	allow	for	additional	costs	such	as	the	maintenance	that	old	vehicles	require,	and	fluctuations	in	the	cost	of	fuel.	They	also	assumed	that	money	could	be	safely	 stored	 away	 until	 an	 accumulation	 was	 complete,	 but	 this	 never	 seemed	possible	or	even	desirable;	he	had	to	live.			In	another	way,	entrepreneurial	and	individualistic	aspirations	were	at	odds	with	the	 messy	 and	 complex	 neighborhood	 and	 kinship	 based	 networks	 in	 which	Human	Right	and	his	 fellow	taxi	drivers	 lived,	and	around	which	 their	work	was	structured.	 Human	 Right	 was	 embedded	 in	 two	 such	 networks,	 located	 in	 two	distinct	areas	of	town.	The	first	was	the	neighborhood	in	the	East	End	of	Freetown	where	 his	 nuclear	 and	 several	 extended	 family	members	 lived.	 The	 second	was	Congo	Town	area,	 in	 the	west,	where	 I	 had	 come	 to	 know	him.	He	did	not	 have	family	 in	 Congo	Town,	 but	was	 a	 familiar	 face	 around	 the	 neighborhood,	 having	
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worked	 for	 local	 taxi	 owners	 in	 the	 area;	 buying	 a	 taxi	 was	 a	 popular	 informal	investment	in	Freetown,	and	several	were	located	there.		
	
East	End			In	 relation	 to	 his	 family	 in	 the	 East	 end,	 Human	Right	was	 both	 committed	 and	resentful.	 He	 held	 a	 particularly	 strong	 grudge	 against	 his	 father,	 who	 was	indirectly	responsible	for	his	having	taken	up	driving	in	the	first	place.	Before	the	war,	his	 father	had	a	good	 job	working	 for	an	 international	shipping	company	at	the	 Freetown	 docks.	 According	 to	 Human	 Right’s	 narrative,	 however,	 instead	 of	prioritizing	his	family,	he	had	lived	an	indulgent	lifestyle.	When	Human	Right	was	young	 he	 remembers	 his	 father’s	 reluctance	 to	 contribute	 ‘chop	 money’	 (daily	household	food	expenses),	let	alone	save	money	for	his	children.	As	Human	Right	would	phrase	it,	‘I	was	not	given	any	foundation’.	After	the	war,	Human	Right,	aged	14,	 stopped	attending	 school	–	his	parents	were	unable	 to	afford	 the	expenses	–	and	had	taken	to	the	streets	to	work	as	an	apprentice	in	a	poda	poda	(minibus),	a	common	way	of	entering	the	transport	business.			Human	 Right	 often	 talked	 about	 a	 deep	 vein	 of	misfortune	 that	 ran	 through	 his	family.	 (This	 came	 to	mind	when	 I	 interviewed	his	 father.	He,	 like	Human	Right,	considered	himself	to	have	been	let	down	in	his	turn	by	the	uncle	who	had	brought	him	 to	 Freetown	 and	 supported	 him	 for	 a	 time,	 yet	 ultimately	 denied	 him	 an	inheritance.	Human	Right’s	 father	attributed	this	to	the	fact	that	he	had	not	been	initiated	into	the	‘secret	society’	in	their	home	village.)	Human	Right	was	critical	of	the	way	his	 father	was	 raising	his	 sisters.	His	 older	 sister	had	given	birth	out	of	wedlock,	 and	 his	 father	 refused	 to	 continue	 seeing	 her.	 He	 equally	 resented	 the	way	that	his	younger	sister	was	not	being	properly	disciplined;	she	was	being	put	through	school,	but	had	started	seeing	boys.	Human	Right	was	concerned	that	she	should	 not	 become	 pregnant	 like	 her	 sister,	 and	 blow	 the	 opportunity	 she	 was	getting,	 which	 was	 not	 much	 better	 than	 his	 own.	 After	 witnessing	 some	arguments	on	this	matter,	 it	seemed	to	me	that	Human	Right	was	frustrated	that	he	was	not	taken	more	seriously	in	the	family	decision-making	process.			
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Despite	 these	 tensions,	 Human	Right	 remained	 committed	 to	 his	mother,	 father,	and	 sisters.	 He	 attended	 church	 religiously	 every	 Sunday	 –	 he	was	 a	 committed	and	passionate	Christian	–	after	which	he	spent	the	day	with	them.	When	he	was	working,	he	would	make	every	effort	to	visit	his	family,	often	making	contributing	to	household	expenses.	When	I	first	met	his	family,	they	were	staying	in	a	slum-like	area	 in	 a	 very	dilapidated	 shelter.	However,	 after	 falling	out	with	 their	 landlord,	who	felt	aggrieved	when	they	stopped	offering	him	portions	of	their	daily	cooking,	they	moved	to	a	house	very	high	up	on	a	mountainside	in	a	newly	settled	area	that	was	much	cheaper	and	cleaner.	Human	Right’s	mother	was	disabled	and	struggled	to	 get	 up	 and	 down;	 so	 Human	 Right	 frequently	 took	 long	 diversions	 from	 his	working	 day,	 when	 he	 had	 a	 car	 available,	 to	 assist	 her.	 The	 car	 often	 incurred	minor	damage	from	the	rocky	road.			Human	Right’s	multi-faceted	 relationship	with	his	 family	was	bound	up	with	his	own	working	 and	 business	 arrangements	 as	 a	 taxi	 driver.	 Family	 networks	 had	proved	 his	 best	 bet	 for	 accessing	 seed	 money	 for	 his	 business	 plans.	 He	 had	borrowed	money	from	a	rotating	credit	association	that	his	mother	ran,	 in	which	the	 other	 participants	 were	 primarily	 church-going	 ladies.	 He	 had	 an	 uncle	 in	Freetown	who	had	invested	with	him	in	a	motorbike.	Finally,	as	already	mentioned	in	the	prologue,	he	had	a	relatively	established	uncle	who	lived	in	Canada,	who	had	provided	some	 financial	 assistance	 in	 the	past.	Human	Right	 for	many	years	had	been	expecting	him	to	send	money	to	his	family,	which	he	hoped	they	would	invest	in	a	new	poda	poda	that	he	would	operate	on	their	behalf.			These	relationships	were	also	a	source	of	tension	within	the	family.	Human	Right	had	 remained	 in	 debt	 to	 his	 mother	 for	 the	 money	 he	 had	 borrowed,	 which	strained	her	 relationship	with	 her	 church-going	 friends.	He	 felt	 that	 his	 uncle	 in	Freetown	 had	 not	 contributed	 appropriately	 to	 their	 joint	 business	 ventures,	 in	which	he	felt	that	his	own	expertise	as	a	driver	(his	uncle	was	primarily	a	baker)	was	not	taken	seriously	enough.	While	his	uncle	in	Canada	was	a	constant	source	of	hope	for	the	future,	it	sometimes	seemed	as	though	this	was	a	‘castle	in	the	sky’,	unlikely	ever	to	materialize.		
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The	events	surrounding	Human	Right’s	series	of	accidents	illustrated	the	complex	entanglement	of	 business	 and	 family	 relations,	 and	 the	 affective	 ambiguities	 and	tensions	 that	 emerged	 from	 it.	 In	 the	months	 leading	up	 to	 the	 accident,	Human	Right	had	returned	to	bike	riding	after	many	years	of	taxi	driving,	and	was	staying	with	family	back	in	the	East	End.	Shortly	before	his	most	severe	accident,	which	I	described	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 this	 chapter,	 he	 had	 returned	 to	 Congo	 Town,	where	he	had	been	 staying	on	 and	off	 for	many	years.	We	 spent	part	 of	 the	day	together	at	this	new	residence,	during	which	I	received	a	call	from	his	mother	who	wanted	 to	 check	 that	he	was	okay.	Human	Right	 explained	 to	me	 that	 she	had	a	dream	recently,	in	which	a	large	group	of	boys	had	come	to	their	house	asking	for	her	husband	and	for	Human	Right.	She	had	been	able	to	fend	them	off,	but	she	was	concerned	 that	 they	 would	 find	 him	 elsewhere.	 The	 dream	 was	 alarming	 on	several	 levels,	 not	 least	 the	 ways	 that	 it	 echoed	 events	 of	 the	 civil	 war,	 during	which	Human	Right	and	his	family	had	fled	and	hid	from	the	RUF	as	they	entered	Freetown.	On	another	 level,	 it	speaks	 to	Human	Right’s	mother’s	concern	 for	her	son’s	wellbeing,	and	her	conflicted	part	in	it;	he	was	riding	a	beat-up	motorcycle,	attempting	 to	 raise	money	 as	 soon	 as	 possible	 to	 pay	 back	 his	 debt	 to	 her.	 The	money	she	had	lent	him	was	a	gesture	of	support	and	love,	but	at	the	same	time	it	placed	him	 in	potentially	 fatal	danger	on	 the	 streets.	After	 the	 terrifying	episode	she	had	predicted	in	her	dream	had	transpired	in	the	form	of	the	accident,	she	was	there	by	his	side	at	the	pharmacy	arranging	his	medical	treatment,	pleading	to	the	pharmacist	 that	 he	 should	 dress	 the	 wound,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 did	 not	having	the	full	payment	required	at	hand.			Human	 Right’s	 desire	 to	 fulfill	 his	 entrepreneurial	 ambition	 of	 building	 up	 a	transport	 business	 and	 becoming	 a	 boss	 involved	 both	 strained	 and	 volatile	working	relationships	with	members	of	his	family.	It	also	involved	taking	the	risks	so	 often	 fetishized	 in	 capitalist	 ideology:	 in	 this	 case,	 they	 were	 of	 the	 life-threatening	 kind.	 Taxis	 and	motor-bikes	 circulated	 at	 a	 fast	 pace	 among	 drivers	and	 owners.	 Human	 Right	 had	 initially	 bought	 a	 taxi,	 but	 it	 required	 so	 much	maintenance	that	it	had	set	him	back.	He	eventually	sold	this	taxi	and	bought	two	motorbikes,	 both	 in	 bad	 condition	 in	 themselves,	 only	 one	 of	 which	 was	
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operational.	Becoming	an	owner	and	‘boss’	entailed	getting	deeper	into	debt	to	his	family,	and	placing	himself	in	greater	personal	danger.		
	
Congo	Town		The	other	major	avenue	through	which	Human	Right	had	found	work	was	through	a	series	of	relationships	he	had	forged	on	the	other	side	of	town	from	his	original	family	home	in	the	East	End;	the	Congo	Town	neighbourhood	to	which	he	had	just	recently	 relocated.	 According	 to	my	 calculation,	Human	Right	 had	worked	 for	 at	least	six	taxi	operators	in	the	neighborhood.	In	addition,	he	had	developed	working	relationships	 with	 many	 other	 young	 taxi	 drivers,	 who	 would	 often	 informally	distribute	work	 amongst	 themselves,	 unbeknownst	 to	 their	 employers.	 Typically	taxi	drivers	were	employed	on	a	day-to-day	basis.	After	coming	to	pick	up	the	car,	they	would	be	expected	to	provide	50,000	Le	(about	$10)	‘master	money’	per	day,	as	well	as	to	cover	their	 fuel	allowance	(although	this	was	often	negotiable).	Any	extra	 they	would	keep	 for	 themselves.	Taxis	would	 typically	circulate	 the	city	on	routes	between	major	junctions,	a	trip	between	each	of	which	would	yield	a	1000	Le	payment	by	the	passenger.	Most	taxis	would	load	4	passengers	at	once.	In	some	instances,	cars	would	be	chartered	for	personal	journeys,	as	with	most	taxis	in	the	UK,	but	 in	most	 cases	 they	 functioned	more	 like	mini-bus	 taxis	 elsewhere	 in	 the	continent.	 This	 generally	 created	 conditions	 in	 which	 taxi	 drivers	 were	incentivized	 to	 drive	 quickly	 to	maximize	 personal	 profit	 –	 the	more	 often	 they	circulated,	 the	more	 quickly	 they	made	money.	 The	 alternative	was	 to	 drive	 on	worse	roads,	where	shorter	distances	and	less	traffic	typically	earned	drivers	more	money	 in	 less	 time.	 The	major	 downside	 to	 this	was	 that	 the	 car	was	 subject	 to	more	 wear	 and	 tear.	 The	 informal	 working	 agreements	 between	 owners	 and	drivers	often	 stipulated	 that	 small	 repairs	were	 the	 responsibility	of	 the	drivers,	while	the	owners	covered	larger	ones.			Owners	often	attempted	to	strike	agreements	that	would	incentivize	drivers	not	to	drive	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 vehicle.	 These	 informal	 agreements	 are	 familiar	 in	informal	 economic	economies,	where	 there	 is	no	 ‘legal	 contract’	 to	 formalize	 the	partners’	 shared	 interests	 (Hart	2000).	One	way	was	 to	get	a	 ‘guarantor’,	often	a	
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senior	 or	 established	 figure	 in	 the	 community	 whose	 authority	 both	 parties	respected,	who	could	vouch	 to	 the	owner	on	behalf	of	 the	driver	and	vice	versa.	Another	approach	was	a	‘clause’	indicating	that	the	driver	could	gain	something	if	he	worked	 satisfactorily.	 For	example,	Human	Right	 struck	an	arrangement	with	Foday,	 whose	 taxi	 he	 drove,	 that	 once	 he	 had	 paid	 Foday	 a	 certain	 amount,	 he	would	be	given	 the	car.	At	 the	 time,	Foday	was	renting	a	small	 ‘pan	body’	 (room	made	from	of	iron),	while	he	was	getting	ready	to	move	to	a	slightly	larger	place.	Foday	had	promised	Human	Right	 that	he	could	take	over	the	room	when	Foday	left.			However,	neither	of	 these	expectations	panned	out,	and	the	driving	arrangement	broke	off	–	a	familiar	situation	for	Human	Right.	Foday	claimed	to	be	unhappy	with	how	Human	Right	had	been	treating	the	car,	and	wanted	to	hold	him	responsible	for	a	malfunction	in	one	of	the	windows.	Human	Right	was	not	willing	to	pay,	and	Foday	took	that	matter	to	the	police,	 through	a	personal	connection	at	the	police	station.	 Human	 Right	 ended	 up	 spending	 a	 night	 in	 a	 cell.	 From	 Human	 Right’s	point	of	view,	 the	window	episode	was	blown	out	of	proportion	as	an	excuse	 for	Foday	 to	 terminate	 their	 arrangement	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 he	would	 not	 have	 to	fulfill	 Human	 Right’s	 reasonable	 earlier	 expectations.	 This	 was	 especially	distressing	 for	 Human	 Right	 because	 he	 had	 been	 dipping	 into	 his	 profits	 by	treating	Foday’s	car	with	particular	care,	and	by	ensuring	he	provided	the	‘master	money’	in	full	every	day,	regardless	of	how	the	day’s	work	had	gone.			Needless	 to	 say,	 drivers	 had	 their	 own	 ways	 of	 ‘taking	 advantage’	 of	 their	employers.	 This	 often	 occurred	 through	 arrangements	 made	 illicitly	 and	unbeknownst	to	the	taxi	owners.	For	example,	taxi	drivers	routinely	recruit	fellow	taxi	drivers,	mainly	 friends	 from	the	neighborhood,	 to	 take	over	 the	operation	of	the	car	–	effectively	inserting	themselves	as	intermediary	bosses.	These	‘second’	or	in	some	cases	‘third’	drivers	would	be	expected	to	provide	a	larger	‘master	money’	rate.	 This	 was	 sometimes	 achieved	 by	 creating	 an	 additional	 shift	 in	 the	 day,	undertaken	by	a	different	driver.	Sometimes	drivers	would	take	several	cars	 in	a	single	 day,	 and	 find	 other	 drivers	 to	 drive	 them	 simultaneously.	 The	 result	 was	that	 drivers	 had	 the	 potential	 to	 make	 more	 money	 than	 the	 taxi	 owners	
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themselves,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 effectively	 become	 ‘bosses’	 (‘owners’	 of	 the	 means	 of	production),	even	if	they	were	in	reality	gatekeepers	who	did	not	legally	own	the	taxis	they	were	‘managing’.			For	 Human	 Right,	 the	 Congo	 Town	 neighbourhood	 was	 more	 than	 a	 working	environment;	he	simultaneously	built	close	relationships	on	the	side	–	even	if	these	emerged	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 from	 ‘work’	 –	 and	 became	 socially	 integrated.	 He	formed	a	particularly	close	relationship	with	Balloon	Burst,	who	became	known	as	his	 ‘apprentice’.	 Balloon	 Burst	 had	 been	 Human	 Right’s	 side-man	 when	 he	operated	a	poda	poda	 in	the	neighborhood.	As	apprentice,	he	was	responsible	for	collecting	 fares	 from	customers	and	organizing	seating.	As	was	often	expected	 in	these	 relationships,	 Human	 Right	 was	 giving	 Balloon	 Burst	 driving	 lessons	 that	would	 take	place	when	 they	had	a	 few	moments	between	shifts	on	a	quiet	 road.	The	 two	were	 very	 close	 friends	 and	 ‘brothers’:	Human	Right	 became	 a	 familiar	face	in	Balloon	Burst’s	family	compound,	where	he	would	often	eat	meals.	Balloon	Burst	 lived	 in	a	small	 ‘pan	body’	near	 to	 the	 family	compound,	and	Human	Right	would	often	stay	there	for	extended	periods	of	time,	giving	it	the	quality	of	‘home’	for	him.	This	arrangement	gave	 their	 relationship	a	degree	of	 ambiguity;	Human	Right’s	 ‘seniority’	 over	 Balloon	Burst	 at	work	was	 challenged	 by	Balloon	Burst’s	seniority	in	the	domestic	sphere	as	Human	Right’s	host	in	the	area.			Like	 Human	 Right’s	 relationships	 with	 his	 nuclear	 family	 and	 the	 East	 End,	 his	relationships	 in	 his	 other	 primary	 network,	 Congo	 Town,	 had	 their	 own	complexities.	They	represented	a	valuable	means	of	support	and	livelihood,	not	to	mention	 as	 residence,	 but	 they	 were	 also	 a	 source	 of	 volatility,	 conflict,	 and	exploitation,	 often	 centered	 around	 unfulfilled	 expectations.	 As	 a	 consequence,	these	relationships	took	on	a	fairly	unstable	form,	falling	prey	to	bitter	fallings	out	that	strained	and	even	severed	them.	From	the	perspective	of	poor	young	men	like	Human	 Right,	 taxi	 driving	 was	 a	 frustrating	 enterprise	 through	 which	entrepreneurial	 aspirations	 and	 dreams	 remained	 unfilled.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	though,	the	volatility	 inherent	in	social	relations	lent	 itself	to	a	form	of	rapid	and	genuine	social	mobility.			
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The	 complex	 economic	 arrangements	 and	 divisions	 of	 labour	 blurred	 Marxian–style	boundaries	between	the	‘workers’	and	the	‘owners’,	predicated	on	command	over	 the	 means	 of	 production.	 Human	 Right,	 and	 other	 drivers	 like	 him,	 could	become	the	 ‘boss’	 for	that	period	of	the	day	when	they	were	in	possession	of	the	vehicle.	Since	they	were	able	to	accumulate	‘fast	money’,	they	could	also	spend	like	a	boss;	Human	Right	often	splurged	quite	indiscriminately.	They	could	–	illicitly	–	employ	other	drivers	 to	work	 ‘for	 them’,	while	 the	car	was	 in	 their	hands,	which	made	them	a	‘boss’	in	another	way.	They	could	also	use	the	vehicle	for	their	own	purposes,	as	Human	Right	often	did	when	he	performed	errands	for	his	family.	In	other	 instances,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 owner	 and	 the	 worker	 was	complicated	by	the	 fact	 that,	 in	 terms	of	driving,	 the	owner	might	be	the	driver’s	‘junior’.	 This	 was	 the	 case	 with	 Foday	 and	 his	 brother	 Alhassan,	 both	 of	 whom	owned	vehicles	that	Human	Right	had	driven,	yet	both	of	whom	Human	Right	had	helped	teach	to	drive	and	brought	into	the	driving	work.			The	relationship	between	drivers	and	owners	was	also	rendered	fluid	by	the	pace	at	which	vehicles	circulated	between	them.	Established	owners	often	aimed	to	sell	on	 their	 vehicles	 to	 drivers	 with	 limited	 means;	 these	 cars	 were	 often	 in	 poor	condition	 and	 required	 major	 repairs.	 The	 result	 of	 this	 was	 that	 drivers	 like	Human	Right	would	become	car	owners	for	short	periods,	sometimes	at	the	same	time	as	driving	 for	other	owners	to	raise	 funds	to	repair	 their	 ‘new’	cars.	All	 this	helped	align	taxi	drivers,	albeit	 in	a	certain	mediated	 fashion,	with	the	models	of	entrepreneurialism	 with	 which	 they	 identified.	 Taxi	 driving	 offered	 the	 kind	 of	mobility	associated	with	capitalism,	not	quite	in	the	‘individualised’	way	identified	with	 entrepreneurialism,	 but	 rather	 in	 relation	 to	 others.	 Through	 taxi	 driving	Human	 Right	 could	 ‘become	 somebody’,	 which	 he	 often	 expressed	 to	 be	 his	primary	 aspiration	 in	 life.	 In	 this	 case,	 he	 could	 become,	 for	 limited	 periods,	 a	‘boss’,	even	if	at	the	end	of	the	day	he	would	transform	back	into	to	a	 ‘poor	boy’.	Staying	with	Balloon	Burst	and	working	for	several	taxi	owners	and	drivers	in	the	area	enabled	him	 to	 earn	a	basic	 livelihood	and	become	a	member	of	 the	Congo	Town	community.	He	was	also	able	to	support	his	family	through	contributions	to	daily	expenses	and	the	use	of	his	driving	skills,	giving	him	some	degree	of	mobility	within	his	family.		
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However,	 these	markers	 of	 mobility	 were	 fragile,	 and	 threatened	 to	 cement	 his	junior	status	through	his	continuing	dependence	on	others.	This	reflects,	I	think,	a	fundamental	 tension.	On	 the	one	hand	 there	was	Human	Right’s	 entrepreneurial	aspirations	to	rise	above	and	escape	from	social	relationships	in	the	neighborhood	and	his	 family	 in	which	he	was	marginal	or	 junior,	and	on	 the	other	 there	was	a	social	reality	in	which	these	networks	were	the	only	means	available	him	to	do	so.	Without	 them,	 he	 could	 not	 gain	 access	 to	 capital	 or	 a	 means	 of	 production.	Attempts	 to	build	a	business	 required	working	and	 further	entangling	himself	 in	the	very	set	of	social	relations	 from	which	he	was	trying	to	escape.	Human	Right	himself	expressed	this	very	clearly:	 ‘there	is	family	in	the	good	way	and	family	in	the	bad	way’.	The	family	in	the	‘bad	way’	was	manifested	a	history	of	bad	luck	and	circumstances,	 of	 jealous	elders	holding	back	 those	below	 them,	 as	was	 the	 case	with	his	father	and	his	uncle.	‘Good’	family	was	a	source	of	hope	and	opportunity,	which	Human	Right	associated	with	his	mother,	who	thought	‘positively	about	his	future’.	 Despite	 his	 entrepreneurial	 stylings,	 his	 bonds	 with	 his	 family	 were	significant,	and	it	was	in	this	domain	that	he	wished	to	be	respected.	He	wanted	to	do	his	 family	proud,	even	when	he	 felt	skeptical	about	whether	 they	deserved	 it,	and	it	was	his	family	that	came	to	his	side	after	his	accident,	when	he	was	most	in	need.			As	with	 the	 complex	 relationship	between	 the	BRU	and	 the	 state,	 these	 tensions	too	should	be	viewed	 in	 the	context	of	 the	spread	of	capitalism	promoted	by	 the	forces	 of	 globalization,	 and	 in	 that	 of	 contemporary	 development	 discourse	 as	enacted	in	Sierra	Leone.	A	key	tenet	of	 ‘neoliberal	development	discourse’	 is	that	capitalism	and	market	solutions	are	a	vehicle	out	of	poverty	(Dolan	&	Johnstone-Louis	 2011,	 Elyachar	 2002,	 Rapley	 1999).	 Entrepreneurialism	 had	 thus	 been	promoted	in	the	global	south	in	a	form	that,	as	anthropologists	have	noted,	can	in	some	cases	strain	and	sever	social	relations	(Meagher	2010)	and	in	others	advance	existing	social	projects,	albeit	 in	ways	that	run	risks	and	accumulate	debt	(James	2014).	 Taxi	 driving	 in	 Sierra	 Leone	 exemplifies	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 business	enterprises	 become	 entangled	 in	 social	 structures,	 particularly	 the	 family,	neighborhood,	and	associational	networks.		
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Conclusion		In	 this	 chapter,	 I	have	analyzed	 two	networks	 into	which	young	men	working	 in	informal	 transport	 in	 the	 city	 were	 integrated,	 corresponding	 to	 two	 models	through	 which	 they	 sought	 to	 achieve	 upward	mobility	 professionally.	 The	 first	was	 the	 motor-bike	 taxi	 driving	 union,	 which	 was	 structured	 according	 to	 a	hierarchical,	 institutional,	 state-like,	 model.	 The	 second	 was	 taxi	 driving	businesses,	 which	 were	 aligned,	 in	 principle,	 to	 ideals	 of	 entrepreneurial	enterprise.	 The	 chapter	 showed	how	both	networks,	 and	 the	 ideals	 according	 to	which	 they	 were	 structured,	 faced	 contradictory	 social	 realities	 that	 lent	ambiguous	qualities	to	the	actions	of	participants.	In	the	case	of	the	BRU,	officials	and	members	resisted	oppression	 from	the	state,	while	seeking	state	acceptance.	Consequently,	the	BRU	took	on	elements	of	the	state,	including	disciplinary	modes	of	 governance,	 and	 overt	 performances	 of	 state-like	 authority,	 at	 the	 same	 time	that	 riders	 and	 officials	 operated	 according	 to	 collectivist	 and	 rebellious	tendencies	 that	 can	 be	 traced	 to	 the	 BRU’s	 roots	 in	 the	 RUF.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 taxi	driving	businesses,	drivers	had	to	reconcile	desires	for	‘self-making’	and	individual	mobility	 according	 to	 a	 capitalist	 framework	 with	 a	 social	 reality	 in	 which	businesses	were	embedded	into	neighborhood	and	family	networks	that	rendered	these	ambitions	unreachable	in	their	idealized	forms.			The	 chapter	 has	 revealed	 some	 of	 the	 parallels	 between	 the	 character	 of	 each	network	and	the	position	of	youth	in	them.		On	one	level,	both	networks	in	practice	are	overlapping,	as	demonstrated	by	Human	Right	who	moved	between	them.	 	 It	was	 after	 a	 time	 of	 ‘crisis’	 –	 a	 traffic	 accident	 –	 that	 each	 network	 converged	 to	fulfill	 the	 duties	 of	 support	 and	 ‘coming	 close’	 that	 gave	 the	 BRU	 a	 familial	character.	 This	 familial	 character	 of	 the	 BRU	 extended	 beyond	 this.	 	 It	 was	apparent	 in	 the	 use	 of	 kinship	 idioms,	 such	 as	 ‘brotherhood’,	 as	 well	 as	expectations	of	patronage	and	support	that	young	riders	expected	of	their	elders,	as	well	as	conversely	payments	from	drivers	to	the	union,	which	were	sometimes	labeled	 bora,	 the	 term	 traditionally	 given	 to	 respectful	 gifts	 given	 by	 youth	 to	elders.	 Equally,	 the	 disciplinary	 qualities	 of	 the	 union,	 in	 particular	 the	introduction	of	the	Bike	Monitoring	Officers	–	who	gave	recognition	to	the	fact	that	
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many	riders	were	young	and	undisciplined	–	certainly	echoes	parental	roles.	The	result,	 however,	 was	 a	 mutual	 reliance,	 in	 both	 cases,	 between	 individuals	 and	groups	that	equally	were	antagonistic.			With	reference	to	studies	beyond	Sierra	Leone,	I	have	suggested	that	these	models,	and	 the	 contradictions	 they	 embody,	 can	 be	 connected	 to	 the	 place	 of	 informal	transport	and	informal	associations	in	neoliberal	Africa,	which	I	suggest	is	missing	in	 existing	 analyses	 of	 Sierra	 Leone	 that	 have	 tended	 to	 situate	 the	 profession	purely	 in	 the	 post-war	 peace-building	 context.	 In	 other	 settings	 in	 the	 ‘global	South’,	 the	 forces	 of	 neoliberalism	 both	 weakened	 relationships	 with	 and	increased	 reliance	 upon	 the	 state.	 They	 have	 resulted	 in	 internal	 structures	 that	were	at	once	weaker	more	 formalized.	The	BRU,	with	 its	 fluctuating	relationship	with	 the	 state	 and	 organizational	 structure,	 represents	 all	 of	 these	 dynamics	simultaneously,	 resembling	 the	 kind	 of	 performative	 brokerage	 that	 neoliberal	conditions	 have	 been	 seen	 to	 encourage	 in	 a	 range	 of	 settings.	 Entrepreneurial	stylings	 can	 also	 be	 understood	 with	 reference	 to	 the	 proliferation	 of	contemporary	 development	 discourses	 that	 are	 pervasive	 in	 Sierra	 Leonean	political	discourse	and	 in	NGO-speak,	which	has	 seeped	 into	all	 strata	of	 society.	They	 also	 reflect	 the	 influence	of	 popular	 culture,	 particularly	urban	music	 from	across	 the	 Atlantic.	 Yet	 these	 ideals	 correspond	 with	 a	 reality	 in	 which	 it	 is	impossible	to	build	businesses	without	family	and	neighborhood	networks	that	are	the	most	reliable	sources	of	investment	capital.			These	 contradictions	 do	not	 trap	 young	men	 in	 conditions	 of	 stasis,	 as	might	 be	expected.	 Rather,	 the	 networks	 and	 models	 I	 have	 described	 above	 enable	meaningful	progression	and	mobility,	as	well	support	and	a	sense	of	belonging	and	community.	 Drivers	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 become	 bosses,	 and	 thus	 achieve	further	 integration	 into	 family	 and	 community	networks,	 just	 as	union	members	become	part	of	a	state-like	structure	in	which	they	are	accepted.	The	affective	and	performative	elements	of	taxi	driving	and	the	BRU	are	not,	I	think,	as	misguided	or	fantastical	as	they	might	seem,	but	efficacious	and	meaningful.	Even	if	their	ideals	remain	unfulfilled,	they	allow	drivers	to	gain	a	meaningful	professional	status	and	
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a	recognized	position	in	social	in	terms	that	are	not	merely	dictated	from	without	but	also	forged	from	within.			This	 chapter	 thus	 builds	 on	 the	 insights	 of	 the	 previous	 chapter	 through	 its	presentation	of	social	mobility	predicated	on	negotiations	between	contradictory	sets	 of	 social	 expectations	 and	 aspirations.	 It	 also	 presents	 a	 version	 of	 status	negotiation	for	young	men	that	does	not	centrally	rely	on	life-course	ritual,	but	on	other	more	everyday	modes,	even	 if	 the	 family	remains	central;	as	 in	 the	case	of	taxi	 drivers	 such	 as	 Human	 Right,	 and	 in	 the	 familial	 idioms	 of	 relatedness	employed	by	bike	 riders	 that	 evoke	horizontal	 and	vertical	 type	 relations.	 In	 the	next	chapter	I	turn	to	another	arena	of	economic	life	for	young	men:	consumption.		This	builds	on	 this	 chapter	 through	 continuing	 the	examination	of	 the	ways	 that	performative	 assertions	 of	 status	 intersect	 with	 economic-based	 identities	 and	negotiations	 of	 dependency	 and	 independence	 around	 the	 family	 and	neighborhood.		
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Chapter	4.	‘I’m	a	young	man,	I	like	to	bluff’:	consumption,	
ambiguous	exchange,	and	the	performance	of	status	
	In	November	2013,	the	second	month	of	my	fieldwork,	I	was	invited	by	Alhassan	to	accompany	him	on	a	trip	to	a	garage	on	the	other	side	of	town,	where	he	was	going	to	 have	 some	 work	 done	 on	 his	 taxi.	 Alhassan	 is	 one	 of	 my	 closest	 contacts	 in	Sierra	 Leone;	 I	 spent	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 time	 with	 him	 during	 the	 course	 of	 my	fieldwork.	 Alhassan’s	 family	 compound	 was	 close	 to	 where	 I	 stayed	 in	 Congo	Town,	 and	 for	 the	 first	 9	 months	 I	 lived	 with	 his	 brother	 Foday,	 with	 whom	Alhassan	 shared	 a	 father.	 The	 purpose	 of	 Alhassan’s	 trip	 to	 the	 garage	 was	primarily	 cosmetic;	 to	 smooth	 over	 some	 scratches	 and	dents	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	car,	 and	 apply	 fresh	blue	 and	 yellow	paint,	 the	markings	which	 indicate	 that	 his	Nissan	 Sunny	 was	 a	 working	 taxi.	 Alhassan	 conveyed	 a	 sense	 of	 urgency	 about	getting	the	work	done,	 leaving	me	little	time	to	get	ready	after	his	early	wake	up	call.	 The	 day	 before,	 he	 had	 received	 $250	 from	 an	 American	 for	whom	 he	 had	worked	in	Freetown.	Although	the	American	had	returned	to	the	United	States,	he	remained	 a	 patron	 figure	 for	 Alhassan.	 Alhassan	 had	 requested	 the	money	 as	 a	matter	 of	 urgency	 to	 fix	 his	 broken	 car,	 the	 primary	 source	 of	 his	 livelihood,	despite	the	fact	that	–	in	my	eyes	at	least	–	the	car	was	operational.	We	arrived	at	the	dusty	garage	in	the	morning	and	stayed	until	after	dark.	Wedged	between	the	road	and	the	back	of	a	petrol	station,	the	garage	was	divided	into	sections	assigned	to	 specialists	 such	 as	mechanics,	 sprayers,	 and	 fitters,	 who	 operated	with	 some	degree	 of	 independence.	 The	 arrangement	 appeared	 chaotic	 at	 first	 glance:	abandoned	cars,	apparently	beyond	repair,	were	littered	around;	the	ground	was	muddy	and	wet	with	oil;	and	boys	were	running	around,	who,	 I	 later	discovered,	were	 responsible	 for	 collecting	 litter.	 	 Attempting	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 place,	 I	wondered	 whether	 the	 chain	 of	 command	 could	 be	 discerned	 according	 to	appearances,	particularly	the	degrees	of	dirtiness.	The	bor	bor	(young/low	status	boys)	 picking	 up	 litter	 were	 clearly	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 pyramid.	 They	 were	noticeably	 thinner	 than	 most	 of	 the	 others	 at	 the	 garage,	 and	 certainly	 dirtier.	Above	 them	 were	 the	 specialists,	 who	 seemed	 in	 most	 cases	 to	 be	 older.	 The	sprayer	 with	 whom	 Alhassan	 worked	 was	 wearing	 white	 clothes	 that	 were	astonishingly	 clean,	 given	 the	environment	 in	which	he	worked.	The	drivers	and	
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vehicle	owners	too	were	mostly	young	men	of	similar	ages;	they	were	noticeably	the	cleanest.	My	tentative	theory	was	disproved,	however,	when	Alhassan	pointed	out	the	manager	of	the	garage,	who	was	directing	the	bor	bor.	He	was	an	older	man	wearing	old	and	dirty	clothes.		Alhassan	 closely	 oversaw	 the	 application	 of	 putty	 to	 flatten	 out	 some	 of	 the	scratches	 and	 dents,	 and	 then	 the	 spraying	 and	 painting;	 he	 also	 participated	 in	cleaning	 the	 car,	 which	 took	 several	 hours.	 In	 addition,	 he	 bought,	 seemingly	spontaneously,	several	decorative	accessories	for	the	car	that	some	men	operating	around	 the	 garage	 were	 selling	 and	 installing.	 These	 included	 chrome-looking	hubcaps	 (made	of	plastic),	metallic	 stickers	 for	 the	 front	and	back	windows,	and	mats	and	seat	covers.	Alhassan	commented	that	the	car	looked	‘new	again’.	At	the	point	of	payment,	after	the	items	had	been	inserted,	although	a	fixed	price	had	not	yet	 agreed	 on,	 Alhassan	 revealed	 that	 he	 did	 not	 have	 enough	 money	 left,	 and	asked	 me	 to	 lend	 him	 some.	 I	 gave	 him	 the	 additional	 money	 uneasily,	 in	 part	because	these	extra	items,	and	the	paint	job	to	some	extent,	appeared	to	me	to	be	far	 from	 ‘necessary’	 purchases.	 This	 prioritisation	 of	 seemingly	 superficial	 work	became	 still	more	 puzzling	 to	me	 during	 the	 subsequent	weeks,	 when	 Alhassan	was	barely	able	to	operate	the	taxi	because	he	did	not	have	money	for	fuel.		This	provided	a	springboard	for	numerous	discussions	on	the	topic,	during	which	various	 answers	 emerged	 to	 explain	why	 Alhassan	 had	 spent	 this	money	 at	 the	garage.	The	primary	reason	was	that	‘the	money	[or	at	least	part	of	it]	was	there’.	Obtaining	 this	 quantity	 of	 cash	 was	 rare,	 and	 holding	 onto	 it	 was	 equally	challenging.	 There	 was	 a	 risk	 that	 the	 money	 could	 just	 ‘disappear’	 through	everyday	 expenses	 such	 as	 paying	 back	 debts,	 satisfying	 requests/claims	 from	family	 and	 friends,	 and	 forms	 of	 personal	 enjoyment	 such	 as	 food	 and	 sex.	Spending	money	on	the	car,	by	contrast,	was	visible,	concrete,	and	to	some	extent	enduring.	 The	 visibility	 of	 the	 work	 –	 unlike	 structural	 repairs	 on	 the	 car,	 for	example	-	was	key.	The	car	immediately	caught	the	eye	of	Alhassan’s	neighbours,	family,	 and	 friends,	 particularly	 those	with	whom	he	 hung	 out	 every	 day	 on	 the	local	‘long	bench’	(hang	out	spot),	and	where	he	often	parked	his	car	when	in	the	neighbourhood.	
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	A	 further	explanation	offered	by	Alhassan	was	 that	decorations	are	 ‘attractive	 to	the	customer;	when	they	see	them	they	want	to	take	the	car,	 that	 is	why	we	buy	them’.	 This	 did	 not	 correspond	 with	 my	 experience,	 which	 is	 that	 pretty	 much	anyone	 would	 get	 in	 any	 taxi	 going	 in	 the	 right	 direction	 with	 a	 spare	 seat.	 It	seemed	much	more	important	that	the	car	was	attractive	to	his	friends	than	that	it	appealed	to	unknown	customers.	In	addition,	Alhassan	had	offered	to	teach	me	to	drive	a	few	weeks	earlier,	which	I	was	keen	to	do,	but	he	had	wanted	to	fix	the	car	first	to	make	it	look	decent.	Alhassan	explained:	‘I’m	a	young	man,	I	like	to	bluff…I	want	a	nice	car’.			Alhassan’s	desire	to	bluff	was	not	exceptional,	but	rather	the	rule	for	many	young	people	in	Freetown,	and	across	the	continent.	Despite	living	in	a	poor	urban	area	where	 there	 was	 no	 running	 water	 connected	 to	 most	 homes,	 electricity	 was	sparse,	and	in	which	the	vast	majority	of	people	were	not	formally	employed,	most	young	 people	 around	me	 dressed	well	 and	 used	 smartphones,	 which	 they	were	regularly	upgrading	(or,	at	times,	of	necessity,	downgrading).	They	would	acquire	shoes,	clothes,	televisions,	stereos,	games	consoles,	DVD	players,	vehicles,	watches	and	 jewellery	 at	 an	 equally	 fast	 pace.	 Learning	 how	 to	 discern	 the	 subtle	gradations	in	the	quality	of	these,	often	flashy,	goods,	as	well	as	how	to	participate	in	bluffing	to	an	appropriate	extent,	was	key.			My	misinterpretation	of	 the	relationship	between	division	of	 labour	and	dress	at	the	garage,	and	my	surprise	at	Alhassan’s	spending	choices,	revealed	the	flaws	in	some	of	my	assumptions	going	into	the	field.	First,	I	had	assumed	that	in	a	context	of	 ‘poverty’,	 practical	 items	would	be	 valued	over	 those	 that	 appeared	primarily	symbolic	or	aesthetic;	and	that,	in	the	case	of	business,	priority	would	be	given	to	investing	 in	what	might	most	directly	bring	 in	profit	 (in	 this	case	 fuel).	Second,	 I	assumed	 that	 in	 a	 setting	 so	 often	 characterised	 in	 the	 literature	 as	 patrimonial	and	hierarchical,	 those	at	 the	 top	of	 the	 ladder	would	be	 the	best	dressed.	While	these	 assumptions	 proved	 to	 be	 incorrect,	 similar	 perspectives	 were	 held	simultaneously	by	those	who	worked	according	to	alternative	logics,	including	the	bluffers	 themselves.	While	 bluffing	was	 a	 way	 that	 young	 people	 ‘masked’	 their	
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precarious	 positionalities,	 bluffing	 was	 often	 also	 the	 marker	 of	 this	 very	predicament.	 It	 thus	 revealed	 their	 ‘actual	 station’;	 young,	 unemployed	 or	irregularly	employed	men	bluffed	the	most.	Although	enthusiastically	practiced	by	Freetown’s	 youth,	 bluffing	 was	 often	 found	 morally	 wanting,	 and	 labelled,	negatively,	 as	 ‘false	 life’.	 As	 Alhassan	 explained,	 ‘some	 people	 will	 dress	 up	 like	they	are	big	men,	or	they	have	stuff,	but	they	don’t	have	anything,	when	you	look	into	their	backgrounds	there	is	nothing’.	And	as	another	friend	told	me:	‘when	you	see	somebody	who	is	dressing	a	certain	way	you	know	if	it	fits	or	not’.			
	
Figure	7	Posing	for	a	photo		I	soon	realised	that	bluffing,	with	all	 its	ambiguities,	was	a	powerful	commentary	on	the	predicament	of	young	people	in	Freetown,	as	well	as	an	agentive	expression	of	 self-making.	 In	 a	 context	 where	 enduring	 transformation	 of	 status	 was	 so	difficult	 to	obtain	 for	 the	people	 I	worked	with,	many	of	whom	were	caught	 in	a	predicament	often	labelled	the	‘crisis	of	youth’,	a	plethora	of	visible	changes	were	performed	 and	 embodied	 on	 a	 day-to-day	 basis.	 This	 backdrop	 is	 helpful	 in	contextualising	 my	 interlocutors’	 lives	 and	 their	 immense	 preoccupation	 with	status,	which	I	think	can	be	understood	partly	as	a	response	to	the	struggles	and	anxieties	 they	 faced.	 As	 I	 discuss	 throughout	my	 thesis,	 however,	 their	 activities	and	 their	 corresponding	 understandings	 challenge	 some	 of	 the	 core	 premises	 of	
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that	 ‘crisis	 of	 youth’.	 My	 interlocutors	 were	 not	 simply	 victims	 of	 a	 political	economy	 in	 which	 they	 were	 marginalised,	 but	 also	 active	 constitutors	 of	 their	own	statuses,	with	bluffing	being	a	key	example.		In	this	chapter,	I	start	by	situating	bluffing	in	Sierra	Leone	in	a	body	of	 literature	that	 examines	 parallel	 consumption	 and	 self-styling	 practices	 on	 the	 continent.	Broadly	 speaking,	 scholarly	 interest	 has	 centred	 on	 untangling	 the	 modern	 and	traditional	features	of	these	practices,	attempting	to	understand	how	and	why	they	are	 meaningful	 in	 Africa.	 In	 this	 case,	 I	 suggest	 that	 bluffing	 represents	 an	adaptation,	and	also	an	inversion,	of	established	Freetown	practices	through	which	elite	status	in	the	city	has	historically	been	articulated.	I	turn	next	to	a	discussion	of	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 environment	 in	 which	 bluffers	 operate	 in	 Freetown,	where	 a	 bluff	 can	 be	 understood	 simultaneously	 as	 a	 wasteful	 and	 present-orientated	practice,	and	a	genuinely	efficacious	economic	strategy.	In	the	chapter’s	final	section,	I	consider	what	the	ambiguous	moral	qualities	of	the	bluff,	as	a	form	of	both	long-term	and	short-term	exchange,	tell	us	about	the	nature	of	coming	of	age	in	Freetown	today.			
Bluffing	in	Africa:	traditional	or	modern,	local	or	foreign?			Practices	akin	to	bluffing	have	caught	the	attention	of	anthropologists	working	in	variety	 of	 African	 contexts.	 Such	 work	 builds	 on	 a	 history	 of	 theoretical	engagement	with	mimesis,	understood	both	as	a	 form	of	colonial	 subjectification	through	which	racial	hierarchies	became	self-enforced	(Fanon	2008	[1952]),	and	as	means	of	 resistance,	 critique,	and	empowerment	 (Stoller	1995).	An	 important	feature	of	many	of	such	mimetic	and	consumption	practices	is	their	 international	or	Western	character,	in	both	colonial	and	post-colonial	settings.	This	has	led	to	a	divide	 in	 analyses	 of	 these	 practices.	 Friedman,	 in	 his	 1994	 study	 of	 Congolese	
sapeurs	–	men	who	dress	in	elaborate	elegant	outfits	influenced	by	Parisian	style	–	sees	 such	mimesis	 of	modernity	 as	 a	 tradition	 that	 can	 be	 situated	within	 local	cosmologies	of	magic	and	religion,	as	well	as	mirroring	local	political	organisation	in	their	associations.	Cole’s	(2004)	study	of	young	women	in	Madagascar	similarly	locates	sophisticated	individual	consumption	of	foreign	goods	as	a	novel	means	of	
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self-making	 in	 context	 where	 family	 structures	 no	 longer	 provide	 a	 satisfactory	means	 of	 resource	 distribution,	 drawing	 at	 the	 same	 time	 on	 a	 long	 tradition	 of	playful	and	sexual	self-fashioning	on	the	island.			Ferguson	 (2006),	 by	 contrast,	 argues	 that	 such	 mimetic	 practices	 can	 be	understood	 as	 purely	 political	 statements	 that	 claim	 global	 membership	 and	citizenship,	 a	 mode	 of	 analysis	 that	 echoes	 Richards’	 (1996)	 characterisation	 of	consumption	practices	among	young	rebels	in	Sierra	Leone’s	civil	war	as	a	means	of	becoming	‘modern’.	Weiss	(2009),	building	on	this	line	of	argument,	thinks	they	represent	a	 fantasy	that	comes	to	 life	 in	the	cracks	of	 local	 limitations	and	global	possibilities.	Equally,	for	Masquelier	(2016),	young	men	who	dress	up	in	Niger	are	actively	 rejecting	 locally	 understood	 adulthood,	 opting	 instead	 to	 extend	 their	status	 and	 lifestyles	 as	 youth,	 from	 which	 they	 have	 more	 to	 gain.	 Newell	convincingly	turns	the	puzzle	on	 its	head	 in	The	Modernity	Bluff	(2012),	situating	the	 bluff	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 moral	 economies	 of	 criminals	 in	 Abidjan,	 which	challenge	understandings	of	a	singular	or	authentic	modernity	–	modernity	itself	is	a	bluff	–	and	the	clear-cut	distinction	between	‘real’	and	‘fake’.	The	ability	to	bluff	or	 ‘fake’	 well	 is	 an	 authentic	 marker	 of	 young	 men,	 who	 align	 themselves	 with	global	markers	of	 status	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 securing	 their	place	 in	 the	 local	networks	of	bluffers	and	criminals	upon	whom	they	depend	to	make	ends	meet.			Bluffing	 in	 Sierra	 Leone	 involves	 an	 interplay	 between	many	 of	 these	 dynamics.	Indeed,	it	is	its	multi-layered	symbolic	(and	economic)	value	that	gives	it,	I	suggest,	its	 strength	 and	 ambiguity.	 The	 ‘modern’	 and	 ‘foreign’	 character	 of	 the	 bluffs	 in	question	are	a	significant	component;	 in	almost	all	cases	 I	encountered,	 ‘bluffing’	was	 concerned	 chiefly	with	 prestige	 items	 that	 originated	 overseas.	 In	 a	 context	where	most	young	men	see	out-migration	 to	 ‘white	man	countries’	as	one	of	 the	only	 viable	 ways	 of	 achieving	 enduring	 social	 mobility,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	objects	sourced	 from	these	 locations	are	desirable.	The	prestige,	 I	 suspect,	 is	not	simply	 the	 fact	 that	 objects	 have	 come	 from	 overseas,	 but	 that	 they	 locate	 the	player	 in	 coveted	 international	 social	 networks.	 A	 number	 of	 these	 objects	themselves	 facilitate	 the	maintenance	of	 these	networks,	 such	 as	 computers	 and	
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smart	phones,	or,	 like	televisions,	stereos,	and	DVD	players,	offer	a	portal	 to	 that	world.			At	the	same	time,	following	similar	observations	in	many	of	the	studies	reviewed	above,	 the	precedent	 of	 these	 objects	 can	be	 found	 in	 local	 tradition.	As	 Jackson	notes	of	the	Karanko	of	Northern	Sierra	Leone:	‘the	modern	imperative	to	migrate	(or	remain	existentially	 impoverished)	has	 its	origins	 in	an	older	 imperative.	For	well-being	has	always	been,	in	the	Kuranko	social	imaginary,	a	matter	of	bringing	the	 vital	 forces	 of	 the	 wild	 into	 the	 precinct	 of	 the	 village	 –	 which	 means	transgressing	the	symbolic	boundaries	that	separate	the	secure	space	of	the	home	from	the	unknown	and	the	beyond’	(Jackson	2011:44).	It	is	notable	that	coming	of	age	 rituals	 in	 rural	 Sierra	 Leone,	 as	 in	 contexts	 across	 the	 continent,	 involve	leaving	the	village	and	going	into	to	the	bush	–	a	magical	arena	of	shape-shifting	–	before	returning	home	transformed.	The	‘beyond’	clearly	is	potent,	as	in	the	case	of	bluffers	 for	whom	the	beyond	of	overseas	 (i.e.	Europe	or	America)	had	not	been	breached,	yet	its	‘vital-forces’	are	nonetheless	accessible.			In	Freetown,	however,	the	picture	of	what	is	from	‘there’	and	what	is	from	‘here’	is	complicated	 by	 the	 city’s	 cosmopolitan	 history	 as	 a	 settlement	 for	 overseas	migrants	and	colonial	administers,	and	a	central	seat	of	British	colonial	operations	in	 the	region.	 In	Freetown,	historically	practices	akin	 to	bluffing	–	dressing	up	 in	Western	 styles	mixed	with	performative	 and	 elaborate	 aesthetics	 –	 is	 associated	most	strongly	with	the	Krio,	the	descendants	of	the	black	British	colonial	subjects	who	had	founded	the	city	(and	those	who	identified	with	or	had	been	incorporated	into	this	ethnic	group).	During	the	colonial	period,	the	Krio	positioned	themselves	as	 intermediaries	 between	 the	 British	 colonisers	 and	 the	 native	 tribes.	 This	involved	taking	on	some	of	the	aesthetics	of	the	colonisers,	which	became	defining	features	of	the	ethnic	group.	One	colonial	account	refers	to	the	Krio	as	‘trousered	Africans’	 (Fyfe	1963).	Another	manifestation	of	 the	practice	was	 the	 taking	on	of	English	names,	which	themselves	have	been	attributed	with	an	elaborative	quality	akin	to	bluffing.	As	activist	and	academic	Walter	Rodney	writes	in	his	famous	book,	
How	Europe	undeveloped	Africa,	‘In	Sierra	Leone,	the	white	cultural	influence	went	back	to	the	18th	century,	and	Sierra	Leone	Creoles	stood	out	even	from	the	rest	of	
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miseducated	black	people.	The	Creoles	were	not	satisfied	with	an	English	Christian	name	 or	 even	 with	 one	 European	 surname:	 they	 had	 to	 choose	 two	 European	surnames	 and	 connect	 them	 with	 a	 hyphen’	 (Rodney	 1972:73).	 Taking	 on	aesthetics	of	Englishness	was	a	way	not	only	of	highlighting	their	proximity	with	the	colonisers,	but	also	of	differentiating	themselves	from	natives.			After	 independence,	 the	Krio	maintained	 an	 elite	 status	 as	 a	 professional	 group,	following	 a	 retreat	 from	 politics	 as	 the	 autochthonous	 Temne	 and	Mende	 tribes	became	politically	dominant.	In	Abner	Cohen’s	study	(1981)	of	the	Krio	(Creoles)	in	Freetown,	a	culture	of	elaborative	performance,	which	he	terms	‘the	dramaturgy	of	power’,	plays	a	central	role	in	maintaining	their	status	as	a	professional	class	of	teachers,	doctors,	lawyers,	and	civil	servants.6	Family	ceremonies,	such	as	lifecycle	rituals,	 were	 crucial	 moments	 when	 the	 elaborative	 performances	 took	 place	around	which	 Krio	 society	 is	 structured.	 Cohen’s	 description	 of	 a	 funeral	 in	 his	chapter	 on	 the	 ‘cult	 of	 the	dead’	 calls	 attention	 to	how	many	of	 the	hundreds	of	attendees	gathered	outside	a	church	wore	pristine	black	suits	and	ties,	with	a	few	even	in	bowler	hats.	In	Cohen’s	analysis,	what	might	be	termed	‘bluffing’	is	highly	integrated	 through	 family	 ceremonies	 into	 establishment	 culture	 and	 family	hierarchies.	It	is	also	collective	in	nature.	He	notes:			 It	 is	essentially	 in	 this	 last	 respect	 [defining	 the	extent	and	 limit	of	 family	relationships]	 that	 the	 extensive	 and	 intensive	 Creole	 family	 ceremonials	should	be	understood.	To	put	it	bluntly,	your	‘family’	consists	of	the	person	who	come,	with	presents	and	contributions	in	hand,	to	eat,	drink,	and	dance	or	grieve	 in	your	ceremonials.	 If	a	relative	 fails	 to	come	to	a	succession	of	your	 ceremonials	 without	 an	 acceptable	 excuse,	 then	 to	 all	 intents	 and	purposes	that	person	ceases	to	be	a	member	of	your	family.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	a	mere	‘friend’	were	to	participate	frequently	in	your	ceremonials,	he	would	in	due	course	become	a	‘cousin’,	as	it	is	not	too	difficult	within	such	a	kinship	system	to	discover	an	appropriate	link…But,	as	it	 is	impossible	for	any	 man	 to	 activate,	 keep	 alive,	 and	 exhaust	 all	 of	 his	 potential	 kinship	relationships,	some	relatives	gradually	lose	touch	with	him,	and	fade	out	of	his	ceremonials.	Others	may	pick	a	quarrel	over	one	or	another	of	the	many	
																																																								6	The	Creole	case	study	clearly	aligns	with	Cohen’s	enduring	theoretical	interest	in	the	interconnections	between	symbolism	and	power,	most	famously	discussed	in	his	1972	book,	Two-Dimensional	Man:	An	Essay	on	the	Anthropology	of	Power	and	
Symbolism	in	Complex	Society.		
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issues	 that	 bedevil	 family	 relationships,	 and	 cease	 to	 participate.	 (Cohen	1981:68)		It	 is	 striking	 how	much	 Cohen’s	 observations	 resonate	 today,	 less	with	 the	 Krio	than	 with	 those	 less	 educated	 autochthonous	 ‘country	 people’	 who	migrated	 to	Freetown	as	labourers,	and	their	descendants	–	now	the	majority	in	Freetown.	In	many	 ways,	 the	 roles	 have	 reversed.	 Krio	 families	 have	 a	 reputation	 for	 being	private	and	being	less	showy	with	their	wealth.	As	the	often-quoted	Krio	parable	puts	it:	‘if	yu	yams	wet,	for	kohba	am’	(If	you	have	white	yams,	a	sign	of	wealth,	you	should	hide	them).			Today,	it	is	the	‘country	people’	–	especially	youth	such	as	Alhassan,	who	moved	to	the	city	from	his	home	village	in	his	early	teens	–	who	are	most	closely	associated	with	 ‘bluffing’.	 This	 represents	 a	 significant	 demographic	 shift	 that	 gets	 to	 the	heart	 of	 what	 justifies	 categorizing	 their	 behaviour	 as	 ‘bluffing’	 (that	 is,	 what	 is	deceptive	 about	 it).	 For	 the	 Krio	 in	 Cohen’s	 study,	 elaborative	 performance	‘accurately’	 reflected	 their	 elite	 position	 in	 society;	 it	 became	 part	 of	 the	reproduction	of	a	professional	class,	and	was	grounded	 in	significant	wealth	 that	came	from	property	ownership	in	the	Freetown	peninsula.	The	groups	associated	with	 bluffing	 in	 my	 study	 were	 not	 likely	 to	 be	 people	 with	 stable	 sources	 of	income,	 property	 ownership,	 or	 formal	 employment	 prospects.	 While	 ‘bluffing’	would	take	place	among	my	interlocutors	at	collective	rites	of	passage	–	working	through	 established	 family	 hierarchies	 –	 it	 would	 also	 take	 place	 beyond	 this	sphere,	in	a	much	more	individual	and	anti-hierarchical	ways.	As	my	experience	at	the	garage	indicated,	those	who	dressed	up	the	most	were	often	those	lower	down	in	hierarchies.		While	the	Krio	referenced	British	aesthetics,	reflective	of	their	often	elite	 and	 formalized	 economic	 and	 political	 positionalities	 in	 the	 colonial	 and	nascent	 post-colonial	 context,	 today	 bluffing,	 often	 inspired	 by	 the	 aesthetics	 of	transatlantic	 urban	 youth	 culture,	 is	 reflective	 of	 a	 much	 more	 informalised	political	economy	that	young	‘country’	men	are	marginally	positioned	in.				Freetown’s	 historical	 context	 is,	 I	 suggest,	 key	 to	 understanding	 the	 role	 of	 the	bluff	 today.	 In	 reference	 to	 the	above	 literatures,	bluffing	 is	 at	once	an	 inversion	and	rejection	of	 local	hierarchies	and	practices,	 in	 favour	of	 ‘global	membership’,	
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as	 outlined	 by	 Ferguson	 and	Masquelier.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 its	 meaning	 derives	from	a	long	history	of	performative	practices	in	Freetown.	In	other	words,	the	call	for	 ‘local	membership’,	and	the	bid	to	become	 ‘citizens’	of	Freetown	according	to	established	 cultural	 practices	 of	 elaborative	 performance,	 involves	 taking	 on	overtly	 ‘white’,	 or	 foreign,	 elements.	While	 land	ownership	 and	 civil	 service	 jobs	might	 be	 inaccessible	 to	 ‘bluffers’,	 dressing	 up	 and	 elaborate	 consumption	practices	 are	 possible.	 This	 represents	 a	 more	 Bourdieusian	 mode	 of	 class	alignment	through	consumption	and	 ‘taste’,	rather	than	a	Marxian	notion	of	class	defined	by	economic	relations.	The	ambiguity	of	the	bluff	is	a	crucial	component;	it	symbolically	aligns	young	people	on	the	one	hand	with	the	here,	now	(and	the	past	to	some	extent),	and	on	the	other	hand,	with	the	beyond	and	the	future.	Yet	it	does	not	 allow	 full-membership	 to	 either	 network,	 but	 rather	 connects	 ‘bluffers’	 to	others	 involved	 in	 ‘bluffing’.	 That	 is,	 it	 further	 cements	 their	 place	 as	 ‘youth’	 in	Freetown,	 in	as	much	as	 it	represents	 for	many	the	only	available	route	to	social	mobility.			
Bluffing	as	an	economic	strategy		
	The	bluff	in	Cohen’s	study	of	the	1970s	Krio	involved	maintaining	elite	status,	but	nevertheless	in	my	study	it	still	held	economic	efficacy,	even	if	the	economic	reality	was	 very	 different.	 Whereas	 performativity	 and	 dressing	 up	 among	 the	 Krio	 in	Cohen’s	 study	 was	 a	 means	 of	 being	 accepted	 into	 a	 formal	 economy	 of	professional	 life,	 underpinned	 by	 significant	 and	 valuable	 land-holdings	 in	Freetown	among	the	ethnic	group,	‘bluffing’	among	Freetown	youth	today	enables	individuals	 to	 participate	 in	 precarious	 informal	 economic	 networks	 and,	 at	significant	 risk,	 to	 realign	patronage	 relationships	 in	 their	 own	 favour.	 The	 bluff	was	 considered	 a	 wasteful	 and	 misleading	 strategy,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 in	ambiguous	ways,	it	was	efficacious.		Criticisms	 of	 ‘false	 life’	 and	 wastefulness,	 as	 might	 be	 expected,	 tended	 to	 be	levelled	 by	 elders,	 who	 scorned	 the	 habits	 of	 youth	 who	 could	 neither	 attain	independence	 and	 self-sufficiency	 nor	 contribute	 to	 family	 expenses.	 Such	criticisms	 were	 regularly	 conveyed	 to	 me	 by	 Auntie	 Alice,	 an	 important	 patron	
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figure	 in	 my	 neighbourhood.	 Auntie	 Alice	 was	 from	 a	 Fula	 background:	 a	 non-native	tribe	with	a	mercantile	reputation	 in	Sierra	Leone	and	across	West	Africa.	Auntie	Alice	employed	many	young	men	–	nearly	all	of	whom	were	members	of	the	local	 mosque	 that	 she	 was	 prominent	 member	 of	 –	 in	 her	 various	 businesses,	which	 included	 a	water	 purification,	 packaging	 and	 distribution	 factory	 that	 she	ran	 on	 the	 ground	 floor	 of	 her	 compound,	 just	 opposite	 Alhassan’s	 family	compound.	Alhassan	was	one	such	young	man:	he	had	worked	for	Auntie	Alice	as	the	 driver	 of	 a	 delivery	 van,	 and	 still	 occasionally	 drove	 her	 personal	 jeep.	 She	continued	 to	 be	 a	 patron	 to	 Alhassan,	 although	 she	 lamented	 the	 fact	 that	 he	generally	 ignored	 her	 advice.	 She	 was	 especially	 critical	 of	 his	 failure	 to	 save	money.	 She	had	opened	a	bank	account	 for	him,	but	he	 invariably	 came	up	with	urgent	excuses	to	withdraw	the	money.	Equally,	he	was	not	keen	to	follow	up	her	suggestion	that	he	could	save	money	by	investing	in	her	business,	through	which	she	would	give	him	a	small	return	on	the	profits,	as	well	as	a	means	of	securing	the	initial	sum.	Instead	–	in	her	eyes,	and	to	some	extent	in	his	–	Alhassan	would	spend	his	money,	‘pretending	to	be	a	big	man’,	keeping	many	girlfriends,	buying	clothes,	renting	a	room	and	parlour	instead	of	saving	to	buy	land	and	build	his	own	place.	In	addition,	he	normally	hired	other	drivers	to	work	his	taxi	–	 for	which	he	paid,	largely,	by	raising	funds	from	patrons	abroad.	These	hired	drivers	tended	to	drive	it	 recklessly,	 thus	 decreasing	 its	 value.	 Additionally,	 hiring	 them	meant	 that	 the	business	 yielded	 less	 profit	 than	 if	 Alhassan	 had	 driven	 the	 taxi	 himself.	 Auntie	Alice	saw	this	as	absurd:	only	a	big	man	ought	to	hire	a	driver	in	this	way.	All	in	all,	the	bluff	or	‘false	life’	that	Alimany	pursued	was	what	allowed	him	to	enjoy	life	in	the	here	and	now,	rather	than	securing	his	future,	as	elders	like	Auntie	Alice	felt	he	should.			Alhassan’s	 bluffing	was	 also	 scorned	 by	 James,	 his	 now	 retired	 father,	 who	 had	expected	that	Alhassan	would	provide	for	him	in	his	old	age.	James	had	worked	as	a	driver	in	Freetown	for	many	years,	but	he	had	now	returned	to	his	native	village.	Alhassan	 was	 raised	 in	 this	 village,	 and	 had	 come	 to	 Freetown	 as	 teenager,	eventually	 learning	to	drive	and	taking	on	some	of	 James’	clients,	 including	some	expats,	 a	 few	 of	 whom	 had	 continued	 to	 support	 Alhassan	 after	 leaving	 the	country.	On	 several	 occasions	when	Alhassan	had	money	 in	his	hand,	 James	had	
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attempted	to	‘come	inside’,	claiming	that	resources	coming	from	his	patron	figures	should	 go	 through	 him.	 For	 example,	 when	 Alhassan	was	 raising	money	 to	 buy	land	to	build	his	own	house,	James	called	a	family	meeting	to	pressure	Alhassan	to	buy	 the	 land	 in	 James’s	 name,	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 whole	 family.	 James	 had	 never	managed	to	build	his	own	family	compound	in	Freetown,	instead	occupying	one	of	the	double	rooms	in	the	now	dilapidated	compound	built	by	his	father.	However,	as	Alhassan	bitterly	explained	to	me,	‘he	does	not	feed	me,	I	want	to	stand	alone’.	Alhassan	considered	himself	to	be,	or	aspired	to	become,	a	man	in	his	own	right.		Alhassan’s	take	on	what	he	owed	his	father	derived	in	large	part	from	his	feeling	that	his	father	had	not	raised	him	well.	Alhassan	was	an	illegitimate	child,	whose	mother	 had	 no	 lasting	 relationship	with	 James.	He	was	 raised	 in	 the	 village	 and	received	 no	 formal	 education,	 unlike	 James’	 children	 with	 his	 current	 wife	(including	Foday,	with	whom	I	lived	for	part	of	my	field	work),	who	were	all	raised	and	 schooled	 in	 town.	 Instead	Alhassan’s	 early	years	were	 spent	helping	around	the	 house	 and	 the	 adjacent	 farmland,	 and	 hunting	 in	 the	 bush.	 In	 addition,	Alhassan	 felt	 that	 James	 had	 exhibited	 extreme	 impatience	 in	 teaching	 him	 to	drive,	and	therefore	Alhassan	had	to	resort	to	learning	‘himself’	on	the	streets	by	becoming	an	apprentice,	 and	 to	 seeking	patronage	elsewhere,	 such	as	with	 their	Freetown	neighbour	Auntie	Alice.	Alhassan	thus	felt	that	he	did	not	owe	his	father	a	great	deal,	though	he	would	still	contribute	to	James’s	travel	expenses	when	he	travelled	to	Freetown,	and	he	had	recently	bought	him	a	generator	for	the	house	in	the	village.	While	Alhassan	wanted	to	‘stand	alone’,	he	remained	closely	integrated	into	 his	 family,	 who	 supported	 him	 in	 many	 ways,	 including	 raising	 his	 own	illegitimate	son	in	the	extended	family	compound	in	Congo	Town.			While	 Auntie	 Alice	 and	 James’	 criticisms	 of	 Alhassan’s	 bluffing	 were	 seemingly	accurate	 –	 it	 was	 hard	 to	 deny	 that	 it	 was	 wasteful	 to	 spending	 cash	 on	 highly	visible	consumer	goods	when	money	was	hard	to	come	by	and	Alhassan	had	not	built	his	own	‘foundation’–	their	criticisms	were	not	coming	from	neutral	places	of	observation.	 Auntie	 Alice’s	 criticism	 was	 in	 part	 informed	 by	 a	 knowledge	 that	Alhassan’s	bluffing	was	extending	his	dependence	on	her.	If	Alhassan	desperately	needed	something,	Auntie	Alice	knew	that	she	would	feel	strongly	obligated,	as	a	patron	 figure,	 to	help	him	out,	 and	moreover	 that	Alhassan	 could	make	a	 strong	
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case	 for	 her	 support	 in	 cases	when	 her	money	 could	 provide	 the	 solution	 for	 a	practical	problem,	 such	as	 a	mechanical	 issue	with	 the	 car.	Conversely,	Alhassan	would	have	 found	 it	 challenging	 to	ask	Auntie	Alice	 for	 funds	 to	 finance	bluffing.	James’s	 criticisms	 of	 bluffing	 came	 from	 the	 opposite	 position,	 as	 someone	who	wanted	 greater	material	 support	 from	Alhassan.	 By	 spending	money	on	bluffing,	Alhassan	 was	 not	 supporting	 James	 in	 the	 present,	 as	 well	 as	 equally	 failing	 to	participate	in	long-term	investments	such	as	buying	land.	According	to	the	logic	of	family	 hierarchies,	 Alhassan’s	 participation	 would	 have	 strengthened	 James’s	claim	to	be	a	beneficiary.			One	 strength	of	 the	bluff	 as	 an	 economic	 strategy	 for	 young	people	was	 its	 very	ambiguity.	The	bluff	played	a	key	role	in	an	on-going	negotiation	between	Auntie	Alice	and	Alhassan	about	what	they	owed	each	other.	Alhassan	often	complained	to	 me	 that	 Auntie	 Alice	 did	 not	 reward	 him	 sufficiently	 for	 services	 that	 he	performed	 for	her.	For	example,	during	 the	Ebola	crisis,	Alhassan	had	connected	her	with	an	NGO	that	was	looking	to	hire	jeeps	to	transport	humanitarian	workers	and	medical	staff,	at	a	very	 favourable	rate.	Auntie	Alice	 initially	paid	Alhassan	a	modest	(in	his	mind)	fee	to	drive	the	jeep	but,	after	a	few	months,	Alhassan	gave	up,	frustrated	that	he	was	not	receiving	a	bigger	cut	given	that	he	was	the	sababu	(the	 link).	By	bluffing	 –	 through	 ‘wasteful	 consumption’	 –	Alhassan	was	 covertly	forcing	 Auntie	 Alice’s	 hand,	 at	 some	 risk,	 to	 provide	 support	 for	 him	 when	 he	needed	it.	This	would	not	have	been	the	case	if	he	had	continued	working	for	her	as	regular	employee,	or	if	he	had	saved	the	money	for	an	inevitable	‘rainy	day’.	In	short,	 bluffing	was	 a	means	 of	 extending	 a	mode	 of	 dependence	 on	 her	 that	 he	found	 favourable	 –	 she	 was	 not	 his	 employer	 but	 his	 patron.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 his	father,	rather	than	the	bluff	reinforcing	Alhassan’s	dependence,	the	bluff	was	doing	the	 opposite;	 it	 became	 a	means	 of	 asserting	 his	 independence.	 If	 Alhassan	 had	spent	 his	 money	 less	 ‘wastefully’,	 such	 as	 on	 land,	 or	 had	 saved	 it	 in	 a	 bank	account,	James,	as	his	father,	would	have	had	a	strong	case	to	make	claims	on	it.			Part	of	the	financial	efficacy	of	the	bluff	lay	in	a	broader	economic	logic	that	I	had	heard	 professed	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 settings:	 in	 Sierra	 Leone,	 a	 context	 of	 extreme	economic	volatility	and	decline,	 saving	money	was	an	unwise	economic	strategy.	
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This	view	was	not	simply	promoted	by	the	young	bluffers	themselves.	In	a	sermon	at	a	service	at	a	local	church	in	Congo	Town,	the	pastor	preached	the	message	that	there	is	no	point	in	waiting	all	your	life	saving	up	money	and	not	eating	or	living	well,	since	by	the	time	you	are	ready	to	buy	your	house	you	will	be	dead.	Or	as	a	local	 tribal	 chief	 told	 Alhassan,	 ‘let	 your	 money	 suffer	 before	 you	 suffer’,	 a	 line	Alhassan	seemed	to	enjoy	quoting.			The	 challenge	 in	 accumulating	 cash	 was	 compounded	 by	 the	 ambiguity	surrounding	 money	 in	 an	 environment	 with	 high	 levels	 of	 indebtedness	 to	 kin,	friends,	and	neighbours,	and	almost	limitless	potential	for	claims	from	the	people	around	 you.	 A	 person	 who	 had	 money	 in	 his	 possession	 for	 long	 would	 be	subjected	 to	 claims	 for	 debts	 to	 be	 repaid,	 or	 for	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 familial	 or	friendship-based	 obligations	 for	 support	 during	 ‘rainy	 days’.	 The	 ambiguity	surrounding	money	 created	 a	 powerful	 sense	 that	 it	was	not	 ‘real’	 unless	 it	was	spent.	 The	 bluff	was	 often	 a	means	 of	 realising	 and	making	material	what	 in	 an	abstract	 form	 was	 ambiguous	 and	 without	 inherent	 value.	 Spending	 money	 on	desirable	consumer	goods	was	 thus	an	efficacious	means	of	 reserving	money	 for	personal	future	use;	consumer	goods,	at	least	in	theory,	were	in	high	demand	and	could	 be	 liquidated	 quite	 easily.	 This	 proved	 to	 be	 the	 case	with	Alhassan’s	 car.	While	prioritising	spending	his	money	on	decoration	and	maintenance,	the	car	had	become	 unworkable,	 yet	 perversely	 this	maintained	 the	 value	 of	 the	 car,	 which,	through	not	being	run	regularly	as	a	taxi,	was	sold	for	a	good	price.	Alhassan	knew	that	 his	 support	 network	was	 deep	 enough	 that	 he	 could	 survive	 for	 some	 time	without	 income	 from	 the	 taxi,	 for	 example	 by	 sharing	 the	 food	 of	 friends,	neighbours	and	family,	and	by	buying	essentials	on	credit.	.			To	 further	 complicate	 this	 social	 picture,	 the	most	 common	 source	 of	 consumer	goods	was	from	friends,	family,	and	neighbours.	One	of	the	‘greatest’	deceptions	of	the	 bluff	was	 not	 that	 it	 involved	 flashy	 showing	 off	 that	masked	 a	 ‘true’,	much	grimmer	or	less	extravagant	reality.	It	was	rather	that	bluffing	involved	displaying	items	that	were	not	wholly	in	the	position	of	those	who	sported	them.	As	I	came	to	realise,	one	reason	why	my	friends	and	neighbours	could	obtain	consumer	goods	at	so	fast	a	pace	was	that	often	they	did	not	own	them,	at	least	not	fully.	In	some	
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instances,	my	interlocutors	would	buy	items	outright,	often	from	shops	downtown,	but	 this	was	 exceptional.	 It	was	much	more	 common	 for	people	 to	 obtain	 goods	from	 their	 friends	 and	 neighbours,	 typically	 involving	 piecemeal	 and	 contested	arrangements.	A	common	arrangement	among	people	who	lived	together	or	near	each	other	involved	simply	borrowing	an	item.			What	 complicated	 matters	 was	 that	 these	 same	 networks	 were	 the	 channels	through	which	consumer	goods	were	often	purchased.	People	rarely	paid	the	full	amount	for	something	up-front	in	these	situations;	rather	objects	were	paid	for	in	instalments.	 These	 arrangements	 bound	 friends	 and	 neighbours	 in	 uneasy	relationships	 of	 (frequently	 contested)	 debt.	 The	 fact	 that	 they	 involved	 friends	and	neighbours	provided	a	measure	of	security;	a	large	pool	of	mutual	contacts	–	on	whose	favourable	reputation	both	parties	depended	–	could	act	as	witnesses	in	case	 of	 disagreement.	 By	 the	 same	 token,	 however,	 it	was	 precisely	 these	multi-layered	d	social	inter-connections	that	allowed	those	who	obtained	items	to	avoid	paying	 for	 them	 in	 full.	 I	 witnessed	 dozens	 of	 such	 cases.	 In	 general,	 those	obtaining	items	would	point	to	reasons	why	they	should	not	pay	the	full	amount,	often	after	using	the	item	for	several	months.	In	some	cases,	they	claimed	that	that	item	was	not	 in	 the	 condition	 that	had	been	promised.	 In	other	 cases,	 the	buyer	would	claim	that	 the	seller	owed	them	something	else,	which	 itself	had	not	been	settled.	 Given	 the	 thickness	 of	 sociality	 in	 Freetown,	 this	 happened	 a	 lot.	 In	 yet	other	 cases,	 there	would	 be	 an	 unspoken	 sense	 that	 full	 payment	was	 rendered	unnecessary	by	the	strength	of	the	social	connection	between	buyer	and	seller,	and	that	 this	 was	 more	 of	 a	 ‘borrowing’	 relationship	 than	 a	 commercial	 one.	 This	approach	 risked	 the	 significant	 straining	 or	 even	 severing	 of	 the	 relationship	 in	question.	I	attended	a	number	of	formal	meetings	called	by	participants	to	resolve	such	 conflicts,	 some	 of	 which	 resulted	 in	 police	 reports	 and	 legal	 charges	 or	participants	avoiding	each	other	for	significant	periods	of	time	while	things	cooled	down.			For	 most	 young	 people	 in	 Freetown,	 it	 was	 close	 to	 impossible	 to	 avoid	participating	 in	 these	 exchanges.	 They	 were	 caught	 in	 a	 ‘catch	 22’,	 not	 least	because	 the	 ability	 to	 borrow	 money	 was	 often	 predicated	 on	 participation	 in	
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bluffing.	Bluffing	made	it	easier	to	borrow	money	from	others,	not	just	because	you	were	‘fooling’	them	into	thinking	that	you	were	better	off	than	you	were,	but	also	because	 items	 that	 could	 be	 liquidated	 and	 sold	 on	 served	 as	 collateral	 and	provided	 reassurance	 that	 funds	 could	 be	 made	 available	 if	 needed.	 During	 the	negotiation	 processes	 of	 such	 financial	 arrangements,	 people	 often	 pointed	 to	assets	in	their	possession,	such	as	televisions,	jewellery,	phones,	or	cars,	claiming	that	they	would	or	could	sell	them,	in	order	to	make	a	more	convincing	case	to	the	creditor.	In	this	sense,	bluffing	was	the	only	game	in	town	for	many	people,	but	it	was	also	a	gamble;	a	person’s	social	relationships	and	reputation	were	at	stake.			A	 revealing	 counter-point	 to	 the	 catch-22	 of	 bluffing	 was	 the	 story	 of	 James’s	cousin,	 Tikay,	 who	 came	 from	 the	 provincial	 town	 of	 Bo	 to	 live	 in	 the	 Bangura	family	compound	shortly	after	I	moved	in.	The	reason	for	Tikay’s	transfer	was	his	appointment	 as	 a	 health	 and	 safety	 officer	 at	 a	 major	 international	 mining	company	 based	 in	 Freetown;	 by	 local	 standards,	 his	 salary	 was	 sizeable	 and	unusually	 reliable.	 I	 was	 struck	 by	 how	 little	 Tikay	 engaged	 in	 flashy	 bluffing	practices,	even	though	his	potential	seemed	greater	than	that	of	most	of	his	peers.	He	once	explained	 to	me	 that,	while	most	 young	people	 in	 town	engage	 in	 ‘false	life’,	 he	 preferred	 to	 ‘lay	 low’.	 It	 struck	 me	 that	 this	 was	 a	 kind	 of	 anti-bluff,	possible	and	desirable	only	because	he	had	a	reliable	income	and	did	not	need	to	engage	in	the	messy	world	of	neighbourhood	bluffing.	In	fact,	he	had	much	to	gain	by	 abstaining,	 which	 may	 be	 why	 he	 maintained	 a	 reserved	 and	 private	 ‘Krio’	disposition.			
Bluffing:	short-term	or	long-term	exchange?			As	the	above	section	demonstrates,	the	bluff’s	ambiguity	is	key	to	its	efficacy	as	an	economic	strategy	for	youth	in	Freetown.	In	this	section,	I	expand	on	the	morally	ambiguous	dimensions	of	the	bluff,	with	reference	to	 its	temporality	as	a	 form	of	exchange	and	its	place	in	practices	of	the	family	and	home.	I	suggest	that	while	the	bluff	 is	 subversive	 and	morally	 problematic,	 it	 facilitates	meaningful	 ‘long-term’	exchange	in	accordance	with	established	mechanisms	of	social	reproduction.	The	difficulty	of	assessing	the	morality	of	the	bluff	comes	in	part	from	the	challenge	of	
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determining	 its	 limits	 in	 Freetown	 today,	 where	 lifecycle	 ritual	 itself	 has	 been	characterised	as	a	form	of	bluff.			The	 analytical	 connection	 between	morality	 and	 temporal	 registers	 of	 exchange	was	forwarded	by	Bloch	and	Parry	in	their	influential	edited	volume	(1989),	Money	
and	the	Morality	of	Exchange.	This	book	 identifies	a	cross-cultural	pattern	of	 two	opposing	 ‘transactional	 orders’,	 each	 with	 its	 own	 temporalities	 and	 moral	valuations,	 and	 the	existence	of	 specific	 acceptable	 and	non-acceptable	means	of	conversion	 between	 orders.	 The	 first	 transactional	 order	 comprises	 exchanges	‘concerned	 with	 the	 reproduction	 of	 the	 long-term	 social	 or	 cosmic	 order’.	 The	second	 is	 ‘a	 “sphere”	 of	 short-term	 transactions	 concerned	 with	 the	 arena	 of	individual	 competition’.	 Each	 transactional	 order	 is	 ascribed	with	 its	 own	moral	valuations:			While	 the	 long-term	cycle	 is	 always	positively	 associated	with	 the	 central	precepts	 of	 morality,	 the	 short-term	 order	 tends	 to	 be	 morally	undetermined	 since	 it	 concerns	 individual	 purposes	 which	 are	 largely	irrelevant	to	the	long-term	order.	If,	however,	that	which	is	obtained	in	the	short-term	 individualistic	 cycle	 is	 concerted	 to	 serve	 the	 reproduction	 of	the	long-term	cycle,	then	it	becomes	positive	(Bloch	and	Parry	1989:24).		Bloch	 and	 Parry	 give	 numerous	 case	 studies	 of	 conversions,	 or	 transformations,	characterised	 as	 ‘cooking’	 in	 the	 household,	 or	 ‘drinking’	 and	 ‘digesting’,	 or	consumption	at	events,	such	as	marriages,	whose	ultimate	goal	is	the	continuity	of	the	 social	 order	 of	 the	 household	 and	 community.	 There	 is	 risk	 of	 moral	admonition	if	these	conversions	do	not	take	place,	or	worse	still,	if	resources	from	long-term	 cycles	 are	 siphoned	 off	 for	 individual	 gain.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	short-term	register	is	without	positive	value:	‘cultural	recognition	is	also	explicitly	given	to	a	cycle	of	short-term	exchanges	associated	with	individual	appropriation,	competition,	sensuous	enjoyment,	luxury,	and	youthful	vitality’	(Ibid:	24),	yet	such	transactions	must	 remain	 subordinated	 to	 the	 long-term	 cycles	 if	 they	 are	 to	 be	deemed	morally	acceptable.		The	bluff	sits	uncomfortably	or	ambiguously	within	this	powerful	paradigm.	At	one	level,	the	bluff	actively	inverts	the	moral	valuations	of	the	transactional	orders;	the	
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short-term	register	is	given	value	over	the	long-term	one.	Criticisms	by	elders	like	Auntie	 Alice	 and	 James	 of	 the	 ‘false	 life’	 of	 bluffers	 can	 be	 understood	 as	challenging	such	an	inversion.	Instead	of	investing	in	the	enduring	social	order	as	mediated	 through	 the	 structures	of	 the	household	and	 its	associated	hierarchies,	resources	are	directed	towards	individual	projects	with	a	more	immediate	pay-off,	through	 the	 wasteful	 consumption	 of	 items	 that	 would	 soon	 be	 rendered	meaningless	 and	 out-dated.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 bluff	 is	 seen	 to	 prioritise	 short-sighted	 and	 present-oriented	 reward	 over	 investments	 with	 longer-term	 value.	And	worse,	 bluffing	 could	 present	 additional	 barriers	 to	making	 such	 long-term	investments:	 for	 example,	 through	 the	 debts	 that	 could	 be	 accrued	 to	 facilitate	bluffing,	 or	 through	 the	 increasing	 demands	 of	 family	 and	 friends	 that	 bluffing	could	 encourage.	As	Alhassan	 complained	 to	me	once,	 ‘when	you	buy	 something	expensive	here,	like	a	car,	people	do	not	think	you	have	spent	all	your	money	on	it,	they	 think	 you	 will	 have	 more	 money’.	 The	 ultimate	 consequence	 might	 be	 the	severing	of	relations	within	these	important	networks.	In	other	instances,	bluffing	could	lead	to	taking	on	new	responsibilities,	such	as	additional	sexual	partners	and	the	corresponding	heightened	risk	of	childbirth.	At	times,	the	conversion	was	from	the	long-term	to	the	short-term	order,	which	Bloch	and	Parry	identify	as	the	most	morally	scorned.	It	was	common	for	people	to	divert	stockpiles	of	money	set	aside	by	 families	 and	 households	 for	 emergencies,	 important	 family	 events,	 or	investment	in	property	or	business,	and	spend	it	on	bluffing	instead.		At	another	level,	the	bluff	is	a	means	of	participating	in	the	long-term	transactional	order.	 As	 outlined	 above,	 the	 bluff	 has	 genuine	 financial	 efficacy.	 In	 a	 context	where	holding	on	to	money	is	extremely	challenging	–	in	part	because	of	existing	debts	to	and	financial	demands	from	kinsmen	or	neighbours	–	spending	money	on	desirable	goods	was	a	way	of	saving	it.	Equally,	as	outlined	above,	the	bluff	could	increase	 a	 person’s	 chances	 of	 receiving	 money,	 goods,	 and	 opportunities	 from	others,	 as	 well	 as	 perhaps	 improving	 his	 chances	 in	 legal	 disputes7.	 The	 bluff	masked	the	often-precarious	social	position	of	the	bluffer	and	the	messy	details	of																																																									7	For	many	of	my	friends,	dressing	up	as	a	‘big	man’	was	a	strategy	for	engaging	with	legal	and	state	institutions	in	order	to	secure	preferential	treatment.	If	there	was	a	settlement	to	be	made	in	a	police	station	they	might	pull	up	in	a	borrowed	jeep,	and	wear	suits	or	Africana	clothes	often	donned	by	political	‘big	men’.	
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how	the	objects	 in	question	had	been	acquired	in	the	first	place.	Bluffing	became	part	of	a	performance	of	the	kind	of	‘watershed’	moment	of	transformation	alluded	to	 above:	 one	 that	 was	 recognised	 and	 given	 value	 by	 large	 strata	 of	 Freetown	society.	 While	 the	 bluff	 might	 strain	 certain	 networks,	 such	 as	 those	 linking	households	and	families,	 it	also	solidified	relations	and	allowed	the	renegotiation	of	 social	 standing,	 particularly	 among	 peers,	 who	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	determining	status	and	the	capacity	to	get	by.	The	bluff	could	enable	someone	to	benefit	 from	 these	networks,	with	 an	 aim	of	 reinvesting	 in	 the	more	 established	long-term,	 transactional	 order.	 Because	 it	 facilitated	 engagement	 with	 several	collectives,	bluffing	was	not	necessarily	the	domain	of	increased	individualism,	as	might	be	expected	if	it	was	a	‘short-term	exchange’	in	Bloch	and	Parry’s	model.	The	value	 of	 the	 bluff	 was	 predicated	 on	 collective	 acknowledgement,	 in	 an	 almost	fetishized	way.	 It	 thus	 represents	 a	means	 of	 converting	 from	 the	 short-term	 to	long-term	transactional	order,	and	vice	versa.	It	can	be	considered	simultaneously	wasteful	 and	 present-oriented,	 and	 meaningful	 and	 future-orientated.	 It	 is	 as	individualistic	 in	 its	 orientation	 as	 it	 is	 collectivist.	 It	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 moral	admonition,	and	at	the	same	time	the	source	of	allure,	praise,	and	envy.		The	 challenge	 of	 determining	 whether	 bluffing	 is	 a	 long-term	 or	 short-term	exchange	 is	 further	 complicated	 by	 the	 place	 of	 lifecycle	 ritual	 in	 the	 ‘long-term’/‘short-term’	system.	In	classic	anthropological	wisdom,	rites	of	passage	such	as	 marriages,	 even	 though	 they	 involve	 a	 seemingly	 presentist	 focus,	 are	nonetheless	considered	 long-term	exchanges	because	 they	have	 far-reaching	and	long-term	 consequences	 for	 the	 organisation	 of	 social	 reproduction.	Dressing	 up	for	 rites	 of	 passage	 events	 such	 as	 weddings,	 graduations,	 baby	 naming	ceremonies,	 and	 funerals	 is	 a	 central	 aspect	 of	 neighbourhood	 and	 family	 life	 in	Freetown.	 These	 events	 are	 particularly	 significant	 because	 they	 are	 the	collectively	 sanctioned	 means	 through	 which	 transformation	 of	 status	 occurs.	There	 is	 a	 strong	 sense	 of	 obligation	 to	 ‘show	 face’	 at	 these	 events,	 and	 to	 be	dressed	 appropriately.	 This	 requires	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 hierarchies	 of	 the	household	and	 family,	which	are	 formalised	 through	 the	enactment	of	 the	 ritual.	For	 example,	 the	 central	 ritual	 moment	 of	 an	 engagement/marriage	 is	 the	ceremonial	distribution	of	money	by	the	groom’s	family	to	the	elders	in	the	wife’s	
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family.	 Through	 the	 acknowledgement	 and	 agreement	 of	 these	 elders,	 who	represent	 the	 established	 family	 collective,	 the	 long-term	 transformation	 of	 the	married	 couple’s	 status	 is	 signified.	 I	 regularly	 encountered	 instances	 of	 family	members,	 including	 fathers	 and	 sons,	 who	 were	 no	 longer	 on	 speaking	 terms,	allegedly	 because	 of	 failure	 to	 show	 up	 at	 an	 important	 family	 event.	 It	 was	common	 for	participants	 to	get	 tailor	made-clothes,	 such	as	 the	matching	ashobi,	that	would	be	made	by	people	close	to	the	couple.	The	announcing	of	the	material	for	 the	 ashobi	 was	 a	 key	 moment	 in	 the	 wedding	 proceedings,	 typically	 taking	place	 a	 few	 months	 in	 advance,	 and	 indicating	 that	 the	 wedding	 was	 ‘really	happening’.	 Sometimes	 these	 forms	 of	 dressing	 up	 would	 be	 labelled	 bluffing,	particularly	 if	 they	 involved	 flashy	 clothes.	 People	 often	 spent	 large	 amounts	 of	money	on	these	occasions	–	in	fact	there	was	a	strong	obligation	to	do	so	–	and	this	kind	of	spending	was	not	typically	questioned	as	problematic	or	wasteful.		Significantly,	most	bluffing	was	performed	outside	these	occasions,	during	day-to-day	 life.	 Indeed,	 the	 bluff	 entailed	 treating	 the	 ‘everyday’	 as	 though	 it	 was	 an	‘event’.	It	involved	spending	money	on	display,	but	not	for	formally	and	collectively	acknowledged	 reasons	 such	 as	 a	 wedding	 or	 a	 funeral.	 Thus	 the	 bluff	 became	dangerously	potent.	The	bluff	gained	visibility	not	simply	through	refusal	to	‘dress	up’	 for	 the	 right	 occasions,	 therefore	 bypassing	 and	 undermining	 established	family	hierarchies,	but	by	exploiting	the	value	of	dressing	up	in	the	framework	of	the	 ‘everyday’	 frame.	 This	 inverted	 the	 proper	 ritual	 order	 between	 heightened	moments	of	ritual	and	normal	life,	and	was	thus	regarded	as	rebellious.				Yet	 the	 bluff	 may	 have	 penetrated	 deeper	 than	 this,	 redefining	 not	 only	 the	positions	of	young	people	in	social	and	family	structures,	but	the	very	mechanics	of	these	structures.	As	many	of	my	interlocutors	told	me,	marriage	itself	has	become	a	‘bluff’	in	Freetown	today,	a	key	part	of	‘false	life’.	This	was	memorably	explained	to	me	by	Mohammed,	a	 city	 council	worker	 for	whom	Alhassan	was	 temporarily	driving	while	his	car	was	being	fixed.	We	were	sitting	in	the	garage	chatting,	across	from	the	carcass-like	chassis	of	a	yellow	Hummer,	still	relatively	shiny,	but	without	wheels	 or	 an	 engine,	 that	 had	 seemingly	 been	 abandoned	 in	 the	 garage.	 No-one	was	working	 on	 it,	 and	 it	 did	 not	 look	 as	 though	 it	would	 be	 repaired	 any	 time	
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soon.	This	sparked	a	conversation	about	 ‘maintenance’	and	bluffing,	which	got	to	the	heart	of	the	‘false	life’	criticism.	Mohammed	said	that	‘Life	is	at	levels.	I	want	to	build	 a	 house,	 have	 money,	 buy	 a	 fine	 car,	 but	 maintenance	 is	 the	 key.	 Like	 in	marriage,	if	marriage	was	a	one-off	payment	then	everyone	would	be	married,	but	maintenance	is	the	issue’.	By	this	he	meant	that	achieving	the	next	level	makes	no	sense	unless	you	can	maintain	at	that	 level.	The	person	who	bought	the	hummer	had	enough	for	the	purchase	but	not	enough	to	keep	it	running,	and	so	the	whole	thing	 was	 lost.	 This	 reminded	 me	 of	 many	 cases	 I	 heard	 about	 where	 married	couples	 spent	all	 the	money	collected	 from	relatives	and	 friends	on	 the	wedding	ceremony	and	reception,	leaving	none	to	maintain	their	new	household.	Unlike	the	Krio	 in	 Cohen’s	 study,	 where	 ceremonies	 were	 key	 to	 the	 long-term	 material	security	of	their	participants,	it	is	often	the	case	now	that	a	ceremony	can	mask,	or	even	jeopardize,	the	long-term	material	(in)security	of	the	couple	in	question.			The	modern	imperative	in	Freetown	for	large	weddings	ceremonies,	often	named	‘white	 weddings’,	 is	 opposed	 to	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 local	 customary	 or	 ‘country’	marriage	that	centred	on	an	‘engagement’	ceremony	at	which	the	bride	price	was	paid	and	symbolic	goods	exchanged	between	families.	The	‘white	wedding’,	which	would	normally	 follow	 this	 in	a	church	or	mosque,	and	 then	a	 reception	hall,	 far	outweighed	 the	 cost	of	 the	bridge	price,8	even	 though	 locally	 it	was	 seen	 to	hold	less	significance	 legally	(in	a	customary	sense).	What	made	the	marriage	binding	was	 the	 agreement	 and	 exchange	 between	 families,	while	 the	 ‘white	wedding’,	 I	was	 often	 told,	was	 a	 celebration	 and	means	 of	 blessing	 the	marriage.	 Yet	 those	who	 wanted	 to	 get	 married	 faced	 enormous	 social	 pressure,	 and	 potential	 for	stigma	and	resentment,	if	the	‘white	wedding’	was	not	performed	at	a	satisfactory	scale9.		In	 this	 light,	 then,	 ‘bluffing’	 in	 the	 everyday	underscores	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	everyday	 is	 a	 significant	 arena	 in	 itself,	 disconnected	 from	 and	 in	 some	 ways																																																									8	In	one	wedding	of	a	close	friend,	the	bride	price	was	about	1/25th	of	the	total	cost	of	the	wedding	9	Responses	to	the	prohibitive	expected	costs	of	weddings	have	become	a	major	topic	of	scholarship	on	Africa	in	a	variety	of	contexts	(James	2014,	Janson	2013,	Masquelier	2005,	Solway	2016).	
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threatened	 by	 lifecycle	 ritual	 –	 the	 opposite	 of	 Cohen’s	 observations	 among	 the	Krio	 in	 the	 1970s.	 This	 reveals	 the	 precariousness	 of	 the	 lives	 of	 many	 young	people	 today,	 when	 the	 established	means	 through	which	 social	 transformation	takes	place	 in	relation	to	the	home	and	lifecycle	are	no	 longer	achievable.	This	 is	not	just	because	many	people	cannot	afford	to	marry,	but	because	marriage	itself	becomes	a	‘bluff’	and	devoid	of	long-term	meaning	when	it	cannot	be	backed	up	by	a	 level	 of	material	 security,	 or	 ‘maintenance’.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	 ‘bluff’	 can	be	read	as	a	‘fantasy’	of	social	mobility	and	transformation	that	masks	a	true	reality	in	which	 the	 ‘bluffers’	 do	 not	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 engage	 in	 more	 enduring	transformations,	 and	 are	 still	 dependents.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 bluff	 draws	attention	to	the	fantastical	nature	of	marriage	itself	as	a	means	for	transformation.			
Conclusion		In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 have	 analysed	 the	 practice	 of	 bluffing,	 a	 defining	 consumption	practice	for	young	people	in	Freetown	that	is	mirrored	across	the	continent.	While	the	bluff	is	steeped	in	far-reaching	symbolism,	especially	for	those	who	look	to	the	‘more	developed’	world	 for	 their	own	personal	development,	 I	 have	 situated	 the	practice	 in	 the	Freetown	context.	 I	have	charted	 the	ways	 that	bluffing	builds	on	established	practices	in	the	city	–	historically	associated	with	the	Krio	–	but	is	now	associated	with	recent	migrants	to	Freetown,	or	their	descendants,	most	of	whom	are	 young	 and	 unestablished.	 While	 a	 simplistic	 reading	 of	 the	 activity	 might	dismiss	 it	 as	 wasteful	 and	 uneconomical,	 I	 have	 demonstrated	 the	 ways	 that	 it	holds	social	and	economic	efficacy	in	this	rather	different	Freetown	context,	even	as	 risks	 reproducing	 the	 marginality	 experienced	 by	 many	 of	 the	 city’s	 young	inhabitants.	.			The	 ultimate	 power	 of	 the	 bluff	 lies	 in	 its	 ambiguity.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	 is	 a	rebellious,	 anti-authoritarian	 act,	 in	 which	 young	 people	 favour	 personal	transformation	 over	 participation	 in	 established	 family	 structures.	 On	 the	 other	hand,	the	bluff	represents	a	complex	strategy	in	which	young	people’s	positions	in	these	 structures	 are	 reconfigured,	 and	 at	 times	 even	 strengthened.	 On	 another	level,	 the	 bluff	 demonstrates	 the	 broad	 desire	 of	 young	 people	 to	 escape	 the	
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structures	and	predicaments	that	constrain	them,	even	as	they	try	to	work	within	them.	 This	 might	 be	 interpreted	 at	 the	 level	 of	 place:	 bluffing,	 oriented	 to	 the	‘beyond’,	 is	 a	 call	 to	 escape	 Freetown,	 while	 still	 being	 an	 established	 way	 of	becoming	embedded	in	the	city.	Either	way,	the	bluff	ensures	that	the	marginality	experienced	 by	 young	 people	 is	 not	 simply	 imposed	 from	 without;	 rather,	 the	young	people	themselves	become	architects	of	their	own	identities.			As	highlighted	by	 the	preoccupations	of	Alhassan	and	many	others,	 the	bluff	 is	a	‘mask’	that	reveals	as	much	as	 it	conceals.	The	concept	of	the	bluff	and	 ‘false	 life’	offer	 a	 powerful	 commentary	 on	 the	 status	 of	 young	 people	 and	 social	reproduction	 in	 Freetown	 today.	 In	 this	 commentary,	 the	 bluff	 has	 come	 to	redefine	 the	 form	and	 structures	 through	which	 social	 reproduction	 takes	 place,	and	 the	 lay	 of	 the	 land	 in	 a	 city	 whose	 defining	 characteristics	 are	 the	pervasiveness	 of	 economic	 informality	 and	 impermanence.	 This	 became	 clear	when	 a	 major	 highway	 construction	 project	 on	 the	 peninsula,	 undertaken	 by	Chinese	 contractors	 hired	 by	 the	 state,	 became	 popularly	 labelled	 ‘cosmetic	development’,	 reflecting	 the	widely	held	assumption	 that	 the	 road,	while	 looking	good	now,	would	not	last.			This	chapter	builds	on	a	central	 line	of	argument	 throughout	 the	 first	half	of	 the	thesis,	 through	 further	 highlighting	 the	 ways	 that	 social	 mobility	 ambiguously	occurs	 through	 often	 unspoken	 and	 everyday	 negotiations	 of	 the	 terms	 of	relationships,	 centring	 around	 the	 family	 and	 neighbourhood,	 and	 taking	 place	around,	broadly	speaking,	economic	activity.	 	The	next	chapter	begins	the	second	half	of	the	thesis,	in	which	those	we	have	met	in	the	opening	chapters	experience	life	 during	 the	 Ebola	 crisis.	 	 	What	 we	 see	 is,	 in	many	ways,	 a	 shift	 from	 social	mobility	taking	place	in	the	‘everyday’	to	taking	place	around	the	collective	‘event’,	as	life-course	ritual	becomes	reignited	with	new	and	old	meanings,	and	prioritised.	This	then	leads	to	new	directions	in	thinking	about	‘crisis’.			
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Chapter	5.	‘Black’	and	‘White’	Death:	Burials	during	Ebola		In	 2014-15	 screens	 around	 the	 globe	 were	 inundated	 with	 images	 of	 Sierra	Leoneans	in	full	body	protective	suits	and	masks,	carrying	corpses	on	stretchers	to	be	buried	–	scenes	resembling	an	apocalyptic	science	fiction	film.	These	were	the	front-line	troops	deployed	to	defeat	Ebola,	a	‘mysterious’	and	deadly	virus	with	no	known	cure	that	emerged	from	the	depths	of	the	rainforest	borderland	of	Guinea,	Sierra	 Leone,	 and	 Liberia.	 The	 virus	 is	 thought	 to	 have	 entered	 Sierra	 Leone	following	the	May	2014	funeral	of	a	traditional	healer,	who	had	been	working	with	Ebola	victims	 from	Guinea.	Ebola	would	go	on	to	claim	the	 lives	of	close	to	4000	Sierra	 Leoneans.	 Ebola	 captured	 the	world’s	 imagination	with	 nightmarish	 fears	that	 it	 would	 spread	 like	 the	 plague.	 The	 result	 was	 an	 intense	 and	 expensive	intervention	 involving	 scores	 of	 international	 governmental	 and	 non-governmental	organizations.	A	state	of	emergency	was	declared	in	Sierra	Leone	on	30th	 July	 2014,	 followed	 by	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 National	 Ebola	 Response	Centre,	headed	by	the	Minister	of	Defence.			For	many	months	after	the	initial	outbreak,	Ebola	felt	oddly	distant.	Yet	there	was	a	powerful	and	familiar	sense	of	 foreboding.	The	civil	war	had	emerged	from	the	same	region	in	the	east	of	the	country,	eventually	hitting	Freetown	to	devastating	effect.	 In	 July	 2014,	 the	 first	 cases	 of	 the	 virus	were	 reported	 in	 the	 capital	 city.	‘Ebola’	 was	 deadly	 yet	 ambiguous.	 Its	 symptoms	 closely	 resembled	 those	 of	familiar	 diseases,	 such	 as	 malaria.	 In	 my	 neighbourhood	 several	 possible	 Ebola	cases	were	 identified,	 leading	to	 the	quarantining	of	 their	 family	households.	But	they	were	contested	by	many	residents,	not	least	because	the	virus	did	not	spread	in	Congo	Town.	However,	 the	 increasingly	onerous	measures	enforced	under	 the	state	 of	 emergency	were	 felt	 by	 everyone.	 School	 and	 colleges	were	 shut	 down.	Gatherings	of	over	ten	people,	travel,	and	business	activity	were	highly	restricted.	There	 were	 daily	 curfews	 at	 6pm,	 and	 regular	 ‘lockdowns’	 lasting	 several	 days.	Getting	by	during	 these	hard	 times	entailed	accepting	and	negotiating	new	 laws,	procedures,	 bureaucratic	 structures,	 and	 dangers,	 and	 reconciling	 them	 with	established	practices	and	routines	of	social	 life	and	death.	When	people	 in	Sierra	
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Leone	 spoke	 of	 ‘Ebola’,	 they	 were	 often	 referring	 not	 to	 the	 virus,	 but	 to	 these	challenges.			Since	 the	 corpses	of	Ebola	victims	are	highly	 contagious,	 there	was	 considerable	risk	 of	 transmission	 during	 funerals,	 through	 ritual	 body	 washing	 and	 contact	between	mourners.	 Not	 surprisingly,	 then,	 burial	 was	 perhaps	 the	 heaviest	 and	highest	profile	arena	of	regulation.	Regardless	of	the	Ebola	status	of	the	deceased,	all	burials	were	to	be	performed	by	official	teams	at	designated	cemeteries.	During	the	 early	 stages	 of	 the	 outbreak,	 bodies	 were	 left	 in	 the	 street	 and	 mortuaries	overflowed.	In	response,	burial	teams	were	established,	staffed	primarily	by	young	men	working	under	the	auspices	of	the	Ministry	of	Health	and	international	NGOs.	The	 teams	 were	 trained	 and	 equipped	 to	 perform	 all	 burials	 according	 to	 an	unfamiliar,	 bureaucratically-informed	 biomedical	 paradigm	 featuring	 clinical	management	 and	 strict	 procedures	 oriented	 towards	 safety	 and	 efficiency.	 This	soon	 presented	 a	 new	 challenge,	 accentuated	 by	 the	 pressing	 social	 obligations	that	 surround	 death	 in	 Sierra	 Leone:	 the	 speed	 and	 efficiency	 of	 these	 burials	interfered	with	 the	enactment	of	customary	rituals.	 It	was	 in	relation	 to	deaths	 -	the	majority	of	which	were	not	caused	by	the	virus	during	the	Ebola	crisis	-	that	I	most	often	heard	reflections	on	Ebola's	cruelty	and	the	suffering	it	caused.	While,	as	mentioned	in	the	previous	chapters,	attitudes	to	 life-course	ritual	have	shifted	in	character,	it	is	notable	that	burials	remained	a	particular	pressing	arena	of	social	obligation	 and	 significance;	 while	 flexibility	 is	 often	 demonstrable,	 such	 shifts	appear	 more	 contentious	 and	 more	 heavily	 reflexively	 analysed.	 Burial	 teams	made	 significant	 efforts	 to	 allow	 for	 local	 cultural	 practices	 and	 enable	 some	flexibility.	 Yet	 still	 some	 people	 tried	 to	 avoid	 these	 regulations	 altogether,	choosing	 to	 perform	 illegal	 ‘secret’	 burials,	 in	 co-ordination	 with	 established	authorities	 such	as	 the	police,	 city	 council	 and	military	 (as	opposed	 to	 the	novel	burial	teams),	though	still	at	risk	of	a	hefty	punishment.		The	 difficulties	 Ebola	 imposed	 on	 performing	 ritual	 invites	 reflection	 on	 the	relationship	 between	 the	 enactment	 of	 funerary	 rites	 and	 the	 continuity	 or	disruption	 of	 social	 order.	 In	 Sophocles’	 Antigone,	 the	 protagonist	 attempts	illegally	 to	perform	an	honourable	burial	 for	her	brother	 -	 the	disgraced	 loser	of	
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Thebes’	 civil	 war	 -	 against	 the	 orders	 of	 her	 uncle,	 King	 Creon.	 The	 ensuing	disorder	 is	 characterized	 as	 a	 disease,	 tragically	 wiping	 out	 Creon’s	 family,	 and	threatening	 social	 order	 at	 large:	 ‘the	 entire	 city	 is	 gripped	 by	 a	 violent	 disease’	(Sophocles,	 Antigone	 II.114).	 Anthropological	 analysis	 of	 ‘good’	 death,	 following	Hertz’s	(1960	[1909])	Durkheimian	analysis	of	second	burials,	has	emphasized	the	close	 relationship	 between	 the	 performance	 of	 proper	 post-death	 ritual	 and	 the	maintenance	and	 reproduction	of	 social	 order.	This	 is	 achieved	 through	exerting	ritual	 order	 in	 the	 face	 of	 abrupt	 and	 unpredictable	 biological	 death,	 and	harnessing	 the	 regenerative	 potential	 of	 ritual	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	 loss	 of	individuals	 by	 reinstallation	 in	 the	 collective	 consciousness	 (Bloch	 and	 Parry	1982).			Many	have	questioned	the	neat	conceptual	relationship	between	‘good’	death	and	social	order.	Just	as	it	is	problematic	to	attribute	discrete	beginnings	and	endings	to	 funerary	 ritual,	 so	 is	 it	problematic	 to	assume	 that	 they	can	restore	 full	 social	order	 (Seremetakis	1991:48).	 Studies	have	emphasized	 that,	while	African	death	presents	a	seemingly	greater	unravelling	of	the	social	fabric	than	death	in	the	more	individualized	West,	 the	 outcome	 is	 often	 not	 ‘regeneration	 of	 life’	 in	 a	 cohesive	sense.	 Rather	 funerary	 practices	 become	 sites	 of	 contestation	 and	 negotiation	between	 competing	 social	 and	 religious	 groups	 and	 authorities	 (De	Boeck	 2009,	Posel	and	Gupta	2009,	Smith	2004,	de	Witte	2001),	 serving	as	occasions	 ‘for	 the	(re)production	 and	 the	 (un)making	 of	 both	 solidarities	 and	 hierarchies,	 both	alliances	 and	 conflicts’	 (Jindra	 and	Noret	 2011:2).	 Funerary	practices,	 and	 social	orders,	 are	 far	 from	 static	 and	 singular	 on	 the	 continent.	 Significant	 shifts,	including	greater	diversity	 in	 form,	have	been	 linked	 to	 the	processes	of	colonial	and	 post-colonial	 political	 economy,	 the	 influence	 of	 Islam	 and	 Christianity,	urbanization,	 migration,	 technological	 development,	 and	 notably	 the	 AIDS	pandemic	 (Chabal	 and	 Daloz	 1999,	 Geschiere	 2005,	 Henderson	 2011,	 Lamont	2011,	Meyer	2004,	Page	2007,	Peel	2000,	Ranger	2011,	van	der	Geest	2006).	What	social	order	is	re-established	after	death	in	contexts	with	turbulent	histories,	and	what	part	do	funerary	practices	play?			
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Funerary	 ritual	 and	 social	 order	 appear	 particularly	 interdependent	 during	periods	 of	 social	 unrest	 and	 disorder.	 In	 war-time,	 for	 example,	 practical	challenges	 arise	 in	 relation	 to	 the	performance	of	burial	 rites,	 and	 in	 reconciling	‘mass	 death’	 with	 existing	 categories	 of	 death	 (Kwon	 2006).	 Yet	 burials	 can	 be	powerful	 mechanisms	 for	 establishing	 new	 orders.	 Funerary	 rituals	 and	memorialisation	practices	are	propitious	sites	for	political	claims	made	during	or	after	 periods	 of	 upheaval.	 Dead	 bodies	 are	 powerful	 symbols	 of	 historical	 depth	and	continuity	(Hallam	&	Hockey	2001),	yet,	lacking	their	own	‘voice’,	are	ripe	for	manipulation	in	the	service	of	political	claims	and	narrative	construction	(Verdery	1999),	and	for	propagating	illusions	of	permanence	and	stability	(Scheele	2006).		During	 the	Ebola	 crisis,	 the	 regulation	 and	 transformation	of	mortuary	practices	were	 principle	 aims	 of	 the	 international	 response	 rather	 than	 merely	 collateral	challenges.	 Burials	 constituted	 a	 defining	 experience	 of	 life	 under	 the	 state	 of	emergency.	 They	 brought	 to	 the	 fore	 the	 core	 social	 conflict	 of	 the	 Ebola	 crisis:	local	 beliefs	 and	 practices	 versus	 international	 ones.	 This	 tension	 has	 been	highlighted	in	studies	of	the	Ebola	crisis.	Fairhead	(2016)	emphasizes	the	dramatic	breakdown	 of	 fragile	 ‘social	 accommodations’	 between	 ‘cultures’,	 recalling	 a	violent	 regional	 history.	 Richards	 (2016)	 shows	 how	 the	 adaptability	 and	ingenuity	of	local	culture,	particularly	at	the	rural	village	level,	was	undermined	by	the	 international	 response,	 which	 chose	 not	 to	 support	 local	 responses	 and	acknowledge	their	complex	workings.	This	tension	is	seen	to	have	encouraged	the	breakdown	of	multiple	forms	of	‘trust’	(Anoko	2014,	Brown	2016,	Le	Marcis	2015).	Despite	community	engagement	initiatives	and	some	use	of	ethnographic	insights	in	 the	 response,	 ‘local’	 culture	 was	 widely	 framed	 as	 an	 inconvenient	 and	backward	obstacle	to	the	elimination	of	the	virus.			Little	detailed	anthropological	attention	has	so	far	been	paid,	however,	to	how	this	conflict	was	understood	on	the	ground,	or	to	the	complex	ways	in	which	it	played	out,	 especially	 for	 the	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 Sierra	 Leoneans	 who	 did	 not	encounter	 the	 virus	 directly,	 but	 whose	 lives	 and	 deaths	 were	 nonetheless	 hit	heavily	 by	 ‘Ebola’.	 This	 chapter	 explores	 how	 burials	 became	 the	 sites	 in	which	crisis	and	disorder	were	most	acutely	experienced	and	evident,	yet	around	which	
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new	 social	 orders,	 practices,	 and	 hierarchies	 were	 forwarded	 and	 reconfigured.	Such	 processes	 involved	 complex	 compromise,	 adaptation,	 and	 negotiations	among	a	variety	of	 actors	and	authorities,	 established	and	novel,	who	 in	 shifting	ways	represented	alternately	official	and	local	responses.			In	Freetown,	the	conflict	between	state	of	emergency	protocols	and	existing	local	practices	was	coded	 in	 the	racial	 language	of	 ‘black’	and	 ‘white’.	These	terms	are	quotidian	 reference	 points	 in	 Freetown,	 representing	 primary,	 yet	 complex,	categories	 through	 which	 cultural	 norms,	 values,	 and	 practices	 are	 understood.	During	 the	 crisis	 these	 categories	 were	 both	 destabilized	 and	 yet	 took	 on	heightened	explanatory	value.	Broadly	speaking,	the	 ‘Ebola’	burials	performed	by	the	burial	 teams	constituted	 ‘white’	death,	 in	which	all	bodies	were	to	be	treated	equally	 and	 burials	 performed	 efficiently	 and	 safely.	 Opposed	 to	 this	 was	customary	burial,	or	 ‘black’	death,	in	which	burial	practices	vary	according	to	the	status	and	religion	of	the	deceased,	and	in	which	the	proper	enactment	of	funerary	ritual	 is	 a	 pressing	 social	 and	 religious	 obligation.	 Temporal	 flexibility	 and	improvisation	 are	 often	 key	 to	 the	 performance	 of	 rituals	 in	 Freetown’s	unpredictable	 environment.	 Yet	 although	 ‘secret’	 burials	 were	 more	 aligned	 to	‘black’	 death,	 the	 boundaries	 between	 the	 categories	 were	 blurred	 and	 porous.	‘Secret’	 burials	 were	 more	 private	 than	 most	 Freetown	 burials,	 and	 required	extensive	 bureaucratic	 navigation	 along	 paths	 different	 than	 those	 established	during	the	state	of	emergency,	incorporating	some	safety	protocols.	In	the	case	of	the	 burial	 team,	 the	 face	 of	 the	 ‘white’	 system	 was	 not	 white	 foreigners,	 but	primarily	 young	 black	 Sierra	 Leonean	 men	 who,	 as	 formally	 employed	‘gatekeepers’	of	the	state	of	emergency,	experienced	a	rare	opportunity	for	social	mobility.			In	Sierra	Leone,	these	racial	categories	recall	a	 long	history	of	violent	 integration	into	 the	 Atlantic	 World.	 Beginning	 in	 the	 early	 sixteenth	 century,	 Sierra	 Leone	became	a	major	 site	of	 extraction	 for	 slaves	 sent	 to	 the	Americas.	 Freetown	was	established	 in	 1792	by	 immigrant	 ‘free	 persons	 of	 colour’	 and	 ‘black	 Londoners’	after	 the	 British	 ban	 on	 the	 international	 slave	 trade,	 although	 slavery	 within	Sierra	 Leone	 was	 only	 outlawed	 in	 1928	 (Lovejoy	 &	 Schwarz	 2015).	 The	
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descendants	of	these	founders,	who	were	joined	by	waves	of	recaptive	slaves	and	migrating	black	British	colonial	subjects,	became	known	as	the	Krio,	discussed	in	the	 previous	 chapter.	 The	 Krio	 as	 an	 ethnic	 group	 came	 to	 be	 seen	 as	simultaneously	 and	 alternately	 ‘black’	 –	 through	 their	 historic	 link	 to	 slavery,	diaspora,	and	colonial	racism	–	and	‘white’	–	through	their	sometimes	elite	status	in	Freetown,	secured	through	identification	with	British	imperial	 institutions	and	culture;	including	the	dressing-up	practices	discussed	in	chapter	4.	While	the	Krio	positioned	 themselves	 as	 ‘interpreters	 of	 Western	 culture	 to	 other	 Africans’	(Harris	 2013:13),	 through	which	 their	 elite	 status	 in	 the	 colonial	 administration	was	 at	 times	 secured,	 such	 positions	 equally	 led	 to	 racist	 resentment	 by	 white	authorities.	While	the	Krio,	as	already	mentioned,	are	now	a	minority	in	Freetown,	their	history	is	key	both	to	the	formation	of	non-essentialized	local	understandings	of	 race,	 and	 in	 providing	 an	 enduring	 model	 of	 brokerage,	 mediation,	 and	transformation	between	 ‘black’	and	 ‘white’,	which	became	starkly	evident	during	the	Ebola	crisis	for	a	variety	of	actors,	as	this	chapter	will	go	on	to	illustrate.			This	chapter	examines	the	ways	in	which	Freetown's	history	came	dramatically	to	life	during	the	Ebola	crisis,	when	residents	were	yet	again	 faced	with	reconciling	conflicting	 cultural	 paradigms,	 this	 time	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 epidemic	 and	powerful	international	intervention.	Around	burials,	characterized	as	an	‘arena	of	social	contestation,	a	space	where	heterogeneous	and	antagonistic	cultural	codes	and	 social	 interests	 meet	 and	 tangle’	 (Seremetakis	 1991:15),	 racial	 categories,	ritual	 practices,	 and	 understandings	 and	performances	 of	 ‘order’	 took	 on	 hybrid	forms.	 ‘Black’	 and	 ‘white’	 notions	 of	 ‘order’	 were	 simultaneously	 distinct	 and	opposed	–	particularly	as	idealized	references	–	yet	in	‘practice’	overlapping	and	at	times	complementary,	thus	representing	a	locally	meaningful	framework	through	which	the	crisis	was	understood,	experienced,	and	negotiated.		
	
Obligations	and	obstacles			On	the	afternoon	of	the	6th	of	August	2015,	I	received	a	text	message	from	James,	my	close	friend	and	the	oldest	son	in	the	family	I	lived	with	in	Congo	Town.			
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Anty	Marie’s	condition	is	bad	she	has	been	admitted	at	the	hospital	in	the	isolation	ward	at	cottage		Marie,	a	charismatic	and	worldly	woman	in	her	late	30s,	was	James’s	step-mother’s	sister.	She	had	come	to	 live	with	us	a	few	months	earlier,	after	her	marriage	to	a	German	citizen	of	Sierra	Leonean	origin,	with	whom	she	had	become	pregnant.	She	was	preparing	to	 join	her	husband,	referred	to	as	 ‘the	German’,	 in	Europe;	a	task	complicated	by	the	Ebola	crisis;	Freetown's	German	consulate	had	stopped	issuing	visas.	 For	 Marie,	 the	 obstacles	 she	 faced	 reflected	 not	 only	 the	 stretching	 of	bureaucratic	channels	by	the	regional	and	global	crisis	of	Ebola,	but	also	jealousies	among	her	extended	family	and	neighbours	in	Freetown.	As	she	explained	to	me,	‘You	know	black	people,	we	have	black	mind’.	 It	was	because	of	 these	 jealousies	that	she	had	moved	from	the	house	where	she	had	been	 living	to	stay	with	us	 in	the	 family	 compound	 of	 her	 sister,	 Rachel.	 Marie	 had	 been	 unwell	 for	 several	weeks.	While	her	illness	did	not	seem	serious,	it	was	persistent.	Helped	by	Rachel,	Marie	 sought	 medical	 attention,	 but	 their	 efforts	 were	 fruitless.	 Finally	 she	collapsed	and	was	taken	to	the	Cottage	hospital	in	Freetown's	old	Fourah	Bay	area.	The	city’s	medical	system	was	overstretched	by	Ebola;	many	patients	were	either	refused	 admission,	 or	 resisted	 going	 for	 fear	 of	 being	 (mis)diagnosed	 as	 Ebola	positive.	A	 few	hours	 after	 James	 sent	his	 text	message,	he	 called	 to	 tell	me	 that	Marie	had	died	in	hospital.		I	 went	 straight	 to	 the	 hospital,	 feeling	 that	 it	 was	 expected	 of	 me;	 I	 had	 often	observed	 the	 importance	 of	 friends	 and	 family	 ‘coming	 close’	 at	 times	 of	 crisis,	such	as	after	Human	Right’s	accident	on	his	bike.	I	met	James,	his	uncle	(an	elder	in	the	family	compound),	his	cousin,	his	step-brother,	and	a	neighbour	who	worked	as	a	 technician	 in	 the	hospital.	The	group	was	attempting	 to	make	arrangements	for	Marie's	burial.	Their	efforts	centred	on	gaining	access	to	the	body	so	that	they	could	perform	the	burial	themselves;	this	was	illegal	under	the	state	of	emergency.	Regardless	of	the	deceased’s	Ebola	status,	all	burials	during	the	state	of	emergency	were	to	be	performed	by	official	teams	at	the	NGO-managed	Waterloo	Cemetery	in	Eastern	 Freetown,	 established	 to	 bury	 the	 city’s	 dead	 during	 the	 time	 of	 Ebola.	Consultations	with	the	mortuary	staff	made	it	clear	that	illegal	access	to	the	body	
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in	 order	 to	 perform	 a	 ‘secret’	 burial	 -	 still	 common	 for	 families	 with	 the	 right	connections	and	able	 to	make	sufficient	payments	 -	was	out	of	 the	question.	The	body	was	still	in	the	isolation	ward	and	therefore	difficult	to	access,	especially	after	a	recent	dispute	between	the	medical	and	mortuary	staff	over	the	distribution	of	payments.		We	returned	to	 the	hospital	 the	next	morning.	The	test	results	were	negative	 for	both	Ebola	and	Malaria.	There	were	 further	negotiations	with	hospital	 staff	over	whether	Marie's	body	could	be	dressed	and	perfumed	before	the	burial	team	took	her.	A	family	friend	and	former	nurse	at	the	hospital	had	volunteered	to	perform	this	 duty,	 dressed	 in	 Personal	 Protective	 Equipment	 (PPE).	 The	 request	 was	refused	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 the	 ‘white	 doctors	would	 not	 allow	 it’.	 Instead,	 the	body	was	put	into	a	standardized	body	bag,	carried	to	the	white	jeep	used	by	the	burial	team	to	transport	corpses,	and	taken	to	the	Waterloo	Cemetery		We	arrived	at	 the	cemetery	before	 the	 team	(they	had	other	bodies	 to	collect	on	the	way),	Hundreds	of	mourners	were	waiting	to	witness	burials.	When	our	team	came,	 we	 were	 called	 into	 the	 cemetery	 by	 a	 young	 man	 wearing	 tinted	 blue	sunglasses	and	a	tight	matching	vest	and	shorts	made	of	‘africana’	fabric.	He	looked	as	though	he	had	stepped	out	of	an	Afrobeat	music	video,	but	was	responsible	for	the	 challenging	 task	 of	 co-ordinating	 the	 mourners,	 burial	 teams,	 and	 cemetery	staff.	The	young	men	in	the	team,	some	of	whom	I	recognized	from	my	research,	lowered	 the	 body	 into	 the	 pre-dug	 plot	 assigned	 to	Marie.	 Taylor,	Marie’s	 elder	brother,	had	bought	a	wooden	mesh,	which	was	placed	over	the	body	bag	(there	had	been	no	time	to	make	a	coffin)	so	that	dirt	was	not	cast	disrespectfully	directly	onto	 the	 ‘naked’	body.	After	a	 short	negotiation	with	 the	burial	 team	supervisor,	the	body	bag	was	opened	so	that	the	family	could	take	one	last	look	at	Marie’s	face.	Marie’s	twin	brother,	a	filmmaker	by	trade,	was	recording	the	proceedings	closely,	partly	 for	Marie’s	husband	 in	Germany.	The	8	or	 so	mourners	huddled	 together,	taking	photos	on	their	smart	phones.	With	no	pastor	available,	and	uncertain	how	to	proceed	in	this	unfamiliar	and	unusually	institutionalized	environment,	James,	a	chef	 by	 profession,	 spontaneously	 took	 the	 lead.	 He	 recited	 the	 Lord’s	 Prayer,	stoically	declaring,	in	the	manner	of	a	cleric	at	the	graveside,	that	‘God	marks	our	
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time	 to	 die	 for	 a	 purpose	 that	we	 don’t	 know	 or	 understand’.	 A	metal	 sign	was	erected	with	Marie’s	personal	details,	including	the	plot	number,	to	make	it	easier	for	the	family	to	locate	the	grave	in	future.			When	we	got	back	to	the	compound,	Marie’s	sister,	Rachel,	served	us	large	plates	of	groundnut	soup	with	fish	and	rice,	which	she	had	prepared	for	those	who	would	come	to	tel	osh,	share	their	sympathies.	The	people	who	had	been	at	the	cemetery	reported	what	they	had	witnessed.	They	spoke	of	the	horror	and	cruelty	of	Ebola:	long	 rows	of	 freshly	dug	graves;	 the	arrival	of	 the	burial	 team	with	13	bodies	 (a	figure	regularly	quoted	in	the	compound	in	the	coming	weeks),	all	children	apart	from	Marie;	and,	perhaps	most	powerfully,	the	grave	of	a	young	woman	which	was	being	filled	in	with	no	mourners	present.	James	admitted	that	this	was	what	finally	brought	him	to	tears.	At	the	same	time,	their	reports	sounded	notes	of	admiration.	The	 orderly	 running	 of	 the	 cemetery,	 involving	 independent	 co-ordination	between	grave	diggers	and	the	burial	team	(without	family	involvement),	and	the	measured	 neatness	 in	 the	 arrangement	 of	 plots,	 were	 by	 turn	 unfamiliar	 and	impressive.	Taylor,	Marie	and	Rachel’s	older	brother,	presented	Rachel	with	a	bag	containing	the	white	shawl	and	perfume	he	had	bought	in	the	hope	of	being	able	to	dress	Marie.	This	served	as	the	necessary	evidence	that	he	had	tried	his	hardest	to	bury	their	sister	according	to	established	norms.			Rachel	reflected	later	that	‘Ebola	means	that	you	don’t	feel	it	when	somebody	dies,	they	do	it	[the	burial]	so	quickly,	but	then	you	will	sit	down	and	remember	them,	imagine	about	them’.	This	profound	comment	seemed	to	crystallise	the	‘cruelty’	of	Ebola,	when	the	pressing	and	emotionally	charged	obligations	surrounding	death	became	 entangled	 with	 the	 imposing	 presence	 of	 the	 novel	 biomedical	 order	honed	 to	 eliminate	 the	 virus.	 The	 immediacy	 of	 the	 Ebola	 crisis,	 and	 present-oriented	pressures	to	‘fight’	against	it,	were	difficult	to	square	with	the	‘enduring’	feeling	 of	 obligations	 surrounding	 ‘good’	 death	 in	 Sierra	 Leone,	 in	 which	 the	deceased's	 eternal	 fate	 lay	 in	 the	 balance	 (Little	 1954,	 Richards	 2015,	 Spencer	2015).	 When,	 soon	 after	 hearing	 that	 Marie	 had	 died,	 James's	 cousin	 asked	fearfully	 whether	 she	might	 have	 had	 Ebola,	 he	 was	 sharply	 criticized	 by	 other	family	members	 for	 expressing	 self-concern	 at	 an	 inappropriate	 time.	 It	was	not	
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that	 the	 risk	 of	 catching	 Ebola	 was	 not	 taken	 seriously	 –	 many	 of	 those	 in	 the	compound	were	 taking	precautions	against	 it	 and	were	 critical	 of	 those	who	did	not	–	but	that	fear	of	infection	was	considered	temporary	and	individual	compared	to	the	obligations	that	arose	from	the	death	of	a	close	family	member	or	friend.	As	a	friend	put	it,	‘In	Sierra	Leone	we	care	about	the	person	more	once	they	have	died	than	when	they	are	alive’.			There	was	a	powerful	atmosphere	of	unresolved	anxiety	 in	 the	compound	 in	 the	weeks	 after	 Marie's	 death,	 reflecting	 the	 ‘incompleteness’	 of	 her	 life	 –	 her	pregnancy	and	planned	migration	to	Europe	–	and	the	uncertainty	about	the	cause	of	her	death.	This	was	compounded	by	the	 ‘incompleteness’	of	the	funerary	rites.	Burial	teams	were	tasked	with	performing	burials	on	the	same	day	that	the	body	was	 collected,	 which	 created	 significant	 time	 pressures	 for	 mourners.	 Muslim	burials	 in	 Freetown	 are	 typically	 performed	 soon	 after	 the	 death,	 following	 the	ritual	washing	and	wrapping	of	the	body	in	a	lapa	(sheet),	and	a	procession	from	the	local	mosque	or	house	of	the	deceased	to	the	cemetery.	Christian	burials	often	take	place	weeks	after	the	death,	leaving	time	to	prepare	a	coffin,	kasanka	(special	clothes	for	the	corpse),	badges	with	pictures	of	the	deceased,	personalized	service	booklets,	 and	 food	and	drink.	A	wekin	 (vigil)	 is	usually	held	 the	night	before	 the	burial,	 followed	 by	 a	 church	 service	 in	 the	 morning	 and	 a	 procession	 to	 the	cemetery,	often	involving	uniformed	bands.	At	times,	bodies	are	transported	from	Freetown	 to	 natal	 villages	 for	 burial	 in	 family	 plots	 alongside	 (prominent)	ancestors.	Restrictions	on	gatherings	made	Muslim	memorial	 services	–	 typically	on	 the	 1st,	 3rd,	 4th,	 and	 40th	 days	 after	 the	 death	 –	 challenging	 to	 perform.	 The	handling	 of	 corpses	 was	 prohibited	 for	 risk	 of	 infection,	 and	 this	 precluded	 the	ritual	 washing	 of	 bodies,	 performed	 at	 home	 or	 in	 mortuaries,	 as	 well	 as	 the	ceremonies	 conducted	 by	 ‘secret	 societies’	 (initiation	 societies)	 after	 their	members	pass	away.		In	 Sierra	 Leone,	 the	 treatment	 of	 the	 dead	 –	 including	 those	 responsible	 for	performing	key	tasks	and	manner	and	locations	in	which	burials	are	performed	–	are	closely	connected	to	the	status	of	the	deceased.	Burials	are	key	means	through	which	 claims	 to	 land	 are	 made,	 especially	 in	 rural	 contexts,	 and	 it	 is	 through	
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respectable	 burial	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 elders	 that	 the	 link	 between	 the	 ancestors	and	 the	 living	 is	maintained,	 and	 blessings	 for	 the	 community	 secured	 (Jackson	1977,	 MacCormack	 1984).	 Funerals	 and	 memorial	 services	 are	 also	 important	opportunities	for	family	meetings,	at	which	disputes	are	voiced	and	settled	in	the	presence	 of	 elders	 and	 stakeholders.	 Negotiations	 often	 included	 the	 care	 of	dependants	 of	 the	 deceased	 and	 distribution	 of	 the	 deceased	 property.	 Burial	teams,	however,	were	 trained	 to	be	blind	 to	 the	status	of	 the	deceased	and	 their	families,	ensuring	the	use	of	the	same	body	bags,	the	same	cemetery,	and	the	same	treatment	for	all.	Thus	Ebola	was	seen	to	present	a	greater	challenge	in	some	cases	than	in	others.			This	 did	 not,	 however,	 preclude	 adaptation,	 often	 improvised	 on	 the	 ground.	Marie’s	 mourners’	 attempted	 to	 negotiate	 certain	 allowances	 at	 the	 Waterloo	cemetery,	 and	 afterwards	 in	 the	 arrangements	 for	memorialisation.	 Immediately	after	her	burial,	Marie’s	family	started	planning	a	memorial	service	–	adapted	from	Muslim	’40	days’	ceremony	–	which	would	be	less	hampered	by	regulation	than	the	burial,	 allowing	 the	 family	 to	mark	Marie’s	 death	 in	 a	more	 fitting	manner.	 For	several	weeks	 after	 the	death,	 ‘the	German’	 had	been	uncommunicative,	 and	did	not	 readily	 contribute	 to	 expenses	 that	 the	 family	 were	 incurring.	 During	 this	period	 rumours,	 albeit	 hotly	 debated	 and	 contested,	 circulated	 in	 the	neighbourhood	 and	 beyond	 that	 ‘the	 German’	 had	 visited	 Freetown	 every	 few	years,	 each	 time	 becoming	 attached	 to	 women	 who	 died	 soon	 after.	 In	 these	narratives	he	was	transformed	from	a	well-meaning	‘white’	European	citizen	who	could	 help	 the	 family,	 to	 a	 ‘black’	 ritualist	 (someone	 who	 uses	 witchcraft	 to	sacrifice	others	for	personal	profit).			The	difficulties	surrounding	Marie’s	burial	did	not	render	it	meaningless	or	void	of	‘order’,	 even	 if	 a	 ‘good’	 death,	 as	 customarily	 measured,	 was	 not	 achieved.	 The	burial	 was	 rather	 performed	 according	 to	 the	 protocols	 of	 an	 all-encompassing	bureaucratic	 system,	which	dictated	 that	every	person	who	died,	whether	or	not	they	were	among	the	close	to	4000	Sierra	Leoneans	who	succumbed	to	Ebola,	was	buried	as	if	they	had	contracted	the	virus.	Although	Marie	tested	negative,	she	was	nevertheless	buried	as	if	she	had	Ebola,	and	thus	became	a	victim	of	‘mass	death’.	
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Instead	 of	 a	 family	 plot	 or	 a	 local	 cemetery,	 where	 her	 body	 would	 have	 been	interred	alongside	 family	or	community	members	of	previous	generations,	Marie	was	buried	among	people	who	had	in	common	only	that	they	had	died	during	the	time	of	Ebola.	The	number	assigned	by	the	burial	team	indicated	statistically,	and	spatially	 in	 the	 neat	 rows	 of	 the	 recently	 established	Waterloo	 cemetery,	where	Marie	 fell	 in	 this	 ‘mass	death’.	The	 ‘community’	 in	which	she	was	buried	did	not	mirror	the	one	in	which	she	had	lived,	but	rather	the	time	and	circumstances	of	her	death.	 The	 alternating	 expressions	 of	 praise	 and	 horror	 I	 heard	 from	my	 fellow	mourners	at	 the	cemetery	reflected	the	recognition	of	 the	foreign	and	temporary	‘order’	of	the	state	of	emergency,	and,	at	the	same	time,	the	awareness	that	it	was	a	form	of	 ‘disorder’	–	an	obstacle	 to	 the	 typical,	albeit	varied,	ways	of	dealing	with	death	in	Sierra	Leone.		Since	Marie	died	in	hospital,	her	family	had	no	choice	but	to	work	with	the	Ebola	authorities.	 In	many	 other	 cases,	 families	 simply	 failed	 to	 report	 a	 death	 to	 the	burial	 teams,	 preferring	 to	 perform	 burials	 themselves.	 Although	 referred	 to	 as	‘secret	burials’,	prohibited	under	the	state	of	emergency	and	punishable	by	heavy	fines	and	arrest,	these	funerals	were	not	inevitably	deemed	‘illegal’;	they	resulted	from	 negotiations	 with	 established	 bureaucratic	 and	 legal	 structures	 that	 were	often	 perceived	 to	 carry	 more	 weight	 than	 new	 Ebola	 authorities.	 The	 ‘secret	burials’	 too	were	 highly	 structured,	with	 built-in	 –	 though	 far	 from	watertight	 –	safety	 measures.	 By	 means	 of	 permission,	 assistance,	 and	 documentation	 from	authorities	 such	 as	 the	 Freetown	 City	 Council	 (who	 issued	 Ebola-free	 death	certificates),	 the	 police	 and	 their	 post-mortem	 teams	 (who	 often	 administered	their	own	Ebola	tests),	mortuary	workers,	ambulance	drivers,	and	the	military,	 it	was	possible	 for	mourners	 to	perform	burials	 themselves,	at	places	and	 times	of	their	 own	 choosing.	 Negotiating	 with	 these	 gatekeepers	 typically	 required	 large	payments	 (roughly	 US$400)	 or	 high-level	 connections,	 so	 they	were	 undertaken	primarily,	 though	 not	 exclusively,	 when	 people	 of	 high	 status	 died.	 In	 my	neighbourhood,	 local	 representatives	 of	 the	 City	 Council	 became	 experts	 in	managing	 ‘secret	 burials’;	 management	 of	 the	 local	 cemetery	 was	 already	 a	primary	task.	Their	most	prominent	project,	conceived	before	but	executed	during	and	 after	 the	 crisis,	was	 erecting	 a	wall	 around	 the	 cemetery,	 in	 part	 to	prevent	
	 147	
street	youth	from	congregating	there.	Their	authority	and	their	connections	to	the	city’s	 existing	 bureaucratic	 institutions,	 the	 local	 community	 and	 the	 cemetery,	meant	that	Council	members	were	well	positioned	to	broker	‘secret’	burials.			While	 the	 burial	 teams	 were	 criticized	 for	 performing	 burials	 too	 hastily,	 the	'secret'	alternatives	could	be	too	slow.	In	June	2015,	I	attended	the	burial	of	Rachel,	a	nurse,	and	prominent	member	of	a	local	Pentecostal	church	in	Congo	Town,	who	had	reportedly	tested	negative	for	Ebola.	Her	body	was	being	kept	in	the	mortuary	of	 a	 military	 hospital	 not	 too	 far	 away.	 Her	 husband,	 a	 teacher	 in	 a	 local	 girl’s	school,	had	planned	to	perform	the	burial	the	previous	day,	when	a	large	number	of	mourners	had	gathered	at	the	hospital	for	a	service,	but	he	was	unable	to	secure	all	the	necessary	documentation	in	time.	The	next	day,	after	receiving	permission	and	making	arrangements	with	Council	representatives	for	the	grave	to	be	dug	in	the	local	cemetery,	Rachel's	body	was	transported,	effectively	in	disguise,	from	the	mortuary	 to	 the	 cemetery	 gates	 in	 an	 ambulance,	 with	 military	 personnel	accompanying	 as	 an	 extra	 security	 measure.	 The	 Christian	 practice	 of	 a	 wekin	(vigil)	the	night	before	the	burial	at	the	house	of	the	deceased	was	abandoned,	and	–	 inverting	 the	usual	practice	–	 a	 church	 service	was	performed	after	 the	burial,	without	the	body	present.	Some	local	young	men	volunteered	to	carry	the	coffin	to	the	grave,	after	purposefully	donning	the	disposable	blue	medical	gloves	that	were	handed	as	 an	Ebola-inspired	 safety	precaution.	The	ambulance	hurriedly	 left	 the	scene.	 As	 the	 body	was	 lowered	 into	 the	 ground,	 uniformed	 girls	 from	 Rachel's	husband’s	 school	 sang	 a	 hymn.	 Before	 they	 had	 finished,	 the	 volunteers	 had	already	 begun	 helping	 the	 regular	 cemetery	 gravediggers	 to	 fill	 in	 the	 grave,	hoping	to	speed	up	the	job.	As	the	crowd	–	mostly	dressed	in	black	and	white	–	was	dispersing,	a	local	fixer	collected	money	to	tip	gravediggers	and	cemetery	staff.	The	remaining	mourners	 stood	by,	 carefully	observing	 the	 filling	 in	of	 the	grave,	 and	the	collecting	and	counting	of	the	money.	In	the	heat	of	the	midday	sun,	it	occurred	to	 me	 that	 the	 gravediggers,	 volunteers,	 and	 witnesses	 were	 performing	 two	stressful	 tasks:	 burying	 a	 loved	 one,	 and	 ‘burying	 the	 evidence’.	 The	 burial	 was	improvised	and	hybrid:	informed	by	‘enduring’	obligations	of	customary	funerary	obligations,	 yet	 adapted	 with	 respectful	 reference	 to	 the	 biomedical	 norms	
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introduced	 by	 burial	 teams,	 as	well	 as	 genuine	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 risks	 of	infection	and	punishment	for	illegal	burial.			
‘Safe	and	dignified	burials’		The	 regulation	 of	 burials,	 deemed	 key	 sites	 of	 Ebola	 transmission,	 was	 a	 top	priority	in	the	Ebola	response.	The	Ministry	of	Health	and	NGO-run	burials	teams	were	mobilized	 to	 perform	all	 burials	 at	 official	 cemeteries.	 As	 a	 friend	 told	me,	‘now	 if	anyone	 is	 sick	 they	 treat	 it	 like	Ebola’.	For	home	deaths,	 family	members	were	 required	 to	 call	 ‘117’,	 an	 emergency	 service	 that	would	 co-ordinate	with	 a	burial	 team	 stationed	 in	 the	 vicinity	 to	 collect	 the	 body	 within	 24	 hours.	 If	 the	death	occurred	in	a	medical	facility,	as	with	Marie,	staff	would	co-ordinate	with	the	team.	Freetown	was	divided	into	4	bases,	with	about	20	teams	serving	the	city.	The	teams	 were	 initially	 managed	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health	 and	 Sanitation,	 but	 in	October	2014,	many	of	 the	 responsibilities	 of	managing,	 recruiting,	 training,	 and	funding	were	handed	over	to	NGOs.		Each	 burial	 team	 had	 12	 members	 with	 a	 variety	 of	 roles:	 drivers,	 stretcher-bearers,	chlorine	sprayers,	navigators,	and	a	team	supervisor,	although	roles	were	often	interchanged	informally	on	the	ground.	They	operated	two	white	jeeps,	one	for	 the	 personnel	 and	 equipment,	 and	 one	 for	 the	 bodies.	 The	 teams	 consisted	primarily	 of	 young	men,	 from	 various	 Sierra	 Leonean	 tribes,	 in	 their	 20s;	 team	supervisors	were	sometimes	older.	Formally,	all	members	of	 the	 team	were	paid	the	 same	 rate	 (roughly	 US$100	 per	 week),	 regardless	 of	 role.	 A	 separate	government-run	 documentation	 and	 swab	 team	 followed	 the	 burial	 team	 on	motorbikes;	their	responsibility	was	to	conduct	Ebola	tests	on	the	corpses,	which	would	be	processed	within	42	hours,	and	to	collect	data	concerning	the	deceased	and	 surviving	 family,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 illness,	 and	 the	 reported	 cause	 of	 death.	Since	burials	were	performed	before	the	result	of	the	Ebola	test	was	processed,	the	body	was	handled	only	by	trained	specialists	who	would	dress	in	a	new	set	of	PPE	for	 each	 body	 collected,	 and	 were	 sprayed	 with	 chlorine	 immediately	 after	 the	body	 had	 been	 placed	 in	 the	 jeep.	 If	 the	 result	 was	 positive,	 a	 separate	 team,	including	members	of	the	police,	quarantined	for	21	days	(the	incubation	period	of	
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the	virus)	the	house	where	the	person	had	died.	Initially,	in	the	latter	part	of	2014,	burial	teams	were	faced	with	a	backlog	of	cases,	and	bodies	were	regularly	left	in	streets.	 By	 early	 2015,	 after	 more	 funding,	 training,	 and	 new	 management,	 the	burial	 teams	 became	 proficient	 at	 performing	 their	 duties	 ‘like	 clockwork’,	according	to	the	expatriate	manager	at	the	Irish	NGO	responsible	for	managing	the	burial	 team	 I	 followed.	 The	 team	 supervisor,	 a	 sweet	 fatherly	 figure,	 told	 me	proudly	that	no	burial	team	members	had	died	of	Ebola	in	Freetown.		
	
Figure	8	Members	of	a	burial	team	getting	prepared	to	pick	up	a	body		The	 burial	 teams	made	 admirable	 efforts	 to	 perform	 ‘safe	 and	 dignified	 burials’	(their	 slogan)	 in	 consultation	 with	 mourners.	 They	 attempted	 to	 give	 family	members	time	to	pray	safely	over	bodies,	they	permitted	up	to	10	mourners	to	be	present	 at	 the	 cemetery	 during	 burials,	 and	 they	 often	 facilitated	 requests	 that	would	 not	 impede	 safety,	 such	 as	 agreeing	 to	 dress	 or	 wrap	 the	 body	 in	 ways	requested	 by	 mourners.	 Burial	 teams	 could	 be	 convinced	 to	 drive	 past	 the	churches	where	 funeral	 services	were	 being	 held	 on	 their	way	 to	 the	 cemetery.	Team	members	 often	 exchanged	private	 telephone	numbers	with	 the	 families	 of	the	 deceased	 to	 facilitate	 mutual	 updates;	 at	 the	 same	 time	 informal	 mediators	from	 the	 community’s	 side	 emerged	 to	 facilitate	 communication	 between	 the	burial	teams	and	mourners.		
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Despite	 these	 efforts,	 the	 burial	 teams	 acquired	 a	 reputation	 for	 being	 hard	 to	negotiate	with.	This	was	 in	part	because	their	members	were	often	 ‘unknown’	to	the	families	of	the	deceased.	Given	the	widespread	practice	of	working	through	or	making	personal	contacts,	 this	 lack	of	 familiarity	challenged	established	methods	of	 dealing	 with	 authorities	 and	 bureaucratic	 entities;	 no	 channels	 or	 sababu	(connections)	were	in	place	to	facilitate	negotiation.	Another	factor	was	that,	once	the	 responsibility	 for	 administering	wages	was	 transferred	 from	 the	Ministry	 of	Health	to	NGOs,	burial	team	members	were	paid	more	reliably	and	at	higher	rates	than	most	had	ever	experienced	before.	They	were	thus	less	open	to	bribery,	and	more	 likely	 to	 stick	 to	 their	 SOP,	 than	other	 officials.	When	 they	were	willing	 to	take	the	risk	of	diverting	from	these	procedures,	it	was	for	members	of	their	own	family	or	community	-	not	necessarily	in	return	for	direct	payment	but	mindful	of	the	obligations	towards	closely	connected	people.	But	this	kind	of	responsiveness	could	 carry	 harsh	 penalties.	 As	 my	 burial	 team	 supervisor	 told	 me	 when	 it	emerged	that	a	colleague	had	illegally	performed	a	burial	in	an	unofficial	cemetery	-	 a	 transgression	 for	which	he	was	ultimately	dismissed	 -	 ‘that’s	 fine	 to	help	 the	community,	 but	 the	 community	 won’t	 pay	 you	 500,000	 Leones	 ($100)	 a	 week’.	Their	tendency	to	be	impervious	to	bribes	and	special	pleading	was	one	source	of	the	popular	antipathy	towards	the	burial	team	and	accusations	of	immorality.			Tensions	surrounding	the	activities	of	the	burial	teams	were	heightened	by	the	fact	that	the	majority	of	members	were	youth,	many	of	whom,	in	the	team	I	followed,	had	 previously	 held	 employment	 as	 bike	 riders,	 some	 attached	 the	 bike	 park	discussed	 in	 chapter	 3.	 Their	marginality	was	 invoked	 by	 complaints	 that	 burial	teams	were	drunk,	high,	disorderly,	or	disrespectfully	dressed.	Management	of	the	dead	by	young	men,	while	potentially	dangerous	and	stigmatizing,	was	equally	an	empowering	 act.	 By	 comparison,	 in	 Kinshasa	 the	 taking	 over	 of	 cemetery	management	 by	 youth	was	 viewed	 as	 a	 radical	 statement	 of	 protest	 against	 the	authority	of	elders,	ancestors,	and	the	state	(De	Boeck	2009:246).	In	this	case	they	were	 also	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	 formal	 employment	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 which	 was	being	used	in	a	variety	of	ways:	saving	money	to	buy	land	and	vehicles,	for	school	or	 college	 fees,	 or	 for	 migration	 programmes;	 investing	 in	 informal	 businesses;	supporting	family	and	friends	through	hard	times;	and	living	‘big’	while	they	good,	
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visibly	 consuming	 imported	 technological	 goods	 and	 flashy	 clothes.	 Employment	conditions	were	also	a	source	of	anxiety;	no-one	knew	when	their	jobs	would	end.	The	country	would	be	declared	Ebola	 free	42	days	after	 the	 last	detected	case	of	Ebola,	 a	 measure	 determined	 by	 the	 World	 Health	 Organisation.	 The	 fact	 that	burial	 team	 members	 were	 benefitting	 from	 ‘Ebola	 money’	 was	 a	 source	 of	criticism.	The	strongest	criticisms,	however,	were	mobilized	against	political	elites	accused	of	siphoning	off	for	personal	use	the	considerable	sums	that	were	entering	the	country,	yet	not	participating	in	the	dirty,	risky	work	on	the	ground.		Following	Durham’s	(2000)	characterisation	of	African	youth	as	‘social	shifters’,	it	seems	 significant	 that	many	 of	 those	 entrusted	 to	 act	 as	mediators	 between	 the	state	of	emergency	and	the	public	during	the	crisis	were	young	men	and	women,	who	 were	 perhaps	 especially	 capable	 of	 juggling	 and	 undergoing	 the	 necessary	transformations	between	numerous	positionalities	–	high	and	low,	and	‘black’	and	‘white’.	 Striking	 transformations	were	 performed	 on	 a	 daily	 basis,	 as	 the	 team's	pristine	white	jeeps	rolled	up	to	the	location	where	a	body	was	to	be	collected,	and	the	stretcher	bearers	and	swab	team	started	donning	fresh	PPE	at	the	back	of	the	jeeps	until	they	were	fully	masked.	They	would	then	perform	the	duties	of	burial	team,	which	included	not	only	collecting	the	body,	but	also,	at	times,	participating	in	Muslim	and	Christian	prayers.	The	body	was	placed	in	one	of	the	vans,	the	PPE	was	removed,	and	the	boys	were	back	on	the	road.	Lively	conversation,	banter,	and	light-hearted	 argument	 resumed	 until	 they	 reached	 the	Waterloo	 cemetery	 that	afternoon,	 the	 PPE	was	 once	 again	 donned,	 and	 bodies	were	 carried	 to	 pre-dug	graves.	 The	 PPE	 facilitated	 their	 transformation	 from	 black	 men	 to	 racially	ambiguous	experts,	masked	in	a	uniform	of	the	 ‘white’	world.	Their	adherence	to	professional	protocol	temporarily	positioned	them	as	‘white’	actors	who	would	not	work	 through	 established	 ‘black’	 networks	 and	 conventions	where	 the	 elite	 and	well-connected	 could	 bend	 the	 rules	 in	 their	 own	 favour.	 Perhaps	 it	 was	 not	coincidental	that	many	used	their	hefty	post-Ebola	redundancy	pay	for	migration	programmes	after	the	crisis	ended.			
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‘Black’	and	‘White’	death			Tensions	 between	 local	 practices	 and	 expectations	 surrounding	 death	 and	 those	imposed	under	 the	state	of	emergency	were	often	 framed	by	my	 interlocutors	 in	terms	of	 ‘black’	and	 ‘white’	–	racial	categories	 through	which	cultural	norms	and	values	are	complexly	coded	 in	Freetown.	The	 ‘black	system’,	also	called	 ‘African’,	referred	 to	 notions	 of	 local	 culture,	while	 the	 ‘white	 system’	 referred	 to	 foreign,	western	 culture.	 In	 the	 ‘white	 system’	 people	 are	 seen	 to	 act	 according	 to	 fixed	principles	and	cannot	be	convinced	to	alter	their	professional	responsibilities.	The	burial	teams	were	formally	trained	to	adhere	to	this	ideal,	which	included	treating	all	 dead	 bodies	 and	 mourning	 families	 the	 same,	 regardless	 of	 age,	 status,	 or	personal	connections.	 In	 the	 ‘black	system’,	by	contrast,	people	are	seen	 to	show	bias	 towards	 some	 over	 others,	 particularly	 their	 ‘own	 people’	 (family,	 friends,	community),	and	sometimes	those	more	senior,	or	those	who	offered	money	that	trumped	 professional	 responsibilities.	 The	 ‘white’	 and	 ‘black’	 systems	 were,	 for	most	 of	 my	 interlocutors,	 both	 positive	 and	 negative,	 often	 depending	 on	 the	positionalities	of	the	actors	involved.	The	‘white	system’	was	at	times	admired	as	principled,	 fair,	 and	 necessary	 for	 ‘development’,	 and	 the	 ‘black’	 as	 backwards,	selfish,	 and	 self-destructive.	 Yet	 at	 other	 times	 the	 alternative	 evaluations	 were	made:	 the	 ‘black	 system’	 indexing	 enduring	 values	 such	 as	 tradition,	 care,	 and	respectability,	 as	 well	 as	 adaptability	 and	 resilience,	 and	 the	 ‘white’	 of	 greater	material	and	temporary	value,	or	(although	rarely	thus	articulated),	as	oppressive	and	 cruel.	 During	 the	 Ebola	 crisis,	 these	 opposing	 moral	 evaluations	 became	starker	than	usual.	The	‘black	system’	was	represented	in	a	dominant	discourse	in	the	 Ebola	 response	 as	 an	 obstacle	 to	 eliminating	 the	 virus.	 As	 the	 burial	 team	supervisor	once	told	me:	 ‘culture	is	the	problem	here’.	Yet	for	many	the	positives	were	just	as	strongly	felt	–	particularly	in	terms	of	traditional	commitments	to	care	and	support	which	were	crucial	during	hard	times.			The	‘black’	and	the	‘white’	categories	represent	contrasting	temporal	orientations,	a	 recurring	 reference	point	 throughout	my	 fieldwork.	 ‘White	 time’	 referenced	an	abstract	ideal	of	events	occurring	in	a	pre-determined	and	predictable	manner	that	was	 often	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 reality	 of	 life	 (and	 death)	 in	 Freetown,	 which	
	 153	
necessitates	operating	in	‘black	time’.	Through	the	‘white’	lens,	this	might	be	seen	as	 ‘being	 late’,	 but	 through	 the	 ‘black’	 lens	 it	 signalled	 adherence	 to	 an	 implicit	sense	of	the	‘right’	time,	which	factored	in	the	juggling	of	social	obligations,	as	well	as	 the	endless	practical	obstacles	–	broken	down	cars,	unavailable	 funds,	sudden	illness	 or	 death	 –	 that	 Freetown	 residents	 routinely	 navigate.	 Burials	 are	 a	heightened	case	of	this,	where	the	temporal	consequences	include	the	‘eternal’	fate	of	the	deceased	and	the	most	‘enduring’	of	social	and	ritual	obligations,	yet	volatile	circumstances	require	flexibility	and	adaptability	‘in	the	moment’.	As	death	in	the	time	 of	 Ebola	 made	 plain,	 the	 clockwork	 of	 ‘white	 time’	 -	 while	 exemplifying	Weberian	bureaucratic	 order	 -	 presented	 a	 form	of	 cruel	 impersonal	 disorder;	 a	metronomic	 punctuality	 opposed	 to	 the	 comforting	 rhythm	 of	 activity	 typically	associated	with	‘good’	death.		Alongside	the	discursive	mobilization	of	the	categories	of	‘black’	and	‘white’	by	my	interlocutors,	 they	 took	 on	 embodied	 forms.	 As	 Fassin	 points	 out,	 ‘The	 body	 is	precisely	 where	 the	 three	 dimensions	 [of	 race]	 are	 articulated:	 the	 violence	 of	racialization	is	exerted,	experienced	and	performed	though	the	body’	(2011:428).	In	Sierra	Leone,	the	body	is	a	primary	site	where	the	country’s	traumatic	history	of	slavery	 holds	 enduring	 meaning,	 in	 day-to-day	 movements	 through	 historically	embedded	landscapes,	and	in	ritual	(Ferme	2001,	Shaw	2002).	Bodily	performance	and	 embodied	 memory	 escapes	 the	 limits	 of	 discourse.	 Not	 only	 are	 they	particularly	suited	to	making	sense	of	violent	and	traumatic	histories,	but	they	also	allow	 for	 flexibility	 and	 ambiguity	 beyond	 what	 is	 discursively	 possible.	 The	centrality	 of	 the	 body	 in	 funerary	 ritual,	 both	 of	 the	 dead	 and	 the	 living,	 may	explain	 why	 burials	 were	 key	 sites	 for	 reconciling	 the	 ‘black’	 and	 the	 ‘white’.	Burials	are	powerful	moments	when	transformations	of	embodied	identities	take	place,	 in	 large	 part	 through	 the	 enactment	 of	 ‘techniques	 of	 the	 body’	 (Mauss	1973),	such	as	the	socially	meaningful	acts	of	washing,	dressing,	and	burying	the	corpse.			With	‘black’	death,	the	body	was	recognized	as	member	of	a	family	and	community.	It	would	both	gain	safe	passage	to	the	world	to	come	through	religiously	informed	ritual	and	receive	a	final	claim	to	status	among	the	living.	‘Secret’	burials	aimed	to	
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achieve	 this	 through	 their	 attempts	 to	 adhere	 to	 existing	 practices	 and	 to	work	with	 established,	 though	 now	 marginalized,	 bureaucratic	 and	 authoritative	channels.	With	‘white’	death,	the	body	was	hazardous	material	requiring	specialist	training	 to	handle	 and	dispose	of	 safely,	 in	 order	 to	protect	 the	 corporeal	world	from	 the	 further	 spread	 of	 Ebola.	 Burials	 performed	 by	 the	 burials	 team	constituted	 the	dead	as	part	of	a	 cruel	 ‘mass’	death,	 in	 large	measure	because	of	their	strict	adherence	 to	uniform,	biomedically	 informed	procedures	 that	 treated	all	the	dead	as	‘Ebola’	victims,	regardless	of	their	cause	of	death.			While	these	categories	referenced	idealized	cultural	practices,	as	well	as	individual	and	collective	identities,	the	boundaries	between	the	‘black’	and	the	‘white’	were	in	practice	 blurred	 and	 shifting,	 in	 part	 because	 of	 their	 embodied	 as	 well	 as	discursive	 character.	 Many	 actors	 in	 the	 ethnography	 transform	 or	 mediate	between	 them,	 taking	 on	 features	 of	 both.	 This	 was	 evident	 in	 the	 daily	transformations	 of	 the	 burial	 team	 described	 above.	 The	 gatekeeper	 of	 the	Waterloo	 cemetery,	 and	 by	 extension	 the	 ‘white’	 system,	 dressed	 not	 in	 the	uniform	of	a	recognizable	official	but	in	the	style	of	a	raray	boy	(street	youth).	The	permanent	hospital	 staff	who	would	not	allow	access	 to	Marie’s	body	because	of	the	 ‘white	 doctors’	 were	 thus	 aligning	 themselves	 with	 ‘white’	 institutional	professionalism	 over	 ‘black’	 influence	 through	 personal	 connections.	 The	 Congo	Town	representatives	of	 the	city	council	brokered	 ‘secret’	burials,	 similar	 to	pre-Ebola	burials	but	adapted	for	the	crisis.	Perhaps	even	‘the	German’,	the	gatekeeper	of	 the	 connection	 to	 Europe	 of	 Marie	 and	 her	 family,	 was	 transformed	 from	 a	‘white’	European	 to	a	 ‘black’	 representative	of	Freetown’s	 illicit	underworld.	The	balancing	 of	 ‘white’	 and	 ‘black’	 systems	 is	 required	 to	 varying	 degrees	 of	 all	Freetown	residents	on	a	daily	basis.	During	this	period	of	crisis	and	the	resulting	international	stranglehold,	however,	the	‘black’	and	‘white’	were	more	in	evidence	and	more	volatile	than	usual.		Transformation	 and	mediation	between	 ambiguous	 racial	 categories	 have	 a	 long	precedent	in	the	region’s	violent	integration	into	the	Atlantic	system,	and	notably	in	Freetown	among	the	Krio,	the	decedents	of	the	city’s	freed-slave	founders.	Shaw	has	convincingly	demonstrated	that	the	historic	transformations	and	upheavals	of	
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slavery	resonate	to	the	present	day:	‘the	development	of	a	landscape	of	terror	and	capture;	the	exchange	of	commodified	people	for	important	money	and	goods;	and	the	growth	of	new	kinds	of	 leaders	whose	power	and	wealth	were	derived	 from	this	exchange’	 (2002:11).	Freetown	has	 continued	 to	 serve	as	an	unstable	global	hub	in	the	post-colonial	period,	where	the	balancing	of	‘black’	and	‘white’	systems	is	 of	 continued	 significance.	 The	 civil	 war	 saw	 the	 rise	 of	 NGOs,	 humanitarian	interventions,	 and	 international	 peace-building	 initiatives,	 along	 with	 the	proliferation	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 development	 discourses.	 Yet	 rather	 than	eliminating	 distinctions	 between	 the	 ‘black’	 and	 the	 ‘white’,	 as	 universalist	discourses	might	 be	 expected	 to	 do,	 these	 categories	 have	 in	 some	 senses	 been	pitted	against	each	other.	Benton	has	argued	that	humanitarianism	in	Sierra	Leone	reinforces	 racialized	 non-equivalence	 in	 the	 valuations	 of	 human	 life	 (Benton	2016).	Other	analyses	have	highlighted	the	ways	that	human	rights	discourses	can	become	 locally	 meaningful	 in	 ways	 antithetical	 to	 what	 was	 intended	 by	 the	international	 organizations	 that	 promote	 the	 discourse	 (Ferme	 and	 Hoffman	2004),	in	some	cases	facilitating	the	resurgence	of	local	‘ritual	knowledge’	over	the	hegemony	 of	 Western	 education	 in	 the	 context	 of	 economic	 failures	 (Shaw	2002:23).			Analyses	 of	 the	Ebola	 crisis	 have	 similarly	highlighted	 the	 conflict	 between	 local	culture	and	foreign	norms	(Fairhead	2016),	or	have	shown	how	local	culture	was	largely	neglected	by	the	 international	response	(Richards	2016),	 thus	reinforcing	rather	than	blurring	the	fault-line	between	the	two.	Taking	into	consideration	how	this	 conflict	 was	 locally	 framed	 and	 enacted	 with	 reference	 to	 the	 ‘black’	 and	‘white’	categories,	I	suggest	that	the	Ebola	crisis	was	on	the	one	hand	understood	as	a	clash	between	two	distinct	cultural	systems	or	social	‘orders’,	but	that	on	the	other	hand,	hybridity,	brokerage,	and	creative	movement	between	these	systems	was	both	possible	and	 locally	meaningful,	 albeit	 far	 from	symmetrically	 so	given	the	sizeable	muscle	and	coercive	potential	of	the	well-funded	state	of	emergency.	For	example,	the	burial	teams,	which	aimed	to	facilitate	‘dignified’	burials,	formally	incorporated	 customary	 ritual	 into	 their	 procedures,	 alongside	 some	 degree	 of	informal	 flexibility	 and	 accommodation	 on	 the	 ground.	 Equally,	 ‘secret’	 burials	became	 much	 more	 bureaucratically	 informed	 than	 usual,	 incorporated	 safety	
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protocols,	 and	were	often	performed	more	quickly	 and	 in	 a	 lower	key	 than	 they	might	usually	have	been.			Recognition	 of	 both	 categories,	 and	 brokerage	 between	 them,	 are	 long-standing	mechanisms	for	forwarding	political	claims	in	Sierra	Leone.	Death	and	burials	are	key	 moments	 when	 statuses	 and	 hierarchies	 are	 destabilized	 and	 constructed,	which	were	in	a	particular	state	of	flux	during	the	crisis.	As	Hallam	et	al.	point	out:	‘The	 body	 in	 death	 highlights	 the	 passage	 of	 time,	 the	 inevitability	 of	 physical	transformation,	and	thereby	acts	as	a	powerful	reminder	that	the	self	is	subject	to	change’	(1999:4).	This	chapter	has	highlighted	how	such	claims	to	status	became	subsumed	within	 the	 larger	social	and	symbolic	orders	of	 the	 ‘black’	and	 ‘white’,	both	of	which	were	reignited	with	potential	for	making	claims	during	the	period	of	national	crisis.	Their	low	status	as	youth	enabled	burial	team	members	to	promote	themselves	as	gatekeepers	of	 the	 ‘white’	system	in	which	established	hierarchies	and	preferential	treatment	were	eroded	by	a	powerful	human	rights	discourse	that	demanded	 the	 equal	 treatment	 of	 all	 bodies.	 Such	 claims	 had	 the	 backing	 of	 the	state	 of	 emergency.	 ‘Secret’	 burials,	 facilitated	 by	 established	 connections	 and	resources	that	higher-status	families	were	able	to	mobilize,	allowed	the	authority	of	 the	 ‘black’	 system	 to	 trump	 the	 novel	 laws	 and	 protocols	 of	 the	 state	 of	emergency.		
	
Conclusion			In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 described	 burial	 practices	 during	 the	Ebola	 crisis,	which	 I	have	suggested	is	revealing	of	 local	experiences	and	responses	to	crisis,	 in	which	life	 course	 ritual	 was	 central,	 and	 in	 which	 young	 men	 played	 a	 major	 role.		Equally,	burials	during	Ebola	are	revealing	of	the	relationship	between	‘good’	and	‘bad’	 death	 and	 social	 ‘order’	 and	 ‘disorder’,	 that	 has	 defined	 anthropological	discussion	on	the	topic.	They	suggest	that	they	are	indeed	related,	which	becomes	particularly	 clear	 during	 times	 of	 crisis	 and	 disorder.	 During	 Ebola,	 their	relationship	 could	 not	 have	 been	 more	 overt:	 the	 regulation	 of	 burials	 was	 a	principle	 concern	 of	 the	 international	 response,	 and	 challenges	 surrounding	funerary	 rites	were	 a	defining	 experience	of	 the	 crisis	 for	 Freetown	 residents.	 It	
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was	 through	 imposed	 ‘Ebola’	 burials	 that	 the	 ‘disorder’	 of	 the	 Ebola	 virus	 was	contained,	 yet	 it	 was	 those	 same	 practices	 that	 constituted	 those	 who	 received	them	-	a	far	greater	number	than	those	who	died	of	the	virus	–	as	part	of	the	‘mass	death’	of	Ebola.	Significantly,	however,	Freetown	residents	were	not	working	with	a	singular	notion	of	‘order’	or	‘disorder’,	but	drawing	on	the	two	registers	of	‘black’	and	 ‘white’.	 It	 was	 not	 simply	 that	 ‘white’	 order	 represented	 disorder	 in	 local	understandings,	although	the	conflict	was	acknowledged	 in	 this	 language;	rather,	both	simultaneously	represented	 ‘order’	and	 ‘disorder’	 for	 local	residents.	Buried	beneath	 these	 normative	 tensions	was	 a	 conflict	 between,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	new	 authorities	 and	 protocols	 of	 the	 state	 of	 emergency,	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	established	 authorities,	 connections,	 and	 bureaucratic	 channels.	 Navigating	 this	disjuncture	became	a	key	characteristic	of	living	through	the	crisis,	which	came	to	the	 fore	when	 pressing	 obligations,	 such	 as	 those	 surrounding,	 death,	 came	 into	play.	The	continuity	of	social	life,	through	the	performance	of	on-going	practices	in	negotiation	with	 familiar	authorities,	 social	networks,	 and	 temporal	expectations	had	 to	 be	 reconciled	 with	 the	 dangers	 of	 Ebola	 and	 the	 novel	 regulations	 and	structures	of	the	state	of	emergency.			These	challenges,	however,	were	not	entirely	unfamiliar.	Securing	 ‘good’	death	 is	never	 straightforward	 in	 Sierra	 Leone’s	 unpredictable	 and	 volatile	 environment,	where	flexibility	in	the	performance	of	ritual	is	a	necessity.	Securing	a	‘good’	life	is	an	 even	 greater	 challenge.	 By	 virtue	 of	 the	 close-knit	 nature	 of	 family	 and	community	life,	not	to	mention	widespread	material	scarcity	and	lack	of	adequate	medical	facilities,	death	is	always	close	at	hand.	Tensions,	conflict,	and	controversy	are	often	present	at	 funerals,	along	with	the	recognition	that	things	might	not	go	according	 to	 plan.	 Equally,	 Sierra	 Leone's	 long	 history	 of	 reconciling	 ‘black’	 and	‘white’	 is	 a	 source	 of	 considerable	 scope	 for	 the	 fluidity,	 hybridity	 and	 creative	brokerage	through	which	new	orders	were	forwarded.	Ebola	did	not	introduce	the	racial	coding	of	‘culture’,	but	triggered	a	highly	developed	system	of	classification	that	 is	 a	 constant	 reference	 point	 in	 Freetown.	 Ebola	 did,	 however,	 inject	 these	categories	with	 renewed	meaning	and	potency,	 in	part	because	 the	 categories	of	‘black’	and	 ‘white’	were	so	evidently	 in	dialogue	and	conflict	 in	 ‘real	 time’	during	the	 crisis.	 Burials	 became	 a	 primary	 interface	 between	 Freetown	 residents	 and	
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these	competing	systems,	and	thus	were	both	emblematic	of	the	crisis	at	large	and	reflective	of	the	continuing	challenges	of	life	and	death	in	post-colonial	Africa.			The	 mobilisation	 of	 and	 complex	 fluid	 character	 of	 the	 ‘black’	 and	 ‘white’	categories,	 outlined	 in	 the	 chapter,	 represent	 emic	ways	 through	which	many	of	the	 sets	 of	 social	 tensions	 between	 sets	 of	 expectations	 and	 registers	 discussed	throughout	 the	 thesis	 were	 understood	 and	 articulated.	 	 The	 tensions	 between	‘kinship’	and	 ‘business’	registers	discussed	in	chapter	2	relate	to	these	categories	in	revealing	ways.	As	do	articulations	of	‘formal’	and	‘informal’	economic	registers	discussed	in	chapter	3.	Equally,	the	complex	interplay	between	‘global’	and	‘local’	aesthetic	 styles,	 and	 ‘long-term’	 and	 ‘short-term’,	 in	 chapter	 4,	 map	 onto	 these	racial	 categories,	 each	with	 their	 own	 temporal	 expectations	 and	 implications	 in	status	 formation.	 In	 many	 instances	 these	 oppositions	 share	 an	 idealised,	 often	discursive	 form,	with	 a	 reality	 that	 is	much	more	 fluid,	 embodied,	 and	mutually	constituting.	 The	 nature	 of	 this	 interplay,	 I	 suggest,	 is	 very	 important	 in	understanding	how	family	and	intimate	politics	entail	very	careful	management	of	what	 is	 ‘said’	 and	 what	 is	 ‘done’.	 These	 interrelations	 return	 in	 chapter	 7,	 and	finally	in	the	conclusion	in	a	more	explicit	discussion	of	their	relationships	and	the	broader	 analytical	 significance	 of	 it.	 This	 chapter	 additionally	 outlines	 the	 ways	that	 the	Ebola	 crisis	 entailed	 great	 attention	 and	 contestation	 around	 life-course	ritual,	around	which	young	men	occupied	central	roles.	This	is	much	less	present	in	 the	 first	 three	 chapters,	 in	 which	 the	 ‘everyday’	 is	 the	 dominant	 arena	 of	sociality	and	social	mobility	for	young	men.		This	point	is	reinforced	further	in	the	next	chapter,	where	we	examine	the	events	surrounding	another	life-course	ritual,	a	 baby	 naming	 ceremony.	 	 The	 productive	 relationship	 between	 social	reproduction	according	 to	 a	 life-course	model	 and	 crisis	 –	 a	 central	 argument	of	the	thesis	–	is	thus	further	explored.			
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Chapter	 6.	 Life-course	 ritual	 and	 the	 realigning	 of	 intimacies	
during	Ebola		It	was	the	evening	of	May	17th,	2015,	in	Congo	Town.	The	state	of	emergency	had	been	 in	 effect	 for	 almost	 a	 year.	 A	 weariness	 surrounding	 the	 Ebola	 crisis	 was	taking	hold	in	the	capital.	The	city	had	witnessed	a	steep	rise	in	cases	in	late	2014	and	early	2015,	when	new	clusters	of	cases	were	popping	up	regularly	in	different	neighbourhoods.	This	created	a	degree	of	panic;	it	was	hard	to	predict	where	and	when	a	new	case	would	emerge.	By	now,	however,	the	rate	of	Ebola	transmission	was	on	the	way	down.	Every	evening	there	was	an	announcement	of	the	number	and	location	of	new	cases	and	the	number	of	deaths	countrywide.	I	had	listened	to	the	 announcement	 with	 some	 neighbours	 who	 had	 gathered	 for	 an	 ad-hoc	‘bachelor’s	eve’	celebration;	one	of	the	group	was	getting	married	the	next	day.	At	that	 point,	 several	 days	had	passed	with	no	new	 cases	 identified	 locally,	 but	 the	daily	 announcement	 brought	 the	 unwelcome	 news	 of	 a	 handful	 of	 new	 cases	upcountry.	The	state	of	emergency	–	through	which	hosts	of	stringent	regulations	had	been	implemented,	most	notably	travel	restrictions,	curfews,	and	lockdowns	–	was	set	to	be	lifted	after	42	hours	had	elapsed	with	no	new	cases	coming	to	light.	This	measure,	established	by	the	World	Health	Organisation,	amounted	to	double	the	21-day	incubation	period	of	the	Ebola	virus.	The	clock	had	been	reset.			The	party	was	taking	place	on	a	much	smaller	scale	than	might	normally	have	been	expected.	 Gatherings	 of	 more	 than	 ten	 people	 were	 illegal	 under	 the	 state	 of	emergency,	but	by	now	the	common	practice	of	bribing	 the	police	had	become	a	standard	way	of	 bypassing	 this	 law.	But	 the	 groom,	 like	many	others	during	 the	crisis,	was	extremely	short	of	money.	Our	neighbours	had	made	a	collection	for	a	crate	 of	 locally	 brewed	 Guinness.	 Someone	who	worked	 for	 the	 National	 Power	Authority	 had	 used	 his	 influence	 to	 secure	 electricity	 for	 our	 area	 –	 never	 a	certainty	and	often	a	rarity	–	so	we	would	have	 light	and	could	dance	to	an	RnB,	Afrobeat,	and	Reggae	playlist	put	together	by	James,	described	in	chapter	2	and	5.	James,	 usually	 the	 first	 to	 dance	 and	 crack	 a	 joke,	was	 uncharacteristically	 quiet	and	 contemplative,	 sitting	 by	 himself	 on	 the	 veranda.	 Another	 neighbour	explained,	‘James	is	feeling	the	effects	of	Rachel	being	close	to	giving	birth’.		
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	Rachel	and	James,	a	couple	in	their	mid-20s	had	been	together	for	about	two	years,	and	 Rachel	 had	 become	 pregnant	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 2014,	 shortly	 after	 the	declaration	of	the	state	of	emergency.	She	was	studying	business	management	and	finance	at	college,	but	 the	college	had	been	closed	until	 further	notice	during	the	Ebola	 crisis.	 Rachel	 also	 ran	 several	 informal	 businesses,	 including	 an	 esusu	(rotating	credit	association)	among	mostly	female	market	traders,	and	a	very	small	store	selling	household	goods	that	she	had	set	up	in	partnership	with	James.	James	had	been	out	of	work	since	September	2014,	when	the	restaurant	he	worked	for	stopped	operating	because	of	the	crisis.			Our	 neighbour	 was	 right.	 As	 James	 and	 I	 arrived	 back	 at	 his	 family	 compound,	Rachel	 was	 sitting	 on	 the	 veranda	 of	 the	 house	 belonging	 to	 James’s	 uncle	 and	auntie,	Samuel	and	Jane.	The	two	of	them	were	both	standing	close	by,	alongside	two	of	Rachel’s	close	female	friends	from	the	neighbourhood.	Rachel	was	in	severe	pain,	and	her	feet	were	very	swollen,	meaning	that	she	could	barely	walk	without	assistance.	 A	 few	 hours	 earlier,	 she	 had	 gone	 to	 the	 NGO-run	 maternity	 clinic	where	she	had	registered	earlier	in	her	pregnancy,	but	they	told	her	that	she	was	not	 close	 enough	 to	delivering	 and	 sent	her	home.	 James	 suggested	 going	 to	 the	Connaught	hospital	–	one	of	Freetown’s	main	hospitals	–	but	this	idea	was	rejected.	Rachel	had	attempted	to	enrol	in	its	maternity	ward	several	weeks	earlier,	but	had	not	found	the	process	easy;	the	state	hospitals	were	severely	overstretched	during	the	 epidemic,	 and	 were	 also	 deemed	 hotspots	 for	 Ebola	 transmission.	 Instead,	Rachel	and	her	friends	headed	to	Rachel’s	family	compound,	a	few	hundred	meters	down	 a	 steep	 path	 into	 the	 valley,	 where	 her	 mother	 was	 preparing	 for	 a	traditional	sara	(small	ceremony)	that	aimed	to	bring	about	an	auspicious	delivery.	They	had	decided	to	go	to	a	local	mami,	an	old	lady	and	former	nurse,	who	would	deliver	 the	 baby	 at	 her	 home,	 using	 a	 combination	 of	 western	 procedures	 and	customary	methods.	James	and	Jane	were	particularly	unhappy	about	this	option.	James	told	us,	‘they	do	not	have	much	faith	in	that	family,	Christians	do	not	make	
sara’.	 Jane	 agreed:	 ‘we	wait	 for	 God	 to	 intervene’.	 Rachel’s	 family	 were	Muslim,	although	Rachel	had	started	attending	church	with	 James’s	sisters.	 I	asked	 if	God	was	intervening	now,	and	they	laughed.	Samuel	advised	James	against	interfering	
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further:	 ‘this	 is	women’s	 business’.	 The	 tension	 and	uncertainty	weighed	heavily	on	 us	 all,	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 this	was	Rachel’s	 first	 birth.	 According	 to	Auntie	Susan,	‘If	you	have	more	experience	you	can	give	birth	at	home,	but	if	you	panic	you	may	need	a	caesarean	and	they	can’t	be	trusted	to	do	that’.	James	went	to	his	pastor	to	pray	privately	with	him,	as	is	routine	for	fathers	before	childbirth.	On	 Jane’s	 instruction,	and	against	her	husband’s	advice,	we	called	a	 friend	 in	 the	neighbourhood,	a	taxi	driver,	who	drove	Jane	and	me	to	the	mami’s	house	on	the	other	side	of	the	valley,	which	was	experiencing	a	blackout	at	the	time.	The	mami	was	 frail	 and	 it	 seemed	 as	 though	 she	 had	 been	 drinking	 that	 evening.	 From	Rachel’s	swollen	 feet,	 she	had	deduced	that	she	would	require	special	 treatment,	and	 was	 therefore	 was	 prepared	 to	 refer	 her	 to	 the	 formal	medical	 authorities.	Jane	 fetched	Rachel	 from	 inside,	 and	we	walked	her	back	 to	 the	 car,	where	 they	drove	 back	 to	 the	 clinic.	 Rachel	 was	 once	 again	 turned	 away,	 despite	 being	 in	severe	pain	and	feeling	as	though	she	was	ready	to	deliver.	The	following	morning,	a	neighbour	of	Rachel’s	–	who	was	married	to	James’s	adopted	sister	–	took	Rachel	back	to	the	clinic	where	she	was	finally	admitted.	James	was	still	unhappy	to	be	out	of	the	loop.			Later	that	same	day,	James	and	I	met	Rachel	at	the	gates	of	the	clinic,	carrying	their	new-born	baby	boy,	who	would	be	named	Moses.	The	clinic	was	publicized	as	free	for	patients,	but	Rachel	was	forced	to	make	an	informal	payment	before	she	could	be	 discharged,	 just	 as	 she	 had	 made	 a	 similar	 under-the-table	 payment	 to	 be	registered.	We	returned	back	to	the	neighbourhood	with	the	baby,	stopping	first	at	James’s	family	compound,	then	on	to	Rachel’s	compound.	The	neighbours	crowded	around	 the	 baby,	 telling	 the	 couple	 tenki	 (thank	 you).	 The	 baby	was	 taken	 to	 a	room	where	Rachel	and	James	had	arranged	for	him	and	Rachel	to	stay,	near	to	her	family.	Despite	her	earlier	dismissive	comment,	Auntie	Susan	performed	a	sara	of	rubbing	salt	and	leaf	around	the	umbilical	cord	so	that	 it	would	fall	off	 in	3	days,	and	 the	 baby	 was	 washed.	 Food	 was	 served,	 prepared	 by	 Rachel’s	 mother	 and	neighbours.			The	National	Ebola	Response	Centre,	which	comprised	national	and	international	authorities	involved	in	the	large-scale	humanitarian	intervention,	had	introduced	a	
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series	of	rules	and	regulations	that	defined	the	state	of	emergency,	as	outlined	in	the	previous	chapter.	These	rules	and	regulations	threatened	to	put	life	‘on	hold’	as	they	 restricted	 and	undermined	 social	 routines	 and	practices,	 particularly	 in	 the	domestic	 sphere.	 Not	 surprisingly,	 then,	 the	 ‘Ebola’	 state	 of	 emergency	 was	experienced	particularly	intensely	at	moments	of	transition	in	the	lifecycle,	such	as	birth	and	death.	The	state	of	emergency	operated	on	the	basis	that	eliminating	the	spread	of	Ebola	was	an	absolute	priority	shared	by	all,	and	that,	once	this	objective	had	been	achieved,	normal	‘stable’	life	would	continue.		This	assumption,	was,	however,	sharply	opposed	to	the	experience	of	many	people	who	 were	 living	 through	 the	 crisis,	 for	 whom	 biological	 and	 social	 continuity	seemed	more	 crucial	 than	 ever.	 The	 tension	 between	 continuity	 and	 stasis	 was	particularly	 evident	 around	 bodily	 transformations	 such	 as	 illness	 and	 lifecycle	processes,	 exemplified	by	pregnancy	 in	 this	 case.	Rachel’s	pregnancy	was	not	 an	outlier;	 the	 number	 of	 pregnancies	 reportedly	 increased	 significantly	 during	 the	crisis,	 reflecting	 the	 closure	 of	 schools	 and	 widespread	 boredom	 among	 young	people.	 Rachel	 and	 her	 loved	 ones	were	 experiencing	 a	 crisis	 requiring	medical	attention,	yet	established	procedures	and	operations	such	as	those	associated	with	childbirth	were	much	more	challenging	 than	usual.	The	state	hospital	where	 she	had	 initially	 sought	 medical	 attention	 did	 not	 admit	 her,	 and	 the	 NGO	 clinic	 at	which	 she	 had	 enrolled	 was	 overstretched.	 More	 generally,	 the	 higher	 charges	required	 to	use	medical	 facilities	put	 them	out	of	 reach	 for	people	who,	 through	loss	 of	 work,	 were	 harder	 up	 than	 usual.	 Public	 transport	 was	 not	 operating	 at	night,	and	travel	 in	and	out	of	the	city	was	restricted.	All	 these	were	obstacles	to	formal	healthcare.	The	country’s	healthcare	system	was	experiencing	a	huge	influx	of	 money,	 but	 rather	 than	 strengthening	 its	 existing,	 ailing	 infrastructure,	 this	extra	funding	was	directed	towards	Ebola	with	projects	such	as	temporary	Ebola	holding	and	treatment	centres	and	ambulances	dedicated	to	those	suspected	to	be	infected	with	the	virus,	and	its	victims.	All	the	while,	the	country’s	main	maternity	hospital	was	on	the	brink	of	collapse.	A	significant	number	of	the	country’s	doctors	had	 died	 from	 the	 virus,	 and	 there	 were	 crackdowns	 under	 state	 of	 emergency	regulations	on	the	smaller	clinics	and	pharmacies	where	people	typically	went	for	treatment	or	medication.		
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On	top	of	all	this,	perhaps	paradoxically,	there	was	greater	resistance	than	usual	to	using	 formal	 healthcare	 facilities;	 they	were	 now	 seen	 as	 hotspots	 for	 the	 Ebola	virus.	Stories	circulated	of	people	misdiagnosed	as	Ebola	positive	and	admitted	to	isolation	wards	where	 contact	with	 family	was	prohibited,	or	where	 they	 caught	the	 virus	 from	 ‘real’	 Ebola	 victims	 on	 the	 ward.	 More	 sinister	 stories	 reported	nurses	deliberately	 injecting	patients	with	 the	Ebola	virus.	These	stories	built	on	long-standing	 suspicions	 surrounding	 nurses	 as	 witchcraft	 practitioners,	 and	 on	theories	that	Ebola	was	being	spread	intentionally	to	secure	continued	aid	funding,	which	 was	 being	 siphoned	 off	 by	 elites	 and	 others	 for	 personal	 use10.	 Another	reason	 for	 avoiding	 formal	medical	 care	during	 the	 time	of	Ebola	was	 the	 risk	 it	carried	of	stigmatization	within	the	neighbourhood.			In	this	chapter,	I	examine	the	case	study	of	Rachel,	James,	and	their	new-born	baby	Moses,	to	try	to	understand	how	the	Ebola	crisis	affected	attempts	to	start	a	family.	The	chapter	shows	how	the	processes	of	social	and	biological	reproduction	could	not	be	put	‘on	hold’.	On	the	contrary,	they	were	pressing	priorities,	in	part	because	the	 very	 networks	 and	 relationships	 that	 are	 established	 and	maintained	 in	 the	process	of	family	formation	are	at	the	same	time	key	to	day-to-day	survival	during	times	 of	 crisis.	 Yet	 these	 challenges	 surrounding	 pregnancy,	 birth,	 and	 social	reproduction	 in	 a	 time	 of	 Ebola	 were	 not	 always	 radically	 different	 from	 those	faced	 in	 ‘normal’	 circumstances	 in	 Freetown,	 where	 material	 scarcity	 is	widespread,	medical	infrastructure	weak	and	de-developed	(Robinson	and	Pfeiffer	2015),	birth	outside	stable	family	structures	common,	and	a	range	of	social	beliefs	and	 practices	 co-exist.	 Family	 formation	 within	 urban	 neighbourhoods,	 such	 as	Rachel	and	James’s,	were	characterized	by	a	high	degree	of	connectivity.	Intimate	relationships	 were	 fraught	 with	 tension	 and	 uncertainty,	 not	 least	 because	partners	 often	 had	 numerous	 overlapping	 connections	 that	 required	 a	 careful	politics	 of	 adjustment.	 Realigning	 intimacies	 was	 a	 defining	 feature	 of	 family	formation	 -	 an	 on-going,	 protracted	 and	 ‘crisis-ridden’	 process	 -	 into	which,	 this	chapter	 suggests,	 the	 tensions	emerging	 from	 the	Ebola	 crisis	became	subsumed	and	incorporated.																																																										10	Similar	anxieties	and	suspicions	have	been	identified	in	a	variety	of	contexts,	particularly	surrounding	vaccines	(Leach	and	Fairhead	2007).		
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Another	aim	of	 this	chapter,	which	has	been	relatively	consistent	 throughout	 the	thesis,	 is	 to	 further	 our	 understanding	 of	 male	 youth	 in	 Africa	 through	contextualising	them	in	relation	to	the	perspectives	and	actions	of	women	around	them;	 through	 which	 a	 complex	 picture	 of	 gender	 emerges.	 	 While	 gendered	expectations	 often	 appear	 to	 conform	 to	 overtly	 patriarchal	 tropes	 –	 which	undoubtedly	hold	powerful	sway	in	this	context	–	such	a	reading	has	the	potential	to	 mask	 some	 of	 the	 nuances	 of	 gendered	 roles	 and	 relations	 in	 practice.	Throughout	 the	 thesis	we	 have	 seen	 female	 figures	who	 have	 held	 authoritative	positions	in	matters	of	 family	politics	and	business,	and	in	the	furthering	of	their	personal	projects.	However,	expectations	that	women	invest	in	existing	household	structures	as	opposed	to	young	men,	who	often	spend	outside	of	 them	–	a	cross-cultural	pattern	–	nonetheless	hold	some	currency;	even	 if	gendered	divisions	of	labour	 in	 relation	 to	 ‘public’	 and	 ‘private’	 sphere	 appear	 increasingly	 eroded.	 In	this	 chapter	 we	 see	 both	 sides	 of	 this	 coin	 simultaneously;	 we	 see	 how	expectations	 set	 confines	 through	 which	 male	 and	 female	 actors	 act,	 with	seemingly	 marginalizing	 consequences,	 yet	 equally	 how	 actors	 themselves	manoeuvre	within	these	confines	to	further	their	own	aims.	This	was	particularly	evident	 through	 the	ways	 that	Rachel’s	business	projects	became	entangled	with	her	and	James’s	projects	of	family	formation	during	a	particularly	unstable	episode	in	Freetown’s	history.		This	chapter,	in	turn,	aims	to	contribute	to	the	insights	from	studies	of	African	working	women	that	have	centred	heavily	on	women	themselves	(Clark	2010,	Hann	2013),	by	placing	men	and	women	on	a	relatively	even	footing.			
James	and	Rachel	continued…	
	James	and	Rachel	had	known	each	other	for	many	years,	and	started	going	out	in	2013.	Their	 families	 lived	close	 to	each	other	 in	Congo	Town.	They	were	both	 in	their	mid-	to	late-twenties,	and,	from	their	teenage	years	onwards,	had	both	spent	much	of	 their	 lives	 in	 the	neighbourhood.	As	result	of	 living	near	each	other	 in	a	close-knit	neighbourhood,	they	had	many	mutual	friends	and	family.	Rachel	 lived	with	her	frail	mother,	whose	immediate	neighbours	were	Aisha	(James’s	sister	by	adoption)	and	her	husband	Kei.	Kei	and	Aisha	were	major	figures	in	the	homes	of	both	James	and	Rachel’s	families.	Kei	operated	a	small	car	mechanic	business;	most	
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days	he	 could	be	 seen	 lying	under	 rusty	 cars,	 or	directing	 a	 team	of	 apprentices	near	 the	 entrance	 to	 James’s	 family	 compound,	where	he	parked	 the	 cars.	As	 an	authoritative	 male	 figure,	 Kei	 acted	 as	 an	 uncle	 to	 Rachel,	 whose	 father	 lived	upcountry.	 Aisha	 had	 inherited	 the	 role	 of	 head	 of	 the	 women’s	 secret	 society,	established	in	the	1950s	by	the	matriarch	(Mami	Mafemebe,	discussed	in	chapter	2)	 of	 James’s	 family	who	had	 initially	 settled	 in	 the	 area.	 As	 a	 result,	 Aisha	 split	much	 of	 her	 time	 between	 the	 compounds,	where	 she	was	 often	 a	 key	 figure	 in	both.	Foday,	a	long-time	friend	of	James’s	and	of	his	cousin	Umaru	(all	of	whom	we	met	in	chapter	2)	–	they	all	attended	the	same	church	–	lived	very	close	to	Rachel.	James	 and	 Umaru	 regularly	 ate	 food	 prepared	 in	 Kei	 and	 Aisha’s	 house.	 This	increased	 after	 Umaru	 began	 sleeping	 with	 Kadiatu,	 the	 niece	 of	 James’s	 step-mother,	Rachel,	which	as	described	 in	chapter	2,	was	the	source	of	some	tension	between	and	within	the	families.				Early	 in	 their	 relationship,	 James	described	Rachel	 as	 his	 ‘best	 friend’,	 and	often	sang	her	praises	 to	me.	He	had	her	number	saved	 in	his	phone	as	 ‘my	wife’,	 and	they	 would	 often,	 somewhat	 jokingly,	 text	 each	 other,	 calling	 each	 other	 names	such	 as,	 ‘the	 father	 of	 my	 child’,	 or	 ‘the	 love	 of	 my	 life’.	 Rachel	 was	 very	entrepreneurial.	 She	 set	 up	 a	 small	 shop	 in	 a	 makeshift	 room	 adjacent	 to	 her	mother’s	veranda,	selling	everyday	household	items	such	as	canned	food,	biscuits	and	 sweets,	 mosquito	 repellent	 coils,	 powdered	 milk,	 tea,	 and	 soap,	 which	 she	would	 buy	 downtown	 in	 bulk.	 Rachel	 would	 go	 once	 a	 month	 to	 the	 luma,	 a	produce	market	out	of	town,	where	she	would	buy	palm	oil	and	rice	to	sell,	both	to	stock	her	own	shop	and	sometimes	also	on	behalf	of	her	 father	who	had	a	small	farm	out	of	town.11	James,	who	worked	at	a	restaurant	and	guesthouse	in	a	nearby	neighbourhood,	 would	 spend	 much	 of	 his	 free	 time	 between	 these	 places	 of	business.	 Rachel	 ran	 several	 esusu	 schemes	 (rotating	 credit	 associations),	 each	with	slightly	different	financial	structures	(varying	sums,	and	varying	intervals	of	collection	and	distribution).	Rachel’s	mother	had	a	 stall	 in	 the	 local	 food	market,	and	many	of	her	fellow	market	women	were	in	Rachel’s	esusu.	James	had	invested	several	hundred	dollars	in	her	shop,	and	equally	Rachel	had	recently	contributed																																																									11	This	became	much	harder	once	luma	were	banned	under	the	state	of	emergency,	and	travel	out	of	town	became	more	challenging.	
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to	 James’s	 sister’s	 wedding	 expenses,	 both	 of	 which	 bound	 them	 together	 as	 a	couple	looking	towards	a	shared	future.		On	several	occasions,	however,	Rachel	expressed	to	me	a	concern	that	she	wanted	James	 to	 think	more	 about	 their	 future.	 She	wanted	 him	 to	 get	 better	 at	 saving	money,	and	not	to	waste	it	on	drinking	and	‘cheap	popularity’,	by	which	she	meant	hanging	out	with	 friends	who	were	not	 ‘serious	about	 the	 future’.	 She	convinced	him	to	join	an	esusu	scheme,	to	which	he	paid	10,000	Leones	a	day.	Rachel	feared	that	James	was	spending	money	on	other	women.	He	in	turn	complained	that	she	was	 overly	 jealous	 and	 suspicious,	 but	 Rachel	 told	 me	 that	 it	 was	 the	 wasted	money	that	concerned	her	most.			It	 was	 true,	 however,	 that	 James	 was	 seeing	 other	 women.	 It	 is	 common	 in	Freetown	 for	 men	 and	 women	 to	 have	 numerous	 simultaneous	 sexual	relationships.	 Many	 Sierra	 Leoneans	 must	 reconcile	 an	 ideal	 of	 monogamy	 –	 a	mother	giving	birth	after	marriage,	and	living	with	her	husband,	the	father	of	her	child,	 in	 a	 stable	 home	 –	 with	 a	 reality	 in	 which	most	 children	 are	 born	 out	 of	wedlock,	most	young	people	do	not	have	their	own	stable	homes,	and	many	people	are	conducting	numerous	sexual	relationships	simultaneously.			Rachel	wanted	to	build	a	household	with	James	but,	growing	up	in	Freetown,	she	knew	all	too	well	that	men	could	not	be	relied	upon;	she	once	explained	to	me	how	important	 it	was	not	 to	 become	 too	dependent	 on	men.	However,	Rachel	 had	 to	reconcile	her	desire	for	self-reliance	with	her	desire	to	be	a	wife.	As	she	explained,			‘when	 you	 are	 from	 a	 poor	 family,	 you	 need	 to	 find	 money	 in	 different	places	because	men	will	 let	you	down	 if	you	don’t.	But	 if	you	have	money	they	will	treat	you	better,	and	will	have	to	listen	to	you,	as	you	won’t	be	so	reliant	on	them.	When	I	was	growing	up	I	didn’t	know	how	to	cook,	I	would	just	 go	 to	 school	 and	 come	 back	 and	 not	 help	 around	 the	 house,	 just	 sell	market	 goods.	 It	 is	 only	now,	 because	of	 James,	 that	 I	 have	 learnt	how	 to	cook	and	keep	the	home’.		
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Rachel’s	pregnancy,	in	this	respect	an	untimely	one,	coincided	almost	exactly	with	the	 declaration	 of	 the	 state	 of	 emergency,	 which	 became	 a	marker	 of	 collective	crisis	for	Sierra	Leoneans.	It	signaled	that	anyone	was	at	risk	of	catching	the	Ebola	virus,	 and	 that	 the	 rules	 and	 regulations	 of	 the	 state	 of	 emergency	 were	inescapable.	 From	 a	 grassroots	 perspective,	 though,	 it	 often	 appeared	 that	personal	experiences	of	the	Ebola	crisis	did	not	represent	a	singular	or	monolithic	period	 of	 upheaval,	 rupture,	 or	 danger,	 but	 were	 rather	 marked	 by	 a	 series	 of	small,	inter-connected	crises.	On	the	one	hand,	the	Ebola	crisis	was	a	humanitarian	crisis	of	global	proportions,	but	on	the	other	it	felt	domestic	and	intimate.			Both	James	and	Rachel	experienced	significant	financial	strains	that	coincided	with	the	pregnancy	and	the	declaration	of	the	state	of	emergency.	In	response	to	travel	restrictions	in	and	out	of	the	country,	as	well	as	daily	curfews	on	business	activity	during	 the	 crisis,	 the	 restaurant	 and	 guesthouse	where	 James	worked	 closed	 its	operations;	 James	 lost	 his	 job	 and	 received	 little	 financial	 compensation.	 Rachel	experienced	her	own	financial	crisis	as	the	esusu	(rotating	credit	associations)	that	she	ran	dramatically	crashed.	One	figure	she	quoted	was	that	she	found	herself	in	9	million	Leones	($1800)	debt,	as	money	she	owed	to	her	clients	could	not	be	paid	back.	One	client	 threatened	 legal	action,	 after	which	Rachel	 ran	away	 for	 several	days,	 not	 telling	 her	 family	 or	 James	where	 she	 had	 gone.	 In	 addition,	 the	 small	grocery	 store	 that	 Rachel	 and	 James	 ran	 together	 struggled	 during	 this	 time,	 in	part	 because	 the	 luma	 --	 the	 monthly	 produce	 markets	 on	 the	 outskirts	 of	Freetown	where	Rachel	usually	bought	produce	in	bulk	–	were	banned	under	state	of	emergency	regulations.			Rachel	and	James	were	unmarried	when	Rachel	got	pregnant.	James,	in	particular,	was	 keen	 to	 arrange	 a	marriage,	 so	 that	 the	 birth	 of	 their	 child	would	mark	 the	establishment	of	an	honourable	family.	However,	this	was	no	easy	task,	especially	now	 that	money	was	harder	 to	 come	by.	 James	attempted	 to	 lay	kola	 for	Rachel.	This	 represents	 the	 ‘traditional’	 or	 ‘country’	 method	 of	 marriage,	 where	 the	husband	and	his	family	give	a	bride	price	and	other	symbolic	and	monetary	gifts	to	the	bride	and	her	family	at	an	engagement	ceremony.	The	initial	meeting	between	the	families,	however,	was	not	fruitful.	James	complained	that	Rachel’s	family	were	
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being	 unreasonable	 in	 asking	 for	 too	 much	 for	 the	 bride	 price,	 not	 taking	 into	account	the	crisis,	or	 the	ways	that	he	had	previously	supported	Rachel.	Some	of	Rachel’s	 friends	 were	 also	 critical.	 As	 one	 female	 friend	 put	 it,	 ‘they	 should	 not	treat	 her	 like	 meat	 for	 sale,	 that	 is	 old-fashioned	 thinking’.	 Rachel’s	 family	 also	failed	 to	 offer	 to	 prepare	 food	 for	 the	 engagement	 ceremony,	 a	 traditional	obligation	of	the	bride’s	family;	James	was	a	‘stranger’	entering	the	household	and	therefore	in	need	of	being	hosted.	James	called	a	family	meeting	(with	his	family),	seeking	advice	about	 to	whether	he	should	attempt	 to	renegotiate,	but	his	 father	advised	him	strongly	against	making	another	offer,	since	that	would	bring	shame	on	his	family.	Rachel	told	me	later	that	she	had	not	wanted	her	family	to	offer	to	prepare	food	for	the	event,	even	on	a	modest	scale.	She	feared	that	this	would	lead	to	 even	 greater	 embarrassment	 down	 the	 road	when	 they	 failed	 to	mobilize	 the	resources	 required	 to	 put	 together	 a	 marriage	 programme	 on	 the	 grand	 scale	considered	appropriate	for	such	an	event.	The	Ebola	crisis	was	not	regarded	as	an	excuse	to	halt	the	quest	for	family	formation;	lifecycle	rituals,	key	to	the	process	of	social	reproduction,	were	subject	to	the	same	expectations	as	before	the	crisis.			By	 the	 time	 Rachel	 gave	 birth,	 as	 described	 above,	 James	 and	 Rachel	 remained	unmarried,	 and	 there	 were	 no	 wedding	 plans	 in	 the	 pipeline.	 This	 contributed	further	 to	 the	 instability	 around	 Moses’s	 birth	 and	 its	 immediate	 aftermath;	parental	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 were	 not	 clearly	 defined.	 Perhaps	 for	 this	reason,	 Rachel	 and	 James	 organized	 a	 large-scale	 pulnador	 (baby	 naming	ceremony),	 which	 was	 performed	 two	 weeks	 after	 the	 birth.	 Traditionally	 this	ritual	would	 have	 been	 performed	 a	week	 earlier,	 symbolising	 the	 new	 arrival’s	first	outing	and	introduction	to	the	community.	A	name	would	be	given	to	the	baby	during	a	ceremony	that	was	often	administered	by	an	elder	or	a	religious	 leader.	According	 to	 this	 tradition,	 James	and	Rachel	arranged	a	small	ceremony	a	week	after	 the	 birth,	 administered	 by	 James’s	 Uncle	 Samuel.	 But	 they	 also	 spent	 an	additional	week	 arranging	 a	much	bigger	public	 ceremony.	This	was	 challenging	not	 just	 because	 of	 their	 financial	 situation,	 but	 also	 in	 legal	 terms;	 state	 of	emergency	 bylaws	 prohibited	 gatherings	 of	 more	 than	 ten	 people.	 Using	connections	with	 the	 local	 police	 station	 via	 a	 friend	 and	 neighbour,	 James	was	
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able	 to	 secure	 a	 uniformed	 police	 presence	 at	 the	 ceremony,	 thus	 giving	 it	 the	required	semblance	of	legality.			Hundreds	 of	 people	 were	 invited,	 including	 significant	 figures	 such	 as	 James’s	former	boss	at	the	restaurant	and	guesthouse,	who	made	a	financial	contribution.	James	 was	 relieved	 that	 the	 relationship	 had	 not	 died;	 in	 fact	 the	 pulnador	had	proved	to	be	a	vehicle	for	keeping	it	alive.	Rachel	invited	members	of	the	Muslim	youth	group	to	which	she	had	belonged.	Many	of	 the	guests	were	mutual	 friends	and	neighbours	 from	 the	neighbourhood.	The	programme	 took	place	 in	 an	open	space	behind	James’s	family	compound.	He	and	Rachel	erected	a	tarpaulin,	under	which	the	official	proceedings	took	place.	They	rented	chairs,	which	were	carefully	arranged	in	neat	rows	around	the	small	square.	Fresh	ginger	ale	was	served	to	the	guests	 while	 they	 were	 waiting	 for	 the	 ceremony	 to	 start.	 The	 ceremony	 was	overtly	Christian;	proceedings	were	 led	by	the	pastor	of	a	church	that	 James	had	recently	started	attending.	Hymns	were	sung,	verses	from	the	Bible	read,	and	the	pastor	delivered	a	sermon,	during	which	he	commented	that	childhood	should	be	taken	more	 seriously	 in	 Sierra	 Leone,	 given	 that	 people	 are	 ‘once	 an	 adult,	 but	twice	 a	 child’.	 He	 noted	 how	 parents	 often	 start	 to	 neglect	 children	 after	 a	 few	years,	and	commented	disapprovingly	on	the	fact	that	many	Sierra	Leoneans	have	children	out	of	wedlock,	as	was	the	case	for	Rachel	and	James.	He	added,	however,	that	God	would	judge	the	parents	according	to	the	way	that	they	raised	the	child.	This	 was	 a	 welcome	 and	 comforting	message.	 The	 sermon	was	 followed	 by	 the	official	naming	of	the	baby,	who	Rachel	held	in	her	arms	as	guests	came	and	placed	money	in	her	lap,	as	was	customary.	Afterwards,	food	prepared	by	James’s	sisters	and	 step-mother	was	 served	 on	 disposable	 plates.	 It	was	 the	 type	 of	 food,	 often	named	 ‘white	 food’,	 that	 was	 typically	 served	 at	 wedding	 receptions:	 jollof	 rice,	noodles,	prawn	crackers,	and	balls	of	beef.	All	these	features	of	the	ceremony	–	the	food,	 the	 religious	aspects,	 and	 the	 scale	–	were	more	 reminiscent	of	 a	Christian	wedding	ceremony	than	a	typical	pulnador.			The	 fact	 that	 the	 baby	 naming	 ceremony	 resembled	 a	 wedding	 was	 not	coincidental;	it	seemed	to	me	to	be	a	self-conscious	substitute	on	the	part	of	Rachel	and	James
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about	starting	their	own	family.	Their	emphasis	on	the	pulandor	in	these	adverse	conditions	 exemplifies	how	 lifecycle	 ritual	 and	 family	 formation	after	birth	were	prioritised	 during	 the	 Ebola	 crisis.	 Indeed,	 they	were	 arguably	more	 significant,	especially	 when	 viewed	 from	 a	 long-term	 perspective,	 than	 the	 relatively	temporary	 concerns	 of	 the	 Ebola	 crisis.	 In	 the	 short	 term,	 the	 Ebola	 outbreak	represented	an	urgent	danger,	and	the	state	of	emergency	a	major	obstacle,	but	in	the	long	term,	challenges	around	family	formation	seemed	for	many	more	pressing	and	more	enduring.			Indeed,	as	the	pulnador	demonstrated,	these	long-term	concerns	were	inseparable	from	 the	day-to-day	 challenges	of	 getting	 through	 the	 crisis.	The	pulnador	was	a	powerful	 mechanism	 that	 helped	 secure	 Rachel,	 James	 and	 Moses’s	 place	 in	 a	social	 network	 and	 support	 community.	 At	 a	 time	 when	 James	 and	 Rachel	 had	limited	income,	securing	these	relationships	was	more	important	than	ever;	these	are	 the	 very	 networks	 and	 relationships	 required	 for	 survival	 at	 times	 of	 crisis.	This	 proved	 to	 be	 the	 case	 for	 Rachel	 and	 James.	 Many	 of	 those	 invited	 to	 the	ceremony	became	actively	involved	in	raising	Moses	and	in	supporting	Rachel	and	James	through	Ebola	and	beyond.			The	positive	public	image	projected	at	the	pulnador	was	not,	however,	an	accurate	reflection	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 James	 and	 Rachel,	 which	 had	 become	fraught	and	tense	as	the	pregnancy	progressed.	At	one	point,	James	said	he	wanted	to	 break	 up,	 and	 expressed	 his	 disappointment	 in	 her	 in	 a	 strikingly	 legalistic	manner.	He	spoke	of	 the	 ‘four	occasions	when	she	has	 let	me	down’,	 referring	to	the	 times	 he	 had	 bailed	 her	 out	 of	 financial	 troubles,	 or	 she	 had	 shamed	him	 in	some	way.	He	seized	Rachel’s	computer	as	a	kind	of	collateral,	which	angered	her.	He	also	said	that	he	wanted	to	‘marry	the	child’,	a	way	of	claiming	rights	over	the	baby	 according	 to	 a	 traditional	 process,	 although	 this	 had	 to	 be	 reconciled	with	state-based	 legal	 rights	 that	mothers	have	over	 their	 children	 for	 the	 first	 seven	years	of	their	life.	But	James’s	aggressive	actions	succeeded	in	convincing	Rachel	to	show	 emotion	 and	 speak	 apologetically	 to	 James	 and	 his	 family	 members,	 thus	signalling	that	they	were	back	together	and	that	their	commitment	stood.			
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The	liminality	that	James	and	Rachel	encountered	as	a	result	of	her	pregnancy	was	spatial	 as	 well	 as	 temporal.	 For	 Rachel,	 it	 had	 become	 clear	 that,	 as	 a	 pregnant	woman	 in	 a	 relationship	 with	 the	 baby’s	 father	 that	 was	 both	 committed	 and	precarious,	 there	 was	 no	 ‘right’	 place	 for	 her.	 During	 this	 period,	 she	 moved	between	three	locations,	none	of	which	proved	satisfactory.	Sometimes	she	stayed	with	her	step-sister	in	Waterloo,	on	the	outskirts	of	Freetown.	This	was	a	cause	of	anxiety	 for	 James,	 who	 did	 not	 trust	 Rachel’s	 step-sister’s	 intentions,	 not	 least	because	Rachel’s	very	presence	there	indicated	that	she,	Rachel,	did	not	trust	him	to	look	after	her	and	the	baby.	The	physical	distance	meant	that	he	did	not	know	what	was	going	on	with	Rachel.	James	once	told	me,	‘I	don’t	know	about	in	Europe,	but	in	Africa	“step	business”	is	always	conflict.	When	there	is	the	same	mother	but	different	 father…each	 sibling	 are	 looking	 out	 for	 themselves’.	 This	 corresponded	with	 Rachel’s	 complaints	 that	 her	 step-sister	 had	 not	 been	 interested	 in	 looking	after	 her	 during	 her	 pregnancy.	 Rather,	 she	 and	 her	 husband	 wanted	 Rachel’s	assistance	 in	 running	 the	shop	 in	which	 they	worked	and	 lived.	 James	suspected	that	 keeping	Rachel	 close	was	 a	 strategic	way	of	 stalling	on	 repaying	 the	money	that	 Rachel’s	 step-sister	 had	 borrowed	 from	 them.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 all	 this,	 James	worked	hard	to	find	somewhere	in	the	neighbourhood	for	Rachel	to	stay	while	she	was	 pregnant,	 and	 where	 she	 and	 the	 baby	 could	 eventually	 live.	 After	 lengthy	negotiations,	they	found	a	room	of	her	own	close	to	her	family	compound,	but	this,	too,	 had	 its	 complications.	 When	 James	 spent	 time	 there	 with	 Rachel,	 which	included	 sleeping	 together,	 her	 family	 expressed	 their	 unhappiness	 that	 the	relationship	was	not	more	official,	or,	 to	put	 in	 in	more	material	 terms,	 that	 they	had	 not	 been	 compensated	 as	 generously	 as	 they	 would	 have	 been	 if	 the	engagement	been	official.	The	problems	were	exacerbated	when	Moses	became	ill	and	 started	 sleeping	badly	 in	 the	month	after	Eid.	 It	 had	been	noted	 that	babies	often	 became	 ill	 in	 the	 area	 in	 which	 Rachel’s	 room	 was	 located.	 A	 year	 or	 so	earlier,	 another	 baby	 had	 died	 there,	 having	 been	 eaten	 by	 a	 witch,	 as	 it	 was	explained	to	me.	And	Rachel’s	 family	were	in	an	on-going	conflict	with	their	own	landlord,	giving	their	situation	an	added	sense	of	precarity.			At	 this	 point,	 Rachel	 moved	 up	 to	 James’s	 family	 compound,	 exchanging	 rooms	with	 James’s	cousin,	who	did	a	swop	by	moving	down	to	where	Rachel	had	been	
	 172	
living.	James,	Rachel,	and	Moses	all	slept	in	the	small	room,	just	big	enough	to	fit	a	single	 bed.	 The	 responsibility	 for	 looking	 after	 Moses	 was	 shared	 among	 the	women	and	children	of	the	house,	especially	Rachel,	James’s	step-mother,	his	aunt	Jane,	 and	 his	 younger	 siblings.	 The	 intimacy	 and	 support	 inherent	 in	 this	environment	did	not,	however,	lead	to	a	trusting	and	stable	relationship	between	the	parties	 involved.	 Issues	over	 the	 illegitimacy	of	 James	and	Rachel’s	 child	and	the	lack	of	formality	in	their	relationship	persisted.	Rachel	bonded	well	with	one	of	James’s	 sisters,	 with	 whom	 she	 was	 in	 the	 habit	 of	 joking	 and	 chatting	 while	preparing	 food	 on	 the	 veranda,	 commenting	 on	 Facebook	 posts,	 and	 watching	Nigerian	and	Indian	soap	operas.	Yet	she	still	felt	like	unwelcome	visitor,	someone	not	yet	formally	incorporated	into	the	family.	The	relationship	between	Rachel	and	Rachel	was	particularly	tense.	Rachel	was	neither	a	stranger	nor	fully	familiar.	She	was	 close	 to	 Kadiatu,	 Rachel’s	 disreputable	 niece	 described	 in	 chapter	 2.	 After	Rachel	 and	Kadiatu	 fell	 out,	 after	 the	 failed	 fish-selling	 venture,	 Kadiatu	went	 to	live	with	Foady	and	Aisha,	who	adopted	one	of	her	sons.			James	and	Rachel	fought	intensely	when	they	were	living	together.	This	seemed	to	be	part	of	 an	on-going,	 often	 indirect,	 game	of	 chicken;	 a	process	 through	which	the	terms,	and	conditions	of	their	relationship,	and	their	responsibility	and	‘rights’	over	 Moses,	 were	 constituted	 and	 negotiated.	 In	 most	 cases	 like	 Rachel	 and	James’s,	couples	do	not	stay	together	or	marry	after	having	a	child	together;	rather	the	 child	 will	 live	 in	 the	 home	 of	 one	 of	 their	 family	 members,	 or	 in	 a	 home	established	later	by	one	of	the	parents	with	a	future	partner.	One	point	of	tension	between	Rachel	and	James	was	over	sex.	Rachel	told	me	that	James	wanted	to	have	sex	 with	 her	 and	 was	 pressuring	 her.	 Popular	 wisdom	 in	 Freetown	 told	 that	breastfeeding	 mothers	 should	 not	 have	 sex	 for	 the	 first	 year	 after	 giving	 birth,	which	 was	 explained	 as	 a	 nutritional	 health	 issue	 for	 the	 growing	 child.	 James,	unemployed,	was	not	sleeping	with	other	women	at	this	point.	Rachel	told	me	that	she	was	also	withholding	 from	sex	since	 it	was	better	 for	 their	 future	as	a	stable	couple.	 Rachel	 was	 unhappy	 with	 how	 James	 treated	 her	 now	 that	 they	 lived	together	in	close	proximity.	He	was	not	as	forthcoming	as	previously	with	material	support.	 This	 was	 exacerbated	 after	 James	 started	 working	 at	 his	 new	 job	 at	 a	prominent	NGO.	Yet	when,	following	the	suggestion	of	his	cousin,	James	offered	to	
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give	 her	 a	 small	 daily	 allowance,	 Rachel	 rejected	 it,	 seeing	 it	 as	 a	 patronizing	gesture,	 which	would	 increase	 her	 dependence	 on	 him.	 She	 still	 earned	 a	 small	income	from	a	boy	who	sold	household	goods	on	her	behalf,	and	she	was	keen	to	emphasise	her	self-reliance.		Having	Rachel	live	under	his	eye	in	the	compound	gave	James	considerable	power	in	the	relationship.	James	knew	that	he	had	family	members	who	could	raise	their	child	 for	him	if	Rachel	 left,	and	this	 further	strengthened	his	bargaining	position.	Having	 Rachel	 under	 his	 roof	 also	 meant	 that	 he	 ‘owed’	 her	 less	 because,	structurally,	he	was	 ‘bearing’	her.	Yet	being	close	 to	 James	was	also	a	position	of	strength	for	Rachel.	If	she	left	the	compound,	she	would	lose	custody	over	Moses,	although	 if	 James	asked	her	 to	 leave,	 she	would	be	able	 to	 leave	with	Moses	and	maintain	 custody.	 Rachel’s	 presence	 in	 the	 compound	 also	 restricted	 James’s	ability	to	form	other	relationships,	and	gave	Rachel	extensive	inside	knowledge	of	his	 family	 affairs	 and	 dynamics.	 One	 tumultuous	 evening,	 after	 careful	 planning	during	the	day,	Rachel	took	money	that	 James	had	left	 in	his	room	and	broke	his	television,	provoking	a	 fight.	 If	he	hit	her,	 she	was	prepared	 to	go	straight	 to	 the	local	police	station,	or	the	local	 ‘family	support’	unit,	to	report	a	case	against	him	that	would	likely	result	in	her	gaining	custody	over	Moses.	James,	mindful	of	this,	but	 never	 openly	 admitting	 that	 it	 influenced	 him,	 did	 not	 hit	 Rachel,	 although	significant	verbal	abuse	was	exchanged.	Instead,	he	used	the	incident	for	his	own	benefit.	After	checking	with	his	contact	at	 the	 local	police	station	 to	confirm	that	Rachel	had	not	 reported	 a	 case,	 James	 reported	 it,	 together	with	 the	 insults	 that	she	had	directed	at	him.		The	following	morning,	Rachel’s	step-sister,	mother,	and	Kei,	came	to	James’s	compound	to	‘beg’	to	him	and	Rachel,	that	is,	to	make	a	formal	apology.				Despite	 the	 tumultuous	course	of	 their	 relationship,	 James	and	Rachel	ultimately	did	get	married	–	in	December	2016,	with	a	wedding	celebration	even	bigger	than	their	baby	naming.		
	
Exception	or	the	rule?			
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A	key	question	emerging	from	the	case	of	James	and	Rachel	concerns	the	extent	to	which	 their	 tumultuous	 story	 of	 pregnancy,	 love,	 and	 family	 formation	 was	influenced	by	the	Ebola	crisis	with	which	it	almost	exactly	coincided.			The	 liminal	zone	 in	space	and	 time	 that	Rachel	and	 James	occupied	was	 in	some	respects	emblematic	of	the	liminality	that	was	collectively	experienced	during	the	Ebola	crisis	–	a	period	of	great	uncertainty,	 in	which	many	day-to-day	operations	were	 challenging	 to	 perform.	 It	 is	 hard	 not	 to	 draw	 some	 direct	 connections	between	the	conditions	of	the	state	of	emergency	and	some	of	James	and	Rachel’s	difficulties:	 the	 overstretching	 of	 formal	 health	 infrastructure	 experienced	 by	Rachel	and	those	around	her	at	the	end	of	her	pregnancy;	James’s	loss	of	work,	an	indirect	 result	 of	 travel	 restrictions	 and	 curfews;	 and	 even	 the	 crash	 of	 Rachel’s	
esusu,	plausibly	precipitated	by	the	desire	or	need	of	her	participants	to	‘cash	out’	during	the	crisis	and	by	Rachel’s	decreased	ability	to	source	funds.			What	was	remarkable	about	Rachel	and	James’s	story	is	that	at	no	point	was	Ebola	seen	as	an	excuse	to	put	the	process	of	family	formation	‘on	hold’.	This	was	evident	in	 Rachel’s	 family’s	 unwillingness	 to	 accept	 a	 lower	 bride-price	 and,	 in	 a	 more	covert	way,	in	Rachel’s	support	for	this,	given	that	they	would	not	be	able	to	stage	an	honourable	wedding	according	to	the	usual	high	standards.	The	fact	that	public	ceremonies	were	more	challenging	to	perform	during	the	crisis	–	not	least	because	large	 gatherings	were	 illegal	 –	was	 not	 considered	 a	 satisfactory	 excuse.	 On	 the	contrary,	 the	 social	 processes	 such	 as	 weddings,	 through	 which	 intimacies	 are	realigned	and	relationships	publicly	acknowledged,	seemed	more	 important	 than	ever	during	the	crisis.			Key	 to	 understanding	 these	 responses	 and	 priorities	 is	 an	 appreciation	 of	 the	unstable,	 non-linear,	 character	 of	 family	 formation	 in	 ‘normal’	 circumstances.	 In	Sierra	Leone,	children	are	often	not	raised	 in	single	households,	but	rather	move	between	 several	 different	 households,	 and	 between	 village	 and	 urban	neighbourhoods,	through	the	course	of	their	childhood,	and	are	raised	by	range	of	actors.	This	 is	often	a	result	of	shifting	household	circumstances	–	 the	death	of	a	guardian,	migrations,	legal	or	informal	disputes,	and	financial	fluctuations.	In	many	
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cases,	 children	 are	 born	 outside	 a	 stable	 parental	 partnership.	 Negotiating	 the	rights	over	and	responsibilities	for	looking	after	the	children	is	often	a	drawn-out	process,	 which	 can	 last	 for	 year,	 and	 often	 involves	 a	 range	 of	 family,	 religious,	customary,	and	state	authorities.	Typically,	the	formation	of	partnerships	does	not	occur	in	straightforward	ways,	or	at	identifiable	moments	of	transformation,	such	as	 through	 marriage.	 Rather,	 binding	 relationships	 are	 typically	 constructed	 in	piecemeal,	 challenging,	 and	 non-linear	ways,	 involving	 a	 variety	 of	 intermediary	measures	of	relationship	status	that	mediate	being	‘single’	and	being	‘married’.			These	fluid	and	flexible	practices	were	a	resource	for	Rachel	and	James	during	the	process	of	forming	their	family.	For	example,	while	marriage	was	not	on	the	cards,	they	were	able	instead	to	use	an	up-scaled	pulnador	to	similar	effect.	In	so	doing,	they	 drew	 on	 a	 long	 history	 of	 the	 mixing	 of	 social	 practices	 and	 traditions	 in	Freetown,	 rather	 than	 a	 set	 of	 routines	 administered	 by	 single	 authoritative	structures,	 as	has	been	documented	 in	 rural	Sierra	Leonean	contexts	 (Fanthorpe	2007,	MacCormack	1984).			Such	conditions	are	far	from	unique	to	Freetown,	however,	and	comparative	cases	shed	light	on	the	dynamics	at	play.	Jennifer	Johnson-Hanks’s	research	in	southern	Cameroon	 reveals	 the	 ways	 that,	 “rather	 than	 a	 clear	 threshold	 into	 female	adulthood,	 here	motherhood	 is	 a	 loosely	 bounded,	 fluid	 status.	 Contrary	 both	 to	folk	intuition	and	to	the	assumptions	of	a	life	cycle	framework,	Beti	motherhood	is	not	 a	 stable	 status.	 Beti	 women	 who	 have	 borne	 children	 are	 not	 necessarily	mothers,	 at	 least	 not	 all	 the	 time.	Motherhood,	 instead,	 constitutes	 a	 temporary	social	 status,	 an	 agent	 position	 that	 can	 be	 inhabited	 in	 specific	 forms	 of	 social	action”	 (Jonhson-Hanks	 2002:865).	 Becoming	 a	 mother	 is	 not	 achieved	 through	the	 biological	 process	 of	 giving	 birth,	 but	 rather	 through	 honourable	 family	formation,	 which	 “demands	 mastery	 of	 very	 different	 spheres”	 (ibid	 870-1),	including	education,	biological	motherhood,	 and	employment.	Yet	 these	different	spheres	do	not	follow	one	another	in	a	linear	manner,	and	can	sometimes	play	out	against	one	another.	Pursuing	education	might	be	a	mark	of	seniority	for	a	woman,	but	 it	 might	 equally	 undermine	 her	 status	 as	 a	 mother	 or	 adult	 and	 make	 her	revert	to	something	more	like	the	status	of	‘school-girl’.		
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In	 several	 ways,	 these	 observations	 correspond	 with	 Rachel’s	 situation.	Progressing	 in	 life,	a	goal	she	explicitly	stressed,	required	the	pursuit	of	multiple	life	 projects	 in	 multiple	 spheres:	 her	 college	 degree,	 her	 business	 ventures,	 her	sexual	relationship	with	James	and	perhaps	other	men,	and	biological	motherhood.	What	was	particularly	striking	about	the	story	of	James	and	Rachel	was	not	just	the	piecemeal	 way	 that	 their	 relationship	 was	 formed	 –	 involving	 mastery	 of	 very	different	 spheres	 representing	 varying	 and	 opposing	 social	 positionalities,	 as	Johnson-Hanks	emphasises	 -	but	 the	extent	 to	which	 these	varying	spheres	were	so	 interconnected,	 often	 involving	 the	 same	 actors	 and	 characters.	 Rachel’s	business	ventures	were	intimately	connected	to	James,	who	was	a	major	investor.	Her	 relationship	 with	 James	 was	 connected	 through	 numerous	 common	 friends	and	 family	 members,	 which	 bound	 them	 closely	 together	 before	 marriage	 was	even	attempted.	James	provided	his	room	for	Rachel	to	sleep	in	with	the	baby	after	the	birth,	which	made	Rachel	 even	more	 closely	 integrated	 into	his	 family	when	there	were	tensions	with	her	own.		Yet	all	 these	 interconnections	and	overlaps	were	sources	of	conflict,	 tension,	and	animosity,	 as	 well	 as	 of	 support;	 reflecting	 some	 of	 the	 dynamics,	 albeit	 in	particularly	 amplified	 forms,	 described	 in	 chapter	 2.	 Rachel	 and	 James’s	 joint	business	ventures	once	symbolized	their	shared	future	aspirations,	but	became	a	focal	 point	 of	 conflict	 when,	 during	 the	 Ebola	 crisis,	 things	 collapsed.	 Material	exchange,	proximity,	and	sex	corresponded	to	expressions	of	love	in	complex	and	often	 contradictory	ways.	When	 James	 and	 Rachel	 were	 living	 together	 in	 close	proximity,	they	were	not	regularly	sleeping	together.	But	instead	of	being	a	sign	of	hostility	or	 the	breakdown	of	 their	relationship,	 this	was	 the	means	by	which	an	honourable	shared	future	could	be	achieved.	When	Rachel	was	most	desperately	in	need	 materially,	 she	 rejected	 financial	 support	 from	 James	 as	 a	 statement	 of	independence	 and	 pride.	When	 James	was	 out	 of	work,	 he	 slept	 less	with	 other	women,	yet	was	also	less	able	to	forge	a	stable	relationship	with	Rachel.			The	numerous	mutual	 friends	and	 family	members	 that	 James	and	Rachel	had	 in	common	constituted	an	invaluable	support	network,	but	this	made	the	process	of	conducting	 their	 relationship	 political	 and	 contentious.	 There	 was	 never	 a	 time	
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when	 everyone	 was	 on	 good	 terms.	 Rachel	 and	 Rachel	 had	 long-standing	disagreements	 relating	 to	 the	 failed	 fish	business,	 and	Rachel	did	not	of	approve	James	 and	Rachel’s	 eventual	marriage	 plans	 until	 very	 close	 to	 the	 event.	 James	and	 Foday,	 once	 best	 friends,	 were	 not	 on	 speaking	 terms	 for	 long	 stretches	 of	time,	 and	 Umaru	 took	 on	 the	 position	 of	 Foday’s	 closest	 friend.	 Aisha,	 Kei,	 and	James,	all	key	decision	makers	in	both	family	compounds,	were	often	at	odds	with	each	other.			James	 and	 Rachel’s	 story	 reveals	 that	 the	 tense	 process	 of	 realigning	 intimacies	was	 integral	 to	 the	on-going	process	of	 family	 formation,	while	at	 the	same	 time	defining	responses	 to,	and	characteristics	of,	 the	Ebola	crisis.	Not	all	 the	dangers	facing	 Rachel	 and	 James	 were	 Ebola-related;	 they	 were	 also	 threatened	 by	witchcraft,	loss	of	status,	dishonourable	family	formation,	and	losing	custody	over	Moses.	Underlying	all	 these	dangers	were	uncertainties	 surrounding	overlapping	and	multi-dimensional	 intimate	 relationships,	 in	 which	 the	 ‘status	 quo’	 was	 not	‘stability’	but	‘flux’.	Ebola	did	not	create	these	conditions,	but	it	intensified	them	by	placing	actors	like	James	and	Rachel	in	positions	of	greater	reliance	on	their	‘base’	support	 network	 of	 friends,	 family,	 and	 neighbours,	 as	 alternative	 modes	 of	security	became	stretched	and	eliminated.	This	was	demonstrated	most	clearly	by	James	and	Rachel’s	simultaneous	loss	of	income	streams,	but	it	was	also	matched	in	parallel	affective	and	less	material	processes.			
Conclusion			In	 this	chapter,	 I	have	described	how	a	young	couple	attempted	 to	start	a	 family	during	the	period	Ebola	crisis	in	Freetown,	Sierra	Leone.	Rachel	became	pregnant	at	an	early	stage	of	the	state	of	emergency,	delivered	during	its	height,	and	married	and	moved	into	a	home	with	James	a	year	after	it	was	lifted.			Taking	 a	 leaf	 from	 the	 book	 of	 Gabriel	 Garcia	 Marquez,	 their	 story	 might	 be	labelled	 ‘Love	 in	 a	 time	 of	 Ebola’,	 inasmuch	 as	 the	 virus	 and	 its	 associated	procedures	 alternately	 intersected	 with	 and	 become	 irrelevant	 to,	 rather	 than	directly	 influenced	 and	 determined,	 the	 formation	 of	 their	 romantic	 partnership	
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and	family.	In	the	context	of	an	undeveloped	health	infrastructure	and	widespread	material	scarcity,	family	formation	was	far	from	being	a	stable	process	even	before	the	 virus	 swept	 through	 Sierra	 Leone,	 and	 it	 remains	 so	 after	 it	 died	 away.	 This	suggests	 that	 Ebola	 did	 not	 create	 a	 radical	 transformation.	 Despite	 the	 Ebola	crisis,	the	processes	of	family	formation	remained	a	priority	and	in	many	respects	took	 on	 even	 greater	 significance	 than	 in	 normal	 circumstances,	 in	 part	 despite	and	 in	 part	 because	 of	 the	 conditions	 of	 life	 in	 the	 state	 of	 emergency.	 This	 ran	counter	to	the	underlying	assumptions	about	the	formal	Ebola	response,	and	state	of	 emergency	 regulations,	 in	 which	 elimination	 of	 the	 virus	 was	 an	 ultimate	priority.	 Given	 that	 transmission	 occurred	 through	 bodily	 contact,	 and	 at	gatherings,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 state	 of	 emergency	 was	 in	 tension	 with	processes	of	biological	and	social	reproduction,	in	which	intimate	contact,	medical	attention,	and	public	acknowledgment	 through	ritual	are	key.	Yet	such	processes	were	able	to	continue,	albeit	with	difficulty	at	times.			This	chapter	offers	insight	into	why	family	formation	remained	a	priority.	Firstly,	I	have	suggested	that	family	formation	remained	possible	in	large	measure	because	of	 the	 general	 instabilities	 that	 surround	 it	 in	 ‘normal’	 times,	 and	 the	 host	 of	flexible	practices	that	exist	in	tandem	with	these.	These	then	provided	the	tool-kit	to	 deal	with	 the	 additional	 uncertainties	 and	 tensions	 introduced	 by	 Ebola.	 In	 a	different	environment	where	social	practices	are	more	rigid	and	predictable,	Ebola	might	perhaps	have	presented	a	greater	obstacle.			Secondly,	 family	 formation	 was	 prioritised	 because	 it	 represented	 the	 most	pressing,	enduring	and	on-going	concern	for	Freetown	people.	By	contrast,	Ebola	was	 relatively	 distant	 and	 inconsequential.	 Many	 elements	 of	 the	 formal	 Ebola	response	relied	on	an	idea	that	avoidance	of	death	was	ultimate	priority	–	which	often	 came	 across	 in	 Ebola	 messaging,	 with	 posters	 and	 campaign	 slogans	including	lines	such	as	‘save	your	life’	and	‘Ebola	kills’.	Yet	for	those	living	through	the	Ebola	crisis,	it	seemed	that	avoiding	‘social	death’	was	a	far	greater	concern.			Thirdly,	 however,	 I	 have	 suggested	 that	 the	 very	 process	 of	 surviving	 crisis	 in	Sierra	Leone	involves	the	same	key	elements	involved	in	family	formation:	namely	
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the	 realigning	of	 intimacies.	 In	other	words,	 not	 only	was	 family	 formation	 -	 the	prevention	of	‘social	death’	-	a	long-term	concern	that	simply	could	not	be	put	‘on	hold’,	but	these	very	processes	were	also	integral	to,	and	constituting,	of	the	day-to-day	 experience	 of	 getting	 through	 the	 crisis,	 and	 building,	 maintaining,	 and	realigning	one’s	position	in	a	support	network.			This	 interplay	 between	 longer-term	 and	 shorter-term	 concerns	 was	 further	complicated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 process	 of	 realigning	 intimacies	 involved	 a	constant	 negotiation	 of	 expectations,	 often	 in	 seemingly	 contradictory	 ways.	Securing	 the	 long-term	 future	 sometimes	 appeared	 possible	 only	 through	 short-term	 insecurity	 and	 tension,	 through	 which	 intimacies	 were	 negotiated	 and	realigned.	 In	this	 light,	 the	social	tensions	that	Ebola	encouraged	were	subsumed	into	a	continuing	processes	of	realigning	of	intimacies	and	family	formation,	rather	than	stalling	or	 inverting	 them.	This,	 then,	analytically	connects	 life	before	Ebola	and	life	during;	while	coming	of	age	in	normal	life	and	in	‘crisis’	are	seen	to	differ	–	with	life-course	ritual	gaining	new	potencies	and	meanings	for	young	men	during	the	 crisis	 –	 they	 both	 share	 a	 centring	 on	 relationships	 around	 the	 home	 and	family,	 in	 which	 opposition	 and	 co-operation	 are	 often	 inseparable.	 These	commonalities	shed	light	on	the	meanings	of	‘crisis’	for	young	men	in	a	context	like	this,	 as	 something	 both	 ‘exceptional’,	 yet	 equally	 enabling	 for	 the	 realization	 of	long-held	aspirations.				
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Chapter	7.		Crisis,	the	state,	and	the	state	of	emergency		In	September	2014,	I	returned	to	London	for	what	would	turn	out	to	be	6	months	away	from	the	field.	Sierra	Leone	and	Ebola	remained	ever-present,	however,	not	least	because	of	the	global	media	coverage	the	outbreak	was	receiving.	Ebola	was	one	of	the	top	stories	of	the	2014/15	news-cycle.	While	Ebola	was	deadly,	 it	was	hard	 not	 to	 feel	 that	 the	 reporting	 was	 disproportionate.	 Not	 only	 was	 Ebola	unlikely	to	represent	the	global	health	threat	that	 it	was	purported	to,	but	 it	was	not	 even	 the	 greatest	 threat	 to	 the	 majority	 of	 those	 living	 at	 its	 epicentre.	Residents	 of	 Sierra	 Leone,	 Liberia,	 and	 Guinea	 faced	 not	 only	 the	 more	omnipresent	 viruses	 such	 as	 malaria,	 but	 many	 lived	 in	 conditions	 of	 material	scarcity	with	no	state-based	‘safety	net’	to	speak	of.			In	the	eyes	of	the	world,	key	factors	in	the	spread	of	the	virus	were	local	ignorance	of	 its	 symptoms	 and	 mechanists	 of	 transmission,	 compounded	 by	 mistrust	 of	modern	 medicine.	 Locals	 were	 seen	 to	 favour	 conspiracy	 theories	 or	 spiritual	explanations:	 in	 very	 parallel	 ways	 to	 perceptions	 of	 AIDS	 elsewhere	 in	 the	continent	 (Henderson	 2011,	 Hunter	 2010).	 A	 major	 thrust	 of	 the	 international	humanitarian	response	involved	raising	awareness	of	Ebola	symptoms,	and	calling	on	the	residents	of	affected	countries	to	refrain	from	practices	that	spread	it,	such	as	body	contact,	eating	bush	meat,	caring	for	the	sick,	and	burying	the	dead.	One	set	 of	Ebola	messaging	prevailed	on	people’s	 ‘selfish’	 instincts	 to	 save	 their	 own	lives	 through	 adherence	 to	 novel	 protocols	 such	 as	 reporting	 sicknesses	 and	deaths	to	centralised	emergency	services,	known	as	‘117’,	rather	than	performing	acts	of	care	themselves.	Another	set	of	messaging,	by	contrast,	called	on	residents	to	‘come	together’,	setting	aside	differences	and	working	alongside	each	other	for	the	collective	and	national	interest.	This	messaging	tended	to	invoke	the	language	of	sacrifice.		
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Figure	9	Public	messaging:	'let's	stop	Ebola'	As	many	 reports	 testified,	 however,	 this	 introduced	 an	 additional	 difficulty;	 the	three	 states	 in	 question	 were	 unable	 to	 tackle	 the	 issue	 themselves.	 These	undeveloped,	or	underdeveloped,	states	had	neither	the	medical	and	bureaucratic	infrastructures	 nor	 the	 resources	 to	 co-ordinate	 an	 effective	 response	 to	 the	outbreak.	 In	 addition,	popular	mistrust	 of	 the	 state	was	widespread,	 as	 could	be	expected	in	the	context	of	economic	decline,	state	neglect,	and	recent	civil	war.			When	 I	 returned	 to	Freetown	 in	March	2015,	 the	 state	of	 emergency	was	 in	 full	effect.	 The	 virus	 showed	 promising	 signs	 of	 being	 contained,	 but	 still	 posed	 a	threat	country-wide	threat.	I	arrived	the	day	before	a	3-day	lockdown	in	Freetown.	By	now,	the	rules	and	regulations	of	the	state	of	emergency,	though	onerous,	were	familiar	 to	Freetown	residents.	Thankfully	none	of	my	 friends	or	neighbours	had	succumbed	to	the	virus.	The	President,	Ernest	Bai	Koroma,	proposed	a	goal	that	by	Independence	Day,	exactly	a	month	later,	the	spread	of	Ebola	would	be	halted.	In	a	speech	just	before	the	lockdown	he	told	the	country:		 Everybody	 in	 every	 house	 in	 every	 community	 in	 this	 country	 is	 very	important	 in	 our	 fight	 against	 Ebola.	 Avoid	 touching	 each	 other,	 avoid	eating	 bush	meat,	 avoid	 visiting	 the	 sick,	 avoid	 attending	 funerals,	 report	illnesses	and	deaths	to	the	nearest	health	facility	or	call	117.	We	know	some	of	 the	 things	we	 are	 asking	 you	 to	 do	 are	 difficult.	 But	 life	 is	 better	 than	these	difficulties.	Today	the	life	of	every	one	is	at	stake,	but	we	will	get	over	
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this	difficulty	if	all	do	what	we	have	been	asked	to	do.	Ebola	is	no	respecter	of	 persons.	 It	 is	 not	 an	 APC	 or	 SLPP	 disease.	 It	 is	 not	 a	 disease	 of	 any	political	 party,	 or	 ethnic	 group	 or	 district.	 Anyone	who	 is	 not	 careful	 can	endanger	 themselves	 and	 others	 that	 they	 love.	 These	 are	 extra-ordinary	times,	and	extra-ordinary	times	require	extra-ordinary	measures.			When	I	arrived	back	in	the	neighbourhood,	a	main	topic	of	discussion	was	a	recent	political	 scandal	 in	 which	 the	 vice-president	 had	 been	 sacked	 by	 President	Koroma.	A	 few	weeks	before	 the	 lockdown	 the	vice-president	 took	 refuge	 in	 the	American	 embassy.	He	 announced	 to	 the	 global	media	 that	 he	was	 quarantining	himself	 for	 21	 days	 (the	 incubation	 period	 of	 the	 virus)	 because	 one	 of	 his	bodyguards	had	 succumbed	 to	Ebola.	Global	media	 reports	 lauded	 this	 act	 as	 an	inspiring	 example	 of	 the	 willingness	 of	 the	 country’s	 ruling	 elite	 to	 subject	themselves	 to	 the	 restrictions	 imposed	 upon	 all	 Sierra	 Leoneans,	 promoting	 the	message	of	‘we’re	all	in	it	together’.	Other	reports,	though,	proposed	an	alternative	narrative	in	which	the	vice-president	had	fled	to	the	embassy	after	seeing	soldiers	arrive	 at	 his	 compound,	 fearing	 that	 he	 was	 about	 to	 be	 arrested.	 Given	 the	escalating	tensions	between	himself	and	the	president,	his	fear	was	reasonable.	It	was	explained	to	me	that	the	vice-president’s	bad	track	record	on	corruption	was	jeopardizing	 continuing	 flows	 of	 money	 coming	 into	 the	 country	 from	 the	international	 community,	 known	 locally	 as	 ‘Ebola	 money’.	 The	 opposition	 party	was	planning	a	protest	on	the	Sunday,	but	the	lockdown	made	that	impossible.			These	 discussions	 among	my	 neighbours	 reflected	 a	 widespread	 set	 of	 theories	according	 to	 which	 ‘Ebola’	 was	 welcome,	 and	 encouraged,	 or	 even	 carefully	fabricated	by	political	authorities	who	were	benefitting	from	the	millions	coming	into	the	country	to	fight	the	virus,	as	well	as	from	the	executive	powers	offered	by	military	rule	and	the	state	of	emergency.			On	the	first	day	of	the	lockdown,	I	went	to	visit	Auntie	Alice,	the	business	woman	and	local	patron	figure	we	met	in	chapter	4.	She	was	filling	me	in	on	the	details	of	the	presidential	political	scandal	as	we	stood	on	the	balcony	on	the	second	floor	of	her	 house,	 which	 overlooked	 the	 local	 mosque.	 In	 the	 courtyard	 of	 the	mosque	were	 hundreds	 of	 bags	 of	 rice	 and	 containers	 of	 oil	 donated	 by	 the	World	 Food	Programme	to	local	authorities,	to	be	distributed	to	the	neighbourhood	during	the	
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lockdown	 on	 a	 ticketed	 system.	 Outside	 the	 mosque,	 a	 slow-moving	 line	 had	formed,	 populated	 by	 ever	more	 disgruntled	 locals.	 It	 looked	 as	 if	 a	 fight	would	break	 out	 any	minute.	 At	 just	 this	 point,	 the	 local	 authorities	 administering	 the	distribution	 –	 the	 local	 councillor,	 police,	 and	 senior	 members	 of	 the	mosque	 –	locked	the	gates	and	returned	home.	Auntie	Alice	told	me	‘they	will	be	back	later	after	 dark’.	 ‘Bend	 bend	 business	 (corruption)	works	 at	 all	 levels’,	 she	 explained.	She	was	not,	however,	unsympathetic:	‘So	many	jobs	get	paid	so	little	here,	and	you	have	to	pay	for	transport	and	everything,	so	it	is	not	possible	to	build	up	any	other	way	here’.	She	spoke	with	a	degree	of	experience.	Coming	from	a	poor	family,	her	big	break	had	come	during	the	civil	war,	when	she	had	informally	acquired	at	the	Freetown	docks	the	contents	of	crates	of	donated	goods	intended	as	aid	and	sold	them	on	 to	 fellow	market	 traders	downtown.	The	 scenes	at	 the	mosque	brought	her	back	to	this	time	when,	as	she	explained,	the	government	responded	to	a	rice	shortage	by	buying	in	bulk	for	cheap	redistribution.			
	
Figure	10	Line	outside	the	mosque		The	authorities	at	the	mosque	were	clearly	working	‘on	commission’,	that	is,	they	were	 seen	 to	be	handing	out	 supplies	 to	political	 favourites,	 or	 siphoning	off	 for	personal	 accumulation.	 Yet	 the	 supplies	 were	 also	 distributed	 according	 to	 the	bureaucratic	ticket	system,	in	which	households	lower	down	in	the	valley	in	which	
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the	neighbourhood	stands	–	deemed	to	be	poorer	–	were	also	prioritised.	As	I	was	leaving	 Auntie	 Alice’s	 house,	 a	 young	man	walked	 by	with	 a	 sack	 of	 rice	 on	 his	shoulder	 exclaiming	 ‘this	 is	 the	 first	 time	 I	 have	 benefited	 from	APC	 (the	 ruling	party)	 in	8	years	of	power’.12	However,	as	Titi,	 a	disgruntled	neighbour,	 far	 from	well	off,	living	in	the	higher	area	explained,	‘the	system	is	working	through	sababu	(personal	 connections/luck),	 not	 just	 through	 need.	 For	 some	 it	 is	 harder	 to	 get	food	than	for	others’.	 If	you	were	not	from	one	of	the	prioritised,	extremely	poor	households	 lower	down	in	the	valley	then	your	best	chance	of	getting	something	was	through	connections.			Another	neighbour,	Mr.	Barrie,	who	ran	a	small	grocery	shop	near	the	mosque,	also	failed	 to	 receive	 a	 ticket.	 He	 took	 this	 criticism	 a	 step	 further.	 ‘Africans,	 he	explained,	have	a	good	face	but	bad	heart.	They	do	not	wish	well	unto	each	other,	for	their	“fellow	man”.	They	will	have	1000,	take	500	for	themselves	and	then	take	another	300	from	the	other	man’s	portion	for	themselves	also’.	‘White	people	don’t	work	on	commission’			Later	in	the	afternoon	I	visited	Auntie	Zain’s	house.	She	lived	next	door	during	the	first	 9	 months	 of	 my	 fieldwork,	 when	 I	 lived	 lower	 down	 the	 valley.	 They	 had	received	an	allocation	of	rice	and	oil	 from	the	mosque,	and	one	of	her	daughters,	Memuna,	 was	 carefully	 dividing	 it	 into	 4	 parts,	 to	 be	 distributed	 to	 3	 of	 the	immediate	neighbours	who	had	not	received	a	ticket.	This	amounted	to	27	cups	of	rice	 each	 for	 each	 household,	 and	 2/3	 of	 a	 large	 bottle	 of	 oil.	 Memuna’s	considerable	 patience	 in	 carefully	 dividing	 the	 portions	 posed	 a	 striking	counterpoint	 to	 the	 restlessness	and	noise	around	 the	mosque.	 In	 fact,	 from	 this	vantage	point,	the	lockdown	had	something	of	a	holiday	feel.	The	National	Power	Authority	 had	 arranged	 that	 electricity,	 normally	 irregular	 and	 unpredictable,	would	 be	 provided	 for	 the	 entire	 3-day	 lockdown.	 Auntie	 Zain’s	 husband,	 who	worked	 long	 hours	 at	 a	 hospital	 and	who	 I	 had	 barely	 ever	 seen,	 despite	 living	metres	away	for	9	months,	was	around	for	the	whole	weekend.	This	was	a	feature	
																																																								12	Receiving	a	monthly	bag	of	rice	is	a	mark	of	formal,	often	state-based,	employment.	
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of	 the	 lockdown	 that	 others	 noted	 too:	 neighbours	 and	 families	 were	 forced	 to	spend	time	together	around	the	house.			During	 the	 lockdown,	 two	 powerful	 logics	 of	 redistribution	 were	 at	 play	simultaneously,	 just	 as	 Titi	 had	 outlined	 to	 me.	 The	 first	 reflected	 a	 system	 of	distribution	 according	 to	 the	 ‘fairest’	 allocation	 of	 resources	 based	 on	 ‘need’,	 a	measure	 determined	 by	 socio-economic	 and	 geographical	 positioning.	 This	 logic	was	 seemingly	 informed	 by	 a	 value	 of	 ‘efficient’	 distribution	 through	 a	 ticketed	system	of	more	or	less	equal	amounts	to	as	many	households	as	possible,	starting	with	 the	poorest.	 The	 second	 logic	was	 that	 of	 sababu	 or	 ‘commission’,	 in	which	those	in	a	position	to	take	more,	such	as	the	gatekeepers	at	the	mosque,	did	so,	at	the	 same	 time	 showing	 preference	 to	 socially	 proximate	 others,	 such	 as	 friends	and	 family.	 In	practice,	 these	 two	distinct	 logics	were	blended,	as	exemplified	by	the	 mixing	 of	 methods	 at	 the	 mosque,	 and	 by	 Memuna’s	 carefully	 measured	distribution	 to	 her	 immediate	 neighbours,	 which	 reflected	 abstract	 equity	 and	equivalence	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 care	 for	 proximate	 others	 over	strangers.		During	 the	 lockdown,	 as	 throughout	 the	 outbreak,	 I	 was	 struck	 by	 the	simultaneous	 feelings	 of	 exceptionality	 associated	with	 ‘crisis’,	 and	 the	 alarming	normality;	 for	my	neighbours	and	friends,	 life	was	going	on.	The	Ebola	virus	was	surprisingly	 absent	 from	 conversation	 during	 the	 lockdown,	 making	 life	 seem	almost	 normal.	 The	 president’s	 speech	 which,	 with	 its	 calls	 of	 exceptional	measures	 and	 self-sacrifice,	 fully	 embraced	 the	 moralistic	 language	 of	 crisis,	seemed	at	odds	with	my	interlocutors’	discussions	of	recent	political	scandal	and	corruption,	 which	 felt	 very	 much	 like	 ‘politics	 as	 usual’.	 The	 lockdown	 –	 an	example	of	unusually	authoritative	state	regulation	and	personal	sacrifice	–	had	a	remarkably	 holiday-like	 and	 sociable	 atmosphere,	 albeit	 punctuated	 by	 conflicts	such	 as	 those	 around	 the	 mosque.	 The	 pre-lockdown	 food	 distributions	 too	blended	 the	 familiar	 and	 the	 exceptional.	 For	 those	 lacking	 favourable	 political	connections,	 like	 the	 man	 who	 claimed	 that	 this	 was	 the	 first	 time	 he	 had	benefitted	 from	 the	 present	 government,	 hand-outs	 from	 the	 state	 (of	 food	donated	by	the	WFP)	were	a	welcome	novelty.	However,	the	informal	distributive	
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logics	that	accompanied	this	bureaucratic	process	were	a	reminder	for	people	like	Mr.	Barrie	and	Titi	that	normal	‘corrupt’	rules	remained	in	place.			In	this	chapter,	I	tease	out	–	with	reference	to	the	character	of	state,	humanitarian	intervention,	and	the	popular	economies	of	those	involved	in	the	response	–	some	of	 the	 ways	 that	 the	 crisis	 became	 locally	 meaningful.	 I	 suggest	 that	 a	 key	characteristic	of	this	‘crisis’	was	the	novel	form	assumed	by	the	state	in	the	state	of	emergency.	From	an	ethnographic	perspective,	I	then	hone	in	on	the	economic	and	working	arrangements	of	 those	employed	 in	a	 formal	capacity	under	 the	state	of	emergency,	 particularly	 the	 official	 burial	 teams	 that	 we	met	 in	 chapter	 5.	 This	material	 demonstrates	 how	 team	 members	 balanced	 conflicting	 professional,	personal,	and	social	expectations	and	pressures,	shifting	carefully	between	formal	and	informal	economic	registers.			This	 chapter	 demonstrates	 the	 ways	 that	 people	 ‘in	 crisis’	 get	 caught	 between	conflicting	models	of	how	 to	act;	 in	which	 the	distance	between	models	 appears	exaggerated.	 In	 the	 Ebola	 crisis,	 the	 fault-line	 was	 between,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 a	relational	model	of	informal	redistribution	and	looking	out	for	one’s	‘own’,	and,	on	the	 other,	 a	 more	 universalistic	 model	 of	 collective	 action,	 which	 paradoxically	involved	a	greater	degree	of	 individualism.	These	two	models	correspond	closely	with	the	local	categories	of	‘black’	and	‘white’	discussed	in	chapter	5.	The	challenge	of	deciding	which	model	to	work	through	was	tied	up	with	the	 internal	difficulty	experienced	by	 those	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 assessing	how	 long	 the	 crisis	would	 last,	and	 thus	 how	 far	 ‘exceptional	 measures’	 were	 demanded.	 Navigating	 all	 this	required	 first	 coming	 to	 terms	with	 a	 state	 that	was	novel	 in	 its	workings	while	also	operated	according	to	familiar	values.	The	chapter,	building	on	narrative	and	theoretical	 threads	 than	 have	 run	 throughout	 the	 thesis	 –	 flowing	 between	‘normal’	time	and	‘crisis’	–	reveals	how	‘crisis’	can	be	productive	of	‘normality’,	and	equally	how	‘normality’	can	entail	‘crisis’.			What	made	Ebola	exceptional	as	 ‘crisis’	was	the	precise	 form	of	the	 intervention,	and	 the	 ways	 it	 was	 enacted,	 engaged	 with,	 and	 rendered	 meaningful	 on	 the	ground.	 The	 Ebola	 crisis	 and	 its	 interventions	 deviated	 from	 both	 the	 typically	
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non-Weberian	 modalities	 of	 the	 state	 in	 contemporary	 Africa,	 and,	 at	 the	 same	time,	the	trends	in	foreign	intervention	in	Africa.	Rather	than	reflecting	recent	anti-state	 and	 pro-market	 trends	 in	 neoliberal	 intervention	 in	 Africa,	 the	 Ebola	intervention	was,	by	and	 large,	pro-state.	 It	was	heavily	bureaucratic,	 regulatory,	infrastructural,	 and	 non-market-	 oriented	 in	 its	 scope	 and	 design.	 The	international	humanitarian	response,	costing	millions	of	dollars,	involved	scores	of	international	 organizations,	 but	 these	 became	 attached,	 in	 complex	 ways,	 to	existing	state	structures	as	part	of	the	National	Ebola	Response	Centre,	headed	by	the	Minister	of	Defense.			While	at	times	there	was	tension	between	existing	state	structures	and	the	novel	state	 of	 emergency	 structures	 and	 non-state	 organizations,	 as	 discussed	 around	burials,	 the	 general	 effect	 of	 this	 complex	 authoritative	 structure	 was	 an	experience	 of	 the	 state	 that	 differed	 radically	 from	 that	with	which	most	 people	were	 familiar.	 	Yet	 it	nonetheless	represented	the	realisation	of	popular	 ideals	of	what	a	state	should	look	like.	The	‘as	if’	had	become,	for	temporary	period	of	time,	the	‘as	is’.	This	created	a	paradox	in	which	state-like	apparatus	and	infrastructure,	usually	thought	of	as	long-term	and	enduring,	was	in	place	for	a	remarkably	short,	if	undetermined,	period	of	time.		The	state	of	emergency	entailed	 the	 introduction	of	emergency	medical	 services,	facilitated	 by	 hundreds	 of	 imported	 brand-new	 vehicles,	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	‘117’	 (the	 service	 to	 report	 illnesses	 and	 deaths).	 	 There	 were	 centralized	 food	distributions,	 dead	 bodies	 were	 managed	 through	 a	 centralised	 service,	 and	dozens	 of	 new	 (albeit	 strikingly	 temporary)	 clinics	 and	 treatment	 centres	 were	constructed	 countrywide,	 most	 of	 them	 well	 supplied	 with	 medical	 equipment.	There	was	a	heightened	monitoring	of	populations,	 through	overt	means	such	as	health	checkpoints	and	household	checks,	as	well	as	efforts	 in	demographic	data	collection.	 One	 of	 the	 furthest	 reaching	 aspects	 of	 the	 state	 during	 the	 state	 of	emergency	 was	 the	 institution	 of	 ‘hazard	 pay’,	 discussed	 below,	 in	 which	thousands	 of	 Sierra	 Leoneans	 received	 formal	 salaries	 from	 the	 state	 for	 their	involvements	 in	 the	 response.	 	 While	 these	 features	 of	 the	 state	 of	 emergency	represented	 something	 that	 appeared	 corresponding	 to	 a	 revitalization	 of	 Sierra	
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Leone’s	civil	service,	my	ethnography	equally	demonstrates	how	these	new	state-like	structures	were	informalised	in	ways	that	took	on	something	of	the	character	of	the	kind	of	‘shadow	state’	featured	in	much	analysis	of	the	African	state	(Bayart	1993,	Bayart,	Ellis	&	Hibou	2001,	Reno	1995).		In	the	next	section,	I	will	return	to	the	burial	teams,	describing	of	how	individuals	engaged	in	the	Ebola	response	by	working	under	the	state	of	emergency	navigated	the	 simultaneous	 ‘permanence’	 and	 ‘impermanence’	 of	 the	 state.	 I	 will	 pay	particular	attention	to	the	balancing	and	brokering	that	took	place	between	formal	and	informal	economic	registers,	originally	introduced	in	chapter	3.	
	
‘Hazard	Pay’		At	the	height	of	state	of	emergency,	thousands	of	Sierra	Leoneans	were	receiving	regular	payment	from	the	state	–	known	as	‘hazard	pay’	–	for	their	involvement	in	the	Ebola	 response.	Many	of	 those	mobilized	were	 young	men	 and	women,	who	had	 never	 before	 been	 formally	 employed,	 and	 had	 previously	 received	 little	material	support	from	the	state.	One	such	beneficiary	was	Peter,	a	motor-bike	taxi	driver	and	a	university	 student	 studying	community	development	at	Fourah	Bay	College.	Peter	was	an	intelligent,	generous,	and	entrepreneurial	young	man	that	I	had	grown	to	know	well	during	an	earlier	phase	of	my	fieldwork.	He	was	actively	involved	 in	 the	 Sierra	 Leone	 Commercial	 Bike	 Riders	 Union	 (BRU),	 where	 he	served	as	public	relations	officer	at	one	of	the	local	bike	parks	where	I	was	doing	research.	 As	 outlined	 in	 chapter	 3,	motor-bike	 taxi	 driving	was	 one	 of	 the	most	popular	 professions	 for	 young	men	 in	 Freetown,	 and,	 in	 the	 years	 after	 the	 civil	war,	had	been	introduced	to	the	capital	from	rural	towns,	where	the	business	was	operated	primarily	by	former	rebels.	However,	it	was	a	dangerous	and	fraught	line	of	 work.	 It	 was	 not	 uncommon	 for	 drivers	 to	 have	 accidents,	 weaving	 through	heavy	 traffic,	 often	 on	 badly	 paved	 roads.	 In	 addition,	 bike	 riders	 were	experiencing	 an	 increasingly	 tense	 relationship	 with	 the	 police,	 who	 would	regularly	 arrest	 drivers,	 often	 in	 pursuit	 of	 bribes.	 Many	 drivers	 ended	 up	 in	prison,	unable	to	pay	their	way	out.		
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Making	a	living	through	bike	riding	had	become	more	challenging	during	the	crisis,	in	part	because	a	law	was	instituted	according	to	which	commercial	transport	was	permitted	to	run	only	from	6am	to	6pm	each	day.	Partly	through	his	involvement	in	the	union,	Peter	was	recruited	to	the	Ebola	response	as	a	bike	rider.	He	became	attached	to	one	of	the	burial	teams,	operating	in	Western	Freetown,	close	to	where	I	was	 living.	The	burials	 teams	were	established	under	the	state	of	emergency	to	perform	 all	 burials	 regardless	 of	 the	 Ebola	 status	 of	 the	 deceased;	 the	 risk	 of	transmission	was	significant	when	the	bodies	of	Ebola	victims	were	prepared	for	burial	 according	 to	 customary	 practices.	 When	 a	 death	 was	 reported	 to	 the	authorities	 –	 following	 what	 was	 now	 a	 central	 byelaw	 under	 the	 state	 of	emergency	–	the	burial	teams	were	tasked	with	collecting	the	body	for	the	burial,	which	would	 take	place	 later	 in	 the	afternoon	at	 the	newly	established	Waterloo	cemetery	on	the	outskirts	of	town.			In	 Freetown,	 there	 were	 about	 20	 teams,	 operating	 from	 4	 bases.	 Each	 team	comprised	 12	main	 team	members	who	 performed	 a	 variety	 of	 roles:	 stretcher-bearers,	 chlorine	 sprayers,	 navigators,	 drivers,	 and	 team	 supervisors.	 They	operated	two	pristine	white	jeeps,	one	for	the	team	members	and	the	other	for	the	corpses.	Other	than	the	team	leaders,	who	tended	to	be	more	senior	and	in	some	cases	 female,	most	burial	 team	members	were	young	men.	Each	burial	 team	was	accompanied	by	a	swab	conductor	and	a	documenter,	who	followed	their	assigned	burial	team	on	two	motorbikes.	The	swab	conductor	would	take	a	medical	sample,	which	would	be	delivered	to	a	 laboratory	 for	processing	as	part	of	an	Ebola	test;	this	took	a	few	days.	The	documenter	would	collect	detailed	information	from	the	deceased’s	‘next	of	kin’	regarding	their	family,	the	composition	of	their	household,	and	 the	 possible	 cause	 of	 death.	 Peter	 and	 another	 young	 man,	 Alhaji,	 were	attached	as	bike	riders	to	a	burial	team	based	at	a	beach	not	far	from	Congo	Town.	For	the	last	5	months	of	my	fieldwork	I	spent	about	one	day	a	week	with	the	team.			The	 day-to-day	 activities	 of	 the	 burial	 team	 I	 followed	 comprised	 a	 stark	juxtaposition,	on	the	one	hand,	of	killing	time	at	the	makeshift	base	on	the	beach	through	activities	such	as	playing	 football,	drinking,	smoking,	comparing	updates	on	 phones,	 and	 political	 debates,	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 collecting	 and	 transporting	
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bodies	 for	 burial.	 This	 latter	 task	 involved	 adhering	 to	 carefully	 learnt	 safety	protocol,	 as	well	 as	 negotiating	with	mourning	 families	who	 could	 be	 genuinely	unfamiliar	with	 these	novel	procedures,	or	actively	resistant	 to	handing	over	 the	bodies	of	their	relatives.	Weaving	between	these	opposing	activities	were	on-going	processes	of	managing	the	often	 informal	and	 improvised	working	arrangements	that	emerged	around	official	duties	and	formal	management	structures.			I	 observed	 one	 case	 in	 my	 neighbourhood,	 in	 which	 the	 bereaved	 family	 of	 an	elderly	 man	 refused	 to	 hand	 over	 his	 body	 to	 the	 burial	 team,	 resulting	 in	 a	significant	 confrontation	 in	 the	 street	 outside	 the	 house.	 The	 family	 argued	 that	since	the	deceased	had	been	sick	for	a	long	time,	and	had	been	already	diagnosed	by	medical	workers	as	Ebola-free,	there	was	no	need	to	hand	over	his	body	to	the	team	 for	 testing	and	burial.	The	deceased’s	brother	was	asking	 for	 time	 to	make	arrangements	for	the	post-burial	gatherings,	but	–	as	Peter	explained	to	me	later	–	they	 had	 in	 fact	 intended	 to	 perform	 the	 burial	 themselves	 illegally.	 All	 this	 felt	particularly	 fraught	 because	 the	 deceased	 was	 a	 prominent	 member	 of	 a	 local	initiation	 society.	 The	 team	 eventually	 left,	 after	 Peter	 and	 the	 family	 had	informally	exchanged	private	phone	numbers.	The	brother	called	a	politician	with	whom	he	was	personally	connected	to	arrange	to	perform	the	burial	 themselves.	He	was	advised	against	it,	in	part	because	‘117’	had	already	been	alerted,	and	there	could	be	legal	repercussions.	The	brother	then	called	Peter,	who	arranged	for	the	team	to	return	later	that	day	to	collect	the	body.			The	 burial	 teams	 proper,	 and	 the	 documentation	 and	 swab	 teams	 who	 were	attached	 to	 them,	 were	 formally	 employed	 by	 different	 authorities.	 The	 burial	teams,	originally	operated	on	a	 low	budget	by	the	Ministry	of	Health,	were	taken	over	 by	 an	 assortment	 of	 well-funded	 international	 NGOs	 which,	 in	 addition	 to	managing	 the	operations	of	 the	 team	and	payment	of	 the	workers,	also	arranged	for	 intensive	 training	courses	on	safety	protocol	and	psycho-social	 issues	 for	 the	team	members.	 Every	morning,	 team	members	were	 provided	with	 a	 rice-based	breakfast.	 Payday	 came	 reliably	 every	 Friday,	 when	 each	 team	 member	 –	 from	supervisor	 to	 stretcher-bearer	 –	 would	 receive	 an	 envelope	 containing	 the	equivalent	of	$100	(500,000	Le)	in	cash.		
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	 		The	swab	and	documentation	teams,	however,	remained	under	the	sole	control	of	the	Ministry	of	Health,	 and	were	paid	under	 the	centralized	 ‘hazard	pay’	 system,	using	 a	 mobile	 banking	 service	 to	 make	 monthly	 payments.	 The	 use	 of	 mobile	banking	 technology	could	be	perceived	as	a	convenience	 for	 the	payees,	who	did	not	 have	 to	 go	 to	 a	 specific	 physical	 location	 to	 receive	 their	 pay.	 In	 practice,	however,	 as	 I	 discovered	 from	 Peter’s	 experiences,	 the	 opposite	 was	 the	 case.	When	 Peter’s	 pay	 was	 withheld	 for	 several	 months,	 he	 spent	 many	 days	 at	 the	administrative	 office	 attempting	 to	 appeal	 his	 case.	 Like	 most	 Sierra	 Leoneans	navigating	bureaucratic	 structures,	 he	 sought	help	 from	more	 senior	 and	better-connected	people,	such	as	his	team	supervisor.	After	a	lot	of	effort	and	time,	Peter	started	 to	 be	 paid	 again,	 but	 the	 lost	 pay	 was	 never	 fully	 recovered.	 Peter	commented,	‘Sierra	Leoneans	are	wicked,	not	just	the	government,	but	all	of	us’.			Peter	explained	to	me	that	the	reason	he	was	not	being	paid	because	the	officials	responsible	for	administering	the	payment	system	were	working	‘on	commission’.	They	used	several	different	techniques	to	derive	personal	profit.	One	method	was	to	withhold	simultaneously	the	salaries	of	about	a	dozen	people	in	the	hope	that	at	least	 one	 of	 them	 would	 not	 make	 a	 formal	 appeal.	 Another	 method	 involved	inserting	 fake	 names,	 known	 as	 ‘ghost	 workers’,	 into	 the	 pay	 system	 and	accumulating	 their	 ‘salaries’	 centrally.	 Another	 technique	 was	 to	 manipulate	payment	figures	by	switching	currencies.	For	example,	when	a	payment	of	$30	was	required,	they	would	pay	instead	30,000	Le	(worth	$5).			Such	manipulations	and	techniques	were	by	no	means	limited	to	these	state-based	administrators.	As	 time	went	on,	 administrators	of	 the	burial	 teams	at	 the	NGOs	themselves	 began	 working	 ‘on	 commission’,	 instituting	 their	 own	 informal	arrangements	and	strategies.	For	example,	 it	was	explained	 to	me	 that	when	 the	NGO	 was	 tasked	 with	 recruiting	 3	 new	 burial	 teams,	 those	 responsible	 for	recruiting	 hired	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 they	 would	 receive	 a	 cut	 of	 the	 pay-package.	 This	 arrangement	was	 practically	 invisible	 to	 the	NGO’s	 expatriate	 and	non-involved	local	administrative	staff;	the	new	team	members	received	their	full	envelopes	 every	 Friday	 along	 with	 the	 other	 workers	 and	 only	 later	 paid	 their	
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benefactors.	As	for	the	‘ghost	workers’,	the	team	I	followed	operated	with	only	11	members	instead	of	the	usual	12	after	a	worker	was	fired	for	misconduct	and	not	replaced.	 This	 former	 employee	 was	 apparently	 deeply	 resentful	 of	 his	 ex-	colleagues,	 and	 Peter	was	 only	 team	member	with	whom	 he	 retained	 contact.	 I	asked	Peter	why	 this	man	blamed	his	 co-workers	 instead	 of	 the	 authorities	 that	dismissed	him,	to	which	he	replied,	‘that	is	black	mentality,	that	it	is	other	people’s	faults’.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 came	 more	 naturally	 to	 him	 to	 claim	 that	 his	 former	colleagues	had	conspired	against	him,	than	that	he	had	been	wrongfully	dismissed.			Manipulations	of	official	employment	arrangements	were	equally	prevalent	among	the	workers	themselves.	Since	the	work	of	driving,	documenting	cases	and	taking	Ebola	swab	tests	that	was	set	aside	for	four	people	could	in	principle	be	carried	out	by	 one	 person,	 Peter	 and	 his	 co-bike-rider	Alhaji	 devised	ways	 of	 covering	 each	other’s	shifts.	Through	close	observation	and	informal	instruction	from	the	official	swab	 conductor,	 both	 learnt	 how	 to	 put	 on	 and	 take	 off	 the	 Personal	 Protective	Equipment	 and	 conduct	 the	 tests	 safely	 and	 efficiently.	 Peter,	 an	 educated	university	 student,	 could	 do	 all	 the	 documentation	 required,	 while	 Alhaji,	 not	formally	educated,	needed	assistance.	The	official	documenter	had	recently	taken	up	a	second	 job	as	a	school	 teacher	–	a	 job	 that	would	probably	 last	 longer	 than	this	one	–	and	sometimes	his	 cousin	came	 in	 to	 fill	 in.	The	physical	 resemblance	between	the	two	meant	that	 the	stand-in	could	use	his	cousin’s	 ID	card	and	pass	for	 him.	 Originally,	 Peter	 and	 Alhaji	 agreed	 to	 switch	 around,	 each	working	 one	week	on	and	one	off.	Both	owned	 their	own	bikes,	 allowing	 them	 to	make	 some	money	on	the	side,	along	with	their	formal	monthly	wages.	As	a	bonus,	the	person	who	had	worked	during	 the	 day	would	 collect	 the	 daily	 fuel	 allowance	 that	was	provided	 for	 both.	 This	 gave	 Peter	 and	 Alhaji	 an	 additional	 cash	 income;	 they	struck	 an	 agreement	 with	 the	 manager	 at	 the	 officially	 assigned	 petrol	 station,	according	to	which	they	received	cash	in	place	of	their	 fuel	allocation.	The	petrol	station	 manager	 could	 then	 re-sell	 the	 petrol,	 and	 they	 fuelled	 their	 bikes	 at	 a	cheaper	station	in	the	East	end	of	town.		In	June	2015,	Peter	needed	to	prepare	for	university	exams.	He	also	had	additional	family	 commitments;	 his	 young	daughter,	who	normally	 lived	with	 her	mother’s	
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family	in	their	village	upcountry,	was	staying	in	town	with	Peter	now.	At	this	point,	Alhaji	 was	 doing	 almost	 all	 the	 driving,	 and	 he	 asked	 for	 a	 weekly	 payment	 of	30,000	Le,	in	addition	to	Peter’s	fuel	money,	now,	given	that	he	was	doing	all	of	the	work.	 But	 Peter	 felt	 he	 was	 asking	 for	 too	 much	 and,	 as	 a	 negotiating	 tool,	threatened	 to	 use	 the	 ‘legal	 route’.	 This	 would	 entail	 paying	 instead	 the	 official	documentor	 –	 in	 practice	 the	 official	 documentor’s	 cousin	 –	 to	 cover	 for	 him.	Meanwhile	 Alhaji	 was	 still	 contractually	 obliged	 to	 continue	 his	 own	 job,	 and	would	 be	 fired	 if	 he	 did	 not	 comply.	 After	 long	 and	 heated	 negotiations,	 they	settled	 on	 an	 extra	 payment	 of	 21,000	 Le	 per	 day	 and	 the	working	 relationship	continued.	Dramatic	 fluctuation	between	antagonism	and	co-operation,	alongside	the	spirited	joking	and	teasing	that	blurred	the	boundaries	between	them,	as	well	as	 the	strategic	use	of	official	and	 legal	protocol	 in	unofficial,	 illegal	negotiations,	defined	Peter	and	Alhaji’s	relationship.	
 This	complex	blending	of	and	brokering	between	formal	and	informal	employment	arrangements	was	 also	 reflected	 in	 how	 the	burial	 team	used	 their	 salaries.	 The	unusual	situation	of	 formal	employment	and	regular	wages,	yet	 for	an	undefined	and	 limited	 period,	 seemed	 to	 present	 conflicting	 pressures	 for	 team	members.	Being	 formally	 employed	was	 in	 principle	 very	 attractive	 to	 the	 team	members,	many	of	whom	had	never	before	received	regular	wages.	Yet	it	was	clear	to	all	that	their	 employment	 was	 temporary,	 as	 was	 their	 relationship	 with	 the	 NGO,	 and	both	would	end	once	the	spread	of	Ebola	had	been	curtailed.	The	country	was	to	be	declared	 Ebola	 free	 42	 days	 after	 the	 last	 Ebola	 case.	 This	 figure	 –	 double	 the	length	of	the	incubation	period	of	the	virus	–	was	determined	by	the	World	Health	Organisation.	 There	 was	 much	 speculation	 among	 the	 anxious	 team	 members	about	when	 their	 employment	might	 end,	 and	 how	much,	 if	 any,	 severance	 pay	they	 would	 receive.	 The	 extensive	 10-week	 psycho-social	 programme	 in	 which	burial	 team	members	were	enrolled	was	geared	 towards	eventual	 ‘reintegration’	of	the	team	into	their	neighbourhoods	and	communities.	On	the	positive	side,	this	demonstrated	 concern	 for	 their	 long-term	welfare,	 especially	with	 regard	 to	 any	stigma	 to	which	 they	might	 later	 be	 subject	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 proximity	 to	 the	Ebola	 virus.	On	 the	negative	 side,	 ‘reintegration’	 implied	 an	 eventual	 severing	of	
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relationships	with	the	NGO.	Burial	team	members	seemed	strikingly	unconcerned	about	the	former,	but	very	concerned	about	the	latter.				Not	surprisingly,	many	team	members	appeared	to	prioritise	living	‘big’	while	they	could.	As	the	weeks	and	months	progressed,	the	workers	began	dressing	in	more	fashionable,	 often	 imported,	 clothes,	 such	 as	 cool	 trainers	 and	 leather	 jackets.	Many	upgraded	 their	phones,	 and	sported	 flashy	 jewellery;	 representative	of	 the	practice	of	 ‘bluffing’	discussed	in	chapter	4.	The	team	supervisor,	Mr.	Kamara	–	a	sweet	and	reserved	fatherly	with	somewhat	1950s	British-seeming	mannerisms	–	did	 not	 subscribe	 to	 this	 flashy	 attitude,	 and	 determinedly	 wore	 the	 same	chequered	flat	cap	and	loose	brown	suit.	He	was	critical	of	the	office	manager	who,	like	 many	 of	 the	 young	 men,	 was	 spending	 conspicuously	 the	 money	 he	accumulated	so	rapidly	‘on	commission’.	Mr.	Kamara	already	resented	the	fact	that	the	office	manager,	who	had	previously	worked	as	a	truck	driver,	was	flaunting	his	new-found	 authority	 over	 him.	Mr.	 Kamara	 had	been	working	 at	 the	Ministry	 of	Health	 for	many	years	 and	 considered	himself	 an	expert	 in	 epidemiology,	 yet	he	was	just	the	supervisor	of	an	individual	burial	team,	doing	the	‘dirty	work’	on	the	ground,	while	the	manager	sat	 in	the	safety	and	comfort	of	an	office.	Mr.	Kamara	once	 jokingly	 told	me:	 ‘we	are	existing,	even	you	are	existing,	but	he	 is	 living.	He	has	 two	new	cars	now	 including	 a	 jeep,	 and	others	of	 them	 [the	 administrators]	have	bought	cars	too.	If	he	was	a	Krio	man	he	would	eat	the	money	carefully,	but	he	is	a	country	man’.13		In	 many	 cases,	 though,	 conspicuous	 consumption	 was	 tempered	 by	 other	commitments	and	strategies.	Burial	team	members	were	often	required	to	support	their	 families	 through	 hard	 times.	 One	 of	 the	 boys	 told	 me,	 ‘I	 am	 going	 to	 give	200,000	 Leones	 to	my	mother	 today	 because	 she	 has	 tried	 for	me.	 She	 has	 also	been	 cursed	 a	 lot	 today’.	 He	 was	 referring	 to	 the	 mother-based	 swear	 words	directed	 at	 him	 by	 resentful	 friends	 and	 acquaintances.	 As	 Mr.	 Kamara	 told	me	when	we	were	driving	 in	 the	 jeep	one	Thursday,	 the	day	before	pay-day,	and	he	had	just	received	several	back-to-back	calls	from	family	members:	 ‘I’m	tired	with	Thursdays,	suddenly	they	all	call	me	and	tell	about	their	problems’.																																																										13	See	discussion	in	chapter	4	or	‘country’	versus	Krio	people	in	Freetown.		
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	Few,	 if	 any,	 of	 the	burial	 team	members	 I	 knew	opened	bank	accounts.	As	Peter	explained,	 ‘the	 problem	 is	 you	 cannot	withdraw	money	 easily	 in	 an	 emergency’.	However,	 other	 kinds	 of	 investments	 were	 more	 popular.	 An	 informal	 esusu	scheme	(rotating	credit	association)	was	opened	with	some	of	the	team	members	as	contributors.	Some	made	payments	on	land	or	bought	vehicles	as	investments;	Peter	bought	a	motorbike	for	his	cousin	to	drive	commercially.	Peter	also	used	his	income	to	fund	his	final	year	of	university	study,	and	invested	in	a	clothes	business,	which	 ultimately	 failed.	 Others	 invested	 in	 existing	 businesses,	 such	 as	 grocery	stores,	 operated	 by	 friends	 and	 family,	 or	 set	 up	 their	 own	 small	 enterprises.	 A	common	 strategy	 was	 to	 save	 money	 for	 migration	 programmes,	 typically	arranged	by	local	agents	who	could	secure	tickets	and	work	visas,	or	travel	visas	whose	holders	would	often	overstay	illegally	or	make	asylum	claims.	A	year	after	the	 crisis,	 I	 learned	 that	 several	 of	 the	 team’s	 migration	 attempts	 had	 been	successful.			The	burial	 teams	were	 in	many	ways	 the	masked	 face	of	 the	state	of	emergency,	and	 their	 work	 reflected	 the	 underlying	 priorities	 and	 structures	 of	 the	 official	Ebola	 response.	 They	 were	 trained	 to	 perform	 their	 work	 according	 to	 strict	biomedical	 protocols,	 even	 if	 allowances	were	made	 for	 customary	 ritual.	 Every	individual	and	family,	regardless	of	status,	was	formally	subject	to	equal	treatment.	The	 burial	 teams,	 equipped	 with	 state	 of	 the	 art	 gear,	 were	 part	 of	 an	unprecedented	 centralisation	 and	 bureaucratization	 of	management	 of	 the	 dead.	The	 documentation	 and	 swab	 teams	participated	 in	 the	 process	 of	mapping	 and	monitoring	 populations	 that	 occurred	 on	 a	 massive	 scale	 during	 the	 crisis.	 In	economic	 terms,	 the	 burial	 teams	 were	 paid	 a	 formal	 salary,	 predicated	 on	contractual	 duties,	 and	 received	 redundancy	 packages	 when	 their	 contracts	expired.	 All	 members	 of	 the	 main	 team,	 regardless	 of	 role,	 were	 paid	 the	 same	amount.			Counterposed	to	these	activities,	however,	was	an	array	of	informal	arrangements	that	operated	according	to	a	very	different	logic.	This	became	the	subject	of	much	reflection	and	commentary,	often	within	a	discourse	of	‘black’,	‘Sierra	Leonean’,	or	
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‘African’	 ways	 of	 doing	 things,	 which	 contrasted	 with	 the	 so-called	 ‘white’	character	 of	 the	 official	 arrangements.	 Ultimately,	 though,	 the	 informal,	 ‘black’	arrangements	did	not	fatally	undermine	the	work	of	the	team,	and	even	enabled	it.	As	Mr.	 Kamara	 told	me	proudly,	 none	 of	 the	 burial	workers	 in	 Freetown	 caught	Ebola.	Most	of	 the	earnings	of	 the	young	workers	entered	 the	 informal	economy	almost	 immediately;	 barely	 any	 of	 them	 opened	 bank	 accounts.	 Many	 of	 those	involved	 in	 the	 Ebola	 response	made	 informal	 earnings	 alongside	 their	 salaries.	Peter	 and	 Alhaji,	 for	 example,	 converted	 their	 fuel	 allowance	 into	 cash,	 NGO	managers	employed	ghost	workers,	and	officials	in	the	hazard	pay	office	took	cuts	for	 themselves.	 Burial	 team	 members,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 came	 up	 with	ingenious	ways	of	covering	each	other’s	shifts	so	that	they	could	take	advantage	of	other	 opportunities.	 Rather	 than	 respecting	 the	 logic	 of	 bureaucratic	professionalism,	these	activities	reflected	a	more	relational	logic,	chiefly	concerned	with	 building	 and	maintaining	 social	 relationships,	 forwarding	 life-projects,	 and	living	 a	 desirable	 life.	 While	 these	 informal	 arrangements	 might	 seem	unprofessional	 in	 character,	 they	 reflected	 values	 and	 concerns	 that	 were	more	enduring	 than	 the	 urgent	 yet	 ultimately	 transient	 concerns	 of	 the	 official	 Ebola	response.			While	there	was	tension	between	these	two	registers	and	sets	of	expectations,	the	burial	 team’s	 activities	 demonstrated	 the	 considerable	 scope	 for	 brokering	between	them	and	blending	formal	procedures	with	informal	arrangements.	This	was	 evident	 in	 Peter	 and	 Alhaji’s	 negotiations,	 the	 team	 members’	 economic	strategies,	 and	 the	allowances	made	 in	negotiations	with	mourning	 families.	The	position	of	burial	 team	members	as	brokers	between	 the	 formal	Ebola	 response,	the	NGOs,	the	state,	and	Freetown	residents,	was	a	source	of	resentment,	but	it	was	also	 an	 empowering	 position,	 especially	 for	 young	 people,	 that	 was	 widely	respected	 and	 deemed	 important.	 Similar	 brokerage	 activities	 occurred	 at	 all	strata	of	society	during	the	crisis,	which	over	time	appeared	to	produce	a	kind	of	convergence.	For	example,	formal	NGO	management	structures	started	out	in	stark	contrast	to	those	of	the	state	authorities,	but	the	two	began	to	resemble	each	other	through	 the	 informal	 strategies	 such	 as	 ‘commission’	 and	 ‘ghost	 workers’	 that	permeated	them	both.	During	the	lockdown	the	mixing	of	formal	bureaucratic	and	
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informal	 relational	 modes	 of	 redistribution	 at	 the	 mosque	 and	 in	 the	 home	reflected	a	similar	convergence	of	formal	and	informal	economic	practice.			The	balancing	of	and	conversion	between	informal	and	formal	economic	registers	have	a	long	historical	precedence	in	Atlantic	Africa.	Jane	Guyer’s	(2004)	formative	study	shows	how	West	Africa’s	 long-standing	entanglement	with	foreign	markets	and	influences	led	to	the	emergence	of	a	multiplicity	of	value	scales	and	economic	logics,	 from	 equivalence	 to	 asymmetrical	 exchange	 determined	 by	 social	 factors	such	 as	 status.	 The	 possibility	 of	 ‘marginal	 gain’	 occurs	 at	 the	 transactional	threshold	 between	 registers	 through	 ‘conversions’.	 Guyer	 argues	 that	 the	multiplicity	 of	 economic	 registers	 and	 performative	 repertoires	 are	 a	 product	 of	conditions	of	volatility,	yet,	in	ways	that	defy	classic	economic	logic,	they	produce	elements	of	stability	predicated	on	growth.	In	her	account	of	a	quest	for	fuel	during	a	 Nigerian	 fuel	 crisis,	 Guyer	 observes	 that	 ‘small	 shifts	 and	 recombinations	 of	elements	 from	 different	 registers	 preserved	 a	 sense	 that	 this	 particular	 sale	 fell	within	 a	 certain	 normality.	 This	 skill	 of	 improvisation	 in	 a	 volatile	 situation	was	based	on	particular	logics	already	in	place	and	shared	at	the	cognitive	level:	logics	and	 skills	 that	 are	 the	 often-mentioned	West	 African	 qualities	 of	 flexibility	 and	resilience’	 (Guyer	2004:114).	As	chapter	2	and	3	 in	particular	demonstrate,	 such	practices	 of	 conversions	 between	 registers	 was	 not	 unique	 to	 ‘crisis’.	 However,	during	 ‘crisis’,	 this	chapter	suggests,	such	registers	appear	more	starkly	opposed,	while	equally	demands,	and	opportunities,	to	broker	between	them	increase.				
	
Conclusion			In	this	chapter,	I	have	analysed	‘on	the	ground’	political	and	economic	dimensions	of	the	Ebola	crisis.	‘Ebola’	was	experienced	as	much	more	than	a	virus,	and	came	to	signify	life	more	broadly	in	the	state	of	emergency.	I	have	described	and	analysed	how	 actors	 came	 to	 terms	 with	 conflicting	 expectations	 and	 social	 pressures	amplified	during	the	state	of	emergency,	as	well	as	how	the	formal	Ebola	response	and	the	state	were	constituted,	reconstituted,	and	entangled	in	people’s	lives.	The	conflicting	models	broadly	correspond	with	what	was	understood	locally	as	‘black’	and	‘white’	ways	of	doing	(see	chapter	4),	and	correspond	analytically	with	formal	
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and	informal	economic	registers	(see	chapter	3).	During	the	crisis,	these	categories	were	polarised	by	 the	 tendency	of	 the	 formal	Ebola	response	 to	pit	 itself	against	local	ways	of	doing	 things,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 there	was	 significant	brokerage	and	 convergence	 between	 them,	 which	 was	 central	 to	 the	 project	 of	 ‘surviving’	Ebola.			A	key	concern	in	this	chapter,	 for	actors	on	the	ground	and	in	my	analysis,	 is	the	question	of	the	exceptionality	of	Ebola	in	a	context	like	Sierra	Leone	and,	in	turn,	the	 analytical	 value	of	 ‘crisis’	more	broadly.	 For	my	 interlocutors,	 living	 through	the	 crisis	 involved	 reconciling	 enduring	 and	 on-going	 ways	 of	 dealing	 with	 the	comparatively	 temporary	 concerns	 of	 crisis.	 These	 concerns	 were	 themselves	informed	by	 the	 logics	 of	 collective	 action	 and	professionalism	 that	 underscored	the	workings	 of	 the	 state	 of	 emergency,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 being	 informed	 by	demands	for	informal	economic	practices	that	took	advantage	of	the	opportunities	of	 ‘crisis’	 and	 helped	 cater	 for	 the	 needs	 of	 those	 living	 through	 it.	 Ebola	 shows	what	 ‘crisis’	 looks	 like	 in	 contemporary	 Africa	 –	 not	 the	 ‘breakdown’	 and	‘deconstruction’	 of	 the	 state,	 as	 assumed	 by	 foreign	 economic	 and	 humanitarian	intervention,	but	rather	the	rapid	‘building’	of	state	apparatus	where	it	no	longer,	or	had	never,	existed.	The	chapter	reveals	how	this	 ‘foreign’	 intervention	became	locally	meaningful,	in	part	as	a	realisation	of	a	set	of	ideals	regarding	how	the	state	should	but	did	not	 look,	and	 in	part	 through	the	adjustment	of	 these	 ideals	 to	 fit	conditions	on	the	ground.			In	 this	 chapter	 we	 see	 further	 linkages	 with	 previous	 chapters,	 which	 provide	colour	 to	 the	ways	 that	 young	men’s	 ‘normal’	 lives	 became	 interwoven	with	 the	conditions	of	crisis.		This	chapter	in	many	ways	pairs	off	with	chapter	3,	with	bike	riders	(and	former	bike	riders)	as	central	protagonists.	It	is	perhaps	not	surprising	that	 young	 men	 who	 were	 so	 active	 in	 creating	 their	 own	 state-like	 structures	were	 particularly	 well	 equipped	 to	 operate	 and	 succeed	 during	 the	 state	 of	emergency,	 in	which	 such	 bureaucratic	 workings	 became	 the	 formal	 norm.	 	 Yet	equally,	 we	 see	 how	 the	 logics	 of	 the	 ‘bluff’	 remain	 significant	 markers	 despite	broader	 social	 transformations.	 In	 the	 conclusion,	 these	 threads	 are	 further	 tied	together.	
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Chapter	8.	Conclusion			I	 left	 Freetown	 in	 September	 2015.	 	 I	 had	 spent	 the	 final	 few	 weeks	 of	 my	fieldwork	collecting	family	histories,	which	in	many	cases	doubled	up	as	a	way	of	saying	emotional	goodbyes	to	members	of	the	families	that	I	had	lived	with,	who	in	some	cases	had	taken	me	on	as	an	adopted	addition.		Alhassan	offered	to	pick	me	up	 from	 my	 room	 in	 Mafembe,	 and	 drive	 me	 in	 his	 Nissan	 taxi	 to	 the	 port	 –	typically	a	20	minute	drive	from	Congo	Town	–	where	ferries	depart	Freetown	for	Lungi,	 the	 location	of	 the	airport.	As	Alhassan	arrived,	 I	was	packing	the	 last	 few	items	that	 I	was	planning	on	taking	back	 to	London,	and	 figuring	out	what	 I	was	leaving	behind;	a	process	that	involved	nostalgically	‘taking	in’	what	had	been	my	home	for	most	of	the	past	year.	As	I	was	scanning	my	eyes	over	the	room,	amidst	a	light	patter	of	rain	on	the	roof,	the	space	appeared	much	more	dilapidated	than	it	had	felt	up	until	 then.	 	Despite	my	efforts	 to	seal	 the	major	gaps	 in	the	roof	with	some	 sheets	 of	 aluminium	 roofing	 –	with	 assistance	 from	one	 of	my	 neighbours	who	was	a	builder	by	trade	–	there	were	still	some	drops	splashing	on	the	floor.		As	we	took	my	luggage	outside,	the	rain	started	escalating;	the	drops	on	the	roofs	of	the	compound	suddenly	beating	in	double-time.			I	handed	 the	keys	 to	Auntie	Rachel,	 and	we	drove	off.	The	 roads	of	Congo	Town	had	 transformed	 into	muddy	 streams.	 	 Alhassan,	who	knew	 the	 terrain	 like	 that	back	 of	 his	 hand,	 fluently	 swerved	 around	 the	major	 pot-holes	 in	 the	 road	 that	were	concealed	under	the	water.		As	we	reached	the	Congo	Cross	roundabout,	we	met	heavy	traffic	that	soon	turned	into	a	standstill.		The	road	had	become	a	river,	with	water	flowing	at	considerable	force,	as	evidenced	by	a	motorbike	on	its	side	that	floated	past	us.	I	was	simultaneously	concerned	with	missing	my	flight,	as	well	as	the	thought	of	the	damage	that	was	being	inflicted	on	the	homes	in	the	valley	in	Congo	 Town.	 The	 car’s	 engine	 was	 not	 starting.	 	 In	 a	 flash	 of	 inspired	improvisation,	Alhassan	steered	his	taxi	through	a	petrol	station	by	the	side	of	the	road,	while	I	was	pushing	from	behind,	thus	avoiding	the	traffic.		Using	the	natural	incline	in	the	road,	he	harnessed	the	available	momentum	to	 ‘jog’	the	engine	into	life.		We	arrived	at	the	port	in	time	for	the	final	ferry,	which	rocked	violently	from	
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side-to-side	 as	 it	 crossed	 the	 passage	 of	water,	 luggage	 flying	 around.	 I	 couldn’t	help	but	think	about	my	biblical	namesake.				
	
Figure	11	On	the	way	to	the	airport		 	As	with	previous	times	that	I	had	left	the	field,	I	again	experienced	the	sensation	of	witnessing	 crisis,	 which	 had	 unfolded	 around	 me,	 from	 afar.	 The	 social	 media	channels	that	I	used	to	communicate	with	many	of	my	interlocutors	were	flooded	with	images	and	videos	of	the	damage:	ruined	homes,	streets	that	had	turned	into	waterfalls,	 and	 tops	 of	 cars	 and	 jeeps	 poking	 out	 from	 the	water-line.	 	 Some	 of	those	who	lost	their	homes	were	temporarily	re-sheltered	in	the	national	stadium,	across	 the	 valley	 from	 Congo	 Town.	 The	 National	 Ebola	 Response	 Centre	 had	redirected	 some	of	 the	 aid	 resources	 for	Ebola	 to	 this	 new,	 and	 seemingly	more	pressing,	emergency.				 ****		Taxi	drivers,	 like	Alhassan	and	Human	Right	–	introduced	in	the	prologue	–	were	the	gatekeepers	to	my	fieldwork.		Yet	rather	than	leaving	them	behind	as	I	got	out	of	 their	 vehicles,	 they	 guided	 me	 through	 the	 course	 of	 my	 whole	 project	 as	 I	learned	about	their	lives	and	the	social	worlds	they	inhabited.	 	The	thesis	has	set	
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about	uncovering	the	ways	that	young	men	in	Freetown,	who	have	grown	up	in	an	era	characterised	by	repeated	‘crisis’,	come	to	inhabit,	understand,	and	act	in	their	social	worlds.	In	addition,	the	thesis	has	charted	and	analysed	what	the	actions	and	perspectives	of	young	men	and	those	around	them	in	the	build	up	to	and	course	of	the	 Ebola	 crisis	 reveals	 about	 what	 ‘crisis’	 means	 in	 such	 a	 context;	 and	 how	 a	foreign	 intervention	 was	 enacted	 and	 rendered	 locally	 meaningful.	 	 I	 have	suggested	 that	 both	 the	 dynamics	 of	 ‘normal’	 life	 (in	 this	 case	 before	 Ebola)	 are	essential	 to	understanding	 the	dynamics	of	 ‘crisis’,	and	equally	crisis	 is	 revealing	and	uncovering	of	enduring	dynamics	 that	hold	 resonance	beyond	 the	particular	period	in	question.				Breaking	 away	 from	 popular	 renderings	 of	 youth	 in	 contemporary	 Africa	 as	structurally	 marginalised,	 consigned	 either	 to	 stasis,	 or	 living	 in	 conditions	 of	constant	 instability	 and	motion,	 the	 thesis	 has	 outlined	 the	 piecemeal	 processes	through	 which	 coming	 of	 age	 and	 social	 mobility	 take	 place.	 	 While	 youth	 in	Freetown	 face	marginality,	 the	 thesis	has	highlighted	 the	agency	 that	young	men	have	 in	 carefully	 configuring	 and	negotiating	 their	 status	 amidst	 ambiguous	 and	contradictory	sets	of	 relations	 in	a	variety	of	 complexly	 intertwined	spheres:	 the	home,	 neighbourhood,	 city,	 and	 state.	 	 At	 all	 these	 levels,	 often	 irreconcilable	moves	 towards	 dependence	 and	 independence	 are	 complexly	 negotiated	 and	balanced.	 	 Throughout	 the	 thesis,	we	 have	 seen	 how	 desires	 to	work	 against	 or	escape	 existing	 structures	 at	 these	 various	 levels	 are	 inseparable	 from	working	within	them,	and	in	many	cases	reproducing	them.		The	performative	repertoires,	economic	practices,	and	modes	of	sociality	enacted	by	young	men	are	reflective	of	the	ambiguity	of	their	circumstances,	as	well	as	being	productive	of	ambiguity.			The	 thesis	positions	 the	domestic	 sphere	as	a	central	arena	 in	 the	 lives	of	young	men.	 Within	 this	 frame	 are	 the	 spaces	 of	 the	 home	 and	 neighbourhood,	 the	everyday	 and	 ritual	 practices	 associated	 with	 the	 life	 course,	 and	 the	 range	 of	social	 relations	and	 intimacies	 that	are	 implicated	 in	 these	 times	and	spaces.	 	An	ethnographic	vantage	point	on	 life	 in	 this	 arena	 through	crisis	has	 revealed	how	on-going	projects	of	social	mobility	and	journeys	of	coming	of	age	–	which	at	their	core	involve	a	realignment	of	intimacies	–	become	entangled	with	the	instabilities	
	 202	
of	crisis.		Responses	to	‘crisis’	and	the	forwarding	of	on-going	life	projects	were	in	many	ways	 inseparable,	which	suggests	an	alternative	 to	 the	popular	notion	that	during	 crisis	 social	 reproduction	 grinds	 to	 the	 halt	 (certainly	 the	 implicit	expectation	 behind	 the	 regulations	 and	 protocols	 of	 the	 state	 of	 emergency	 and	humanitarian	 intervention).	 	 By	 contrast,	 this	 thesis	 has	 demonstrated	 the	ways	that	 crisis	 can	 sew	 the	 seeds	 for	 mobilities	 and	 realignments,	 in	 some	 cases	accelerating	 social	 reproduction	 around	 life-course	 ritual,	 as	 evidenced	 in	particular	 in	 the	 chapters	 examining	 baby	 naming	 ceremonies,	 marriages,	 and	burials.	 	 Thus	 ‘crisis’	 for	 young	 men	 meant	 a	 general	 transition	 from	 social	reproduction	taking	place	in	principle	within	the	realm	of	the	‘everyday’	to	taking	place	 within	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 ‘event’;	 and	 a	 corresponding	 transition	 from	ambiguity	towards	greater	clarity.			Thus	around	domestic	and	intimate	spheres	the	political	economy	of	crisis,	and	the	defining	 social	 conflicts	 associated	with	 it,	 are	 experienced,	negotiated,	 survived,	and	 reconfigured.	 Throughout	 the	 thesis	 we	 have	 seen	 the	 interplay	 between	 a	series	 of	 competing	 logics	 and	 registers,	 each	 with	 their	 own	 sets	 of	 social	expectations,	 temporal	 orientations,	 and	 notions	 of	 personhood	 associated	 with	them.	These	logics	and	registers	have	manifested	in	different	guises	throughout.	In	chapter	 2	 were	 the	 registers	 of	 business	 and	 kinship.	 In	 chapter	 3	 were	 the	informal	 and	 formal	 economic	 registers,	 which	 resurfaced	 in	 chapter	 7	 in	something	of	an	inverted	form	during	the	state	of	emergency.		In	chapter	4	we	see	tensions	between	‘long’	and	‘short’	term	exchanges,	and	the	ways	these	complexly	mapped	onto	‘local’	and	‘global’	inspired	consumption	practices.		And	in	chapter	5	we	saw	the	 ‘black’	and	‘white’	categories,	which	represent	a	powerful	 local	 idiom	through	which	many	of	the	tensions	described	in	other	chapters	were	articulated	and	acted	through.			During	 the	 Ebola	 crisis	 and	 humanitarian	 intervention,	 conflicts	 between	 ‘local’	and	‘foreign’	culture	and	expectations	became	particularly	pronounced	and	acute;	in	 part	 because	 of	 the	 social	 practices	 that	 were	 understood	 to	 be	 causing	 the	spread	of	the	Ebola	virus	–	which	became	subject	to	heavy	regulation	–	and	in	part	because	of	the	political	and	economic	lay	of	the	land	under	the	state	of	emergency.		
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In	 the	 ethnography	we	 see	 individuals	 and	 families	 grappling	with	 sets	 of	 social	expectations	that	appear	particularly	polarised	during	the	crisis.	Yet,	crucially,	as	the	thesis	demonstrates,	Ebola	did	not	introduce	conflicts	between	these	registers,	even	 if	 they	became	more	pronounced.	Throughout	 the	thesis	we	have	seen	how	the	boundaries	between	these	distinct	 logics	and	registers	are	 in	fact	not	distinct	but	permeable	and	mutually	constituting.	Often	discursive	or	idealised	distinctions	engendered	 in	 each	 logic	 are	 undermined	 by	 flexibility	 in	 practice.	 Flexible	practices	 associated	 with	 brokerage	 and	 mediation	 have	 a	 long	 history	 in	Freetown,	 and	 I	 have	 pointed	 to	 ways	 that	 this	 history	 was	 recalled	 and	reconfigured	as	a	response	to	new	circumstances.					This	 history	 of	 course	 is	 not	 unique	 to	 Sierra	 Leone,	 and	might	 usefully	 fit	 into	broader	 work	 on	 similar	 manifestations	 elsewhere	 on	 the	 continent.	 	 In	 South	Africa,	such	oppositions	are	intimately	connected	to	the	colonial	encounter:	‘From	this	 long	 conversation	 came	 the	 stark	 imaginative	 dualisms—white/black,	Christian/heathen,	 sekgoa/setswana	 (European	 ways/Tswana	 ways)—that	developed	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 frontier;	 also,	 the	 syncretisms	 and	transgressions…that	 simultaneously	 undermined	 those	 very	 dualisms,	dichotomies,	 and	 distinctions’	 (Comaroff	 and	 Comaroff	 1997:7).	 	 Importantly,	these	 oppositions	 did	 not	 remain	 fixed	 by	 the	 colonial	 encounter,	 but	 have	continually	 been	 reconfigured	 as	 circumstances	 have	 changed.	 	 These	 African	tropes	 of	 alterity	 and	 otherness	 are	 understood	 in	 this	 analysis	 as	 a	 source	 of	empowerment,	 material	 and	 imaginative,	 for	 the	 colonised.	 	 Ethnography	 has	picked	up	on	these	processes;	in	the	ways	that	local	knowledge	of	this	encounter	–	as	well	as	knowledge	of	parallel	incorporations	into	the	industrial,	democratic,	and	late	capitalist	worlds	–	provide	a	framework	for	identity	formation,	often	through	series	 of	 opposed	 dualities	 (James	 1999,	 Ferguson	 1999).	 In	 Malawi,	 Englund,	building	 on	Vaughan	 (1991),	 demonstrates	 how	 subject	 formation	 in	 democracy	continues	to	rely	on	objectifying	others	and	notions	of	exclusive	civility:	‘Concepts	of	 human	 rights,	 personal	 manners,	 styles	 of	 clothing,	 and	 the	 language	 of	everyday	life	are	all	implicated	in	producing	these	distinctions’	(Englund	2006:9).		
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Building	 on	 and	 incorporating	 insights	 from	 this	 scholarship,	 the	 thesis	 has	attempted	to	understand	how	such	dynamics	resonate	in	Sierra	Leone,	particularly	through	uncovering	how	they	play	out	in	young	men’s	projects	of	coming	of	age	in	Freetown.	 The	 thesis	 has	 pointed	 to	 their	 manifestation	 in	 discourses,	performative	repertoires,	temporal	and	rhythmic	orientations,	social	expectations,	and	 economic	 practices,	 which	 are	 all	 grounded	 in	 the	 constitution	 and	reconfiguring	 of	 social	 relationships	 around	 the	 ‘domestic	 sphere’.	 In	 charting	these	 interconnections,	 the	 thesis	 also	 draws	 and	 builds	 on	 Guyer’s	 (1994)	powerful	 insights	 into	 West	 African	 intersections	 between	 social	 status	 and	practices	 of	 economic	 exchange,	 by	 ethnographically	 demonstrating	 how	 local	categories	of	race,	temporal	expectations,	and	the	rhythms	and	flows	of	social	life	–	as	well	as	the	particular	character	of	the	state	during	a	state	of	emergency	–	map	onto	 the	 type	 of	 economic	 registers	 that	 are	 central	 to	 her	 analysis.	 The	 thesis	demonstrates	the	simultaneously	rigid	and	fluid	character	of	tropes	of	alterity	and	imaginative	dualisms	 in	Sierra	Leone,	and	the	particular	ways	that	 they	 intersect	with	the	messy	details	of	social	life.			This	in	turn	sheds	light	on	the	place	of	youth	in	this	particular	location,	as	well	in	neoliberal	 Africa	 and	 contexts	 of	 ‘crisis’	 beyond.	 A	 growing	 body	 of	 literature	points	 to	 youth	 in	Africa’s	 practice	 of	multiple	 association	 in	 intersecting	 arenas	and	networks;	highlighting	in	turn	the	agency	of	youth	in	self-fashioning	and	self-making.	In	part	this	is	seen	to	occur	through	drawing	on	global	and	local	cultural	forms,	 and	 in	 doing	 so,	 blurring	 the	 boundaries	 between	 what	 have	 been	considered	distinct	cultures	and	social	worlds	(Archambault	2017,	Cole	2004,	Piot	2010,	Janson	2013).	In	Freetown	–	and	in	the	midst	of	a	humanitarian	intervention	–	 such	 configurations	 are	 demonstrably	 multi-layered	 in	 ways	 that	 pushes	 this	analysis	 further.	 	 The	 challenges	 in	 teasing	 out	 what	 is	 ‘modern’	 what	 is	‘traditional’,	 what	 is	 ‘here’,	 and	 what	 is	 from	 ‘there’,	 proves	 to	 be	 particularly	revealing	of	 how	a	 long-history	of	 global	 interactions	have	 shaped	 local	 ‘culture’	and	 social	 formations,	 and	 how	 in	 turn	 these	 become	 consolidated,	 and	 equally	unravel,	in	the	course	of	a	humanitarian	intervention.					
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The	place	of	Freetown	for	the	young	men	at	the	heart	of	this	study	is	one	of	intense	ambiguity	 and	 uncertainty.	 	 Entrepreneurial	 ambitions	 of	 young	 taxi	 drivers,	discussed	in	chapter	3	–	drawing	in	part	on	neoliberal	development	paradigms	of	individualism	and	self-sufficiency	–	must	be	reconciled	with	socially	dense	familial	and	 neighborhood	 based	 networks	 that	 they	 structured	 in,	 in	 which	 increased	integration	is	often	the	only	way	to	further	these	ambitions.	For	bike	riders,	anti-hierarchical	 and	 anti-establishment	 tendencies	 co-exist	 with	 the	 replication	 of	state-like	structures	 in	 their	own	organizing,	 in	part	 through	attempts	to	partner	with	the	sate.	Bike	riders,	like	Peter	described	in	chapter	7,	were,	as	a	result,	well-qualified	to	act	as	the	face	of	the	state	of	emergency	during	their	recruitment	into	the	formal	Ebola	response	as	members	of	burial	teams.	They	demonstrated	in	turn	capacities	 to	 adhere	 to	 bureaucratic	 protocols	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 practicing	informal	methods	that	allowed	them	to	satisfy	the	needs	of	some	of	those	around	them,	and	in	furthering	their	own	projects.			Such	ambiguity	is	equally	prevalent	in	and	around	the	home,	which	for	young	men	represents	 both	 an	 arena	 of	 opportunity,	 support,	 and	 recognition,	 as	 well	 as	 a	space	 of	 danger	 that	 many	 hope	 to	 escape	 from.	 Conflicting	 desires,	 broadly	speaking,	 for	 independence	 and	 dependence,	 are	 heavily	 intertwined:	 seeking	independence	normally	requires	greater	dependence,	and	visa	versa.	Equally,	 life	in	the	home	amounts	to	the	navigation	of	deeply	ambiguous	temporal	patterns	and	orientations.	 What	 corresponds	 to	 long-term	 and	 short-term	 exchange	 –	 the	established	anthropological	bench-mark	distinction	between	fleeting	everyday	life	and	 the	 arena	 of	 social	 reproduction	 respectively	 –	 was	 often	 unclear,	 and	seemingly	inverted.	As	chapter	4	demonstrates,	even	family-sanctioned	ritual	can	be	 a	 ‘bluff’.	 During	 Ebola	 –	 a	 ‘crisis’	 –	 ritual	 was	 reignited	 with	 far-reaching	potential	to	forge	‘orders’	in	the	face	of	disorder.				Crucially,	 the	thesis	attempts	to	move	beyond	pegging	ambiguity	squarely	on	the	political	 economy	 of	 neoliberal	 Africa	 and	 global	 health	 security;	 although	 these	are	 certainly	 central	 pieces	 of	 the	 jigsaw.	 	 Rather	 the	 thesis	 is	 concerned	 with	ethnographically	 and	 theoretically	 making	 sense	 of	 these	 ambiguities	 and	contradictions,	 by	 honing	 in	 on	 how	 they	 are	 made	 sense	 of,	 and	 become	
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productive,	 within	 micro-political	 and	 intimate	 spheres	 on	 the	 ground.	 	 Rather	than	 social	 reproduction	 being	 halted	 for	 young	 people	 during	 crisis,	 the	 thesis	rather	 points	 to	 the	 perhaps	 unexpected	 conclusion	 that	 ‘traditional’	 avenues	 of	coming	of	age,	in	reconfigured	forms,	allowed	for	an	arguable	acceleration	of	social	reproduction.	This	was	evidenced,	 in	different	ways,	 around	burials	described	 in	chapter	5,	and	in	the	baby	naming	ceremony	described	in	chapter	6.	 	Both	rituals	demonstrated	how	immediate	conditions	as	well	as	more	enduring	processes	were	negotiated	through	a	combination	of	improvisation,	as	well	as	through	drawing	on	the	efficacy	and	power	of	‘traditional’	practice.				Central	to	my	analysis	are	the	intimate	realignments	that	take	place	during	crisis	of	different	sorts,	and	their	interconnections:	a	‘global	health	crisis’	on	one	extreme;	but	equally	ruptures	within	the	home	after	unfulfilled	expectations;	an	accident	on	a	 bike;	 a	 death	 in	 the	 family;	 and	 a	 pregnancy	 in	 a	 pressing	 circumstance.	 This	analysis	 reveals	 the	 ways	 that	 rather	 than	 ‘crisis’	 being	 an	 entirely	 external	imposition,	such	forms	of	unsettling,	ambiguity,	and	uncertainty	are	in	themselves	actively	 channeled	and	mobilized	by	young	men	and	 those	around	 them.	 	 In	 this	regard,	the	balancing	and	managing	of	social	expectations	are	a	strong	currency	for	people	 living	 in	 conditions	 of	material	 scarcity.	 	 In	 practice	 this	 involves	 careful	management	of	what	is	‘said’,	and	what	is	left	unspoken,	and	equally	what	is	‘done’,	and	 the	visibilities	of	 such	actions.	The	rhythm	of	 social	 life	 in	 this	 context	often	appears	 dictated	 by	 these	 flows	 of	 ambiguity,	 punctuated	 by	moments	 of	 clarity	and	realignment.			Finally,	 it	 is	 hoped	 that	 this	 thesis,	 while	 ethnographically	 detailed,	 speaks	 to	concerns	 that	 extend	 far	 beyond	 the	 specificities	 of	 Freetown,	 Sierra	 Leone,	 and	Africa.	Such	potential	is	convincingly	articulated	by	Comaroff	and	Comaroff	in	their	article,	‘Theory	from	the	South:	Or,	how	Euro-America	is	Evolving	Toward	Africa’:		Rarely	is	it	[the	Global	South]	seen	as	a	source	of	theory	and	explanation	for	world	historical	 events.	 Yet,	 as	 many	 nation-states	 of	 the	 Northern	 Hemisphere	experience	 increasing	 fiscal	meltdown,	 state	privatization,	 corruption,	and	ethnic	conflict,	 it	 seems	 as	 though	 they	 are	 evolving	 southward,	 so	 to	 speak,	 in	 both	positive	and	problematic	ways	(Comaroff	and	Comaroff	2012:113).			
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While	 the	 cultural	 case	 to	 consider	 West	 Africa	 part	 of	 a	 much	 larger	 field	 is	convincingly	articulated	by	Paul	Gilroy	(1993)	in	The	Black	Atlantic,	contemporary	global	states	of	affairs	make	this	project	all	the	more	convincing.		Indeed,	the	thesis	begins	by	telling	the	story	of	my	journeys	in	two	taxis	driven	by	Sierra	Leoneans	–	one	living	in	London	and	the	other	in	Freetown	–	whose	predicaments	appeared	to	share	many	parallels.	This	feels	like	a	fitting	place	to	end.		Young	people	across	the	globe	face	precarity	in	their	 lives	and	futures.	It	 is	not	controversial	to	claim	that	we	live	in	an	‘era	of	crisis’.	What	‘crisis’	means	for	those	whose	lives	have	been,	and	will	be,	defined	by	 it,	 is	a	pressing	scholarly	endeavor.	 	Early	anthropology	often	considered	 its	 subjects	 to	 be	 manifestations	 of	 an	 earlier	 stage	 in	 the	 human	journey.	 Perhaps	 the	 opposite	 holds	 some	 currency	 today;	 that	 the	 lives	 and	comings	of	age	of	young	men	in	Freetown	during	a	global	health	crisis	might	tell	us	something	about	where	we	are	all	going.																		
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